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Draft Resolution 
on parliaments, public opinion and defence 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having studied the report of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parlia-
ments, public opinion and defence; 
(ii) Convinced that the necessary improvement in public awareness of western ~ecurity and defence 
questions and particularly of the functions and activities of the Assembly ofWest~rn European Union 
in this respect calls for new efforts at both national and international level, · 
CALLS ON NATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
1. To intensify their efforts to follow up the activities of the WEU Assembly in national parlia-
ments, political groups, committees and vis-a-vis the public; 1 
2. To invite governments to take specific steps to provide the public with sul:lstantial information 
about WEU in general and the Council's activities in particular; 
3. To keep a continuing watch over the relevant governmental activities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted bF Mr. EFsink, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. This is the first report to be presented by 
this committee to the Assembly of Western 
European Union since 23rd May 1985 when the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 70 on the amend-
ment of Rule 42 his extending the responsibi-
lities of the committee whose title was changed 
to " Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations". A new task was attributed to the 
committee in that a new paragraph was added to 
Rule 42 his stipulating that the committee shall: 
"(c) make all necessary proposals with a 
view to bringing the work of the Assembly 
to the attention of the public and the press 
in member countries ". 
2. The new scope of the committee cannot 
be without consequences for its future activities, 
but effective action is extremely difficult in view 
of the strict limitations imposed by the Assem-
bly's difficult budgetary situation. 
3. At this stage already a fundamental ques-
tion arises which concerns both governments 
and parliaments: Is the pursuit of an effective 
public relations policy really possible within the 
limits of the rigorous principle of zero growth? 
4. This problem does not concern Western 
European Union alone. It was Lord Carrington, 
the Secretary-General of NATO, who, at the 
opening session of the thirty-first annual assem-
bly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Oporto, 
Portugal, made the following remarks: 
" I sometimes think that our paymasters 
have a rather exaggerated view of the vir-
tues of the shoe-string in the information 
business. A business which the western 
democracies cannot afford to neglect, 
because it is the essence of our system that 
policies - and especially policies for the 
longer haul - will only succeed if they are 
understood and seen to make sense. " 
5. Probably an effective information policy 
cannot be pursued without financial support. 
But this is of course only one aspect. There is 
also the question of the role parliamentarians 
should play vis-a-vis the public in security and 
defence matters at national and international 
level. All activities in this new field need very 
careful consideration before making concrete 
proposals or reaching conclusions. The pur-
pose of this report is therefore merely to collect 
data likely to highlight interrelations between 
parliaments, public opinion and defence ques-
tions in order to establish a basis for working out 
a public relations policy for the Assembly. 
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6. This analysis will not therefore be theore-
tical but will seek to spell out the duties of WEU 
parliamentarians towards the public and public 
opinion and to provide guidelines for fulfilling 
these duties. In a further report firm proposals 
for the Assembly's public relations policy should 
be elaborated. 
II. The different interrelations 
(i) Parliaments and defence 
7. The role of parliaments in defence matters 
has many facets, most of which have already 
been examined by different committees of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. In May 
1977 the Assembly took note of an information 
report entitled " Members of parliament and 
defence " presented by Mr. Delorme on behalf of 
the then Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments. 
8. His study covered the role of members in 
national parliaments and was based on a ques-
tionnaire sent to the parliaments of all member 
countries. A major part of the report dealt with 
the relationship between parliaments and 
governments in defence matters. 
9. One of the Rapporteur's conclusions was 
that " in spite of differences between countries, 
parliaments have important legislative and 
supervisory powers " in defence matters. But 
on the other hand he stated that apart from 
some exceptions, " it would appear that the 
planning of defence policy is the prerogative of 
the executive and even of the government 
assisted by committees of experts ". 
10. Referring to the Netherlands, where a 
defence council attached to the government 
includes representatives of both chambers, the 
Rapporteur concluded that this example was 
worthy of consideration in order to allow the 
legislature to be associated with defence plan-
ning from the outset. Otherwise the fundamen-
tal question had to be raised as to whether the 
nature of modem warfare did not make parlia-
mentary powers illusory. 
11. It is worth repeating these considerations 
because they also have repercussions on the 
question of whether governments and parlia-
ments have a joint or separate function vis-a-vis 
public opinion. 
12. Turning to the European level, the Assem-
bly of Western European Union has only limited 
supervisory powers vis-a-vis the Council. For 
that very reason, the Assembly has always been 
concerned that national governments and the 
Council should keep parliamentarians informed 
about security and defence planning. 
13. In this context, the Assembly adopted spe-
cific recommendations such as: 
- Recommendation 197 on military secu-
rity and parliamentary information 
adopted on 12th May 1970; and 
- Recommendation 333 on parliaments 
and defence procurement adopted on 
22nd May 1979 on reports from the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments. 
14. In their Rome declaration ministers sup-
ported the idea of more contact between the 
Council and the Assembly and in the Council's 
reply to Recommendation 411 on deterrence 
and the will of the people, communicated to the 
Assembly on 20th May 1985, it was affirmed 
that " the enhanced dialogue between the Assem-
bly and the Council should enable public opi-
nion to be even better informed of the basis of 
the defence policy of WEU member states ". 
15. But for the moment these intentions are 
still waiting to be carried into effect and the posi-
tion of WEU parliamentarians, caught between 
the Council and the public, remains difficult. 
(ii) Public opinion and defence 
16. In the abovementioned report by Mr. 
Delorme, one result of the questionnaire was 
summarised as follows: 
" All the answers show the interest of the 
population in defence matters. Parliamen-
tarians are frequently questioned on the 
subject and the political parties have to 
give them prominence in their electoral 
undertakings. " 
17. But such a result does not say anything 
about the main preoccupation of the public in 
security and defence, nor does it give any idea of 
the level of knowledge among the population. 
" Interest in defence matters " may also mean: 
conscientious objection, noise from military 
flights, damage caused by manreuvres, equip-
ment supply problems, stationing of troops, 
military installations, pollution control, etc. 
18. One major and at the same time particular 
aspect was handled in a very comprehensive way 
in the report Mr. Lagorce presented on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee on deterrence 
and the will of the people on which Recommen-
dation 411 was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd 
December 1984. 
19. It is worth quoting the following assess-
ment from the explanatory memorandum as an 
example: 
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" Your Rapporteur conbiders it important, 
and it corroborates the various poll results 
that he has been able tq consult, that inter-
national peace, defence, nuclear weapons 
and the balance of forces, although real 
and serious, are not tqe main preoccupa-
tion of the majority o~ Europeans... The 
inadequacy of the West's means of 
defence, a fact stressed by all govern-
ments, does not seem! very serious to a 
large majority of Europeans." 
20. As a consequence, the Assembly in 
Recommendation 411 recommended that the 
Council" continue to keep European public opi-
nion informed of the danger~ to which the world 
is exposed, of the measur~s available to the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance for 
countering them and of the type and level of 
weapons deployed in Europe 1". 
21. The Council in its reply "shares the 
Assembly's concern to ensur~ that European opi-
nion is informed as completely as possible about 
the threats to our continent and about the secu-
rity and defence policy adopted by the member 
countries of WEU and the ~tlantic Alliance to 
counter these threats ... this is essentially the res-
ponsibility of each member state which provides 
regular information using the methods that it 
considers the most apprdpriate ". There is 
therefore agreement between the Assembly and 
the Council on the general n~ed for an improved 
information policy. I 
22. All parliamentarians sbould use this reply 
in asking their respective governments about 
how they are really implementing this informa-
tion effort towards the public. But the break-
down of tasks between p~rliamentarians and 
ministerial organs in this respect needs further 
clarification. 
23. It is interesting that lthe Council further 
referred to the document " WEU and public 
awareness" which had bee~repared by the Per-
manent Council and had en approved at the 
meeting at ministerial leve in Bonn on 22nd 
and 23rd April 1985. The document was 
annexed to the reply and ~ontains some ideas 
concerning the Assembly's I role in public rela-
tions which will be examine<il below. 
24. In fact it cannot be d(;jnied that parliamen-
tarians too have an important responsibility 
towards the public and public opinion in secu-
rity and defence matters. 
(iii) Parliaments and 4ublic opinion 
25. The responsibility of parliamentarians 
towards the public is mainly based on the fact 
that they are elected by ~he population and 
represent the interests of the people. WEU par-
liamentarians have a twofold responsibility 
DOCUMENT 1038 
towards their national electorate and at Euro-
pean level. 
26. The population has the right to be kept 
regularly informed by its representatives about 
their activities. Conversely, parliamentarians 
should listen to their electors in order to take 
account of their views on all relevant questions. 
Consequently, as already stated in the report 
by Mr. Delorme, parliamentarians have mainly 
an information role towards the public. 
27. This information role is a duty which 
should not be limited to parliamentary activities 
but should include opinions on political deci-
sions and action taken by governments. Parlia-
mentarians should seize every opportunity of 
improving public knowledge and awareness of 
defence and security matters where they are 
better informed than the average citizen. In 
providing their assessments of the situation and 
of governmental activities, parliamentarians 
must also to some extent provide information 
on government actions. 
28. As a first result, it may be said that parlia-
mentarians are something of a link between 
governments and the people. It is important to 
realise that parliaments and parliamentarians are 
responsible towards the people and not towards 
government. But governments are responsible 
both towards parliaments and towards the 
people. Parliaments have to represent and 
interpret the will of the people vis-a-vis the 
governments. The question is whether they 
have also to interpret governmental action vis-a-
vis the people. This question will be examined 
in the following section with particular regard to 
the responsibilities ofWEU parliamentarians. 
Ill. The responsibilities of WEU 
parliamentarians in security 
and defence questions vis-a-vis the public 
29. When the Assembly decided to enlarge the 
competence of this committee in order to 
improve public awareness of its work, it became 
the committee's duty to examine the improve-
ment of technical means for reaching the wider 
public within the given financial limits and also 
the substance of the message to be conveyed to 
the public. 
30. To determine the substance of the Assem-
bly's activities, the point of departure is the fact 
that the Assembly of Western European Union 
is the only international parliamentary institu-
tion with responsibility in defence and security 
matters backed by an international treaty. 
31. The former Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
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therefore raised a crucial point, when he stated 
in his speech to the WEU Assembly in Paris on 
22nd May 1985: 
"The Assembly bears great responsibility 
with regard to the democratic legitimation 
of our endeavours. It represents at an 
international level democracy in practice 
on matters of security policy." 
32. It is interesting to note that in addressing 
the North Atlantic Assembly in Stuttgart on 20th 
May 1985, the Federal Chancellor, Mr. Kohl, 
underlined, with regard to that assembly too, 
that it was of importance in representing the 
democratic element of the Atlantic Alliance. 
But on the same occasion the President of the 
Bundesrat deplored that the North Atlantic 
Treaty did not, in fact, make provision for true 
participation at parliamentary level and stated 
that it had been overlooked that the legislative 
organs too were able to take most important 
decisions for the alliance. 
33. Bearing in mind the stronger position of 
WEU parliamentarians, who have the backing of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and the Assembly's 
Charter, and reiterating the Ministers' wish 
expressed in the Rome declaration " to see the 
Assembly playing an increasing role" also with 
regard to public opinion, it seems urgent for the 
Assembly to define its responsibilities and posi-
tion in this respect on the basis of its legal and 
political independence. 
34. A central aspect of the Assembly's public 
relations policy should therefore be to strengthen 
public awareness of the fact that the existence 
and activities of the WEU Assembly mean first 
and foremost that European defence and secu-
rity policy is democratically supervised at both 
European and national level. 
35. This democratic structure of WEU based 
on an international treaty is unique in the whole 
world and should be brought more often to the 
attention of the public by comparing it, for ins-
tance, with the totally different situation in the 
Warsaw Pact organisation which was created as 
a reaction to the accession of the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty and to 
the Atlantic Alliance, but does not provide any 
specific parliamentary supervision. 
36. In the Assembly's public relations policy, 
parliamentarians could always advocate an 
improvement of the democratic structure of 
WEU, bearing in mind that the powers of parlia-
mentarians are still incomplete at European 
level. On the other hand, there are good 
reasons for explaining in public the advantages 
of having parliamentary supervision in WEU 
both at international and national level. 
37. In working out a public relations policy, in 
substance it should be borne in mind, of course, 
that the Council and its subsidiary bodies form, 
together with the Assembly, one and the same 
organisation, Western European Union. There 
are certainly matters of common interest which 
concern the organisation as a whole, for instance 
to make WEU better known to public opinion. 
The publication of an information booklet 
such as .. Western European Union" prepared 
on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments was undoubtedly in the interest of 
the whole organisation. 
38. But is it possible to join the Assembly and 
the ministerial organs in common action for 
public relations as advocated in the document 
entitled .. WEU and public awareness " prepared 
by the Permanent Council and endorsed by the 
Ministers on 23rd April 1985? 
39. First of all, it is gratifying that the Council 
recognises the importance of an improved public 
relations policy and that steps are being taken to 
carry this policy into practice. In the above-
mentioned document, the role of the Assembly 
is described as follows: 
.. Ill. (ii) The Rome declaration and 
document on institutional reform indicate 
the importance Ministers attach to the 
Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU 
and to the role it might play in striving 'to 
consolidate the consensus among public 
opinion' on the security and defence needs 
of the member states. In this context, 
Ministers at Rome express the hope that 
the Assembly might play a part in achie-
ving greater public understanding of the 
defence and security options open to the 
Council which expresses the political will 
of the individual governments in its policy 
statements. To help in this, the Rome 
institution document calls inter alia for 
the development of informal contacts bet-
ween government representatives and 
representatives of the Assembly, and for 
better means of keeping the Assembly 
informed of the work of the Council so 
that the two bodies can operate together in 
an even more complementary fashion. " 
40. In her address to the Assembly on 21st 
May 1985, Baroness Young, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, explained the role the Assembly 
should play in this context, as follows: 
..... the Assembly has a significant func-
tion, together with member governments, 
in the process of improving public infor-
mation and generating what has been 
called 'reassurance' about our defence 
policies... As representatives of the 
public, and with obligations towards 
them, parliamentarians have a most im-
portant part to play in this process. The 
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main aim of debate in the Assembly is to 
develop ideas and pll'oposals in defence 
and security and to k~ep governments up 
to the mark. In so fa~as is possible, how-
ever, we in the Unit Kingdom believe 
that it should also be t create and expand 
a consensus within our countries, cutting 
across party political boundaries, about 
the need for the alliance and the defensive 
nature of its purpose and strategies as well 
as those of its membet states. We in the 
Council are indebted o the Assembly for 
its work in developin the thrust behind 
the renewal process and for the critical 
exchange of views which has such impor-
tance in our daily work as we govern-
ments account for our~elves in responding 
to Assembly recomm~ndations and ques-
tions. But let us alt become indebted 
for the developmen of public under-
standing of the de ence and security 
option open to us as Council members. " 
41. The Assembly of course is always pre-
pared to explain to the pubic its own views on 
the whole spectrum of secu ty and defence pro-
blems facing Europe. On t e other hand, there 
were some good reasons for he Assembly to cla-
rify its position in Recommendation 420 .. wel-
coming the fact that the Council for its part has 
decided to inform the public about its activities 
but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsi-
ble for information about its own work " and 
recommending that the C~uncil .. inform the 
public and press about its o,.n activities". 
42. There are mainly two reasons why the 
Assembly and its members are not in a position 
to carry out the task of explaining to the public 
the defence and security options open to the 
Council and/or member governments. 
43. The first reason is a pJactical one. Parlia-
mentarians are never infqrmed well enough 
about all aspects of Counctil and government 
concepts and planning in security and defence 
policy. The improvement of contacts between 
the Council and the Assembly is still to be 
implemented and effectivefarliamentary parti-
cipation in decisions will re ain difficult. 
44. The second reason is political one. The 
Assembly has an albeit 1 mited control and 
supervisory function vis-a-vis the Council. Its 
position will therefore always be a critical one 
even in the case of an enhanced dialogue bet-
ween the two main WEU i~stitutions which are 
the Assembly and the Coun il. 
45. Consequently, the o tions open to the 
Council have to be interpre ed and explained in 
public by the Council itself and its member 
governments. On the other hand, it is the task 
of all WEU parliamentarians to explain the 
Assembly's positions on the Council's activities 
and decisions. 
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46. The better the information conveyed to 
the public by the Council at European level and 
by the governments at national level, the more 
rewarding will be the public dialogue on these 
issues. 
4 7. It emerges from the foregoing considera-
tions that the Assembly has to elaborate its own 
public relations policy. One aspect of this 
policy has been mentioned already in paragraphs 
34 and 35. On the other hand, an exchange of 
information between the Council and the 
Assembly about efforts to improve public aware-
ness of WEU matters will be useful. It was 
therefore most useful that the Council transmit-
ted the document on WEU and public awareness 
to the Assembly. Undoubtedly it contains 
useful suggestions which should be assessed for 
the Assembly's public relations work. In addi-
tion, the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations is very grateful that the new 
Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Cahen, has 
agreed to address the committee on the subject 
of improving WEU's public relations activities 
and every opportunity of discussing each other's 
intentions should be seized. 
48. For elaborating the substance of a public 
relations policy for the Assembly, the themes 
listed in the WEU and public awareness 
document might provide a useful collection of 
the main problems now facing Europeans. 
49. The Assembly's positions on actual pro-
blems of western security and defence are set out 
mainly in recommendations addressed to the 
Council and according to Rule 42 bis, para-
graph 3 (a), it is particularly the duty of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions to " select from texts adopted by the 
Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be 
debated in national parliaments ". 
50. It will be one of the new duties of the 
committee to propose a procedure for bringing 
Assembly recommendations to the attention of 
the public and to examine to what extent criteria 
for selecting texts for parliaments are valid for 
the public too. 
51. The committee should also examine 
whether the Assembly should draw up more 
general documents for use in public in which the 
Assembly's function and position would be des-
cribed in a political context. Such considera-
tions should be co-ordinated with the General 
Affairs Committee and the Presidential 
Committee. 
52. After the necessary review of the general 
function of the WEU Assembly with regard to 
the public and after collecting some first ele-
ments of a future public relations policy in sub-
stance, it will be necessary to examine the practi-
cal means available to parliamentarians for 
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reaching the public m security and defence 
matters. 
IV. The means of reaching public opinion 
in security and defence matters 
(i) Governmental action 
53. Referring to the document on WEU and 
public awareness according to which " thtt most 
effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide 
audience is through the public statements of 
politicians and ministers in the national govern-
ments of member states", it might be added that 
successful joint political action by the govern-
ments andjor by the Council would be an even 
more effective public relations policy than poli-
tical speeches and joint declarations. 
54. The Assembly for its part will continue to 
urge the Council and the governments to take 
such political action. 
(ii) Parliamentary action 
55. The intensification of parliamentary 
action at European and national level also 
attracts more public attention. 
56. In this connection WEU parliamentarians 
could and should do far more than heretofore. 
The arrangements for follow-up action in 
national parliaments on the activities of the 
WEU Assembly still seem to be insufficient. 
Parliamentarians who are not members of the 
WEU Assembly still know very little about what 
goes on in WEU. 
57. It therefore goes without saying that the 
initiative taken by the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations for making the 
consequences of the reactivation of WEU better 
known in the parliaments of member countries 
(information-action) has to be continued. 
58. Nevertheless there are other aspects where 
your Rapporteur believes an improvement could 
be made in attracting the public's attention to 
WEU matters. They are listed hereafter. 
59. On 27th October 1975, ten years ago, in 
Document 681 this committee suggested to the 
Assembly and its Presidential Committee that 
every two years a session be held away from the 
permanent seat of the Assembly. This sugges-
tion is still valid, but additional financial means 
will be necessary if it is to be implemented. 
60. The chairmen of national delegations 
should play a greater part in co-ordinating 
follow-up action in national parliaments. It 
could be suggested therefore that the committee 
invite to its meetings once or twice a year, the 
chairmen of national delegations. 
61. Procedure for transmitting texts selected 
for debate in national parliaments and follow-up 
action should be re-examined. At the moment, 
these texts are transmitted by the President of 
the Assembly to the presidents of member par-
liaments under cover of an official letter express-
ing the wish that these texts be used as 
material for speeches or questions to ministers. 
62. It would be useful to send copies of these 
letters also to the chairmen of delegations and 
the rapporteurs for the selected recommenda-
tions in order to encourage them to promote 
follow-up action in the national parliaments. 
63. At present, the Chairman of the Commit-
tee for Parliamentary and Public Relations sends 
a letter with suggested questions on the texts 
selected to committee members. It would also 
be useful for the chairmen of delegations to be 
sent copies of these letters and also the rappor-
teurs for the recommendations in question. If 
possible, the rapporteurs should advise the 
committee on how to proceed with follow-up 
action in the parliaments. 
64. A member should be appointed from each 
parliament to report to the committee once or 
twice a year on the follow-up action in his parlia-
ment. For this, he should ask for the assistance 
of the secretariat of the relevant national delega-
tion. He should also remain in permanent 
contact with the chairman of the delegation and 
use his connections with committees concerned 
and the political groups. 
65. Some delegations meet briefly prior to 
each Assembly session in order to co-ordinate 
procedures during the session. Why not meet 
after the session too in order to co-ordinate 
follow-up action? Such meetings could be held 
in the different member parliaments. 
66. Apart from putting questions to the 
government, it would be very useful if every 
member made an effort to mention Western 
European Union in general, WEU Assembly 
recommendations or other activities of the orga-
nisation in speeches made at plenary sessions of 
the national parliaments. 
67. It was requested in the previous report 
that every national government be asked to 
report regularly to parliament on its activities in 
WEU matters. Such reports should contain not 
only facts but also political assessments and 
decisions and should be debated both in 
committee and in plenary session. 
68. Reverting to the activities of the Assem-
bly, all committees should endeavour to make 
the recommendations the Assembly transmits to 
the Council as concise and specific as possible in 
order to strengthen their effectiveness. This 
will improve the Assembly's position in reques-
ting a comprehensive reply without undue delay. 
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(iii) Action vis-a-vis the publk and public opinion 
I 
69. For the means of reaching the public 
directly, the problems are even more delicate. 
70. From the very outs~t the notions " pu-
blic " and " public opinion " have to be defined 
clearly. The public is not identical with the 
press and media although tlhe latter play a pro-
minent role in shaping public opinion. The 
public also includes the diifferent private and 
public institutions such as dubs, schools, univer-
sities, churches, pressure groups, political par-
ties, trade unions, etc. 1 
71. But first, the public is composed of an 
enormous number of indivii/ua/s who are subjec-
ted to a wide variety of impressions and 
influences. 
I 
72. Because of the complexity of the subject, 
this report can outline onl)l some aspects of the 
problem of reaching publid opinion on security 
and defence matters. 
! 
73. In a further report this subject should be 
examined in detail. At p~esent only the main 
questions to be solved can l>e listed without clai-
ming to be exhaustive. 
I 
74. Among the great nulmber of individuals, 
are there groups whose attitude in security and 
defence matters should be 'fmsidered as crucial? 
75. What is the role and attitude of young 
people? In the Federal Rlepublic of Germany, 
for instance, every third I citizen is less than 
twenty years old. The German Bundeswehr has 
so-called " youth officers ".rhose duty is to seek 
contacts with young peoplle in order to inform 
them about questions related to defence and 
military service. 1 
76. Who has the greatest influence on indivi-
duals and particularly on )joung people? Fami-
lies, schools, universities, cihurches, trade unions 
and other pressure groups all sorts of associa-
tions and clubs, political r parties, or the mass 
media such as television, radio and press? 
77. Is the number of publications and the 
wealth of information so enormous that many 
people are saturated by an kinds of published 
opinion? i 
78. What are the effq:ts of the so-called 
" genius of the period " (Zeitgeist) which is often 
marked by reflections of important contempo-
rary philosophers? 
I 
79. If an improvement is to be made in public 
awareness and understanping of security and 
defence matters, two different means might be 
mentioned, i.e. approaching the population 
directly, or approaching o~inion leaders. 
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(a) Approaching the population directly 
80. There are various possibilities. A good 
example was the participation of the President of 
the Assembly, Mr. Caro, in several political dis-
cussions organised by different organisations 
such as the Europa Union in Hamburg in June 
1985. Every member should seize the opportu-
nity of taking part in such conferences and dis-
cussions where a large audience may be found. 
81. Provided the financial question can be 
settled, groups of young people could be invited 
periodically to come to Paris in order to discuss 
security questions with members of the Assem-
bly. Apparently, the Council of Europe and 
national parliaments already receive many more 
visiting groups than the Assembly ofWEU. 
82. A special problem is the question of creat-
ing a regular WEU publication. The financial 
implications are evident. Nevertheless it should 
be worth studying the activities of similar organi-
sations in this respect. 
83. The Eurogroup for instance recently made 
an effort by publishing an illustrated booklet 
entitled" Western defence, the European role in 
NATO". Several other publications are issued 
by NATO, such as the NATO Review, now 
published six times a year in several languages. 
Every two months the North Atlantic Assem-
bly publishes a document entitled " News" with 
a summary of its activities and a calendar of 
events. 
84. These are only a few examples. Is it not 
worth studying the possibility of creating an 
attractive information review dealing with WEU 
questions? It could also provide a forum where 
members and other prominent politicians would 
have an opportunity of addressing the public. 
Apart from the budgetary question it is obvious 
that it should first be established whether such a 
publication should be created under the aegis of 
the Council or of the Assembly. 
85. Would it be possible to find a film pro-
ducer to produce a film on the activities of the 
Assembly and Western European Union as a· 
whole? Eurogroup was able to produce such a 
film for public showing. 
86. These are only first considerations which 
have to be examined very carefully. 
(b) Approaching opinion leaders 
87. The possibility of establishing contacts 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
dealing with questions of defence and security, 
research institutes, universities, etc., might be 
studied. (It should be recalled that the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of 
the Council of Europe has even created a sub-
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committee for relations with non-governmental 
organisations.) The purpose of such contacts 
might be to ensure that these organisations take 
due account of WEU and its Assembly in their 
own work and particularly in their publications 
which sometimes have an important influence in 
forming the opinions of politicians. 
88. The problem might be illustrated by one 
example: every two weeks the German society 
for foreign policy (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Aus-
wtirtige Politik) publishes a periodical entitled 
Europa Archiv. In its documental part, this 
review always takes account of important events 
and documents relating to WEU. But this does 
not seem to have a visible effect on authors of 
articles which are published in the same perio-
dical. In a recent copy of Europa Archiv dated 
25th August 1985, there was an article on 
burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance - the 
future of the American military presence in 
Europe. 
89. In a footnote, the author gave bibliogra-
phical data about the general problem ofburden-
sharing. No mention was made of Mr. Wilkin-
son's report adopted by the Assembly of Western 
European Union on 29th November 1983 on 
European security and burden-sharing in the 
alliance which was the basis of the Assembly's 
Recommendation 396. Nor was there any 
substantial examination of the contents of 
Mr. Wilkinson's report in the text ofthe article. 
90. There are many reviews, newspapers and 
periodicals at national and European level 
interested in publishing articles on European 
security questions. It would be a good opportu-
nity for the President of the Assembly, the chair-
men of the committees, rapporteurs or other 
members to use these channels for making the 
Assembly's positions known to the public. 
91. Turning to relations with the press and 
journalists, it is first the Press Counsellor who 
should advise the committee on how to present 
the activities of the Assembly in a more effective 
way in the different countries. 
92. But it is worth repeating that this commit-
tee has already examined the problems of rela-
tions with the press twice in recent years. 
Indeed, Dame Jill Knight herself presented two 
information reports on this matter: on 3rd 
December 1980, Document 865 on relations 
with parliaments with preliminary observations 
on relations between parliaments and the press, 
and, on 28th April 1981, Document 873 on rela-
tions between parliaments and the press - the 
WEU Assembly and the press. At that time, 
stress was laid on three main concerns: {i) the 
WEU Assembly was not of sufficient interest for 
the members themselves; (ii) an extremely small 
sum was available in the Assembly's informa-
tion budget compared with that of the European 
Parliament and the Council of Europe; (iii) the 
Council was inactive and failed to provide the 
Assembly with adequate information. 
93. WEU's new prospects following the reacti-
vation agreed by ministers in the Rome declara-
tion should provide an opportunity to improve 
the interest of the press in the Assembly's work 
too. Before considering new technical propo-
sals which, of course, have to be prepared, it 
seems crucial to stimulate the interest of mem-
bers themselves in WEU matters. 
V. Activities of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations 
94. The committee met in Paris on 22nd May, 
in Rome on 11th June and in London on 
5th November 1985. In accordance with Rule 
42 bis of the Rules of Procedure, it selected from 
texts adopted by the Assembly at the first part of 
its thirty-first ordinary session the following 
recommendations to be debated in the parlia-
ments, i.e.: 
- 41 7 on East-West relations ten years 
after the Helsinki final act; 
- 420 on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of 
the Council; 
- 421 on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty - reply to the thirtieth annual 
report of the Council; 
- 423 on the state of European security -
the central region. 
95. These texts were transmitted with a letter 
from the President of the Assembly to the presi-
dents of member parliaments expressing the 
hope that they would be of interest and provide 
subject matter for speeches or questions to 
ministers. 
96. In a letter addressed to committee mem-
bers on 9th September 1985, the Chairman of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations enclosed draft questions relating to the 
subjects covered in the relevant recommenda-
tions and invited members to inform the Office 
of the Clerk of the questions they actually put. 
97. Reactions so far have been practically nil. 
Only Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges put a question 
on Recommendation 420 in the Luxembourg 
Chamber ofDeputies on 11th July 1985. 
98. It was also Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges who 
asked her government about the future role of 
WEU following the Rome declaration (4th June 
1985) referring to Order 58 adopted by the 
Assembly. On 2nd July 1985, she put a ques-
tion on Recommendation 413 on the military 
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use of space and on Luxembourg's contribution 
to the budget of Western Eur~pean Union. 
99. It emerges from this result that there are 
active members but very fe'f' of them keep the 
secretariat informed about their follow-up activi-
ties. Your Rapporteur therefore believes the 
procedure should be imprqved as quickly as 
possible. He made the relevant proposals in 
paragraphs 60 to 66. 
100. The committee has cdntinued to organise 
information meetings in member parliaments. 
On 11th June 1985 an iqformation meeting 
was held with members of the two chambers of 
the Italian Parliament and the press at the Ita-
lian Senate. The relevant 1summary record is 
appended. There was a large attendance on the 
Italian side, and the local. press reported the 
event. Briefings were given! by members of the 
committee as follows : 
- the duties of the ~ew WEU (by Mr. 
Giust); · 
- the Assembly of WtU (by Mrs. Henni-
cot-Schoepges); 
- relations between WEU, NATO and 
other Western Eurbpean organisations 
and countries (by Mr. Eysink). 
101. It is planned to hold the next information 
meeting in the German Bundestag in February 
1986. On 5th November ~985, the committee 
had the pleasure of being addressed in London 
by Mr. Cahen, the new Secretary-General of 
Western European Union, 1 on the subject of improving WEU's public relations activities. 
VI. Conclu~ions 
102. (i) Both the Council and the Assembly 
agree that efforts have to ~e made to improve 
public awareness of defence matters in general 
and of WEU matters in particular. 
103. (ii) As for the Countil and its member 
governments, the best public relations policy 
would be successful politica' action. 
104. (iii) Member governments should be asked 
to report regularly to parlirment on their acti-
vities in WEU matters. 
105. (iv) Parliamentarians in each member 
country should urge their! respective govern-
ments to implement the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 411, accprding to which the 
effort of informing European opinion is essen-
tially the responsibility of each member state. 
106. (v) Parliamentary acdon, and particularly 
follow-up action in national parliaments on the 
Assembly's recommendati~ns, has to be inten-
DOCUMENT 1038 
sified with greater participation by the chairmen 
of national delegations and rapporteurs. 
107. (vi) A member should be appointed from 
each parliament to report to the committee once 
or twice a year on the follow-up action in that 
member's parliament. 
108. (vii) In connection with actions vis-a-vis 
the public and public opinion, the Assembly has 
to work out its own public relations policy 
taking into account that new ways of informing 
the public about its activities must not involve 
new expenditure. 
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109. (viii) In substance, a central point in the 
Assembly's public relations should be to explain 
the significance of WEU's democratic structure 
and the fact that Western European security and 
defence policy is democratically verified and 
supervised at both national and European level. 
On this basis, the Assembly should explain its 
specific activities in public, using, in the first 
place, the recommendations it adopts. 
110. (ix) All reasonable means of approaching 
opinion leaders and the population directly will 
be helpful to stimulate public interest in WEU. 
APPENDIX I 
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1. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 411 on deterrenj::e and the will of the 
people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as 
possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence pplicy adopted by the 
member countries ofWEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats. 
2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular informa-
tion using the methods that it considers the most appropriate. 
3. Parallel to this effort, in the context of joint reflection on this matter, the Council, which met at 
ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, approved a document entitle~" WEU and public 
awareness". This document is annexed to the present reply. i 
4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss 
security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the 
preoccupations of European public opinion which the Assembly can convey tp the Council. The 
enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable publid opinion to be even 
better informed of the basis of the defence policy ofWEU member states. Whilst assuring the security 
interests of the member states and maintaining closer co-operation between them~ this policy makes it 
possible to preserve peace and to seek genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. This 
position has been approved by all the member states of the alliance and freq'\lently reaffirmed, in 
particular in the Washington declaration of 31st May 1984 which demonstrates tlie full agreement and 
unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying theif security. 
5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integrated military structure adopted the 
dual-track decision of December 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Eu~ope which had been 
distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. 
At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue 
with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of fo~ces and stressed that 
western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded. 
Hence the allies regretted the breaking-off of talks by the Soviet Union inl November 1983 and 
the WEU Council can but welcome the opening of a new round of talks between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985. 1 
6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations - multilatera~ly in the appropriate 
fora, but also bilaterally - on all the problems relating to the various arms contrbl questions. In this 
connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold regular consultations with the 
United States on the negotiations in Geneva. Furthermore, the United States! regularly inform the 
NATO Council about these negotiations. 
7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement 
rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to th' next meeting of the 
Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these 
agencies, which include, inter alia, studies in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council 
takes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field. 
8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond1 the competence of 
WEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made 
substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries :at both bilateral and 
multilateral level and specifically at European level within the framework of tlile Lome Convention, 
recently renewed for a second time. 
3. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985. 
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WEU and public awareness 
Introduction 
I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU 
public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial 
meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 
29th October: 
" The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be 
deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit 
proposals ... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities." 
I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to 
the themes WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the means by which this presenta-
tion is to be made. This paper aims to address these points. 
Themes 
11. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment 
to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive 
integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European 
organisations. They emphasised : 
- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ; 
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ; 
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of 
Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries ofthe 
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members. 
11. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their 
views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, 
as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration. 
11. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its public relations, with 
the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following 
could fulfil the expectations set at Rome : 
(a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it 
should never be taken for granted ; 
(b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of 
force imbalances and the present threat ; 
(c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity 
whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive 
dialogue and co-operation ; 
(d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, 
while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the 
European contribution to the alliance and to western security ; 
(e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek 
balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level 
offorces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ; 
(f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of 
armaments; 
(g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions ofthe world; 
(h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy. 
11. (iv)ln view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military 
forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central 
importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to 
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develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, 
and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europf and the American 
nuclear guarantee. 
11. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-establishe~ commitment of the 
alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive 
dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the comple;llities of arms control 
negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early resu~ts cannot always be 
achieved. 
Means 
Ill. (i)There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could
1
be channelled: 
I 
- WEU Assembly ; 
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/ Agencies ; 
- WEU member governments. 
Assembly 
Ill. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform ind~cate the importance 
Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the role it might play in 
striving " to consolidate the consensus among public opinion " on the ~ecurity and defence 
needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the 
Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and 
security options open to the Council which expresses the political wi~l of the individual 
governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls 
inter alia for the development of informal contacts between government! representatives and 
representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the A$sembly informed of 
the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more comple-
mentary fashion. 
Ill. (iii) The Assembly is the only European 
discuss defence and security issues. It attracts 
nial sessions. 
I 
parliamentary body empowered by treaty to 
considerable public attention during its bien-
1 
Ill. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states 
on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across 1 to a wider audience 
the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of 
defence and security issues (see paragraph Ill. (x) below) might also incorporate tl!tese ideas. 
Ill. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. I This will to a large 
extent be a national task ; but WEU institutions can also play a role by helping to spread 
information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by 
Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press 
briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribu-
tion of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in thi~ respect if in future 
Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in 
their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater 
contact between members of parliament of member states and the media. ! 
Council/Secretary-General/ Agencies 
Ill. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive 
relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the p~sidency and national 
governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should 
aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU. I 
Ill. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote 
WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and 
to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge I the Secretary-General 
to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appro-
priate, speeches. 
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Ill. (viii) There is probably a role for a public relations and information unit within the Secre-
tariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and 
disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before 
the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would 
be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distri-
buted by the unit. 
Agencies 
Ill. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to informa-
tion activity in the following ways : 
(i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be 
distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in 
London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation 
of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for 
distribution ; 
(ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list 
of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in 
London. 
National governments 
Ill. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is 
through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member 
states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the 
major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put 
across the agreed themes. 
Ill. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence 
and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organi-
sations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the 
agreed themes and the role ofWEU in the context of European security. 
Ill. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater 
public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council 
will be instructed to look at this problem periodicially during its regular sessions. When the 
Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated 
in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to 
improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions. 
Conclusion 
IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a 
major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater 
public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile 
of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and 
transatlantic unity. 
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APPENDIX II 
Summary record 
of the information meeting with members of the two chambers 
of the Italian Parliament and the press at the Italian Senate, 
Rome, on Tuesday, 11th June 1985, at 4.30 p.m. 
The meeting was organised at the invit- - the Assembly of WEU (by Mrs. Henni-
ation of the Italian Delegation and in the context cot-Schoepges); 
of the special action of the Committee for _ relations between WEU, NATO and 
Parliamentary and Public Relations in the WEU other Western European organisations 
member parliaments. d · (b M E · k) an countnes y r- ysm . 
The following Italian parliamentarians The following discussion was launched by 
attended the meeting: questions put by members o~ the Committee for 
Mr. Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Dele- Parliamentary and Public Relations to their 
gation to the WEU Assembly ; Italian colleagues. 
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the 
WEU Assembly ; 
Mr. Vecchietti, Vice-Chairman of the 
Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly. 
Senate: 
The following members were present : 
MM. Accili, Frasca, Gianotti, Marchio, 
Mezzapesa, Milani, Mitterdorfer, Palumbo, 
Spitella (all members of the Italian Dele-
gation to the WEU Assembly). 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the committee; 
MM. Bernassola, Malagodi, Pierrelli, 
Rum or. 
Defence Committee 
Mr. Ferrara, Vice-Chairman of the com-
mittee; 
MM. Butini, Falluchi, Saporito. 
Chamber of Deputies : 
The following members were present : 
MM. Foschi, Martino, Sinesio (all mem-
bers of the Italian Delegation to the WEU 
Assembly). 
Defence Committee 
Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the committee 
Mr. Stegagnini, Vice-Chairman of the 
committee; 
MM. Di Re, Zanini. 
At the beginning of the meeting briefings 
were given by members of the committee as 
follows: 
- the duties of the new WEU (by Mr. 
Giust); 
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Mr. Goerens asked w!1ether Italian parlia-
mentarians felt they were sufficiently informed 
about WEU matters and if they wished to 
suggest improvements. ! 
Mr. Eysink asked what was the attitude in 
Italy towards the SDI and Eureka programmes. 
On the SDI, Mr. Bianco, Chairman of the 
Italian Delegation to the "(EU Assembly, said 
there was a need of a specific European forum to 
discuss these problems. There were still too 
many bilateral talks andl relations between 
different European countries and the United 
States. The general feeling in Italy was that 
WEU should play an impottant role in harmo-
nising the position of Western European coun-
tries in this matter. 
i 
This position was endorsed by Mr. Milani 
who raised the question of the role the Assembly 
could play within WEU. I 
Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committe~, said this was per-
haps the eve of a strategic revolution. In this 
connection, WEU could haye a new function in 
voicing Europe's view. He was convinced Italy 
wished to address these matters, but the main 
question was whether the British, French and 
Germans had the same I intention. Another 
question was the enlargement of the organisation 
with the accession of Po~ugal and Spain. In 
his view these countries could not be kept 
outside. If European positions were not harmo-
nised, decisions would pe taken elsewhere 
without Europe. 
Mr. Ruf]ini, Chairnjlan of the Defence 
Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, said as 
a matter of fact there was little interest for WEU 
in his committee. The prQblem was whether we 
had the ability to define a joint European 
defence policy. Unfortuqately there was no 
united Europe. The t)jpe of relationship 
between the United States and Europe was not 
clear. Membership of NATO was fundamental 
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for Italy. A difficulty was that there was no 
identity between NATO and WEU, so it was 
impossible to reach a special European position 
on security matters. WEU had the advantage 
of including France. 
Another difficulty came from the United 
States which failed to understand European 
needs. There was a danger of drifting away 
from each other and this could damage the rela-
tionship. If the United States had contacted its 
European allies on the problem of the neutron 
bomb prior to reaching decisions many difficul-
ties would have been avoided. 
In the SDI, it should be carefully conside-
red whether it might not lead to new unbalances. 
He agreed with Mr. Taviani, recalling the 
European Defence Community which had been 
extremely important for Italy. It was important 
for the creation of Europe which should not be 
merely a Europe for trade. In the European 
Community there were too many conflicts. 
Had the defence community succeeded, the 
history of Europe would have been quite 
different. 
WEU could have a future but it should 
work for Europe's unity. 
Mr. Martino thought further meetings 
were needed to be able to reach a decision in the 
Assembly on the SDI. 
Mr. Malagodi asked whether the relation-
ship between Eurogroup and WEU was taken 
carefully into consideration. As for the United 
States, it had to be noted that what the 
Americans considered to be consultations meant 
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only information after decisions had been 
reached. If there had been real consultations a 
problem such as that of the neutron bomb would 
never have happened. 
As for the SDI, he believed the Soviets 
would double the number of their missiles. 
There was adequate co-operation in 
NATO between chiefs-of-staff, but there was a 
need for a political forum. Security was not 
just a question of money. He was very pleased 
that this meeting was being held to discuss these 
questions. 
Mr. Stegagnini mentioned that the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies had tried to put forward a 
bill on the export of armaments. A question 
was whether that bill corresponded to legislation 
in other parliaments. There should be a united 
European position in this matter. Furthermore, 
WEU should work for better co-ordination of 
standardisation. There was still too much 
competition within Europe. 
Sir John Page asked what Italian parlia-
mentarians expected from the new Italian presi-
dency of the WEU Council. 
Mr. Vecchietti said future developments 
depended mainly on three countries : France, 
Britain and Germany. If the three were in 
agreement, the others would follow. Italy 
wanted WEU to be extended to all other Western 
European countries. 
Mrs. Knight thanked all parliamentarians 
for their contributions and closed the meeting at 
6.30p.m. 
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Comparison of present text and proposed amended text 
1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Schulte (Chairman); MM. Eysink, Woodall (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Antoni (Alternate: 
Gianotti), Antretter, Coleman (Alternate: Jessel), Corrie, Delehedde (Alternate: Senes), Sir GeoffreyiFinsberg, Mr. Gorla, Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges (Alternate: Konen), MM. Koeh/, Lapenta, Marchio, Miche/, Pecriaux, Spies von Bullesheim, Unland, Vial-
Massat, van der Werff, Wilquin (Alternate: Beix). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the revision of Articles Ill, IV, XI and XII of the Charter 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
1. To amend Article Ill of the Charter as follows: 
Leave out the whole of paragraph (a) and insert: 
" Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts. 
The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee 
and immediately brought to the attention of representatives. "; 
2. To amend Article IV of the Charter as follows: 
In paragraph (b), leave out" Bureau" and insert" Presidential Committee". 
3. To amend Article XI of the Charter as follows: 
Leave out Article XI and insert: 
"(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau 
for a period of five years. 
(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He 
shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they 
may require. 
(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretariat-General of Western European 
Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments." 
4. To amend the English text of Article XII of the Charter as follows: 
In paragraph (a), leave out " Proposals " and insert " Motions ". 
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Draft Resolution 
on the revision of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows: 
l. Rule 2 S 
Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert: 
" 1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several 
parts." ! 
Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly. 
2. Rule 3 S 
At the end of the paragraph, leave out" or substitutes". 
3. Rule4 S 
In paragraph 2, leave out" Bureau" and insert" Presidential Committee ". 
4. Rule 5 S 
Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert: 
" l. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the oldest representative J.esent shall take the 
Chair until the election of the President has been announced. 
2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in tle Chair unless it is 
concerned with the examination of credentials or the election ofthe President ofthe Assembly." 
5. Rule6S 
Leave oqt paragraph 3 and insert: 
" 3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructtd to examine these 
credentials and report to the Assembly without delay." 
6. Rule 7S 
Leave out the title and insert: 
"Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates". 
Leave out paragraph 1. 
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: , 
" l. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative kay be exercised by a 
substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly." 
Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly. I 
7. RuleS E 
Leave out paragraph 3. 
8. Rule 11 E 
At the beginning of paragraph 2, add:" When in the Chair". 
At the end of paragraph 2, add: . 
" If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resu~e the Chair until the 
debate on that subject is over. " 
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9. Rule 15 E 
In paragraph 1 of the English text, leave out " for any reason " and insert " without having been 
invited by the President of the Assembly". 
Add a paragraph 4: 
"4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the Chamber for the 
purpose of photographic andjor sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presi-
dential Committee. " 
10. Rule 22 S 
At the end of paragraph 1, add: 
" Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after 
that on which the reports were communicated to them. " 
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: 
"2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available 
without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their 
speeches not later than the day after the speech was made. " 
11. Rule 24 S 
Leave out" in accordance with Rule 7 ". 
Add a paragraph 2: 
•• 2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented 
from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register. " 
12. Rule 27S 
In paragraph 4, leave out •• may" and insert •• shall be invited to ". 
English text only: after •• debate", insert •• may". 
13. Rule28U 
In paragraph 2, redraft the end of the first sentence to read: •• and take the form of a recommen-
dation, opinion, resolution, order or decision ". 
At the end of paragraph 2, add: 
•• (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council. 
(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national 
parliaments. 
(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee. 
(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members." 
Rule 30 is therefore deleted. 
14. Rule 29 S 
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: 
•• 2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without 
delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to 
the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting 
preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end 
with the opening of the sitting. " 
Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly. 
15. Rule31 S 
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: 
•• 2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to 
speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the 
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latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of th~ first sitting, their 
request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the Pre-
sident decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak. " 
Leave out paragraph 6 and insert: ! 
"6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging 
him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response. " I 
In paragraph 7, after" determining of", insert" the order ofbusiness of the Assembly". 
16. Rule 32 S I 
At the end of paragraph 4, add: 
" The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raist points of order is 
misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the 
debate." 
17. Rule 34 E 
At the end of paragraph 1, add: 
"Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of~otes cast. " 
At the end of paragraph 2(c), add:" or ifthe President so decides". 
In paragraph 4, after the first sentence, insert: 
" Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. " 
At the end of paragraph 4, add: 
"The President shall announce the result. " 
18. Rule 35 E 
At the end ofparagraph l(b), add:" (see Rule 34, paragraph 1) ". 
At the end ofparagraph l(c), add: 
" In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candida-
ture is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the singl~ candidate shall be 
declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4). " 
Leave out paragraph 2. 
19. Rule 39 E 
At the end of paragraph 2, add former paragraph 3 of Rule 8: 
" The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or Jart-sessions, provi-
sionally fill the ·seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substi-
tutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assemb~y. " 
In paragraph 5, leave out" resolution" and insert" decision". · 
In paragraph 6, leave out" Rule 8, paragraph 3 ",and insert" paragraph 2 ab9ve ". 
20. Rule 40 E 
In paragraph 5, leave out" Bureau of the Assembly" and insert" PresidentialiCommittee ". 
21. Rule 41 E 
At the beginning of paragraph 2, insert:" In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, ". 
In paragraph 4, leave out "and methods of voting (Rule 34)" and insert .J methods of voting 
(Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c))". 
Leave out paragraph 4(b). 
In paragraph 4(c), after" but" insert" elections or". 
Add a paragraph 4( d): 
"(d) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee." 
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22. Rule42 E 
Leave out paragraph 3 and insert: 
"3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form 
of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28. " 
Add a paragraph 4: 
" 4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three 
weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be 
withdrawn from the agenda. However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the 
committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a 
decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within 
the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, pre-
pare a supplementary report to take account of current events. " 
23. Rule47U 
Leave out paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and insert: 
" 1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau. 
His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may 
be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the 
year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year. 
2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he 
will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, 
that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from 
any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompa-
tible with his position as a European civil servant. 
3. In th~ exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide 
the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require. 
4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the 
Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the 
Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level. 
5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European 
Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments. " 
24. Rule50U 
In paragraph 2, leave out" resolution" and insert" decision ". 
25. Rule 51 U 
In paragraph 1 ofthe French text, leave out" resolution "and insert" decision ". 
26. Reference to substitutes S 
Leave out reference to substitutes in the following rules: 2, 5, 13, 26, 27 (first sentence of 
paragraph 6), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 (paragraph 2, line 4), 39, 41 (except in paragraph 7), 43 
(except in paragraph 6), 45 and 51. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by MM. Eysink, Spies 11011 Biillesheim and Unland, Rapporteurs) I 
Rule2 
There is a contradiction in the concept of 
an ordinary session in paragraphs 1 and 2. The 
wording proposed makes a clear distinction 
between the ordinary session which is annual 
and part-sessions. 
There is a contradiction between Rules 2 
and 3. Since, according to Rule 2, paragraph 1, 
" The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as 
often as the fulfilment of its functions may 
require", Rule 3 on convening extraordinary 
sessions seems pointless. The ordinary session 
is all the part-sessions the Assembly holds during 
, the year since it meets " not less than once in the 
course of any calendar year". 
The wording of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly of the Council of Europe is better 
and should be taken as a model. The following 
amendment is proposed: 
Leave out paragraph 1 of Rule 2 and 
insert: 
" Each year the Assembly shall hold an 
ordinary session which may be divided 
into several parts. " 
Leave out paragraph 2 of Rule 2 and 
renumber paragraphs 3 and 4 accordingly. 
Rule3 
These provisions should be brought into 
line with those of Article Ill of the Charter and 
the words " or substitutes " left out. 
Rule4 
The following amendment is proposed: 
Leave out " the Bureau of the Assembly " 
and insert " the Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly". 
This amendment takes into account the 
Presidential Committee's responsibilities under 
Rule 2, paragraph 3, and Rule 14. 
Rule5 
The following drafting amendment is pro-
posed to the French text only: 
Leave out "jusqu'a la proclamation du 
President elu " and insert "jusqu'a la proclama-
tion de !'election du President". 
Rule6 
In paragraph 3, leave out " may examine 
these credentials and report at once to the 
- -
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Assembly " and insert " fiFtY be instructed to 
examine these credentials I and report to the 
Assembly without delay". 
In fact this comm~ttee has not been 
convened for a very long time and it is respon-
sible only for examining the validity of the docu-
ments attesting credential~ which have been 
received from the appropriate authorities. 
Rule 7 
The committee consipered it useful to set 
out the general principle tltat unless otherwise 
stipulated in the Rules of Procedure the powers 
of a representative may be ~xercised by a substi-
tute. It is therefore possi'l>le to leave out the 
reference to substitutes in many of the rules (see 
paragraph 20 of the drafit resolution). It is 
evident that in all cases where they have the 
same powers as representatives, substitutes have 
the same obligations. 
Rule 11 
The provisions of this rule give the Presi-
dent wide enough powers to allow him to solve 
any procedural problem and to settle any inci-
dent, if necessary in coilsultation with the 
Assembly. 
It should be note~ in particular that 
repeated points of order delay the Assembly's 
work and that the President, responsible under 
Rule 11 for maintaining orqer, may stop them to 
allow the Assembly to continue with the debates 
on its agenda. 
Comments in the present report on the 
tabling of amendments (Rule 29) and the right to 
speak (Rules 31 and 33) emphasise the extent of 
the President's powers wheh in the Chair. It is 
proposed, however, to strdss that these powers 
are linked with the fact th't he is effectively in 
the Chair. If he takes p~rt in a debate, the 
committee considers he shOuld not resume the 
Chair until the debate is over. It is therefore 
proposed to add, at the beginning of paragraph 
2, " When in the Chair "I and, at the end of 
paragraph 2, "When the President speaks in a 
debate on a specific subject, he may not resume 
the Chair until the debate on that subject is 
over." 
These provisions ¥e applicable to a 
Vice-President replacing the President in accor-
dance with Rule 12. 
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Rule 15 
Paragraph 1 
After "Chamber", add •• without having 
been invited by the President of the Assem-
bly ... " 
The purpose is to allow access to the 
Chamber for persons who are not members of 
governments of member countries but who have 
been invited by the Presidential Committee to 
attend and often to speak (representatives of 
non-member governments, non-governmental 
speakers, parliamentary observers, etc.). 
Rule 22 
Whereas the official report distributed 
after each sitting gives the full text only of spee-
ches delivered in French and English, the pro-
ceedings issued after each session give the full 
text in French and English of all speeches, irres-
pective of the official language in which they 
were delivered. 
Among the arrangements made for this 
purpose, mention should be made of the possibi-
lity for speakers to ask the verbatim reporters to 
give them the transcription of their speeches a 
few minutes after they have been delivered. A 
copy of this transcription may also be given to 
a delegation secretary at his request. 
It might be useful for this to be set out in 
the Rules of Procedure. It is therefore proposed 
to add a new paragraph 2 to Rule 22 as follows: 
•• 2. A full transcription of speeches made 
in Dutch, German and Italian shall be 
made available without delay to speakers 
on request. They may submit corrections 
to the transcription of their speeches not 
later than the day after the speech was 
made." 
The present paragraph 2, as amended, 
would be added to paragraph 1 since it relates 
solely to the summary report in English and 
French (the word •• stenographie " in the French 
text being left out and •• compte rendu " 
inserted). 
Rule 24 
The revised Rule 7 now covers all 
the rights of substitutes independently of their 
attendance at a given sitting in replacement of 
representatives. 
By making the links between the powers 
of substitutes and signature of the attendance 
register more flexible, the amendment to Rule 7 
therefore clearly gives substitutes rights such as 
that of convening an extraordinary session, ful-
filling the duties of Provisional President or 
standing for election to a committee bureau. 
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Conversely, the rights and duties of 
substitutes in the context of a given sitting 
must be specified. For this purpose, Rule 
24 should be revised by deleting the refe-
rence to Rule 7, which is now pointless, 
and by inserting a new paragraph as follows: 
•• Unless otherwise provided by the rules, 
the powers of a representative who is pre-
vented from attending a sitting may be 
exercised by a substitute who has duly 
signed the register. " 
It is proposed to retain the reference to 
substitutes in rules indicating the area of applica-
tion of a general rule and to delete it in rules 
defining the powers and obligations incumbent 
upon members of the Assembly, the powers and 
obligations of substitutes being, in accordance 
with the principle laid down in Rule 7 revised, 
identical to those of representatives. 
Rule 26: Interpretation 
Paragraph2 
The present rule authorising explanations 
of vote only after the vote on the text as a whole 
conforms to practice in the Council of Europe. 
The purpose of this is to avoid another general 
debate being started before the vote on the text 
as a whole, since certain speakers might be 
tempted to influence the decision of their collea-
gues at the last minute. It thus allows the 
Assembly to vote on the text as a whole imme-
diately after the debate on the amendments. 
Only those who wish to explain the 
meaning of their votes speak. They are neces-
sarily limited in number, which is a considerable 
advantage in view ofthe brevity of sessions. 
Rule 27 
Draft the beginning of paragraph 4 as 
follows: 
•• The Chairman of the Council shall be 
invited to present the report orally to the 
Assembly ... " 
The purpose of this amendment is to 
bring the drafting of the rule into line with the 
corresponding paragraph of the Charter and to 
make the English and French texts concord. 
Rules 28 and 30 
Rule 30 concerns motions for orders. In 
the Assembly's vocabulary, a text emanating 
from a committee is a draft and a text emanating 
from members of the Assembly is a motion. 
After noting the difference between draft 
orders in reports and motions for orders as 
referred to in Rule 30, it is therefore necessary to 
stipulate to what extent the provisions appli-
cable to motions for recommendations, opinions 
or resolutions, covered by Rule 28, also concern 
motions for orders. 
The following differences should be noted: 
(i) motions under Rule 28 must be sub-
mitted in writing and signed by at 
least ten representatives, whereas a 
single representative may lay a 
motion for an order on the table of 
the Assembly; 
(ii) motions under Rule 28 are submitted 
to the Assembly for inclusion in the 
register of the Assembly, whereas 
motions for orders may be put to the 
vote without prior reference to com-
mittee and may in this case be 
adopted directly; 
(iii) where the debate is concerned, Rule 
28 lays down that when the question 
of including such a motion in the 
register is put to the Assembly the 
following only may be heard: one 
speaker for the motion, one speaker 
against and the chairman of any com-
mittee concerned. Rule 30 says 
nothing in this respect but it is custo-
mary to treat a motion for an order in 
the same way as a motion within the 
meaning of Rule 28; 
(iv) finally, the notion of an order is not 
defined but it is generally considered 
that its purpose is to give a mandate 
to the President or to an Assembly 
committee. 
In view of the facility with which a motion 
for an order may be tabled and adopted, the 
Assembly is liable to find itself bound by a text 
adopted without debate by a chance majority. 
To allow the Assembly to keep control of 
its proceedings, three methods may be consi-
dered: 
The first, to which the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe seems to be turning, is to 
introduce into the Rules of Procedure a precise 
definition of the notion of an order laying down 
in particular that an order may not relate to a 
new subject but must relate to a question already 
included in the register of the Assembly and 
keep to matters of form, transmission, execution 
or procedure, without tackling the substance of 
the question. 
The second is to delete completely the 
notion of an order which is possible since in fact 
members of the Assembly generally resort to 
points of order to raise matters which would be 
the subject of a motion for an order if the 
motion for an order were thus defined. Draft 
orders submitted by committees for the purpose 
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of instructing an Assembl>J body to carry out a 
specific task may also be [termed draft resolu-
tions. 1 
The third method ~as the advantage of 
being clear and simple and should be given pre-
ference. It is to define a~order as a mandate 
given to an Assembly bo y and to deal with 
motions for orders under ule 28 like motions 
for recommendations, opinions or resolutions. 
Thus completed, Rule 28 would be the same 
as paragraph 3 of Rule 4t which sets out the 
form of the substantive te t of reports and also 
mentions draft orders. 
The latter solution would imply redrafting 
the end of the first sentenJe of paragraph 2 of 
Rule 28 to read: " and take the form of a recom-
mendation, opinion, resol tion, order or deci-
sion". 
Finally, a definition should be made of 
motions tabled in the As~embly by ten of its 
members and drafts included in committee 
reports. It would be desirable to take this 
opportunity of dispelling tte ambiguity arising 
from the plurality of mean ngs attributed to the 
word" resolution". It ma in fact designate an 
Assembly text addressed by its President to 
international organisatio~, governments or 
national parliaments or a~ Assembly decision 
relating to its operation or ~he status of its mem-
bers: amendments to the Charter (Article XII) 
or the Rules of Procedure (Rule 51), the appoint-
ment of a committee of in!Vestigation (Rule 39, 
paragraph 5), request for thf waiver of immunity 
(Rule 50, paragraph 2). . 
Rule 28 might consequently set out the 
following definitions: • 
" (a) Recommendatiobs or opinions shall 
be addressed to the Council. 
(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to 
international organisations, govern-
ments or national parliaments. 
(c) Orders shall be addressed to the Presi-
de_nt of the Ass~mbly or to a com-
mittee. · 
(d) Decisions concern the working of the 
Assembly and the status of its mem-
bers. 
I 
The adoption of this amendment would 
imply deletion of Rule 30. 
Rule 29: Interpretation 
The purpose of this amendment is to 
ensure that the Assembly h~s time to see amend-
ments before they are debaled, while leaving the 
President the possibility of relaxing this rule if 
necessary. 
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Rule 31: Interpretation 
This amendment is intended to allow the 
President to ascertain the number of speakers 
early enough before a debate to be able to foresee 
the length of the debate and, if necessary, make 
the appropriate arrangements to organise 
it. This provision would moreover facilitate 
the President's task as set out in Rule 31, para-
graph 2: " As far as possible he shall endeavour 
to call alternately upon speakers for and against 
the matter under discussion. " Equally it allows 
him to avoid a succession of speakers of the 
same political group or the same nationality. 
Paragraph 6 
The committee considered the unduly 
vague notion of a personal statement should be 
defined. On the other hand, it wished to leave 
the President greater freedom to choose when a 
member of the Assembly may reply to a personal 
affront. 
Paragraph 7 
After " determining of" add " the order of 
business of the Assembly". 
Speaking time should be limited for 
speeches on the adoption of the draft order of 
business in the same way as for determining the 
orders of the day of sittings and procedural 
matters. 
Rule 33: Interpretation 
The President may have included in the 
draft order of business a proposal to hold a 
debate on one or more reports. He may also 
make such a proposal during the session should 
this seem necessary. 
In regard to speaking time for various 
categories of speaker, proposals were made in 
the memorandum by the President (Document 
1016). This is a question of practice and not 
one for the Rules of Procedure. In this connec-
tion, the Assembly must be able to adapt the 
provisions it agrees upon according to circums-
tances. 
Paragraph 1 
Just as the President regularly limits the 
speaking time in general debates under Rule 33, 
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure, there 
should be no problem if he at the same time 
limits speaking time on amendments. 
Rule 34 
Paragraph 1 
Add at the end of the paragraph: " Only 
affirmative and negative votes shall count in cal-
culating the number of votes cast." 
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The purpose of this amendment is to 
specify that the rule applicable to roll-call votes 
is also applicable to votes by sitting and 
standing. 
Paragraph 2 
This amendment allows the President to 
resort to roll-call votes when, for instance, he 
considers it to be the only way to allow the 
Assembly to vote clearly. 
Paragraph 4 
It is proposed to amend this paragraph by 
adding the provisions in italics: 
" 4. Voting on nominations shall take 
place by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen 
by lot shall count the votes cast. Only 
those ballot papers bearing the names of 
persons who have been duly entered as 
candidates shall be taken into account for 
the purpose of calculating the number of 
votes cast. The President shall announce 
the result. " 
Inclusion of the provisions in italics 
recalls the provisions of Rule 10 for nominations 
other than those of members of the Bureau of 
the Assembly. 
Rule 35 
Paragraph 1 (b) 
Add: " (See Rule 34, paragraph 1) ". 
Paragraph 1(c) 
Add at the end of this paragraph: 
" .. .In the event of a tie, the candidate 
senior in age shall be declared elected. If 
only one candidature is proposed to the 
Assembly and there is no opposition to it, 
the single candidate shall be declared 
elected. (See Rule 34, paragraph 4). " 
These provisions, applicable to the elec-
tion of members of the Bureau of the Assembly 
under Rule 10, may be extended to cover all 
elections. 
Paragraph 2 
Leave out this paragraph whose provi-
sions are included in Rule 34, paragraph 1. 
Rule 36 
The present rule that the quorum is calcu-
lated in accordance with the number of signa-
tures on the register of attendance and not the 
number of representatives effectively present in 
the Chamber has so far proved satisfactory. It 
avoids a minority being able to prevent the 
Assembly from voting by leaving the Chamber. 
It no doubt prevents a parliamentarian from 
ins1stmg on the postponement of a vote by 
invoking the insufficient number of representa-
tives present, but the President may always, at 
the request of a member of the Assembly, and 
with the agreement of the latter, postpone a vote 
or suspend the sitting. Moreover, it is his task, 
in the exercise of his responsibilities under Rule 
11, to avoid a surprise vote. Conversely, calcu-
lating the quorum on the basis of the number of 
representatives present would result in the 
Assembly and its President again becoming 
powerless in face of certain manreuvres aimed at 
preventing the majority from being able to 
express its political wishes. 
Rule 39 
Paragraph 2 
See the proposed amendment to Rule 8. 
Paragraph 6 
The reference should no longer be to Rule 
8, paragraph 3, but to Rule 39, paragraph 2. 
Rule40 
ParagraphS 
Leave out " Bureau " and insert " Presi-
dential Committee". 
This is an overall responsibility of the Pre-
sidential Committee rather than the Bureau. 
Rule41 
Paragraph 2 
According to Rule 40, authorisation is 
necessary for appointing one or more members 
of a committee to carry out an information or 
study visit. A fortiori, the authorisation of the 
Presidential Committee would be necessary for 
appointing a sub-committee in view of the finan-
cial implications of such a decision. 
The following amendment is therefore 
proposed: 
Add at the beginning of Rule 41, para-
graph 2, " In application of Rule 40, para-
graph 5. ". 
Paragraph 4(b) 
This paragraph is not clear. It would be 
better to leave out this paragraph and amend 
paragraph 4 as follows to include a reference to 
Rule 35 on majorities, which is clearer. 
In the first paragraph of paragraph 4, after 
" (Rule 32) " read " methods of voting (Rule 34) 
and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) 
shall apply ... ". 
Paragraph 4(c) 
An election is not simple deliberation but 
a major decision. It should therefore be made 
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quite clear that the same quorum rules apply for 
electing the bureau of a committee or its rappor-
teurs as for the vote on a refort as a whole. 
The following amebdment is therefore 
proposed: 
" A committee may peliberate when one-
third of its member~ is present, but elec-
tions or the vote on a I report as a whole ... " 
Paragraph 4( d): " Substitutes may be 
elected members of the bur~au of a committee. " 
The addition of ~his new paragraph 
is to avoid the ambiguity that might stem 
from the fact that substitutes may not be 
elected to the Bureau ~ the Assembly. It 
might be considered that t is rule was applicable 
to the bureau of a corn ittee. Rule 7, para-
graph 3, makes it clear tMt substitutes may be 
elected to the bureau of afmmittee. Affirma-
tion of this in Rule 41 a s to the clarity and 
coherence of the rules. 
Rule 42 
The purpose of th's amendment is to 
allow the Assembly time 1 to examine reports, 
account being taken of the time required for pre-
paring texts, translating ~he last corrections, 
printing and mailing. · 
I 
It shall nevertheless' still be possible for 
the Assembly, in certain strict conditions, to 
debate a report adopted after the required time-
limit. 
Rule 47 
At the meeting of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges on 4th December 
1984, the Chairman reacll out a letter from 
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, communi-
cating the following resolution by the Bureau 
dated 12th November 198~: 
"The Bureau of the Assembly, 
Anxious to guarantee the Assembly's right 
to exercise in full its supervision of all 
matters within its puf"iew; 
Noting that in exercising this right the 
Assembly is limited in respect of the man-
date it confers upo~ the Clerk and any 
Clerk Assistant as 1 ng as the duration of 
these mandates is no fixed; 
Considering this shortcoming should be 
overcome by the adjoption of new provi-
sions guaranteeing tpat the Assembly can 
exercise its right in this respect; 
Feels it desirable to fix a five-year time-
limit on the mandat~ of the Clerk and any 
Clerk Assistant, ~his mandate being 
renewable by decisioln of the Assembly, 
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Asks the President to proceed to transmit 
the present resolution to the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so 
that the latter may report to the Assembly 
on this matter, if possible at the December 
1984 session. " 
Since lack of time did not allow a report to 
be presented at the December 1984 session, the 
President of the Assembly asked the committee 
to report on this matter at the May 1985 session. 
The Rapporteur first submitted an oral 
report at the meeting of the committee in 
Palermo on 22nd February 1985. 
The matter was discussed at length and 
general agreement on the principle of an amend-
ment was reached without a vote. Consequen-
tly, the Rapporteur drafted the proposed amen-
ded text of Rule 4 7 and presented it orally to the 
Presidential Committee at its meeting on 15th 
April 1985. In this presentation he underlined 
the following points: 
- the political basis and starting point for 
the work of the committee was exclusi-
vely the resolution of the Bureau dated 
12th November 1984; 
- the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges is a purely technical 
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organ. In this specific instance, its 
tasks were merely to work out the tech-
nical and legal means of implementing a 
political decision by the Bureau; 
- as for the legal aspects, the present Clerk 
was elected in December 1980 for an 
unlimited period. An amendment of 
Rule 47 could not have retroactive 
effect. It could be applicable only in 
future provided the post of Clerk 
became vacant. 
The Presidential Committee fully endorsed 
these considerations and authorised the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to 
pursue its work on this basis. 
An amendment to Article XI of the 
Charter will be necessary. According to Article 
XII of the Charter, proposals to amend the Char-
ter are to be tabled in writing by at least ten 
representatives. 
Your Rapporteur proposes therefore to 
submit to the Assembly the attached draft reso-
lution. The text corresponds to that of the pro-
posed amendment to Rule 4 7 but is shorter since 
in the Charter only the basic principles should be 
set out. 
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APPENDIX 
Comparison of present text and proposed amended text 
of the Charter and Rules of Procedure 
Charter 
Present text 
Ill. Sessions of the Assembly 
(a) The Assembly shall meet in ordinary 
session as often as the fulfilment of its functions 
may require, and not less than once in the course 
of any calendar year. 
The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention 
of representatives and substitutes. 
(b) The Assembly may be convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his 
own initiative or following a request by the 
Council or by not less than a quarter of the 
representatives. 
IV. Seat of the Assembly 
(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. 
(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at 
the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the 
Assembly decides otherwise. 
XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the 
Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. He 
shall provide the Assembly and its committees 
with such secretariat and other assistance as 
they may require. 
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make 
a solemn declaration before the Assembly that 
he will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions ; that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties 
from any government or authority other than 
the Assembly, and will refrain from any action 
incompatible with his position as a European 
civil servant. 
(b) The Clerk shall, in consultation with the 
Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or tem-
porary basis as members of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
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Proposed amended text 
Ill. Sessions of th~ Assembly 
(a) Each year the Assem~ly shall hold an ordi-
nary session which may be divided into several 
parts. 
The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by *e Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately br~ught to the attention 
of representatives. 1 
(b) The Assembly may ~e convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his 
own initiative or following a request by the 
Council or by not less than a quarter of the 
representatives. 
IV. Seat of the Assembly 
(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. 
(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at 
the seat of the Assembly urless the Presidential 
Committee of the Assemblt decides otherwise. 
I 
XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presi-
dential Committee on t~e proposal of the 
Bureau for a period of five years. 
(b) In the performance dfhis duties, the Clerk 
shall be responsible to the President. He shall 
provide the Assembly and its committees with 
such secretariat and other assistance as they may 
require. 
(c) The Clerk shall:; eblish close co-ope-
ration with the Secreta General of Western 
European Union, the seer tariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee artd the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
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XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and 
amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
(a) Proposals to amend the Charter of the 
Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least 
ten representatives. After consideration of the 
report thereon by the competent committee or 
committees, such amendments require the 
approval of a majority of the representatives of 
the Assembly. 
(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly, and of any subsequent amend-
ments thereto, shall require an absolute majority 
of the votes cast. 
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XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and 
amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
(a) Motions to amend the Charter of the 
Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least 
ten representatives. After consideration of the 
report thereon by the competent committee or 
committees, such amendments require the 
approval of a majority of the representatives of 
the Assembly. 
(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly, and of any subsequent amend-
ments thereto, shall require an absolute majority 
of the votes cast. 
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Rules of Procedure 
Present text 
RULE 2 
Date and duration of sessions 
1. The Assembly shall meet in ordinary 
session as often as the fulfilment of its functions 
may require, and not less than once in the course 
of any calendar year. 
2. An ordinary session may be divided into 
two or more parts. 
3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention 
of representatives and substitutes. 
4. The Presidential Committee shall inform 
representatives and substitutes of the dates of 
the opening or resumption of an ordinary ses-
sion not less than six weeks beforehand. 
RULE 3 
Extraordinary sessions 
The Assembly may be convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his 
own initiative or following a request by the 
Council or by not less than a quarter of the 
representatives or substitutes. 
RULE 4 
Seat of the Assembly 
1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. 
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at 
the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the 
Assembly decides otherwise. 
RULE 5 
Provisional President 
1. At the beginning of each ordinary session 
the oldest representative or substitute present 
shall discharge the duties of President until the 
election of the President has been announced. 
2. No discussion may take place while the 
oldest representative or substitute is in the Chair 
unless it is concerned with the election of the 
President, or with the election or the report of 
the Credentials Committee. 
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Proposed amen~ed text 
RULE 2 
Date and duration of sessions 
1. Each year the Assefi1bly shall hold an 
ordinary session which n1ay be divided into 
several parts. 
2. The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention 
of representatives. . 
i 
3. The Presidential Coypmittee shall inform 
representatives of the dat~s of the opening or 
resumption of an ordinary session not less than 
six weeks beforehand. 
RULE 3 
Extraordinary sessions 
The Assembly may be~convened in extraor-
dinary session by the Pre ident, either on his 
own initiative or followi g a request by the 
Council or by not less tnan a quarter of the 
representatives. 
RULE 4 
Seat of the A~sembly 
1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. 
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at 
the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembl~ decides otherwise. 
I 
RuLE 5 
Provisional President 
1. At the beginning of each ordinary session 
the oldest representative present shall take the 
Chair until the election oft~e President has been 
announced. ! 
2. No discussion may take place while the 
Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is 
concerned with the examination of credentials or 
the election of the President of the Assembly. 
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RULE 6 
Ratification of credentials 
1. The credentials of representatives and 
substitutes shall be attested by the statement of 
the ratification of credentials formally communi-
cated to the President of the Assembly by the 
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the 
credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them 
on the basis of the official documents supplied 
either by the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the 
parliaments or governments of member states 
subject to conformity with the subsequent ratifi-
cation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
3. A committee of five representatives or 
substitutes chosen by lot may examine these cre-
dentials and report at once to the Assembly. 
4. Any representative or substitute whose 
credentials are contested may take his seat provi-
sionally with the same rights as other representa-
tives and substitutes until the Assembly has 
made a decision on his case. 
RULE 7 
Substitutes and alternates 
1. Any representative prevented from atten-
ding a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced 
by a substitute. 
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance 
with Rule 24 have the same rights as representa-
tives in the Assembly. 
Substitutes may not, however, be elected 
to the Bureau of the Assembly. 
3. A substitute who is a committee chairman 
or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if 
he is not sitting in place of a representative. In 
the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled 
to vote. 
4. Representatives and substitutes may sit on 
committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates. 
Any titular member who is prevented 
from attending a meeting may appoint an alter-
nate from among the alternate members of the 
committee of the same nationality as himself. 
With the consent of the chairman of the 
committee, he may also be replaced by any other 
representative or substitute of the same natio-
nality as himself. 
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RULE 6 
Ratification of credentials 
APPENDIX 
1. The credentials of representatives and 
substitutes shall be attested by the statement of 
the ratification of credentials formally communi-
cated to the President of the Assembly by the 
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the 
credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them 
on the basis of the official documents supplied 
either by the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the 
parliaments or governments of member states 
subject to conformity with the subsequent ratifi-
cation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
3. A committee of five representatives cho-
sen by lot may be instructed to examine these 
credentials and report to the Assembly without 
delay. 
4. Any representative or substitute whose 
credentials are contested may take his seat provi-
sionally with the same rights as other represen-
tatives and substitutes until the Assembly has 
made a decision on his case. 
RULE 7 
Representatives and substitutes, 
titular members and alternates 
1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, 
the powers of a representative may be exercised 
by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected 
to the Bureau of the Assembly. 
2. A substitute who is a committee chairman 
or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if 
he is not sitting in place of a representative. In 
the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled 
to vote. 
3. Representatives and substitutes may sit on 
committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates. 
4. Any titular member who is prevented 
from attending a meeting may appoint an alter-
nate from among the alternate members of the 
committee of the same nationality as himself. 
With the consent of the chairman of the com-
mittee, he may also be replaced by any other 
representative or substitute of the same nationa-
lity as himself. 
5. The alternate so appointed shall have the 
same rights as the titular member. Alternates 
may not however be elected to the bureau of a 
committee. 
APPENDIX 
The alternate so appointed shall have the 
same rights as the titular member. Alternates 
may not however be elected to the bureau of a 
committee. 
RULE 8 
Duration of term of office of representatives 
and substitutes 
1. The term of office of representatives and 
substitutes shall take effect from the date of the 
communication of the statement of the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the President of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, or from the date of their appointment 
by member states if the session of the Assembly 
precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and subject to the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the Parliamentary 
Assembly ofthe Council of Europe. 
2. The term of office shall end in accordance 
with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated 
through parliamentary elections or through 
death or resignation or through invalidation by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
3. The Presidential Committee may, during 
the periods between sessions or part-sessions, 
provisionally fill the seats which have fallen 
vacant in committees with representatives and 
substitutes. These appointments must be rati-
fied at the first session of the Assembly. 
RULE 11 
President 
1. The duties of the President shall be: to 
open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at 
the end of each sitting the date, time and orders 
of the day of the next sitting, to guide the debates 
of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the 
rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to 
close debates, to put questions to the vote and 
announce the result of votes, and to refer com-
munications to the appropriate committees. 
2. The President shall neither speak in 
debate nor vote, his substitute may sit, speak 
and vote in his place. 
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the 
President shall transmit resolutions to inter-
national organisations, governments and natio-
nal parliaments. 
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RULE 8 
Duration of term of office of representatives and 
substitutes 
1. The term of office otl representatives and 
substitutes shall take effect from the date of the 
communication of the statement of the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the President of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, or from the date of their appointment 
by member states if the ses~ion of the Assembly 
precedes that of the Parlia*entary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and s~bject to the ratifica-
tion of the credentials b~ the Parliamentary 
Assembly ofthe Council of£urope. 
2. The term of office shall end in accordance 
with the rules of the Parliar)lentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe whefer a seat is vacated 
through parliamentary el ctions or through 
death or resignation or thr ugh invalidation by 
the Parliamentary Assembl of the Council of 
Europe. 
RULE 1 ~ 
Preside+ 
1. The duties of the President shall be: to 
open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at 
the end of each sitting the date, time and orders 
of the day of the next s~tting, to guide the 
debates of the Assembly, 1o ensure the obser-
vance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on 
speakers, to close debates, tq put questions to the 
vote and announce the rdult of votes, and to 
refer communications to the appropriate com-
mittees. 
2. When in the Chair the President shall 
neither speak in debate nor vote; his substitute 
may sit, speak and vote in bis place. If the Pre-
sident speaks in a debate onl a specific subject, he 
may not resume the Chair until the debate on 
that subject is over. 
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the 
President shall transmit resolutions to interna-
tional organisations, governments and national 
parliaments. 
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RULE 13 
Maintenance of order 
1. The President shall call to order any repre-
sentative or substitute who departs from it. 
2. If the offence is repeated, the President 
shall again call the representative or substitute to 
order and cause the fact to be recorded in the 
minutes of proceedings. 
3. In the event of a further offence (other 
than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the 
President may exclude the offender from the 
chamber for the remainder of the sitting. 
4. In serious cases the President may pro-
pose that the representative or substitute who 
committed the offence be censured and excluded 
from the chamber for a period not exceeding 
four days. The representative or substitute 
upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall 
always have the right to be heard. 
5. After the representative or substitute 
concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his 
right, the vote of censure shall be taken without 
debate. 
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words 
or expressions which are contrary to the good 
conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his 
other rights for the maintenance of order, the 
President may cause such words to be deleted 
from the official report of debates. He shall 
have similar power as regards any intervention 
by a representative or substitute who has not 
obtained prior permission to speak or who 
exceeds the time that may have been allotted to 
speakers. 
RULE 15 
Public order in the chamber and galleries 
1. No person shall enter the chamber for any 
reason except representatives and substitutes, 
ministers who are members of the Council of 
Western European Union, other ministers of 
member states and officials whose duties require 
their presence there. 
2. Only persons provided with a card grant-
ing right of access duly issued by the Clerk may 
be admitted to the galleries. 
3. Members of the public admitted to the 
galleries shall remain seated and in silence. 
Any person expressing approval or disapproval 
shall be ejected at once by the ushers. 
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RULE 13 
Maintenance of order 
1. The President shall call to order any repre-
sentative who departs from it. 
2. If the offence is repeated, the President 
shall again call the representative to order and 
cause the fact to be recorded in the minutes of 
proceedings. 
3. In the event of a further offence (other 
than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the 
President may exclude the offender from the 
chamber for the remainder of the sitting. 
4. In serious cases the President may pro-
pose that the representative who committed the 
offence be censured and excluded from the 
chamber for a period not exceeding four days. 
The representative upon whom a vote of censure 
is proposed shall always have the right to be 
heard. 
5. After the representative concerned has 
been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote 
of censure shall be taken without debate. 
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words 
or expressions which are contrary to the good 
conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his 
other rights for the maintenance of order, the 
President may cause such words to be deleted 
from the official report of debates. He shall 
have similar power as regards any intervention 
by a representative who has not obtained prior 
permission to speak or who exceeds the time 
that may have been allotted to speakers. 
RULE 15 
Public order in the chamber and galleries 
1. No person shall enter the chamber 
without having been invited by the President of 
the Assembly except representatives, ministers 
who are members of the Council of Western 
European Union, other ministers of member 
states and officials whose duties require their 
presence there. 
2. Only persons provided with a card gran-, 
ting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may 
be admitted to the galleries. 
3. Members of the public admitted to the 
galleries shall remain seated and in silence. 
Any person expressing approval or disapproval 
shall be ejected at once by the ushers. 
4. Duly accredited representatives of the 
media may be admitted to the chamber for the 
purpose of photographic and/or sound recording 
only under guidelines approved by the Presiden-
tial Committee. 
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RULE 22 
Reports of debates 
1. A report of debates at each sitting shall be 
compiled in French and English and distributed 
within as short a period as possible. A speech 
delivered in French or English shall be repro-
duced verbatim in the report compiled in the 
language in which the speech was delivered; a 
summary report of the simultaneous interpreta-
tion of the speech shall be incorporated in the 
report compiled in the other language. When a 
speech is delivered in an official language of a 
member state other than French or English, a 
summary report of its simultaneous interpre-
tation shall be incorporated in the reports 
compiled in French and English. 
2. Speakers are required to return the reports 
of their speeches to the Office of the Clerk not 
later than the day after that on which the reports 
were communicated to them. 
3. After each session or part-session the 
reports of debates shall be published in full in 
French and English. 
RULE 24 
Register of attendance 
At each morning and afternoon s1ttmg, 
each representative or his substitute shall sign 
the register of attendance in accordance with 
Rule 7 before taking his place. 
RuLE 26 
Order of debates 
1. A general debate and the examination of a 
text shall take place on the report of the com-
mittee to which the matter has been referred and 
not sooner than twenty-four hours after the dis-
tribution of the report unless the Assembly 
decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 
below. 
2. When examination of and voting on a text 
as a whole have been concluded and the results 
announced, representatives or substitutes may 
present explanations of votes. 
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RULE 22 
Reports of debates 
1. A report of debates at leach sitting shall be 
compiled in French and English and distributed 
within as short a period as possible. A speech 
delivered in French or English shall be repro-
duced verbatim in the rep<j>rt compiled in the 
language in which the speech was delivered; a 
summary report of the simultaneous interpreta-
tion of the speech shall be incorporated in the 
report compiled in the othe~ language. When a 
speech is delivered in an official language of a 
member state other than French or English, a 
summary report of its simultaneous interpreta-
tion shall be incorporat~d in the reports 
compiled in French and English. Speakers may 
submit corrections to the reports of their 
speeches not later than the day after that on 
which the reports were communicated to them. 
2. A full transcription ~f speeches made in 
Dutch, German and Italian shall be made avail-
able without delay to speakers on request. 
They may submit corrections to the transcrip-
tion of their speeches not later than the day after 
the speech was made. 
3. After each session or part-session the 
reports of debates shall be published in full in 
French and English. 
RULE 2f 
Register of attendance 
1. At each morning and afternoon sitting, 
each representative or his 1substitute shall sign 
the register of attendance b~fore taking his place. 
2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, 
the powers of a representattve who is prevented 
from attending a sitting fillY be exercised by a 
substitute who has duly sigrled the register. 
RULE 26 
Order of debates 
1. A general debate and the examination of 
a text shall take place on tie report of the com-
mittee to which the matter has been referred and 
not sooner than twenty-four hours after the dis-
tribution of the report ttnless the Assembly 
decides to apply the prqvisions of Rule 43 
below. · 
2. When examination of and voting on a text 
as a whole have been concluded and the results 
announced, representative$ may present expla-
nations of votes. 
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RuLE 27 
Debate on the annual report 
1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual 
report of the Council of Western European 
Union to each representative and substitute, 
together with related documents. 
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to 
the competent committees the relevant chapters 
of the annual report of the Council of Western 
European Union. 
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees 
shall be held before the opening or resumption 
of the session. 
These committees may formulate ques-
tions, which shall be transmitted by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly to the Council. The text 
of the questions put to the Council and of the 
replies thereto shall be included in reports of the 
committees to the Assembly. 
If a reply is postponed or omitted for 
reasons of European public interest, the question 
shall be published, with a statement of the· rea-
sons given by the Council which deferred or 
prevented the publication of a reply. 
4. The Chairman ofthe Council may present 
the report orally to the Assembly, and a general 
debate take place on the annual report and on 
the message of the Chairman of the Council. 
5. An examination in detail of the texts sub-
mitted by the committees shall begin not earlier 
than twenty-four hours after the distribution of 
their reports. 
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the 
annual report, or any part of the report, must be 
signed by at least ten representatives or substi-
tutes. The adoption of such a motion, which 
shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-
four hours after it has been tabled, shall require 
support from a number of representatives or 
substitutes equal to more than half the number 
of the representatives to the Assembly. 
RuLE 28 
Motions 
1. Motions may be tabled by representatives 
or substitutes on any matter within the aim and 
scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of 
the Charter. 
2. Motions must embody a concise summary 
of the subject raised and take the form of a 
recommendation, opinion or resolution. They 
shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at 
least ten representatives or substitutes. 
3. The President shall decide whether such 
motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, 
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RULE 27 
Debate on the annual report 
1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual 
report of the Council of Western European 
Union to each representative and substitute, 
together with related documents. 
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to 
the competent committees the relevant chapters 
of the annual report of the Council of Western 
European Union. 
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees 
shall be held before the opening or resumption 
of the session. These committees may formu-
late questions, which shall be transmitted by the 
President of the Assembly to the Council. The 
text of the questions put to the Council and of 
the replies thereto shall be included in reports of 
the committees to the Assembly. If a reply is 
postponed or omitted for reasons of European 
public interest, the question shall be published, 
with a statement of the reasons given by the 
Council which deferred or prevented the publi-
cation of a reply. 
4. The Chairman of the Council shall be 
invited to present the report orally to the Assem-
bly, and a general debate may take place on the 
annual report and on the message of the Chair-
man of the Council. 
5. An examination in detail of the texts sub-
mitted by the committees shall begin not earlier 
than twenty-four hours after the distribution of 
their reports. 
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the 
annual report, or any part of the report, must be 
signed by at least ten representatives. The 
adoption of such a motion, which shall not be 
put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours 
after it has been tabled, shall require support 
from a number of representatives or substitutes 
equal to more than half the number of the repre-
sentatives to the Assembly. 
RULE 28 
Motions 
1. Motions may be tabled by representatives 
on any matter within the aim and scope of the 
Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter. 
2. Motions must embody a concise summary 
of the subject raised and take the form of a 
recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or 
decision. They shall be submitted in writing 
and be signed by at least ten representatives. 
(a) Recommendations or opinions shall 
be addressed to the Council. 
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refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presi-
dential Committee. 
Motions which are in order shall be 
printed and distributed immediately. 
4. When the question of including such a 
motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the 
following only may be heard: one speaker for 
the motion, one speaker against and the chair-
man of any committee concerned. 
RuLE 29 
Amendments 
1. Any representative or substitute may pro-
pose and speak to amendments. The President 
shall decide whether they are in order. 
2. Amendments must be signed by their 
author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be 
printed and distributed before their conside-
ration by the Assembly. The President shall 
have the power not to select amendments for 
consideration if, in his opinion, there has not 
been adequate time for members of the Assem-
bly to study such amendments. 
3. Amendments shall relate directly to the 
text which it is sought to alter. Unless other-
wise decided by the President of the Assembly, 
they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. 
4. Amendments shall be put to the vote 
before the text to which they relate. 
5. If two or more amendments relate to the 
same paragraph, the amendment which differs 
most from the original text shall be put to the 
vote first. 
6. When several contradictory amendments 
are tabled, the President may rule that they be 
debated together, their authors speaking in turn 
before the amendments are put to the vote one 
by one. 
7. Amendments to amendments are in order 
only if they do not contradict the amendment; 
they may not be amended. They shall be 
debated after and put to the vote before the 
amendment to which they relate. 
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(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to 
international organisations, govern-
ments or national parliaments. 
(c) Orders shall be addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Assembly or to a com-
mittee. 
(d) Decisions concern the working of the 
Assembly and the status of its mem-
bers. 
3. The President shall decide whether such 
motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, 
refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presi-
dential Committee. Motions which are in order 
shall be printed and distributed immediately. 
4. When the question of including such a 
motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the 
following only may be heard: one speaker for 
the motion, one speaker against and the chair-
man of any committee concerned. 
RULE 29 
Amendments 
1. Any representative may propose and 
speak to amendments. The President shall 
decide whether they are in order. 
2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed 
by their author shall be distributed without 
delay. Unless otherwise decided by the Presi-
dent, no amendment shall be proposed and put 
to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been 
tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting 
preceding that at which it is considered. In the 
case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end 
with the opening of the sitting. 
3. Amendments shall relate directly to the 
text which it is sought to alter. Unless other-
wise decided by the President of the Assembly, 
they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. 
4. Amendments shall be put to the vote 
before the text to which they relate. 
5. If two or more amendments relate to the 
same paragraph, the amendment which differs 
most from the original text shall be put to the 
vote first. 
6. When several contradictory amendments 
are tabled, the President may rule that they be 
debated together, their authors speaking in turn 
before the amendments are put to the vote one 
by one. 
7. Amendments to amendments are in order 
only if they do not contradict the amendment ; 
they may not be amended. They shall be 
debated after and put to the vote before the 
amendment to which they relate. 
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8. The reference back of an amendment to 
committee may always be requested and shall be 
obligatory if requested by the chairman or 
rapporteur of the committee. 
9. The reference back of an amendment to 
committee shall not necessarily interrupt the 
debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit 
within which the committee shall report its 
conclusions on the amendments which have 
been referred to it. 
10. When amendments are being considered, 
unless the President of the Assembly decides 
otherwise, the only members who may speak 
shall be the mover of the amendment, or ano-
ther member speaking in its favour, one member 
opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur 
or the committee chairman. 
RULE 30 
Orders of the Assembly 
1. Any representative or substitute may lay 
on the table of the Assembly a motion for an 
order of the Assembly. The President shall 
decide whether such motions are in order. 
2. Such a motion may be put to the vote 
without being referred to committee. 
RULE 31 
Right to speak 
1. No representative or substitute may speak 
unless called upon to do so by the President. 
Representatives or substitutes shall speak from 
their place and shall address the Chair; the Pre-
sident may invite them to come to the rostrum. 
2. Representatives or substitutes wishing to 
speak shall either enter their names before the 
opening of the sitting in a register provided for 
the purpose or ask for the right to speak in the 
course of the sitting. The President may, in the 
interests of the debate, depart from the order in 
which representatives or substitutes have enter-
ed their names or have asked to speak. As far 
as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately 
upon speakers for and against the matter under 
discussion. Once begun, a speech may not be 
interrupted and resumed at the following sitting. 
3. A speaker may not be interrupted except 
on a point of order. He may, however, with the 
permission of the President, give way during his 
speech to allow another representative or substi-
tute to put to him a question on a particular 
point in his speech. 
4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President 
shall call him to order. If a speaker has already 
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8. When amendments are being considered, 
unless the President of the Assembly decides 
otherwise, the only members who may speak 
shall be the mover of the amendment, or 
another member speaking in its favour, one 
member opposed to the amendment and the rap-
porteur or the committee chairman. 
Deleted. 
RULE 30 
Orders of the Assembly 
RULE 31 
Right to speak 
1. No representative may speak unless called 
upon to do so by the President. Representa-
tives shall speak from their place and shall 
address the Chair; the President may invite 
them to come to the rostrum. 
2. Except for the chairman of the committee 
and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to 
speak in a general debate shall enter their names 
in a register provided for the purpose at the 
latest before the close of the sitting preceding the 
debate. In the case of the first sitting, their 
request to speak shall be made in writing before 
the opening of the part-session. Unless the Pre-
sident decides otherwise, no other representative 
shall be called upon to speak. 
3. A speaker may not be interrupted except 
on a point of order. He may, however, with the 
permission of the President, give way during his 
speech to allow another representative to put to 
him a question on a particular point in his 
speech. 
4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President 
shall call him to order. If a speaker has already 
been called to order twice in the same debate, 
the President may, on the third occasion, forbid 
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been called to order twice in the same debate, 
the President may, on the third occasion, forbid 
him to speak during the remainder of the debate 
on the same subject. 
5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs 
on a question under discussion shall be allowed 
to speak whenever they wish. 
6. A representative or substitute who wishes 
to make a personal statement shall be heard, but 
only at the end of a sitting. 
7. No representative or substitute may speak 
for more than five minutes on any of the follow-
ing: explanations of vote, personal statements, 
comments on the adoption of the minutes of 
proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining 
of the orders of the day of a sitting and all ques-
tions of procedure. 
RULE 32 
Procedural motions 
1. A representative or substitute shall have 
a prior right to speak if he asks leave: 
(a) to move the previous question which, 
if adopted, results in the subject of the 
debate being removed from the agenda 
and from the register ofthe Assembly; 
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting 
or the adjournment of the debate; 
(c) to move the closure of the debate; 
(d) to move reference back to committee. 
Previous questions shall be notified to the 
President before the opening of the sitting and 
put to the vote immediately after the presen-
tation of the relevant committee report. 
None of these procedural motions may be 
moved more than once during the course of a 
debate. 
2. The above matters shall take precedence 
over the main question, the debate on which 
shall be suspended while they are being con-
sidered. 
3. In debate on the above matters, the 
following only shall be heard: the proposer of 
the motion, one speaker against the motion, and 
the rapporteur or the chairman of any com-
mittee concerned. 
4. In addition, a representative or substitute 
shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave 
to raise a point of order. A point of order must 
be confined to raising questions of procedure for 
a ruling from the Chair. 
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him to speak during the remainder of the debate 
on the same subject. 
I 
5. Members of the Counc;il and rapporteurs 
on a question under discussiqn shall be allowed 
to speak whenever they wish. 
6. The President shall debde when a repre-
sentative may respond to a $tatement challeng-
ing him on a personal basis. No debate may 
take place on this response. 
7. No representative maiY speak for more 
than five minutes on any of the following: 
explanations of vote, personlj.l statements, com-
ments on the adoption of the minutes of procee-
dings of the preceding sitting,! determining of the 
order of business of the Assep1bly, the orders of 
the day of a sitting and all questions of proce-
dure. 
I 
RULE 32 
I 
Procedural motions 
I 
1. A representative shall have a prior right to 
speak ifhe asks leave: 
(a) to move the previc>us question which, 
if adopted, results In the subject of the 
debate being remo'(ed from the agenda 
and from the register ofthe Assembly; 
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting 
or the adjournment of the debate; 
I 
(c) to move the closure of the debate; 
I 
(d) to move reference back to committee. 
Previous questions shall be rtotified to the Presi-
dent before the opening of t~e sitting and put to 
the vote immediately after the presentation of 
the relevant committee re~ort. None of these 
procedural motions may be moved more than 
once during the course of a debate. 
2. The above matters sl}all take precedence 
over the main question, the debate on which 
shall be suspended while tl}ey are being consi-
dered. 
3. In debate on the above matters, the 
following only shall be he~rd: the proposer of 
the motion, one speaker against the motion, and 
the rapporteur or the chatrman of any com-
mittee concerned. 
4. In addition, a represclntative shall have a 
prior right to speak if he lj.Sks leave to raise a 
point of order. A point of order must be con-
fined to raising questions L.9f procedure for a 
ruling from the Chair. The time-limit for 
points of order shall be one 
1
minute. If the right 
to raise points of order is misused, the President 
may forbid the offending representative to speak 
for the remainder of the debate. 
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RULE 34 
Methods of voting 
1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and 
standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or 
secret ballot is required. 
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call: 
(a) when an absolute majority is required, 
in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of 
the Rules of Procedure; 
(b) on the draft reply to the annual report 
and on a draft recommendation or 
opinion considered as a whole, when-
ever five or more representatives or 
substitutes present in the chamber so 
desire; 
(c) in other cases, whenever ten or more 
representatives or substitutes present 
in the chamber so desire. 
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical 
order, beginning with the name of a represen-
tative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of 
mouth and shall be expressed by" Yes"," No", 
or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative 
votes shall count in calculating the number of 
votes cast. The President shall be responsible 
for the counting of votes and shall announce the 
result. The votes shall be recorded in the 
minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the 
alphabetical order of representatives' names. 
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by 
secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing 
the names of persons who have been duly 
entered as candidates shall be taken into account 
for the purpose of calculating the number of 
votes cast. 
1. 
RuLE 35 
Majorities 
The majorities required are the following: 
(a) for the adoption of-amendments to the 
Charter, for the adoption of a motion 
to disagree to the annual report or to 
any part of the report or for the adop-
tion of a request for urgent procedure 
without prior reference to committee: 
a number of representatives or substi-
tutes equal to more than half the num-
ber of representatives to the Assem-
bly; 
(b) for any other decision: a majority of 
the votes cast; 
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RULE 34 
M et hods of voting 
1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and 
standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or 
secret ballot is required. Only affirmative and 
negative votes shall count in calculating the 
number of votes cast. 
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call: 
(a) when an absolute majority is required, 
in accordance with Rule 35 (a) of the 
Rules of Procedure; 
(b) on the draft reply to the annual report 
and on a draft recommendation or 
opinion considered as a whole, when-
ever five or more representatives pre-
sent in the chamber so desire; 
(c) in other cases, whenever ten or more 
representatives present in the chamber 
so desire or if the President so decides. 
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical 
order, beginning with the name of a representa-
tive drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of 
mouth and shall be expressed by" Yes"," No", 
or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative 
votes shall count in calculating the number of 
votes cast. The President shall be responsible 
for the counting of votes and shall announce the 
result. The votes shall be recorded in the 
minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the 
alphabetical order of representatives' names. 
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by 
secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall 
count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers 
bearing the names of persons who have been 
duly entered as candidates shall be taken into 
account for the purpose of calculating the 
number of votes cast. The President shall 
announce the result. 
RULE 35 
Majorities 
The majorities required are the following: 
(a) for the adoption of amendments to the 
Charter, for the adoption of a motion 
to disagree to the annual report or to 
any part of the report or for the adop-
tion of a request for urgent procedure 
without prior reference to committee: 
a number of representatives or substi-
tutes equal to more than half the num-
ber of representatives to the Assem-
bly; 
(b) for any other decision: a majority of 
the votes cast (see Rule 34, paragraph 
1); 
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(c) for appointments other than those pro-
vided for in Rule 10 above: an abso-
lute majority of votes cast at the first 
ballot and a relative majority at the 
second ballot. 
2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall 
count in calculating the number of votes cast. 
RULE 36 
Quorum 
1. The Assembly shall not take any decision 
by roll-call unless more than half of the represen-
tatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have 
signed the register of attendance provided for in 
Rule 24 above. 
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall 
be valid, whatever the number of representatives 
or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a 
representative or substitute before the voting has 
begun, the President has ascertained that the 
number of representatives or substitutes who 
have signed the register of attendance is less 
than a quorum. 
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall 
be postponed. It may be taken at any time once 
there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has 
not been possible to vote before the end of 
the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall 
be referred to the Presidential Committee, which 
shall decide whether the text should be put to the 
vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or 
referred back to committee. 
RULE 39 
Appointment of committees 
1. At the beginning of each ordinary session 
the Assembly shall set up the following perma-
nent committees: 
(i) Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments; 
(ii) General Affairs Committee; 
(iii) Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions; 
(iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration; 
(v) Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
2. The first and second of the permanent 
committees shall be composed of twenty-seven 
members divided as follows: Belgium 3; France 
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(c) for appointments other than those pro-
vided for in Rulb 10 above: an abso-
lute majority of votes cast at the first 
ballot and a rel~tive majority at the 
second ballot. Iin the event of a tie, 
the candidate s~ior in age shall be 
declared elected. ' If only one candida-
ture is proposed 1to the Assembly and there is no oppo~ition to it, the single 
candidate shall be declared elected (see 
Rule 34, paragraph 4). 
! 
RULE 36 
I Quorum 
1. The Assembly shall ~ot take any decision 
by roll-call unless more than half of the represen-
tatives to the Assembly orJheir substitutes have 
signed the register of atten ance provided for in 
Rule 24 above. 
i 
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall 
be valid, whatever the numper of representatives 
or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a 
representative before the ViOting has begun, the 
President has ascertained lthat the number of 
representatives or substitutes who have signed 
the register of attendance is lless than a quorum. 
3. In the absence of a Q\lorum, the vote shall 
be postponed. It may be taken at any time once 
there is a quorum. Any rnatter on which it has 
not been possible to vote ll>efore the end of the 
part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be 
referred to the Presidentiall Committee, which 
shall decide whether the text should be put to the 
vote at the next part-sessio~ of the Assembly or 
referred back to committee.' 
RULE 39 
Appointment of c~mmittees 
1. At the beginning of efich ordinary session 
the Assembly shall set up tlhe following perma-
nent committees: 
I (i) Committee on • Defence Questions 
and Armaments; 
I (ii) General Affairs Committee; 
(iii) Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions; 
(iv) Committee on Bbdgetary Affairs and 
Administration; 
I 
(v) Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
2. The first and second of the permanent 
committees shall be compo$ed of twenty-seven 
members divided as follows : Belgium 3, France 
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5; the Federal Republic of Germany 5; Italy 5; 
Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 3; the United 
Kingdom 5. 
The third, fourth and fifth permanent com-
mittees shall be composed of twenty-one mem-
bers divided as follows: Belgium 2; France 4; 
the Federal Republic of Germany 4; Italy 4; 
Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 2; the United 
Kingdom4. 
3. The Assembly may set up special com-
mittees during the session, which may be reap-
pointed at the beginning of subsequent ses-
sions. The Assembly shall fix the total number 
of seats in such committees and the number of 
seats to be allotted to each member state. 
4. When setting up committees in accor-
dance with the provisions of the preceding para-
graph, the Assembly shall have regard to the 
activities of other European organisations. 
5. With the approval of the Council, the 
Assembly may appoint committees of investiga-
tion as provided for in Article VII {f) of the 
Charter, the composition, terms of reference and 
duration of which shall be defined in a reso-
lution. 
6. Candidatures for membership of com-
mittees shall be addressed to the Bureau which 
shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases 
provided for in Rule 8, paragraph 3, to the Presi-
dential Committee, proposals for their composi-
tion taking into account the representation of 
political tendencies. The President of the 
Assembly may invite the chairmen of political 
groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the 
Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential 
Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed 
nominations for one or more seats in a com-
mittee. 
7. The bureau of each committee shall be 
composed of a chairman and two vice-chair-
men. Representatives or substitutes who are 
members of governments shall not be members 
ofthe bureau of a committee. 
RULE 40 
Powers of committees 
1. Committees shall examine questions and 
documents which are referred to them by the 
Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Committees shall also examine the action 
taken on recommendations and resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly on their reports. 
3. Should a committee declare itself not 
competent to consider a question, or should a 
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5, the Federal Republic of Germany 5, Italy 5, 
Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, the United 
Kingdom 5. The third, fourth and fifth perma-
nent committees shall be composed of twenty-
one members divided as follows: Belgium 2, 
France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, 
Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, the 
United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Commit-
tee may, during the periods between sessions or 
part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which 
have fallen vacant in committees with represen-
tatives or substitutes. These appointments 
must be ratified at the first session of the 
Assembly. 
3. The Assembly may set up special commit-
tees during the session, which may be reap-
pointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. 
The Assembly shall fix the total number of 
seats in such committees and the number of 
seats to be allotted to each member state. 
4. When setting up committees in accor-
dance with the provisions of the preceding para-
graph, the Assembly shall have regard to the 
activities of other European organisations. 
5. With the approval of the Council, the 
Assembly may appoint committees of investiga-
tion as provided for in Article VII {f) of the 
Charter, the composition, terms of reference and 
duration of which shall .be defined in a decision. 
6. Candidatures for membership of commit-
tees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall 
submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided 
for in paragraph 2 above, to the Presidential 
Committee, proposals for their composition 
taking into account the representation of politi-
cal tendencies. The President of the Assembly 
may invite the chairmen of political groups to 
attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. 
The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, 
shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations 
for one or more seats in a committee. 
7. The bureau of each committee shall be 
composed of a chairman and two vice-chairmen. 
Representatives who ate members of govern-
ments shall not be members of the bureau of a 
committee. 
RULE 40 
Powers of committees 
1. Committees shall examine questions and 
documents which are referred to them by the 
Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Committees shall also examine the action 
taken on recommendations and resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly on their reports. 
3. Should a committee declare itself not 
competent to consider a question, or should a 
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conflict arise over the competence of two or 
more committees, the question of competence 
shall be submitted to the Presidential Com-
mittee or the Assembly. 
4. Committees of the Assembly may request 
the Council to communicate documents or 
information necessary for their enquiries. 
5. A committee may, with the approval of 
the Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or 
several of its members to undertake a mission 
for purposes of information or study. 
RuLE 41 
Procedure in committees 
1. A committee shall meet when convened 
by its chairman or at the request of the President 
of the Assembly, either during or between 
sessions. 
2. A committee may, in the interest of its 
work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of 
which it shall at the same time determine the 
composition and competence. However, the 
number of members of a subcommittee may not 
exceed a third of the membership of the full 
committee. 
3. Any two or more committees or subcom-
mittees may hold a joint meeting for the exami-
nation of subjects coming within their compe-
tence, but may not reach a joint decision. 
4. The rules adopted for the Assembly 
concerning the election of the President and 
Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 1 0), the minutes of 
proceedings (Rule 21 ), amendments (Rule 29), 
the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions 
(Rule 32), and methods of voting (Rule 34), shall 
apply to the proceedings of committees, subject 
to the following provisions : 
(a) A committee shall vote by show of 
hands, unless any representative or 
substitute requests a vote by roll-
call. The vote on any text which is to 
be tabled in the Assembly shall be 
taken by roll-call. The roll shall be 
called alphabetically beginning with 
the letter "A". Election shall take 
place by secret ballot. The formal 
proposal of candidates is optional. 
(b) Voting in committee shall be by abso-
lute majority of the votes cast, pro-
vided that election shall be by relative 
majority at the second ballot, if neces-
sary. In the event of a tie, the candi-
date senior in age shall be declared 
elected. 
(c) A committee may deliberate when 
one-third of its members are present, 
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conflict arise over the copipetence of two or 
more committees, the question of competence 
shall be submitted to the Presidential Commit-
tee or the Assembly. I 
4. Committees of the Assembly may request 
the Council to commun~cate documents or 
information necessary for tlleir enquiries. 
5. A committee may, 'j\rith the approval of 
the Presidential Committee, appoint one or 
several of its members to undertake a mission 
for purposes ofinformation1 or study. 
RULE 4~ 
Procedure in cormittees 
1. A committee shall meet when convened 
by its chairman or at the request of the President 
of the Assembly, either I during or between 
sessions. 
2. In application of Rqle 40, paragraph 5, a 
committee may, in the interest of its work, 
appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it 
shall at the same time determine the composi-
tion and competence. However, the number of 
members of a subcommitttte may not exceed a 
third of the membership ofthe full committee. 
3. Any two or more committees or subcom-
mittees may hold a joint mbeting for the exami-
nation of subjects coming within their compe-
tence, but may not reach a jfint decision. 
4. The rules adopted for the Assembly 
concerning the election of the President and 
Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 anU 10), the minutes of 
proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), 
the right to speak (Rule 31)1 procedural motions (Rule 32), methods of vdting (Rule 34) and 
majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)), shall 
apply to the proceedings o~ committees, subject 
to the following provisions: · 
(a) A committee shl\ll vote by show of 
hands, unless an[y representative re-
quests a vote by roll-call. The vote 
on any text which
1
is to be tabled in the 
Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. 
The roll shall be called alphabetically 
beginning with th~ letter "A". Elec-
tion shall take place by secret ballot. 
The formal proposal of candidates is 
optional. i 
(b) A committee may deliberate when 
one-third of its Il}embers are present, 
but elections or the vote on a report as 
a whole shall not be valid unless the 
majority of the members of the com-
mittee are present. 
(c) Substitutes may b<t elected members of 
the bureau of a cmlnmittee. 
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but the vote on a report as a whole 
shall not be valid unless the majority 
of the members of the committee are 
present. 
5. The chairman of the committee may take 
part in discussions and may vote, but without 
having a casting vote. 
6. Committee meetings shall be held in 
private. Unless a committee decides otherwise, 
representatives and substitutes may attend mee-
tings of that committee even though they are not 
members, but they may not take part in its dis-
cussions. 
A representative or substitute who has 
moved a motion which has been referred to a 
committee may, however, be invited by that 
committee to take part in its discussions in an 
advisory capacity. 
7. The conditions in which any person who 
is not a representative or substitute may be 
heard by a committee shall be decided by that 
committee. If the committee agrees, such a per-
son may take part in the discussions at the dis-
cretion of the chairman. 
8. The conditions in which the officials of 
Western European Union and experts are heard 
by a committee shall be determined in each case 
after agreement with the Council. 
9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up 
for each committee meeting. 
10. Unless a committee decides otherwise, 
and subject to the confidential character of infor-
mation communicated by the Council, the only 
texts which shall be made public shall be the 
reports that have been agreed to, or statements 
issued on the responsibility of the chairman. 
RULE 42 
Reports of committees 
1. The committees shall appoint a rappor-
teur for each subject, who shall be responsible 
for the preparation of the report of the com-
mittee and for introducing it to the Assembly. 
The final report of a committee shall comprise 
an explanatory memorandum and a substantive 
text. 
2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in 
particular, state the result of the vote taken in 
committee on the report as a whole and, if the 
committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must 
also state the opinion of the minority. 
3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by 
the Assembly. It must be presented in the form 
of a draft recommendation or opinion addressed 
to the Council, a draft resolution or a draft 
order. 
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5. The chairman of the committee may take 
part in discussions and may vote, but without 
having a casting vote. 
6. Committee meetings shall be held in pri-
vate. Unless a committee decides otherwise, 
representatives may attend meetings of that 
committee even though they are not members, 
but they may not take part in its discussions. A 
representative who has moved a motion which 
has been referred to a committee may, however, 
be invited by that committee to take part in its 
discussions in an advisory capacity. 
7. The conditions in which any person who 
is not a representative or substitute may be 
heard by a committee shall be decided by that 
committee. If the committee agrees, such a per-
son may take part in the discussions at the dis-
cretion of the chairman. 
8. The conditions in which the officials of 
Western European Union and experts are heard 
by a committee shall be determined in each case 
after agreement with the Council. 
9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up 
for each committee meeting. 
10. Unless a committee decides otherwise, 
and subject to the confidential character of infor-
mation communicated by the Council, the only 
texts which shall be made public shall be the 
reports that have been agreed to, or statements 
issued on the responsibility of the chairman. 
RULE 42 
Reports of committees 
1. The committees shall appoint a rappor-
teur for each subject, who shall be responsible 
for the preparation of the report of the commit-
tee and for introducing it to the Assembly. The 
final report of a committee shall comprise an 
explanatory memorandum and a substantive 
text. 
2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in 
particular, state the result of the vote taken in 
committee on the report as a whole and, if the 
committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must 
also state the opinion of the minority. 
3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by 
the Assembly. It must be presented in the form 
of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, 
order or decision as defined in Rule 28. 
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RuLE 43 
Urgent procedure 
1. At the request of the Council, of the com-
mittee concerned, or of ten or more representa-
tives or substitutes, a debate may be held on an 
item which has not been placed on the agenda. 
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure 
is received, the President shall cammunicate it 
orally to the Assembly. The request shall then 
be posted up and the relevant text circulated. 
The Assembly shall decide on the request for 
urgent procedure at the earliest after the first 
vote included in the orders of the day of the 
sitting at which the request for urgent procedure 
was communicated to the Assembly and at the 
latest at the beginning of the next sitting. 
3. The debate on a request for urgent proce-
dure shall not enter into the substance of the 
question other than to justify the request or to 
reject the urgent procedure. In connection with 
a request for urgent procedure, the following 
only may be heard: one speaker for the request, 
one speaker against, the chairman of the com-
mittee concerned and one representative of the 
Bureau speaking in its name. 
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent 
procedure, another request concerning the same 
question may not be placed before it during the 
same part-session. 
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assem-
bly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 
26, decide that the debate on the substance of 
the text shall be held on an oral report of the 
appropriate committee, either at the beginning 
of the orders of the day of the next sitting or at a 
later date during the current part-session. 
6. Any request for urgent procedure without 
prior reference to committee shall be put to the 
vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a 
favourable vote by a number of representatives 
or substitutes equal to more than half the 
number of representatives to the Assembly. 
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4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session 
shall be adopted by committees at least three 
weeks before the opening of the relevant part-
session. A report not ado»ted in time shall be 
withdrawn from the agencta. However, if that 
report has been adopted unanimously, the 
Assembly may decide at th~ request ofthe com-
mittee to keep it on its agenda, unless twenty repre-
sentatives are opposed. S\lch a decision shall 
be taken before the order o~ business is adopted 
(Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed 
time-limit a report placed b~fore it, the commit-
tee may, after that time-lim~t, prepare a supple-
mentary report to take account of current events. 
RULE 43 
Urgent procedure 
1. At the request of the Council, of the com-
mittee concerned, or of ten or more representati-
ves, a debate may be held op an item which has 
not been placed on the agenda. 
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure 
is received, the President shall communicate it 
orally to the Assembly. The request shall then 
be posted up and the relevant text circulated. 
The Assembly shall decide: on the request for 
urgent procedure at the earliest after the first 
vote included in the orders pf the day of the sit-
ting at which the request fur urgent procedure 
was communicated to the Assembly and at the 
latest at the beginning ofthelnext sitting. 
3. The debate on a request for urgent proce-
dure shall not enter into *e substance of the 
question other than to justify the request or to 
reject the urgent procedure. In connection with 
a request for urgent proc~dure, the following 
only may be heard: one speaker for the request, 
one speaker against, the cl¥tirman of the com-
mittee concerned and one *epresentative of the 
Bureau speaking in its name. 
4. If the Assembly deqides against urgent 
procedure, another request concerning the same 
question may not be placed before it during the 
same part-session. I 
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assem-
bly may, notwithstanding t9e provisions of Rule 
26, decide that the debate on the substance of 
the text shall be held on an oral report of the 
appropriate committee, eit~er at the beginning 
of the orders of the day of the next sitting or at a 
later date during the current ,part-session. 
I 
6. Any request for urgerit procedure without 
prior reference to committee shall be put to the 
vote by roll-call. Its adoPtion shall require a 
favourable vote by a number of representatives 
or substitutes equal to mor~ than half the num-
ber of representatives to the ~ssembly. 
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RULE 45 
Written questions 
1. Any representative or substitute may put 
written questions to the Council in accordance 
with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text of 
such questions shall be transmitted by the Presi-
dent to the Chairman of the Council. Ques-
tions and answers shall be published by the 
Clerk of the Assembly. 
2. All questions governed by this rule to 
which an answer has not been given within a 
period of one month shall be published, together 
with a statement that no reply has been received. 
RULE 47 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the 
Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He 
shall provide the Assembly and its committees 
with such secretariat and other assistance as they 
may require. 
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a 
solemn declaration before the Assembly that he 
will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions, that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties 
from any government or authority other than 
the Assembly, and will refrain from any action 
incompatible with his position as a European 
civil servant. 
2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the 
Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or tem-
porary basis as members of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
3. The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
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RULE 45 
Written questions 
1. Any representative may put written ques-
tions to the Council in accordance with Article V 
(i) of the Charter. The text of such questions 
shall be transmitted by the President to the 
Chairman of the Council. Questions and ans-
wers shall be published by the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
2. All questions governed by this rule to 
which an answer has not been given within a 
period of one month shall be published, together 
with a statement that no reply has been received. 
RULE 47 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presi-
dential Committee on the proposal of the 
Bureau. His term of office shall expire at the end 
of the fifth year following his appointment and 
may be renewed. If there has not been an 
appointment or reappointment before 30th June 
of the year in which his term of office expires, 
his term of office shall be extended by one year. 
2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make 
a solemn declaration before the Assembly that 
he will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions, that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties 
from any government or authority other than 
the Assembly, and will refrain from any action 
incompatible with his position as a European 
civil servant. 
3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk 
shall be responsible to the President. He shall 
provide the Assembly and its committees with 
such secretariat and other assistance as they may 
require. 
4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the 
proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the 
Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period 
of more than one year. It may delegate to the 
Clerk the right to appoint permanent or tempo-
rary officials of a given level. 
5. The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
APPENDIX 
RULE 50 
Waiver of the immunity of representatives 
and substitutes 
1. Any request addressed to the President by 
the competent authority of a member state for 
the waiver of the immunity of a representative 
or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assem-
bly and then referred without prior discussion to 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges. 
2. The committee shall immediately consi-
der the request, but shall not make any examina-
tion of the merits of the case in question. The 
representative or substitute concerned may, if he 
so wishes, be heard by the committee. The 
report of the committee shall conclude with a 
draft resolution for the retention or the waiver of 
the immunity. 
3. The report ofthe committee shall automa-
tically be included as the first item of the orders 
of the day for the first day on which the Assem-
bly sits after the report has been laid upon the 
table of the Assembly. 
4. The debate on the report shall be confin-
ed to arguments for or against the waiver 
ofthe immunity. 
5. The President shall immediately inform 
the authority which submitted the request 
of the decision of the Assembly. 
RULE 51 
Revision ofthe Rules of Procedure 
1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure 
must be supported by ten or more representa-
tives or substitutes. They shall be referred 
without debate to the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on 
them, as provided by Rule 42 above. 
2. The examination of the report of the com-
mittee shall be included in the orders of the day 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 
above. 
3. The debate shall be concerned only with 
the relevant texts. 
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RuLE ~0 
Waiver of the immunity of representatives and 
substitufes 
1. Any request addressed to the President by 
the competent authority of a member state for 
the waiver of the immunity of a representative 
or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assem-
bly and then referred withQut prior discussion to 
the Committee on Rules of' Procedure and Privi-
leges. 
2. The committee shal~ immediately consi-
der the request, but shall not make any examina-
tion of the merits of the cltse in question. The 
representative or substitute 1 concerned may, ifhe 
so wishes, be heard by the committee. The 
report of the committee shall conclude with a 
draft decision for the retention or the waiver of 
the immunity. 
I 
3. The report of the committee shall automa-
tically be included as the first item of the orders 
of the day for the first day pn which the Assem-
bly sits after the report has been laid upon the 
table ofthe Assembly. 
4. The debate on the report shall be confin-
ed to arguments for or . against the waiver 
of the immunity. I 
5. The President shall immediately inform 
the authority which subm~tted the request of 
the decision of the Assembly. 
RULE 51 
Revision of the RuteJ of Procedure 
1. Motions to amend th~ Rules of Procedure 
must be supported by ten dr more representati-
ves. They shall be referred without debate to 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges, which shall report on them, as provided by 
Rule 42 above. 
2. The examination of tlie report of the com-
mittee shall be included in the orders of the day 
in accordance with the prqvisions of Rule 17 
above. · 
3. The debate shall be concerned only with 
the relevant texts. I 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Bianco and others 
2nd December 1985 
1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles Ill, IV, XI and XII of the 
Charter. 
2. Leave out paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rule 47). 
Signed: Bianco, Amadei, Antoni, Mezzapesa, Foschi, Rauti, Masciadri, Giust, Sinesio, Martino, 
Sarti, Mitterdorfer, Francese 
l. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment 1 withdrawn; amendment 2 fell). 
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Amendments 3 to 9 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENTS 3 to 9 1 
tabled by Lord Hughes and others 
3rd December 1985 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles Ill, IV XI and XII of the 
Charter, leave out" (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committbe on the proposal of 
the Bureau for a period of five years." and insert" (a) The Clerk shall be appointe<jl by the Assembly on 
the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years.". 
4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the 
following new paragraph: 
"9. Rule 14 
In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out 'and'. 
In paragraph 1, line 6, after 'committees' insert 'and one member appointed by each political 
gr~. I 
In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out 'The President may invite the Chairmen o(the political groups 
to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee'." · 
5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the !Rules of Procedure, 
leave out" Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.". 
I 
6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, 
leave out" and there is no opposition to it". 
7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the ~ules of Procedure, 
leave out" Leave out paragraph 4(b). ". 
8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, 
leave out " Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau " and insert " Assembly on the 
proposal of the Presidential Committee". 1 
9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the 
proposed new paragraph 4, line 1, leave out" shall" and insert" may". 
I 
Signed: Hughes, Tummers, Hardy, Buchner, Stoffelen, Blaauw, van Tets, Jung, Cifarelli, 
Staels-Do m pas 
I. See 2nd and 4th sittings, 2nd and 3rd June 1986 (amendments 3, 4, 6 and 8 agreed to; amendments 51 7 and 9 withdrawn). 
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Amendment 10 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENT 10 1 
tabled by Mr. Schulte and others 
4th December 1985 
10. In paragraph 3, line 9, ofthe draft resolution on the revision of Articles Ill, IV, XI and XII of the 
Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out ", the secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. " and insert " and the three agencies for 
security questions. " 
Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Bullesheim, Unland, Lenzer, Berger, Enders, Ahrens, Stoffelen, 
Schmidt, Gansel, Staels-Dompas 
I. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 11 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENT 11 1 
tabled by Mr. Schulte and others 
4th December 1985 
11. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rulesl of Procedure, in the 
proposed new paragraph 5, leave out " , the secretariat of the Standing Armament~ Committee and the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments." and insert" and the three agencies for security questions.". 
Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies vo1 BiUlesheim, Unland 
1. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 12 and 13 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENTS 12 AND 13 1 
tabled by Mr. Schulte 
30th May 1986 
12. At the end of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles Ill, IV, XI and XII ofthe Charter, 
add a new paragraph as follows: 
" 5. That these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986. " 
13. At the beginning of the operative text of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Proce-
dure, after" To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows" insert "and that these amendments shall 
come into force on 1st October 1986 ". 
Signed: Schulte 
I. See 2nd and 4th sittings, 2nd and 3rd June 1986 (amendments agreed to). 
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Amendments 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 
Revision and interpretation of the 
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENTS 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 1 
tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
2nd June 1986 
14. In paragraph 8 ofthe draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the pro-
posal to add at the end of paragraph 2" Ifthe President speaks in a debate on a sp~cific subject, he may 
not resume the chair until the debate on that subject is over". 
15. In paragraph 13 ofthe draft resolution on the revision ofthe Rules ofProce4ure, insert at the end 
of the penultimate line: 
"4. (a) Orders addressed to a committee under sub-paragraph 3(c) of this nde shall be put to the 
vote without reference to committee. 1 
(b) When the question of including in the Assembly's register any other text referred to in 
paragraph 3 of this rule is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one 
speaker for the motion, one speaker against, and the chairman of any committee con-
cerned." 
i 
16. In paragraph 14 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Proctedure, in the second 
line of the proposed new paragraph 2, leave out "Unless otherwise decided by the President". 
17. In paragraph 15 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of ProJedure, omit the pro-
posal to leave out paragraph 6 of Rule 31. 
18. In paragraph 22 of the draft resolution on the revision ofthe Rules ofProce~ure, in the proposed 
new paragraph 4 of Rule 42, leave out " However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the com-
mittee, to place the report on the agenda unless twenty representatives are opposfd. Such a decision 
shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). " ' 
19. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of rrocedure, insert the 
following new paragraph: 
"Rule 12 
After paragraph 1 insert: 
2. A Vice-President who replaces the President may not speak in the particul~r debate over which 
he has presided. " · 
Renumber existing paragraph 2 accordingly. 
Signed: Finsberg 
I. See 2nd sitting, 2nd June 1986 (amendments 14 and 19 negatived; amendments 15, 17 and 18 ~thdrawn; amendment 16 
agreed to). 
63 
Document 1049 6th May 1986 
AGENDA 
of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session 
Paris, 2nd-5th June 1986 
I. Report of the Council 
Thirty-first annual report of the Council to 
the Assembly 
11. Political Questions 
1. Reactivation of WEU - its tasks, struc-
ture and place in Europe 
2. Security and terrorism - the implica-
tions for Europe of crises in other parts 
of the world 
Ill. Defence Questions 
1. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
2. European security and the Mediterra-
nean 
3. Emerging technology and military strat-
egy 
IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions and Western European 
defence 
2. Canadian-European co-operation in 
high technology 
V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
1. Draft opinion on the budgets of the 
ministeral organs of WEU for 1985 
(revised) and 1986 
VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
Revision and interpretation of the Charter 
and of the Rules of Procedure 
VII. Parliamentary and Public Relations 
1. Parliaments, public opinion and 
defence 
2. Promotion of parliamentary and public 
interest in WEU matters 
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Report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion 
Report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von 
Biillesheim and Unland on behalf of the Commit-
tee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Report tabled by Mrs. Fischer on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
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Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session 
Paris, 2nd-5th June 1986 
MONDAY, 2nd JUNE 
Meetings of political groups. 
12 noon 
22nd May 1986 
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
I 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-second: ordinary session. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
1. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation ofthe report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Presfdential Committee. 
Debate. 
2. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
3. Parliaments, public opinion and defence: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committ~e for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. I 
Debate. 
4. Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Fischer on behalf of the Committ~e for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. I 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft resolutions. 
5. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Biillesheim and Unland on behalf 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. ! 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft resolutions. 
TUESDAY, 3rd JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Reactivation of WEU - its tasks, structure and place in Europe: 1 
presentation ofthe report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalfofthe General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
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2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
4. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs ofWEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
1. Thirty-first annual report of the Council: 
presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs ofltaly, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
2. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium. 
3. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom. 
4. Reactivation of WEU - its tasks, structure and place in Europe; 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence; 
Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs ofWEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986: 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
WEDNESDAY, 4th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. European security and the Mediterranean: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
2. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. 
4. European security and the Mediterranean: 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Canadian-European co-operation in high technology: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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THURSDAY, Sth JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe of crises in other patts of the world: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Commit-
tee; 
presentation of the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and trmaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Emerging technology and military strategy: . 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the CoPtmittee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. I 
Debate. · 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARfY SESSION 
I 
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Armaments sector of industry in the member countries 
ECONOMIC STUDY 
prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee 
This study has been circulated separately. 
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Emerging technology and military strategy 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on emerging technology and military strategy 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Definition and understanding of emerging technology 
A. General 
B. Emerging technologies 
C. Applications 
Ill. Official proposals involving emerging technology 
A. The Weinberger proposals in NATO 
B. The European response to the ET initiative 
C. Follow-on forces attack (FOFA) 
D. United States forces' doctrines 
IV. The relationship with military strategy 
I 
V. Economic aspects of emerging technology I 
19th February 1986 
! 
A. Volume and trend of defence research and development expen,iture 
B. Costs of emerging technology project 
C. Cost-effectiveness 
D. European share 
VI. Emerging technology and arms control 
VII. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, Sir 
Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. van den Bergh, Bourges, Brown, De Decker (AIIternate: Close), Dejardin, 
Edwards, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Giust, Huyghues des Etages, Konen (Alternate: Hengel), de Kwaadfteniet (Alternate: Aarts), 
Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Natiez, Pecchioli, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Sto es. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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APPENDICES 
I. Comparative table of defence effort 1981-1985 
A. Financial effort 
B. Manpower effort 
11. Table I : Expenditure on defence research and development (as % of total 
defence expenditure) 
Table 11 : Expenditure on defence research and development (ECU million 
at 1975 prices and exchange rates) 
Table Ill : Defence research and development indicators 
Ill. l. Air-land battle and FOFA target arrays 
2. An interim conventional interdiction system capability will be in place by 
the late 1980s 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report and another on the strategic defence initiative, 1the Rapporteur had 
interviews as follows: 
lOth January 1985- Ministry of Defence, The Hague 
General G.L.J. Huijser, ChiefofDefence Staff; 
Lt. General G.W. Boerman, National Armaments Director; 
Major General Ir. C. M. van den Bergh, Director of Materiel, Army ; 
Commodore Ir. W.J.A. van Raay, Deputy Director Materiel, Navy; 
Major General Ir. H. Boekenoogen, Director of Materiel, Air Force ; 
Brigadier General Ir. E.B. van Erp Taalmankip, Materiel Department, Air Fqrce ; 
Dr. Bert Kraamers, Policy Planning Staff; 
Colonel H.A. Konzy, Chief, Planning Division, Army Staff; 
Colonel de Jong, Information Department, Air Force; 
Lt. Colonel Vollema. 
25th January 1985- Ministry of Defence, Bonn 
Major General Huttel, Assistant Chief of Staff, Politico-Military Affairs; 
Colonel Wiesmann, Politico-Military Affairs ; 
Colonel Rode, NATO Affairs ; 
Colonel Dingier, Armaments Co-operation ; 
Colonel Bromeis, Operations ; 
Lt. Colonel Dr. Schilling, Military-Strategic Affairs ; 
Lt. Colonel Lehr, Defence Planning ; 
Lt. Colonel Wenger, Defence Intelligence; 
Dr. Schloenbach, Armaments; 
Mr. Wenthe, Armaments Research. 
8th February 1985- London 
Chatham House RIIA 
Mr. John Roper, Research Fellow, former Chairman of the committee. 
Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Nigel Nicholls, Assistant Under-Secretary, Defence Staff; 
Mr. John Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary, International Procurement; 
Mr. Nigel Hughes, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser; 
Mr. Brian Hawtin, Head ofNATO/UK Policy Division; 
Mr. T.M. Bossom, Head Resources and Programmes Division; 
Wing Commander R. MacKendrick, Defence Policy Staff; 
Dr. Waters, Scientific Staff; 
Colonel G.J. Bamett, Defence Concepts Staff; 
Miss Hilary Thompson, NATO Policy Division. 
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Plessey Electronics 
Mr. Peter Bates, Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom Representative to NATO Industrial 
Advisory Group (NIAG). 
14th February 1985- NATO Headquarters, Brussels 
Mr. Robin Beard, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support ; 
Mr. M. Weiss, Director of Armaments and Defence Research; 
Mr. N. Spridgen, Armaments and Defence Research; 
Mr. J.M. Stewart, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy. 
25th February-1st March 1985- Washington 
25th February- Department of Defence 
Mr. George Bader, Principal Director, European and NATO Policy, ISP; 
Dr. Harlan Straus, Director, Northern Europe Region, ISP ; 
Mr. Louis Michael, Assistant Under-Secretary, Plans and Development, ORE; 
Dr. James Tegnelia, Assistant Under-Secretary, Conventional Initiatives, ORE ; 
Ms. Mary Ann Gilleece, Deputy Under-Secretary, Acquisition Management; 
Mr. Waiter Henderson, Senior Negotiator, International Acquisition; 
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director, NATO and European Affairs, ORE. 
26th February- Department of Defence 
Mr. Ronald S. Lauder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, ISP ; 
Dr. Steven D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Trade and Security Policy 
(East-West Trade); 
Mr. Randy Bell and Mr. Robert Fiss, Office of Regional Policy Issues, ISP ; 
Mr. Talbot Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary, International Programmes and Technology, 
DRE. 
State Department 
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Bureau. 
Consultant 
Dr. Steven Canby. 
27th February- State Department 
Mr. James Huff, Director, Benelux Department; 
Mr. Martin Wenick, Director, Northern European Affairs; 
Mr. James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs. 
Department of Defence 
Major General Klein, Vice-Director, JS, Plans and Policy, JCS; Colonel Robbins; Major 
Emerson ; Major Dials ; 
Lt. Colonel Sandrock ; 
Commander Sheffield. 
House of Representatives 
Mr. Warren Nelson, Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee. 
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28th February 1985- The Raytheon Corporation, Boston, Mass. 
1st March 1985- National Security Industrial Association, Washington 
Mr. George Newsome, Chairman of the International Committee and representative of Seyfarth, 
Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson ; ' 
Colonel Bruce E. Green, USA (Ret), International Committee Executive. 
Representatives of United States Industry 
Mr. M. Edward Carlson, Director, International Programmes Honeywell, Inc. ; 
Mr. Harley A. Cloud, Director of Technology, Federal Systems Division IBM Corporation; 
Mr. Waiter R. Edgington, Vice-President Marketing, GTE Business Systems Corporation ; 
Mr. Harold V. Larson, Manager International Representation, Rockwell International Overseas 
Corp.; 
Mr. George H. Perlman, Vice-President International Martin Marietta Corporation; 
Mr. Arthur J. Stanziano, Vice-President Government Affairs, Hazeltine Corporation; 
Mr. John C. Stockett Jr., Consultant, Sanders Associates, Inc.; 
Mr. H.C. Witthaus, Industry-Government Relations, General Motors Corporation ; 
Mr. Richard G. Woodbury, Vice-President, Contraves Goerz Corporation. 
Representatives of Department of Defence 
Mr. Frank Cevasco ; 
Dr. Harlan Straus. 
8th March 1985- Paris- Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Henri Conze, Deputy Director, International Relations, Delegation Generale pour 
I' Armement ; 
Mr. Mazens, DGA ; 
General Juin, Deputy Director, GPES; 
Colonel Baer, Defence Staff, IBEG ; 
Colonel Brunet, Defence Staff- Plans and Policy ; 
Colonel de Linage, Defence Staff- General Studies ; 
Professor J. Lestel, Research and Study Directorate, DGA. 
The committee as a whole met at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt. 
General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on emerging 
technology and military strategy. It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the 
North Atlantic Assembly. 
The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed by General 
Charles de Llamby, Commander First French Army, and members of his staff, and at Headquarters 
French Forces in Germany Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Hou(iet, Commander-in-
Chief, and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff. 
The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by 
Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post 
where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by 
General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations. 
The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and 
20th May when it discussed earlier drafts of a combined report on emerging technology and military 
strategy, which also dealt with SDI. 
At a further meeting in Geneva on 24th July 1985, the committee was addressed by represen-
tatives to the Conference on Disarmament. At that meeting, the committee asked the Rapporteur to 
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separate the parts of his draft report which dealt with the strategic defence initiative, and with emerging 
technology and military strategy. 
Following its meeting in Turkey and Greece from 23rd to 30th October when the committee took 
evidence for a forthcoming report on European security and the Mediterranean, the committee then 
met at the seat of WEU in London on 4th November 1985 when it discussed and adopted that part of 
its report dealing with the strategic defence initiative (Document 1 033). The present report was 
adopted by the committee at its meeting in Paris on 19th February 1986. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, 
officials, senior officers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions. 
In particular, the Rapporteur thanks the international secretariat of the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the preparation of the report, 
for its invaluable help. Material problems which made it impossible to make full use of that assistance 
were raised in the committee's report replying to the annual report ofthe Council (Document 1019). 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on emerging technology and military strategy 
The Assembly, • 
(i) Aware of a number of projects in the NATO and IEPG frameworks involvlng the application of 
the most recent technology to weapons and defence equipment, arising in partic~lar from the United 
States emerging technology proposal, and SACEUR's follow-on forces attack concept ; 
(ii) Considering that in many cases NATO countries could advantageous!~ introduce modern 
technology more rapidly into conventional weapons systems to help offset W*saw Pact numerical 
superiority in tanks, guns, and aircraft; 
(iii) Believing that the European allies must examine all such proposals carefully, and that the 
introduction of modern technology into defence equipment must satisfy lthe criteria of this 
recommendation ; 1 
(iv) Calling for the possible arms control implications of the introduction of emerging technology into 
conventional weapons systems to be more closely studied, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that current proposals for the introduction of emerging technolob into conventional 
weapons systems or for the follow-on forces attack concept meet the following crit~ria : 
(a) they should fit the conceptual framework being developed by the NATO Military Committee, 
and take account of North Atlantic Council recommendations bearing ~n mind the need for 
deterrence to maintain peace and security both in Europe and in the world ; 
(b) they should be cost-effective and affordable within the limits of national defence budgets; 
(c) they should emphasise again the need for standardisation and co-opera~'on at European level 
which is also a precondition of co-operation between the European ~llies and the United 
States; : 
I 
(d) they should lead to a balanced and just transatlantic sharing and transfer of technology, 
research and production, and improve interoperability ; 
(e) they should be capable of being taken into account in current and I future arms control 
negotiations ; 1 
2. Report annually to the Assembly on the progress being made on the list of priority projects 
selected by the IEPG ; j 
3. Instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questiohs to report annually 
to the Assembly on the arms control implications of the foregoing proposals. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. 11an den Bergh, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Two parallel but distinct initiatives during 
the last few years have focused attention both on 
the obvious advantages for western defence 
of introducing more modem technology into 
defence equipment, but also on the possible 
disadvantages of doing so. 
1.2. Mr. Weinberger, the United States Secre-
tary of Defence, first proposed in June 1982 that 
NATO should examine emerging technologies 
and their application to weapons systems, with 
the objective, he claimed, of improving conven-
tional defence, reducing reliance on (but not the 
need for) nuclear weapons, and of sharing new 
technology with the European defence industry. 
1.3. A doctrinal debate in the United States 
armed forces some years earlier led in 1982 to 
the introduction of the United States army field 
manual FM 100-5, incorporating the ideas ofthe 
air-land battle. Some features of that concept 
are to be found in SACEUR's separate follow-on 
forces attack (FOF A) proposals aimed in part at 
providing land forces with conventional wea-
pons capable of striking point targets at ranges 
previously reached only by aircraft or nuclear 
missiles. 
II. Definition and understanding of 
emerging technology 
A. General 
2.1. Although the term emerging technologies 
is already used in the media and in public 
discussion, according to General Huitfeldt, 
Director of the NATO International Military 
Staff, who addressed the committee on 15th 
February 1985, the term has not been formally 
defined in NATO. Rather a common under-
standing was established as NATO examined the 
United States emerging technology initiative. 
2.2. In the Netherlands and other NATO 
countries a distinction has been made between 
"emerged" and "emerging", implying that the 
emerged technologies, which have been available 
recently, can be applied to improve existing 
weapon systems. On the other hand, emerging 
technologies, when available, will be incorpo-
rated in future weapon systems more than a 
decade away. A German interpretation refers 
to technologies and developments which would 
make an essential improvement in the perfor-
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mance of reconnaissance, command and control, 
conventional weapon effects and/or setting the 
scene for novel systems. 
2.3. All countries have always given high 
priority to the introduction of new technologies 
and there is nothing fundamentally new in the 
present trends. The development of techno-
logy, whether for civil or military applications, is 
usually evolutionary. However, cumulative 
changes in different technologies may occasio-
nally lead to weapon systems with revolutionary 
capabilities compared with earlier models. These 
weapons could be called revolutionary because 
they change the nature of war instead of 
introducing a new technical principle. Ballistic 
missiles with nuclear warheads are an obvious 
example. 
2.4. Emerging technology in this report is used 
chiefly in the context of the Weinberger initia-
tive of 1982, described in section III.A below. 
B. Emerging technologies 
2.5. McGraw-Hill's Encyclopaedia of Science 
and Technology defines technology thus : 
" Technology is closely related to science 
and to engineering. Science deals with 
man's understanding of the real world 
about him - the inherent properties of 
space, matter, energy and their interac-
tions. Engineering is the application of 
objective knowledge to the creation of 
plans, design and means for achieving 
desired objectives. Technology deals 
with tools and techniques for carrying out 
the plans. " 
2.6. A chief objective of the proposals discus-
sed in this report is to improve significantly 
NA TO's conventional stand-off capability, i.e. 
the ability to engage targets at greater range 
and without, in the case of aircraft, the need to 
overfly the target itself. This requires: 
- real time surveillance; 
- increased target acquisition capability ; 
- greater weapon system accuracy and 
lethality; 
- highly-automated, jamming-resistant 
command, control, communications 
and intelligence systems. 
2. 7. These four objectives are inter-related and 
are technically attainable thanks to technical 
evolution in several key areas described below. 
(i) Microelectronics 
2.8. The United States Defence Department's 
VHSIC 1 technology programme, started in 
1980, is beginning to yield VHSIC-like chips 
specially designed for aerospace and defence 
applications. The programme has been divided 
into three phases lasting to the 1990s. 
2.9. The six phase I contractors are Honeywell, 
IBM, Texas-Instruments, Hughes Aircraft, TRW 
and Westinghouse. Although in a limited sense 
competitors, they share their progress in periodic 
joint review meetings and they have co-operated 
to solve mutual problems. The VHSIC techno-
logy provides some devices which could be used 
in different combinations to create a wide 
variety of signal processor types for radar, image 
processing, electronic warfare and communica-
tions, spread-spectrum and frequency agility, 
navigation and identification subsystems. 
2.10. A start has been asked for with research 
and development of computer technology even 
more advanced than VHSIC. This supercom-
puter, still to be developed, would offer compu-
tational speeds 1,000 times greater than those 
used in military systems today, possibly through 
the use of gallium arsenide as a semiconductor, 
which is being developed at laboratory level in 
France, in place of silicon technology. 
(ii) Computer software 
2.11. Closely related in its applications is the 
software used for computer operations; new 
generation computers will operate programmes 
of far greater length and complexity, and use 
new algorithms for the range of computer 
applications. Europe possesses expertise in this 
area. 
(iii) Material technology 
2.12. New materials, based on ceramics, 
carbon-carbon (composite material) or quartz 
phenolic three (or more) dimensional structures 
(fibre optics), will offer the possibility of quite 
new engines, missiles or armour. Beyond the 
obvious benefits of fibre optics of reducing 
weight (and cost) and increasing the communica-
tions bandwidth with a minimum of signal loss 
as compared with conventional wire guidance 
weapon systems, fibre optics offer the potential 
of creating new weapons that would not other-
wise be possible. 
(iv) Biotechnology 
2.13. There are developments in this field as 
well, e.g.: 
- artificial blood plasma to be used for 
transfusions given to the wounded; 
1. VHSIC: very high speed integrated circuit; see Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, 30th July and 26th November 
1984. 
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- artificial skin to! be used on the 
wounded; 
- " safe " drugs to I reduce fatigue and 
combat stress without inhibiting perfor-
mance; 
I 
- foams and disinte$rators for the rapid 
disposal of dead. . 
I 
' C. Applications 
(i) Sensors 
2.14. Improved sensors will make possible not 
only general tactical reconpaissance of distant 
areas, without the need for aircraft to overfly 
them, but also the locatilon (acquisition) of 
targets at ranges in excess qf 50 km. Airborne 
radar can be refined, atjld remotely-piloted 
vehicles can use the infrared spectrum. Sensors 
can also use acoustic and se~mic signals. They 
can be emplaced behind! enemy lines and 
transmit data by radio. 
2.15. Hitherto interdiction !targets have usually 
been fixed targets such as airfields and infra-
structure installations - · bridges, railway 
marshalling yards and the h~e- but new sensors 
will make it possible to de ect moving tactical 
targets such as a column of nks or vehicles. 
2.16. The United States is furrently developing 
the hi-service JST ARS - t~e joint surveillance 
target attack radar system - which will be a 
sideways looking airborne tdar, comparable in 
some ways to the existin AWACS used for 
identifying aircraft, but irected instead to 
locating targets on the ground. Flying at 
distances of tens of kilob;_etres behind the 
forward line oftroops, with a-~ange of200 km, it 
will be capable of identifWng targets 150 km 
beyond allied forward positi?ns. 
2.17. Simultaneously the United States is deve-
loping the precision loca~ion strike system 
(PLSS) - a passive airborne system which will 
identify and locate sources • of radio and radar 
emission, and transmit th~ information to a 
PLSS ground station for transmission to weapon 
systems which can be used ~o attack the source 
of emission. By locating~enemy air defence 
radars this system will eatly enhance the 
capability for air defence su pression. 
(ii) Command, control anf communications 
2.18. Improved commun1cations, including 
immediate communications
1 
with the foregoing 
sensor systems, will give co~manders real time 
information about hostile targets at ranges over 
which hitherto information from aerial recon-
naissance would become av~ilable only after one 
or several hours, following the return of the 
reconnaissance aircraft and the development of 
photographic films. I 
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2.19. Computer-assisted processing of the grea-
tly increased mass of data which the new sensor 
systems will provide will be necessary to sort out 
target priorities, to assist decision-making and 
the allocation of weapon systems to the most 
urgent targets. 
2.20. The United States has developed JTIDS 
(joint tactical information distribution systems) 
used inter alia for communication with AWACS 
aircraft. The United States further envisages in 
the longer term linking the various sensor 
systems referred to above in the joint tactical 
fusion programme for the 1990s. 
(iii) Computers 
2.21. The introduction of computers 1,000 
times faster than present models will play a 
central role in defence in the 1990s, using 
VHSIC technology, if the key investment for 
development is made now. 
2.22. The supercomputers may one day simu-
late and predict the outcome of various courses 
of military action for field commanders. This 
will allow the commander and his staff to focus 
their attention on the larger strategic issues 
rather than having to manage the enormous flow 
of information that will characterise the battles 
of the future. 
(iv) Other developments 
2.23. Attacks on major air bases with conven-
tional munitions have so far been carried out 
by aircraft alone. But the problem of using 
manned aircraft behind the FEBA 2 results 
in a bigger loss of very expensive fighter 
aircraft. Attack by both aircraft and missiles is 
envisaged in the future. New efficient runway 
penetrators, as well as dispensers fitted to 
aircraft and containing a great number of 
submunitions, will reduce the number of aircraft 
sorties considerably. Ballistic and cruise missiles 
have the advantage of being unmanned and 
being able to carry submunitions. 
Ill. Official proposals involving 
emerging technology 
A. The Weinberger proposals in NATO 
3.1. The first public reference in NATO 
documents to the application of emerging tech-
nology to defence equipment appeared in 
the declaration of the heads of state and 
government participating in the summit meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn on lOth 
June 1982, to which all sixteen NATO countries 
subscribed - Spain was attending for the first 
2. FEBA: forward edge of the battle area. 
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time: "We will seek to achieve greater effec-
tiveness in the application of national resources 
to defence, giving due attention to possibilities 
for developing areas of practical co-operation. 
In this respect the allies concerned will urgently 
explore ways to take full advantage both techni-
cally and economically of emerging techno-
logies. At the same time steps will be taken in 
the appropriate fora to restrict Warsaw Pact 
access to western militarily relevant techno-
logy. " The attached document on integrated 
NATO defence, to which only " the represen-
tatives of the North Atlantic Alliance taking part 
in its integrated defence structure ... " subscribed, 
reiterated the theme, again linking it to another 
initiative of the United States administration 
which was to prevent the transfer of technology 
to the Warsaw Pact: " ... We will ... explore ways 
to take full advantage both technically and 
economically of emerging technologies especially 
to improve conventional defence, and take steps 
necessary to restrict the transfer of militarily 
relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact." Mr. 
Weinberger's initiative attracted little public 
attention at the time because the summit had 
been largely devoted to issues of arms control 
and disarmament. Further papers were sub-
mitted by the United States - in December 1982 
a paper on the central region which in many 
ways forms the core of the ET initiative as 
currently being discussed within NATO circles. 
It was elaborated on in other papers in 1983 
seeking applications for the concept in the other 
regions and to naval forces. 
3.2. The United States proposals for making 
more use of emerging technology for defence 
systems on the central front, as submitted to 
defence ministers in December 1982, is reported 
to have listed four particular topics: 
- defence against Warsaw Pact first eche-
lon forces; 
- improving allied counter-air capability; 
- interdicting follow-on forces of the 
Warsaw Pact; 
- command, control, communications 
and intelligence. 
3.3. There is of course nothing new in the idea 
of using new technology in defence equipment, 
and the United States proposals certainly arou-
sed some scepticism in other allied capitals, 
being suspected in part as a means of selling yet 
more United States sophisticated defence equip-
ment to Europeans. After two years of discus-
sion in the alliance and study by the member 
countries it is generally agreed that conventional 
equipment can be improved but the debate 
continues about the particular weapon systems 
and particular capabilities of weapon systems 
that stand in most need of improvement. In 
particular the cost-effectiveness of some of the 
more elaborate systems suggested remains to be 
established in the eyes of many European 
countries. Although NATO is worried by the 
long-term implications of modernisation of 
Warsaw Pact forces if the present trend conti-
nues, it is still believed that most NATO equip-
ment is technologically superior to that of 
Warsaw Pact forces: 
" ... while both sides also carried out 
extensive modernisation, the rate and 
extent of this modernisation, as far 
as it is measurable and comparable, has 
been greater for the Warsaw Pact. It has 
deployed greater numbers of modern 
systems, many of which incorporate tech-
nological advances leading to capabilities 
increasingly comparable to those of 
NATO. It is the weight and momentum 
of Warsaw Pact modernisation and the 
introduction of large numbers of impro-
ved systems that is the specific cause for 
concern. " 3 
3.4. A particular cause of concern among the 
allies was the fact that the Weinberger initiative 
at the time it was made did not respond to any 
particular military requirement then identified 
by the NATO military authorities. Mr. War-
ner, the German Minister of Defence, proposed 
that the alliance should first elaborate a concep-
tual framework against which specific proposals 
for more sophisticated weapons systems and 
defence equipment could be examined. 
3.5. Conceptual military frameworks in fact 
became generally fashionable in 1983. When 
SACEUR was developing his follow-on forces 
attack proposals referred to in section C below, 
the NATO Military Committee had instructed 
him to produce a conceptual framework which 
would show how his FOFA proposals would fit 
in with NATO's long-term planning guidelines. 
Ministers at the meeting of the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee on 7th December 1983 
instructed the NATO military authorities to 
" develop a conceptual military framework as a 
basis for establishing priorities for the selection 
and application of emerging technologies in 
meeting military requirements " 4• In 1984 the 
Military Committee agreed to produce a broadly 
based conceptual military framework on which 
all NATO defence planning could be based. 
3. Conventional defence improvements. Where is the 
alliance going?, James Moray Stewart, NATO's Assistant 
Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy, in 
NATO Review, April 1985. Emphasis added. 
4. The conceptual military framework, article by Major-
General Michael Reynolds, Assistant Director, Plans and 
Policy Division, International Military Staff, NATO, in 
NATO's sixteen nations, December 1985. The quotation is 
not apparently taken from the DPC communique of 7th 
December 1983. 
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3.6. The communique offhe ministerial meet-
ing of the NATO Defence lanning Committee 
on 4th and 5th December 1 84 records that: 
" ... we invited the S cretary-General and 
the Defence Planning Committee in per-
manent session to come forward with 
proposals for a coher nt effort to improve 
NATO convention 1 defences. This 
should, inter alia, inc ude an early conclu-
sion to ongoing wo k on a conceptual 
military framework, e tablishment of prio-
rities for convention 1 defence improve-
ments ... " 
3.7. In response, the ilitary Committee 
decided to produce both a general NA TO-wide 
military conceptual frame ork and to instruct 
the three major NATO co manders to produce 
more detailed frameworks of their own. The 
Military Committee's gene al conceptual mili-
tary framework was approved by the Military 
Committee on 8th May 1985, designated 
MC-299, and the communiJe of the subsequent 
meeting on 22nd May 1985 ecords that: 
"3 .... we endorsed report from the 
Secretary-General an the Defence Plan-
ning Committee in p~rmanent session on 
conventional defence improvements, in 
response to our mandate last December, 
which provides a co~erent and balanced 
approach to achievi g improvements to 
our conventional orces. The report 
identifies key deficie cies on a regional 
and a functional b is which could, if 
uncorrected, threaten! NA TO's ability to 
implement its strategy. It also highlights 
those areas where ~ecial attention will 
provide the greatest return, both in the 
medium and long te ... 
5. We had an initiajl discussion of the 
work on a conceptual military framework 
submitted by NA TQ's military authori-
ties. This import~a work is conti-
nuing. " 
3.8. An authoritative artic e 5 has described the 
main provisions of the ilitary Committee's 
general conceptual military amework MC-299: 
" ... the document starts by referring to the 
current allied strate~laid down in MC-
14/3. Naturally it re ognises, as it must, 
that the two nuclea legs of the triad, 
together with the co ventional one, are 
interdependent and tually supporting. 
... For the first time in a NATO document 
MC-299 contains a definition of the 
mission of the alli~mce's conventional 
5. Gen=l Reynold• op. oil. EnJha<i• ruld<d. 
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forces. It then goes on to specify the key 
components of that mission (known as 
KMCs - the key mission components) 
which are essential if it is to be accom-
plished. These involve the defeat of the 
forces in the vanguard of a WP attack and 
the neutralisation of the reinforcing for-
mations behind them together with their 
supporting assets and installations. The 
success ofNATO's mission will, of course 
require a favourable environment in th~ 
air while on the ground the accomplish-
ment of the military functions in the rear 
area (that is all areas which are not within 
the sphere of responsibility of the corps 
level of command) will be essential. 
Furthermore a successful allied defence 
will be largely dependent on maritime 
support. At sea the alliance's navies 
must control the seas so that vital areas of 
the oceans are not denied to us ... 
... While the failure to achieve one KMC 
will lead to a failure to achieve the overall 
mission, the interdependence and impor-
tance of each KMC may, nevertheless, 
be assessed differently in the various 
commands and nations of the alliance. 
And so while at alliance level it is neither 
correct nor logical to attempt any priori-
tisation of the KMCs, major NATO 
commanders (MNCs) may set priorities 
for their commands and it will remain the 
responsibility of each nation to determine 
its contribution to allied defence - and 
that includes any priority which a nation 
!llay wish to establish for the provision of 
Its assets to the MNCs ... 
... MC-299 gives an agreed assessment of 
the threat which may face the alliance in 
2005... there is no suggestion that there 
will be dramatic developments in the 
conventional threat during the next 15 
years. . But the assessment does suggest 
th.at,. If left unchecked, WP capabilities 
will mcrease greatly as a result of identi-
fiable evolutionary trends. Second, 
NATO can counter such a development 
by sustaining a step-by-step approach of 
moderate but effective measures. 
... the CMF assesses the alliance's current 
capabilities so that some idea of the full 
span of improvements which are needed 
for the long term can be obtained ... 
Because of its importance in the events 
which led to the formulation of the CMF 
MC-299 devotes special attention to th; 
role which technology, whether emerging 
or emergent, should play in the future. 
But, this is a large and complex subject to 
which we were not able to do as much 
justice as we wished in the timeframe 
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available to us. New and in-depth studies 
are required and are taking place. Never-
theless, the document does suggest a 
general notion of how technology should 
be applied to the improvement of conven-
tional defence. It underscores the contri-
bution which modem technology can 
make to the enhancement of the quality of 
NATO's equipment; it emphasises the 
necessity of establishing a balance between 
quantity and quality and identifies some 
areas whi~h give promise of technological 
opportumty ... 
... The need for a balanced and broad-
based effort leads naturally to a list which 
is somewhat all-embracing. But... a few 
selected measures would not be enough to 
upgrade allied defence vis-a-vis the expec-
ted threat. " 
3.9. As for the more detailed conceptual 
frameworks being produced by the major NATO 
commanders it is understood that a first draft of 
SA~EUR's p~oposal has been discussed by 
nat10ns and IS now being revised while a 
maritime CMF to be produced by the three 
major NATO commanders (SACEUR, SAC-
~ANT and CI~CHAN) is to be produced early 
m 198.6. It IS understood that the Military 
Committee recommended that its own CMF be 
formally endorsed by the ministerial meeting of 
the NATO DPC on 3rd December 1985, and the 
communique of that meeting notes " the work 
under way includes: ... endorsement of a concep-
tu~~ military fr~t;newor.k developed by NA TO's 
military authonties which provides nations with 
broad, longer-term guidance on the military 
requirements ofNATO strategy ... " . 
3.10 .. The D~C communique of22nd May 1985 
contams an Important document on resource 
guidance: 
"Resource guidance 
Resource guidance must always be viewed 
as one amongst several instruments to 
guide the defence efforts within the 
alliance. No formula can provide more 
than planning guidance; the ultimate 
yardstick is the overall ability to perform 
the tasks required to support NATO's 
overall deterrence and defence objectives. 
(a) The~e is a political and military need 
to Improve NATO's conventional 
defence capabilities in relation to 
those of the Warsaw Pact in order to 
narrow the gap and reduce dependence 
on the early recourse to nuclear 
weapons. 
(b) To achieve this every effort must be 
made to obtain optimal value from 
scarce resources. 
(c) To this end vigorous efforts must be 
made to improve co-operation and co-
ordination within the alliance, and as 
part of these efforts a study should be 
undertaken whether specific improve-
ments could best be brought about by 
common funding. 
(d) Notwithstanding the above efforts to 
improve the output from existing 
expenditures it will be necessary to 
increase the allocation of resources to 
defence in real terms with most 
nations achieving rates of real increase 
higher than those in the past. 
(e) Determined efforts should be made as 
a matter of urgency to devise an 
agreed and accepted methodology for 
measuring output performance with a 
view toward developing a variety of 
key performance indicators allowing 
supplementary resource guidance to be 
set in those terms. 
(f) The 3% formula is confirmed as a 
general guide. Those nations which 
have not met it in the past should 
make every effort to do so in the 
future. In applying this general guide, 
account should be taken of the consi-
derations above as well as the specific 
considerations applying to individual 
countries based on analysis of all 
factors relevant to the respective 
national defence efforts. These consi-
derations should take as their starting 
point the quantity and quality of each 
nation's past and present defence 
effort, the identification of the most 
critical deficiencies in each nation's 
force contribution and the necessary 
improvement measures, in short, 
performance. Nations should achieve, 
to the extent possible and as soon as 
possible, necessary force improve-
ments even if they are additional to 
those contemplated at the resource 
level called for by the formula. " 
3.11. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, has recently drawn atten-
tion to the resource allocation problem for 
conventional defence in connection with the 
SDI: 
" .. .1 support continuing the research 
phase of the United States strategic 
defence initiative (SDI) to find out if there 
may be something of use to improve the 
defence of NATO; for example, the 
research might provide us the means to 
develop a theatre nuclear defence system. 
Those of us who share the responsibility 
for the security of NATO share some 
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legitimate concerns albout the SDI pro-
gramme... Our defence resources are 
limited and the price tag for SDI will 
probably be high. W · must ensure that if 
SDI proves feasible in the future, and it is 
deployed, that it do s not drain away 
money needed to mo ernise and improve 
our conventional fore s ". 6 
3.12. During discussion of he proposals in the 
NATO Conference of N tional Armaments 
Directors an attempt has been made to distin-
guish between emerged technology, which could 
be applied in the short term to weapon systems 
about to enter service, and truly emerging 
technology which could be incorporated in 
weapon systems due to enter service say in the 
last decade of the century. In April 1984 
CNAD drew up a list of twelve projects which 
might rank for inclusion in an ET programme, 
designed for entry into service within the next 
ten years. 
3.13. According to the te~hnical press these 
initial ET application programmes, are: 
(a) NATO identifica~ion, friend or foe 
system (IFF) (NIS); 
(b) multiple-launch ~' rocket system 
(MLRS) equippe with a terminally-
guided weapon; 
(c) low-cost powered dispenser (LOC-
POD) for use against fixed targets; 
(d) autonomous precision-guided muni-
tions for 155 mm tube artillery; 
(e) short-range anti-radiation missile 
(SRAM); 
(f) stand-off radar surveillance and target 
acquisition system (this could be 
United States JSTAR); 
(g) electronic support system, a ground-
based system tha[t can process data 
acquired by various sensors; 
(h) artillery locating system; 
(i) a medium-range ~PV for battlefield 
surveillance and ~rget acquisition; 
(j) electronic jammiJg systems for tacti-
cal aircraft; 
(k) electronic warfar . systems for army 
helicopters. 7 I 
3.14. The ministerial me(1ting of the North 
Atlantic Council on 13th December 1985 issued 
a special press statement on armaments co-
operation which noted inter alia that: 
6. Interview with the Westfaelische Nachrichten, 25th 
June 1985, text distributed by SHAPE in ACE output, 
September 1985. 
7. Armed forces Journal International, December 1984. 
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" ministers have agreed: 
- that efforts to increase co-operation in 
research and technology, in particular to 
exploit emerging technologies, should 
be stepped up in order to achieve a 
more cost-effective use of resources of 
the countries of the alliance and facili-
tate the establishment of co-operative 
projects. A wider exchange of informa-
tion is a key factor in these endea-
vours ... ", 
and the Defence Planning Committee commu-
nique of 3rd December 1985 similarly noted 
that: 
" the work under way includes: 
- continued exploitation of emerging 
technologies; 
- progress towards a NATO identification 
system (NIS); 
- endorsement of a conceptual military 
framework developed by NA TO's mili-
tary authorities which provides nations 
with broad, longer-term guidance on the 
military requirements of NATO stra-
tegy; ... " 
3.15. Of these the most urgent project as the 
committee has frequently reported is the NATO 
identification system which will permit all 
NATO air defence systems to positively identify 
any aircraft as friend or foe. There is no single 
standardised system in operation in NATO at 
the present time. Short-range air defence sys-
tems in particular do not have electronic means 
for identifying aircraft. The January 1985 
report to Congress on the standardisation of 
equipment within NATO submitted by the 
Secretary of Defence has this to say: 
" The fact that NATO has to resort to an 
indirect identification process results in 
cumbersome non-responsive procedures 
and weapon identification zones, and 
restrictions on beyond-visual range (BVR) 
capabilities that diminish a major advan-
tage potentially held over Warsaw Pact air 
forces. This situation is compounded by 
the establishment of a hostile ECM envi-
ronment. The critical link to the entire 
air defence structure is the NATO identifi-
cation system (NIS) which would allow 
friendly aircraft greater freedom to operate 
over the battlefield, but which has not 
been obtainable because of disagreements 
with other NATO nations over cost and 
frequency. The Mark XV identification 
friend or foe (IFF) is the only affordable 
system acceptable to the United States 
given the large number of units needed." 
3.16. The committee understands that the D-
band frequency on which the United States 
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Mark XV system operates was acceptable to a 
majority of European countries although one 
preferred the E and F bands which would have 
been more expensive. The recent agreement 
between the Ministers of Defence of Germany 
and the United States on the frequencies to be 
used for the question and answer component 
have now enabled the NATO countries to 
proceed with a definition of a common system, 
and it is hoped that a full development pro-
gramme will get under way shortly, to be 
followed by full-scale production. 
3.17. The system will not be fully effective until 
fitted universally to all platforms, and because of 
the high cost this will take some time. In the 
meantime, NATO has a second approach to the 
problem involving an indirect component to 
collect all the identification data available on the 
battlefield and combine it to produce high-
confidence identification. This system is pro-
gressing through the validation phase, and will 
help to fill the gap until the NIS question and 
answer system is operational. 
3.18. The committee welcomes these overdue 
signs of progress on the NIS. The equipment 
will eventually be manufactured in several coun-
tries; the important thing was to agree on the 
single specification to make all NIS equipment 
interoperable and interchangeable. The com-
mittee recommends that NATO continue to give 
the highest priority to bringing the equipment 
into full-scale production. 
B. The European response to the ET initiative 
3.19. In April 1984 the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) made a joint res-
ponse to the Weinberger ET initiative accepting 
the thesis that the West's advantage in techno-
logy might well be better exploited to offset the 
Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in the 
central region. It provided a conceptual basis 
for priorities in selecting ET projects which the 
committee understands laid emphasis on the 
need to counter Warsaw Pact first echelon 
forces; the need to improve NATO's counter-air 
capabilities and battlefield interdiction to slow 
the rate at which follow-on forces could join the 
battle. It was not felt that the ability to strike at 
follow-on forces in greater depth should have the 
same priority. 
3.20. The IEPG report listed two conditions to 
be met if the initiative were to succeed: 
(i) priorities for projects which would 
clearly increase the defence capabi-
lities and keep costs at a reasonable 
level; 
(ii) political and managerial arrangements 
to ensure that available and future 
technologies will be available to all 
allies, i.e. European and transatlantic 
co-operation, especially the trans-
atlantic two-way street. 
3.21. The IEPG reply listed areas of technology 
deemed to be important for weapon systems; the 
list includes those technologies enumerated in 
section II.B and C above. The response then 
listed some 200 European defence equipment 
projects incorporating high technology which 
were offered to the United States for co-
operation, and about 100 United States projects 
said to be of interest to European countries. 
This is obviously only a preliminary response 
from the IEPG and your Rapporteur found in 
the United States - and in some European 
countries - considerable scepticism about the list 
of 200 European projects, many of which are not 
at a stage where European countries sponsoring 
them are ready in the immediate future to sign 
eo-production agreements with the United 
States. To provide a credible European 
response to the United States initiative- several 
features of which would be attractive to Euro-
pean countries interested in transatlantic co-
operation - the IEPG will have to come up with 
a short list, only one-tenth of the size, of projects 
on which European countries are ready to do 
business at once. 
C. Follow-on forces attack (FOFA) 
3.22. General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, has described the proposals 
for follow-on forces attack associated with his 
command 8• According to General Rogers, 
SHAPE has established three priorities for 
improving conventional forces: (i) bring existing 
forces up to the standards of his command for 
manning, equipping, training, sustaining and 
reinforcing; (ii) modernise weapon systems and 
improve the ability to reduce the rate at which 
Warsaw Pact forces would arrive at the allied 
defensive position; (iii) increase conventional 
forces through mobilisable trained reserves. 
3.23. While SHAPE staff late in 1979 were 
working on (ii) above they noticed that in 
Warsaw Pact exercises ZAPAD '81 operational 
manreuvre groups were used, recalling the 
mobile groups which were part of the Soviet 
Union's world war two concept. It was in this 
context that SHAPE staff began to refer to 
Warsaw Pact forces behind troops actually in 
contact as follow-on forces and this study 
developed into the follow-on forces attack 
concept. 
3.24. General Rogers describes the objectives so 
far in the following words: 
"After the lead Warsaw Pact divisions are 
committed to battle, subsequent divisions, 
armies and army groups follow. Our 
8. NATO Review No. 6, December 1984. 
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FOF A subconcept is designed to attack 
with conventional w pons those enemy 
forces which stretch fi om just behind the 
troops in contact to aslfar into the enemy's 
rear as our target acquisition and conven-
tional weapon systems will permit. 
Allied Command Eurt>pe can prevent the 
attacker from maintaining the momentum 
of his assault by targeting these follow-on 
forces (which include the operational 
manreuvre groups) before they hit our 
general defensive position. NATO mili-
tary commanders have always sought to 
target these follow-on forces but the fact is 
we have lacked adequate target acquisition 
resources and conventional weapon sys-
tems - other than manned aircraft - with 
sufficient range an_d_ ~cc~racy. In rece~t 
years, some prom1s1qg Improvements m 
acquiring targets and in the lethality, range 
and accuracy of cofentional weapons 
have made FOFA a uch more realistic 
subconcept. " 
3.25. General Rogers is at ~ains to point out in 
his article that FOFA is not~ new strategy, but is 
fully compatible with foJ:tWard defence and 
flexible response: " Interdiction of the enemy's 
rear area with long-range ' weapons (manned 
aircraft) has always been parrt ofNATO's general 
defence plans and doctrines. FOFA merely 
seeks ways and means to do it better with other 
systems as well as aircraft. " He points out that 
FOFA is not an adaptation of the United States 
forces' air-land battle concept to NATO, nor is 
the FOFA concept in itself an offensive strategy. 
3.26. As General Huitfeldt, Director of the 
NATO International Military Staff, pointed out 
when addressing the committee in February: 
" FOFA is not a spin-off of the emerging techno-
logies issue, it is a concept~} modernisation of 
one of the classical military sks; interdiction of 
the enemy's rear area. The only means to carry 
it out to date have been ma ned aircraft, scarce 
in numbers, with inappro riate weapons, and 
highly vulnerable over heavi y defended areas. " 
3.27. SACEUR's long-terml planning guideline 
for FOFA was approved by1the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee on 9th November 1984 
and has now been referred to the NATO Mili-
tary Committee. 
D. United States forces' doctrines 
3.28. The following three descriptions of United 
States forces' doctrines have been adapted from 
articles in International Defence Review, August 
and November 1983, pages 1035-1554. 
(i) FM 100-5 
3.29. The United States army has undergone a 
rather rapid evolution in its doctrine in terms of 
how the ground conflict, particularly that in 
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Central Europe, will be waged. This evolving 
doctrine has been set forth in two significant 
field manuals (FM): FM 100-1, The Army, and 
FM 100-5, Operations. 
3.30. To a significant degree, the 1982 version 
of FM 100-5 has its roots in the earlier 1976 
version of the same manual. However, it is 
difficult to perceive any direct link between the 
active defence, as embodied in the earlier 
manual, and the deep attack philosophy of the 
later version. 
3.31. One aspect of the concealed link lies in the 
fact that the manuals are accurate reflections of 
the army at that specific time. Additional 
threads of continuity or links exist in the 
overwhelming focus of the manuals on the 
acknowledgment that the potential adversary is 
numerically superior to the United States forces, 
on the role of forward defence and on the fact 
that the first battle is still significant. 
3.32. The 1976 version also tacitly acknow-
ledges the political realities of NATO or, more 
specifically, that of the Federal Republic of 
Germany: space will not be traded for time. 
Unfortunately, during the same period that the 
doctrine was being formulated, other factors 
were assuming larger and larger roles. 
3.33. The " trip-wire " response - the exchange 
of strategic weapons between the United States 
and the USSR should the USSR invade Western 
Europe - had been replaced by the flexible 
response, and the deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons designed to enhance that flexibility had 
been accomplished. 
3.34. The FM 100-5 manual combined the 
various concepts of operations currently in 
vogue - the extended battlefield, the integrated 
battlefield and battlefield air interdiction - into 
one operational concept. This concept is best 
expressed as the air-land battle in which the 
ground commander sees deep and attacks deep 
with all available resources, using the opera-
tional capabilities of both the land and air forces. 
3.35. In the case of defending NATO, the major 
Soviet vulnerabilities, or areas of weakness, were 
depicted as the predictable division of forces 
and the rigid command and control system. 
(ii) Air-Land Battle 2000 (now called Army 21) 
3.36. Air-Land Battle 2000 is intended to be a 
logical outcome ofthe FM 100-5. 
3.37. The nature of the future battlefield and 
the overwhelming force potential of the enemy, 
say the authors of ALB 2000, argue for 
avoidance of all-out attrition warfare. In order 
to avoid high combat losses, therefore, victory 
must be sought through manreuvre, advanta-
geous positioning of forces, use of deception, 
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psychological efforts to wear down the enemy's 
will and minimum exposure of friendly forces to 
the effects of destructive weapons. 
3.38. The ALB 2000 study covers strategic, 
operational and tactical doctrines, with the 
emphasis on the last two, for which it says new 
organisations are required. The study gives as 
an example a theatre command (strategic) with 
two air-land forces (ALF), a United States 
Marine Corps amphibious brigade, plus USAF 
and United States navy assets at the operational 
level. 
3.39. A series of detailed annexes to the Air-
Land Battle 2000 study discusses the types of 
new equipment that are necessary for its success-
ful implementation. 
(iii) Air Force 2000 (now called Air Force 21) 
3.40. Like the United States army, the United 
States air force has looked into the next century 
and concluded, in a study called Air Force 2000: 
Air power entering the 21st century, that the air 
force must be ready to fight " across the 
spectrum of conflict " from bush wars to nuclear 
exchanges. But, because of limited funding for 
weaponry, the USAF will have to increase its 
reliance on technology and tactical surprise for 
survival. 
3.41. The USAF study, designed to provide 
general guidance to planners as they address 
specific force development issues in the near 
term, was ordered by former USAF Chief-of-
Staff, General Lew Allen, in October 1981 and 
was completed in the summer of 1982. 
3.42. The study took a broad-brush view, 
tackling economic, demographic, environmental 
and technological matters to provide a compre-
hensive picture of the operational environment 
in which the air force of the future will carry out 
its missions. 
3.43. Use will be made of rapid advances in 
computer technology, micro-electronics, com-
munications, composite materials and directed 
energy technologies. 
3.44. The USAF study concluded that " success 
in air warfare in the year 2000 " will depend 
largely on the operation of integrated command, 
control, communications and intelligence 
systems. Such an integrated system will collect, 
process and transmit massive amounts of infor-
mation to commanders. Improved secure com-
munications are also needed, as there are new-
generation computers to help process the huge 
volume of data. 
IV. The relationship with military strategy 
4.1. While the Weinberger ET proposals can 
be of general application to all three armed servi-
ces, and do not in themselves imply any conse-
quences for military strategy or doctrine, the 
most interesting specific proposals concern 
weapon systems which would have their chief 
application in the central region in Europe, and 
would in part be the instrument of SACEUR's 
new FOF A doctrine which has been adopted as a 
long-term planning guideline. There has been 
some public discussion of FOFA in the context 
of military strategy. 
4.2. Some commentators have argued that the 
introduction of operational manceuvre groups 
(OMG) by the Warsaw Pact, identified in the 
ZAPAD '81 exercises, implies a totally new 
Warsaw Pact strategy relying on highly-mobile 
heavily-armoured formations which would pene-
trate rapidly to the rear of NATO forces, and 
that as a consequence the classical Soviet 
concept of second and third echelons which 
would be committed to the attack in successive 
waves as the attack of the first echelon faltered 
has been abandoned. According to this argu-
ment there would no longer be any second and 
third echelon forces in the Warsaw Pact rear, and 
therefore nothing for new NATO deep-attack 
conventional weapons to strike. The commit-
tee is satisfied that this is a quite unrealistic 
interpretation of the OMGs. Your Rapporteur 
understands from his discussions that while 
Warsaw Pact commanders may in future urge 
more initiative for commanders of particularly 
mobile formations to penetrate deeply into 
NATO defensive positions, this shift of empha-
sis represents more an exploitation of the greatly 
improved mobility of all Soviet forces than a 
radical departure from the organisation of forces 
in several echelons. Useful military targets will 
undoubtedly continue to exist at ranges of 100 
and more kilometres behind the battle area. 
The debate over the introduction of conven-
tional missile systems capable of attacking forces 
at this range - and this applies both to surface 
missiles as well as air-launch missiles designed 
to give existing interdiction aircraft a stand-off 
capability in the face of the improved Soviet air 
defences - is a debate over opportunity costs and 
military priorities, it is not a debate over 
whether targets will exist at these ranges. 
4.3. The key to the interdiction debate is the 
rate of build-up of military force in the battle 
area. Weapon systems which will slow the 
arrival of Warsaw Pact forces in the battle area 
may be cost-effective when ranges of several tens 
of kilometres, or classical interdiction of fixed 
installations, are considered. At the same time 
improvement in the speed with which existing 
NATO forces can reach their battle positions can 
also improve the force ratio in the battle area, 
and can do so at less cost than some of the more 
sophisticated weapon systems under conside-
ration for ranges of a 100 km or more. 
4.4. A third and most important aspect of 
strategy and doctrine and its relationship to 
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emerging technologies is ~e question of nuclear 
weapons. All authorities with whom your 
Rapporteur has discuss the subject of his 
report have stressed the t1 et that the introduc-
tion of new technologies !into NATO weapon 
systems is not intended . in itself to replace 
nuclear weapons which, ijt is contended, will 
continue to be needed both to deter the use of 
nuclear weapons by the ~tdversary, and as a 
weapon of last resort should it not prove 
possible for NATO con~entional forces to 
prevent a breakthrough ofiWarsaw Pact forces. 
But the introduction of ~m proved means of 
interdiction, and more s histicated weapons 
with higher kill probabilit in the battle area, 
will considerably enhance he ability of NATO 
forces to withstand by con entional means only 
the Warsaw Pact forces, ~hich in the central 
region continue to be greatly superior in terms of 
numbers of tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a 
result, any Warsaw Pact at~ck on NATO would 
have to commit a far grea~er proportion of its 
conventional forces to battle before NATO 
would need to resort to nuc~ar weapons. From 
this standpoint the nuclear threshold would be 
raised by the introduction of new technologies. 
4.5. This is one aspect of the greater emphasis 
which has been placed on I conventional forces 
ever since the doctrine of flexible response was 
adopted in the 1960s. The !committee recalls in 
this context that on taking ~he dual decision in 
1979 involving the deployment of INF forces, 
NATO unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads for 
tactical nuclear weapons frbm Europe. It has 
further undertaken to wiidraw one nuclear 
warhead for every warhea introduced on the 
INF systems, cruise and ershing 11 missiles 
now being deployed. La~sl at the Montebello 
meeting of the Nuclear PI ning Group in 1983 
it was decided to remove a rther 1 ,400 tactical 
nuclear warheads from E rope, and at the 
meeting of the Nuclear 'lanning Group in 
Luxembourg on 27th Ma~ch 1985 SACEUR 
submitted his proposals fo~ implementing that 
decison which, it is understood, would cover 
rather more than 1,400 m.J.clear warheads for 
obsolescent systems, including atomic demoli-
tion munition and Nike Httcules surface-to-air 
missile warheads. 
I 
V. Economic aspects of emrrging technology 
A. Vohlme and treiUI of tUfetU:e reae~~rch 
aiUI de,elopment u/fnditure 
5.1. A recent OECD stu~y 9 has published 
science and technology indicators which show 
the widely different range 1of expenditure on 
defence research and develqpment by different 
countries, whether as a percep.tage of the defence 
budget or as a percentage of total publicly 
I 
9. Science and technology indicators- Resources devoted 
to research and development, OECP 1984. 
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financed research and development. Thus, in 
1980, the United Kingdom devoted the greater 
part of publicly financed research and develop-
ment to defence (nearly 60%); France devoted 
40% and Germany the same year about 
15%. The trend from 1970 shows a reduction 
in this proportion in the United Kingdom (from 
72% in 1970) and Germany (from about 30% in 
1970), while in France the share of defence 
research and development as a percentage of 
total publicly financed research and develop-
ment has tended to increase from only one-third 
in 1975. The other main manufacturing sectors 
accounting for publicly financed research and 
development expenditure are energy (in 1980, 
21% in Germany, 8% in France, 7% in the 
United Kingdom), space (about 7% in Germany 
and France, 2% in the United Kingdom), civil 
aeronautics (between 2% and 3% in the three 
countries). 
5.2. The United States in 1980 devoted about 
half of publicly financed research and develop-
ment to defence. At the beginning of the 1970s 
the percentage was higher. During the period 
studied in the OECD report space research and 
development accounted for from 15% to 20% of 
publicly financed research and development, 
energy, which accounted for less than 4% in 
1971, increased to more than 11% in 1980, while 
civil aeronautics fell in that country from 3.6% 
in 1971 to 1.9% in 1982. 
5.3. Table I at Appendix 11 shows the trend of 
defence research and development expenditure 
as a percentage of total defence expenditure. 
Big differences emerge. The highest propor-
tions are those of France and the United 
Kingdom (from 13% to 14% in recent years). 
Germany follows some way behind, hardly 
reaching 4%. For the other WEU countries the 
proportion is still smaller - 2% for Italy, 1% for 
the Netherlands and less than 1% for Belgium. 
In the United States some 10% of the defence 
budget is devoted to research and development 
according to annual reports of the Research and 
Engineering Department of the Pentagon. 
5.4. Table 11 shows expenditure on military 
research derived from national defence budgets 
expressed in ECUs at 1975 prices and exchange 
rates. This table shows a fairly regular trend in 
defence research and development. In 1983, 
for the whole of WEU, it passed the 1975 level 
of about 40%. In Belgium and Germany this 
expenditure is on the decrease. France showed 
the highest growth rate among the WEU coun-
tries apart from Italy where defence research and 
development expenditure was originally very 
small. 
B. Costs of emerging technology project 
5.5. As will be seen from the previous sections, 
the Weinberger ET initiative is a general 
concept, and no cost estimate can be attached to 
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the concept as such. Discussion in NATO has 
led to the definition of thirteen possible specific 
projects with differing timescales; the IEPG 
response produced an initial list of 200 Euro-
pean projects in very different stages of readiness 
or development. Cost estimates have been 
advanced for a few of these specific projects that 
are in a sufficiently advanced stage of study, 
costs have also been mentioned in the context of 
SACEUR's follow-on forces attack proposals 
and budgetary requests to Congress are also 
known in respect of President Reagan's strategic 
defence initiative. 
5.6. A 1983 study has provided cost estimates 
for specific weapon systems associated with 
counter-air, battlefield interdiction and corps 
support weapon systems. 10 
(i) Counter air 
5.7. A conventional development ofthe Persh-
ing 11 missile fitted with a terminally guided 
container carrying some 30 conventional high 
explosive connected energy penetrators could be 
used to destroy airfield runways over ranges of 
a few hundred kilometres. The cost for 900 
missiles - 600 to close 30 main airfields for three 
days, while a further 300 could be used in an 
interdiction role against about 100 choke points 
- is estimated at $1.8 billion with further costs of 
$0.22 billion for shelters and $0.25 billion 
manning costs for ten years making a total of 
$2. 3 billion. 
(ii) Corps support weapons 
5.8. A proposed Skeet terminally guided 
weapon capable of homing in on vehicle engines 
could be carried by the multiple-launch rocket 
system being developed by five NATO coun-
tries, carrying about 48 Skeets per rocket. With 
longer-range missile boosters this weapon system 
again could be used against individual mobile 
targets such as tanks or soft vehicles, at distances 
in excess of 100 km. On the basis of 360 mis-
siles per corps, the study estimates a cost of 
$0.22 billion per corps, with additional costs of 
$0.01 billion for vehicles and $0.1 billion for 
manning over ten years, making a total of $0.33 
billion per corps or $2.64 billion to equip eight 
corps in the central region. To that would be 
added a further $1.2 billion to cover surveillance 
and targeting systems for the whole central 
region, that would be necessary to employ this 
Skeet system. 
(iii) Stand-off weapon for aircraft 
5.9. Cost estimates in the study for 2,000 
conventional stand-off weapons - sufficient to 
10. Strengthening conventional defence in Europe, report 
of the European Security Study (ESECS), published by the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1983. 
equip 30 aircraft per corps at two sorties per day 
- amount to $1.2 billion for the weapons with a 
further $0.3 billion for manning, bringing the 
total bill, including other equipment, to $1.51 
billion for the whole central region, with another 
estimated $0.5 for surveillance and targeting 
systems. 
(iv) Central region total estimates 
5.10. The whole of the weapon systems discus-
sed above are estimated by the study to cost 
$8.35 billion for the whole central region, with a 
further $1.05 billion for completing research and 
development costs prior to deployment. These 
estimates were contributed to the study by 
Donald Cotter, president of a consultancy firm 
in the Washington area. The ESECS Steering 
Group doubled the figure suggesting " $20 
billion (with a possible variation of 50% higher 
or lower)". 
5.11. The Pentagon study of interdiction and 
deep attack systems based on the sensors, battle 
management and weapons systems described in 
paragraphs 2.14 to 2.13, for the two United 
States corps in the central region, has estimated 
the total programme cost over the period to 
1990 to be $21.4 billion made up us follows: 
Sensors: TRS (PLSS/ ASARS) 
JSTARS 
Battle management: JTFP 
GACC 
Weapons: Anti-armour 
Interdiction 
Airfield attack 
$billion 
2.7 
3.3 
1.6 
0.7 
5.0 
3.0 
5.0 
21.4 
5.12. The cost for so equipping all corps in the 
central region would be $30 to $40 billion. Dia-
grams showing assumed target density, and the 
timescale for the introduction of these systems 
are at Appendix Ill. 
FOFA costs 
5.13. General Rogers has suggested that the cost 
of his FOFA proposals could be met if the 1980 
NATO objective of a 3% real increase in defence 
expenditure each year were to be raised to an 
annual 4%. The extra 1% would imply annual 
expenditure of $3.5 billion on the total NATO-
country defence budgets of $350 billion (1984 
estimates). As NATO countries are not com-
mitted even to the 3% increase beyond the 
current year, there is obviously no prospect of 
SACEUR obtaining this sort of money. More-
over the opportunity costs of some of the more 
exotic ET projects would be high; they could be 
financed only at the expense of other NATO 
force improvement programmes, including the 
particularly important sustainability programme 
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aimed at increasing stoc~ of ammunition for 
existing conventional wearns. 
C. Cost-effecliPeiU!Ss 
5.14. Some experts have (:riticised the costjkill 
estimates put forward for ~some of the conven-
tional deep-strike weapon systems which have 
been described above. Ca by 11 has concluded: 
I 
" Deep attack of follqw-on forces therefore 
falters on all counts: 
- the underlying prqmise is false: NATO 
is outgunned bu~ neither outmanned 
nor outspent. ATO's problem is 
organisational an doctrinal; marginal 
technological ad ances cannot over-
come these self-in icted wounds; 
- technology is being wrongly focused on 
difficult deep at4tcks rather than on 
easier and more rrwarding targets close 
to the FEBA; 
- while the individ al technologies may 
work, the many i diverse components 
and distinct tasks have yet to be combi-
ned and demonstrated in a benign, 
much less a hostile environment; 
- unless protective veasures are devised, 
any deployed sys em, because of the 
emissions of its ISTA infrastructure 
will have large signatures. Compo-
nents will be vulnerable to attack and 
so the system will be inherently vul-
nerable; cost will inhibit redundancy; 
- NATO requires 4t more annually just 
to modernise curr nt forces. The pro-
posed technologie are additions. Costs 
using its proponents own claims of 
effectiveness are an order of magni-
tude greater than asserted. " 
In particular Canby argues Cotter's estimates for 
terminally guided deep-1· rike Skeet missiles 
mentioned above grossly verestimate the pro-
bability of damaging Sovi t armed forces over 
the ranges considered: 
"More than an order of magnitude 
increase in missiles, firing battalions, and 
funding would be Jequired to make a 
difference. Even so ·t is an open question 
whether much effe t will be obtained. 
With the inclusion 1 of countermeasures 
against the assault-breaker submunitions, 
hit probabilities drop sharply to not much 
11. Dr. Steven L. Can by in an ~ yet unpublished paper on 
new conventional force technolo y and the NATO-Warsaw 
Pact balance submitted to the IISS annual conference, 
September 1984. 
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more than random probability while 
'destroy' probabilities against armoured 
vehicles effectively approach zero." 
5.15. This criticism of course is directed only at 
the deep-strike aspect of the FOFA proposals, i.e. 
the ability to strike individual moving targets at 
ranges measured in hundreds of kilometres. All 
European authorities consulted by your Rappor-
teur have expressed scepticism about the cost-
effectiveness in the present situation of such 
weapon systems. These criticisms do not how-
ever apply to counter-air and interdiction 
systems used against fixed installations 
(airfields, choke points) over comparable ranges, 
nor of course do they apply to improved mea-
sures for striking at first echelon forces over 
distances measured in a few tens of kilometres. 
D. European share 
5.16. European interest in the Weinberger ET 
proposals and in SACEUR's FOFA concept, 
which for the moment remains a long-term 
planning guidance, will depend on the extent to 
which the European defence industry can share 
in production and development of selected 
projects, and in the new technologies involved. 
These new projects would not be attractive to 
European governments if their adoption were to 
lead to a worsening of the current balance 
and defence equipment in the two-way street 
between the United States and Europe. As is 
shown by the 200 projects attached to the IEPG 
study referred to above, European countries also 
possess technological expertise in areas that can 
be offered to the United States; reciprocity will 
be essential in the adoption of projects. 
5.17. At the same time, however, European 
countries must understand the United States 
sense of frustration at the fragmented European 
response to many American initiatives. Most 
of the 200 European projects listed by the IEPG 
are not in fact serious contenders for early 
production agreements; they are there so that as 
many of the IEPG countries as possible can be 
included as potential originators of weapon 
projects. Competition between defence contrac-
tors in different European countries, all of whom 
are operating on too small a scale to be viable in 
the face of the United States, is one of the chief 
obstacles to a balanced transatlantic two-way 
street in defence equipment. It is no answer for 
European NATO countries to buy the product of 
another single European country rather than 
United States equipment when selection of the 
latter will provide generous offset agreements 
ensuring local production of significant parts of 
the United States system in the European 
country acquiring it. For the four countries 
that procured the United States F-16 aircraft the 
choice in practice was much more European for 
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them, because they are now themselves pro-
ducing part of that aircraft, than would have 
been a decision to procure the alternative French 
Mirage aircraft which, because of the no doubt 
shorter production runs involved, could not 
offer the same proportion of local production in 
the other European countries. 
5.18. For the production of the most sophis-
ticated type of weapon systems where the 
research and development costs are a large pro-
portion of the whole project costs - typically 
guided missiles and aircraft - the only solution 
for Europe is to create more international 
consortia so that new weapons projects will be 
genuinely European from the outset and not the 
product of a single European country. 
5.19. As far as the economics are concerned the 
committee concludes that overall the proportion 
of defence resources devoted by the WEU 
countries to defence research and development 
is adequate 12• In the case of the two largest 
arms producers - France and the United 
Kingdom - it compares favourably with the 
United States. The figures are for publicly 
financed defence research and development, that 
undertaken by private enterprise on its own 
account may affect those figures in all the 
countries considered, but such research and 
development is difficult to define, let alone 
identify, when governments in any case tend to 
be the sole customers of defence equipment 
manufacturers. The defence research and deve-
lopment effort of the WEU countries may 
appear to be unfairly shared among them, but it 
would not necessarily be cost-effective to change 
this situation - countries with little or no 
tradition of defence research and development 
might do better to improve their conventional 
defence effort, than to embark from scratch on 
research programmes which would only be of 
small scale. 
5.20. The technological level of European 
defence research is also abreast or ahead of the 
United States in some sectors, but Europe tends 
to lag particularly in the development stage that 
precedes production. A more co-ordinated 
defence research and development effort in 
Europe, eliminating duplication between Euro-
pean countries, would put Europe in a better 
position to compete with the United States, to 
redress the unsatisfactory balance of defence 
equipment in the two-way street, and to become 
far more self-reliant for defence equipment, and 
thus far less affected by the vagaries of initiatives 
from Washington. The result would be to put 
Europe in a better position to participate in the 
transatlantic dialogue - as pointed out above, 
the United States is frustrated by the absence of 
12. See defence research and development indicators at 
Appendix 11, tables I, 11 and Ill. 
a properly organised European partner to 
respond to its initiatives. 
5.21. Work is under way in the IEPG to 
improve this situation, as shown ·in the decisions 
by ministers at the 23rd November 1984 
meeting: 
"Research and technology 
6. Ministers regard the enhancement of 
the European defence technological base 
as being of fundamental importance. To 
this end, it is their intention that co-
operative technology projects (CTPs) 
should be identified in accordance with 
the agreed procedures and within the 
agreed time schedule, so that they are 
available to support developments in key 
areas of defence. They instruct their 
staffs to proceed accordingly. In order to 
promote such an effort in the best possible 
conditions, European industry, with the 
assistance of the European Defence Indus-
trial Group, should be actively involved. 
As soon as CTPs have been identified, 
the question how to involve as many 
nations as possible into these projects 
must be dealt with, taking into account 
the encouragement of a freer flow of 
technology and research information 
among IEPG countries ... 
Balanced European defence industry 
8. Ministers agreed to seek an improve-
ment in the efficient use of resources in 
the European defence industrial base 
through a combination of: 
(a) greater discipline in not launching a 
national development project where 
one already exists elsewhere, natio-
nally or collaboratively, in Europe; " 
and in the communique of the London IEPG 
ministerial meeting on 17th and 18th June 1985: 
" Research and technology 
Ministers re-emphasised the importance 
of enhancing collaboration in defence 
technology research. In this regard, they 
expressed satisfaction with the progress 
made towards identifying co-operative 
technology projects (CTPs). Some 30 
technological areas have been identified as 
fields for possible co-operation. 
Ministers decided to launch concrete co-
operation in research and technology 
based on several initial CTPs which the 
participants will finance on a case-by-case 
basis; these relate to military aspects of the 
following areas: 
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- microelectronics (gallium arsenide); 
- high-strength lightw~ght materials; 
- compound materials! 
• • I 
- Image processmg; 
I 
- conventional warhe~d design. 
They noted that this i$ the first time that 
multinational defencefresearch co-opera-
tion has been appr ached in such a 
thorough fashion ... " 
I 
I 
VI. Emerging technology ~nd arms control 
6.1. The committee recogbises that there will 
be many advantages both tiy way of improved 
conventional defence and Unproved stability if 
some cost-effective new tec~nology can be intro-
duced to provide for examp1e better surveillance 
and monitoring systems which would identify 
troop movements at a distaqce. These might be 
radar and infrared system~mounted in aircraft 
or remote sensors which ea be delivered behind 
enemy lines. Certainly craft identification 
systems need to be improv~d, and better intelli-
gence and data-handling sysfems will be required 
to handle the larger flow pf data that can be 
expected from improved sl.lrveillance and sen-
sors. Conventional weapons themselves for 
defence against first echelpn forces can have 
improved lethality, more sqphisticated anti-tank 
mines can enhance NATO's ability to resist 
attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact 
tanks. 
6.2. Two important coqsequences can flow 
from such technological im~rovements - NATO 
can gain valuable warning time if there were to 
be signs of Warsaw Pact fo ces concentrating for 
a possible attack. At the same time peacetime 
stability will be improv~d when such sur-
veillance systems can rereal the absence of 
preparations for surprise atltack. Improvements 
in conventional weapon 1 systems themselves 
serve to raise the nuclear tgreshold, i.e. to enable 
allied forces to withstand ttack by numerically 
superior forces, without r sorting to the use of 
nuclear weapons. 1 
6.3. At the same timb the committee is 
disturbed to note that littl~ attention appears to 
have been devoted to t~:L possible implications 
for arms control of the ~,~roduction of the sort 
of new technology that is now being envisaged. 
There are all too few prcj)perly verifiable arms 
control agreements at pre!nt in force, and those 
that have been conclude have tended to limit 
weapons to existing level ; there have been no 
true disarmament agree~ents since the war 
which have led to act~ reductions in any 
weapon systems. Doubt have been expressed 
as to whether negotiati ns on arms control 
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would be able to keep pace with the growing rate 
of technical improvement of weapons. A 
number of questions arise: will new technology 
change the character of conventional warfare at 
the operational level? Will the strategic defence 
initiative change the nature of strategic warfare? 
Will the new military options which may be· 
provided by new technology make it more 
difficult to estimate the number of weapon 
systems on each side? In particular the sugges-
tion that certain tactical missiles which at 
present are equipped only with nuclear warheads 
might in the future be used as a means of 
delivery for sophisticated conventional warheads 
of various sorts will greatly complicate the 
existing dual capable problem which already 
arises with most tactical aircraft - are they to be 
counted as nuclear weapon systems or as 
conventional weapon systems in estimating the 
force balance? Most of them are capable of 
delivering either. 
6.4. If continued research permitted one day 
the detection of strategic ballistic missile-firing 
submarines on patrol, the basis of the invulne-
rable second strike, on which the present stable 
system of deterrence is based, would be jeopar-
dised. The Rapporteur wonders whether such 
research should not be restricted through arms 
control agreements. 
6.5. The committee recognises the arms 
control dilemma which faces the alliance 
because of the new technologies. On the one 
hand, NATO has always relied on the superior 
quality of its weapon systems to offset in part the 
numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact but, 
on the other, the introduction of yet more 
sophisticated technology may trigger off a new 
arms race in the field of conventional weapons. 
Professor von Baudissin 13 has proposed pre-
ventive arms control: 
"Until now, weapon systems already in 
operation or ready for deployment have 
for the most part been the subject of 
negotiation... I think that a much more 
promising approach would be to negotiate 
systems before production has begun, an 
approach I call preventive arms control... 
Each side would have less of a vested 
interest in the retention or deployment of 
planned programmes. Both sides would 
therefore be more willing to mutually 
abandon certain technologically advanced 
systems... I would even venture to say 
that this negotiating procedure would 
have the positive influence of limiting 
research and development. If this were 
indeed to occur, the destabilising tendency 
to modernise would be restricted. " 
13. Professor Wolf Graf von Baudissin, New technology, 
stability and the arms control deadlock, paper submitted to 
the IISS conference, September 1984. 
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6.6. The committee notes in this connection a 
sentence in the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty 
member states adopted at their meeting in Sofia 
on 22nd and 2~rd October 1985: 
"The participants in the meeting suggest 
that the USSR and the USA pledge not to 
develop and manufacture new types of 
conventional weapons, comparable in 
their destructive capacity to the mass 
destruction weapons. " 
6.7. If NATO were prepared to forego the 
technological advantages of new weapon systems 
in exchange for an assurance that the Warsaw 
Pact would not subsequently develop similar 
systems, such arms control negotiations might 
be envisaged if the imbalance in present conven-
tional forces could be simultaneously redressed 
through agreement in the MBFR talks in 
Vienna. But the fundamental obstacle would 
be verification. Already however the IAEA in 
Vienna applies international safeguards to civi-
lian nuclear power reactors to ensure that fissile 
material is not diverted to military purposes. 
Significantly the Soviet Union has recently 
accepted the application of IAEA safeguards to 
some of its own civilian nuclear reactors. The 
United Kingdom has recently suggested the 
application of some similar safeguard systems to 
the civilian chemical industry, in connection 
with the treaty banning chemical weapons now 
being negotiated in the Conference on Disarma-
ment in Geneva. The committee suggests that 
a study be made of the possibility of using the 
IAEA type of system as a model for a safeguards 
system that could be adapted to national 
research and development facilities in general, as 
a contribution to verification procedures for 
arms control agreements which might ban 
the introduction of specified technology into 
weapons systems. 
VII. Conclusions 
7 .1. The committee concludes that there is 
both good and bad in the current emerging 
technology proposals. In the first place they are 
beneficial in focusing attention on the need to 
speed up the application of new technology to 
the requirements of allied defence. Market-
driven civilian technology succeeds in putting 
the latest microchips into pocket calculators in 
the shop window within five years of develop-
ment; defence equipment in the field today 
embodies the technology of the 1960s. The 
much smaller scale of the defence equipment 
market compared with the mass civilian market 
for small electronic devices is a factor in 
explaining the ten- to fifteen-year lead time for 
defence equipment compared with five years for 
civilian projects. Where new technology is 
cheap, cost-effective in military terms, and 
where a real military requirement can be found 
for it (whether or not the requirement existed 
already), then the Weinberger initiative would 
have served a useful purpose if it generates 
political pressure to deploy such technology 
rapidly. NATO's technological advantage over 
the Warsaw Pact can undoubtedly be exploited 
to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in 
tanks, guns and aircraft. 
7.2. United States and European projects 
which are candidates for procurement in the 
framework of the ET initiative should be 
considered selectively to see which can be 
usefully employed in the light of existing NATO 
strategy of forward defence and flexible response, 
and whether they fit a conceptual framework 
which is now being developed by the NATO 
Military Committee. For the central region in 
Europe to which most attention is devoted in the 
ET proposals, appropriate projects should be 
selected giving priority: 
- to countering Warsaw Pact first echelon 
forces; 
- to counter-air to blunt the Warsaw Pact 
air offensive; 
- to interdicting an early arrival on the 
battlefield of the first Warsaw Pact 
follow-on forces. 
An effective and credible threat to Warsaw Pact 
forces in greater depth should be maintained, 
but forces which do not affect the force ratio in 
the combat zone are targets oflower priority. 
7.3. The conceptual framework that emerges 
is: 
(i) that allied ground forces in place in 
Europe should have sufficient capabi-
lity to compel the Warsaw Pact to 
make large-scale (and hence visible) 
preparations for any attack, and to be 
able to withstand the first Warsaw 
Pact forces while NATO reserves are 
deployed; 
(ii) that sustainability should be impro-
ved through increased stocks of 
ammunition and reserve equipment; 
(iii) that secure disembarkation facilities 
and sea lanes must be maintained for 
the arrival of United States reinforce-
ments, and that the arrival of Warsaw 
Pact second echelon fronts in the 
battle area must be delayed for 
several days; 
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(iv) that the ability of NATO air forces to 
engage an adversary's air forces 
should be improved. 
7.4. The committee remains deeply sceptical 
about the value of terminally guided munitions 
for use against individual mobile targets at 
ranges of 100 km or more. In many cases 
improving the velocity of NATO force build-up 
will be a more reliable and cheaper means of 
producing the same effect. 
7.5. As far as SACEUR's follow-on forces 
attack proposals are concerned they are accept-
able within the foregoing framework, and as long 
as they serve to raise the nuclear threshold. 
7.6. The committee calls for more attention to 
+--n..~..t·rl to the possible arms contwl implications 
of new technology in conventional weapon 
systems, but recognises that the subject is 
complex. On the one hand, it would be highly 
undesirable to trigger a new and even more 
expensive arms race in conventional weapons to 
parallel that in nuclear weapons. On the other 
hand, the western allies have a real incentive to 
use technology to offset Warsaw Pact numerical 
superiority in tanks, guns and aircraft, and any 
agreement limiting qualitative improvements in 
conventional weapon systems would be very 
difficult to verify. The committee therefore 
makes no substantive proposals on arms control 
in the draft recommendation but proposes that 
the new WEU agency for the study of arms 
control and disarmament questions should study 
urgently the arms control impact of the intro-
duction of ET into conventional weapons, 
including the likely nature and timescale of 
Warsaw Pact reaction to it, and the possibility of 
designing some system of safeguards (based on 
the IAEA safeguards on nuclear reactors - see 
paragraph 6. 7 above) which could be applied to 
research and development in general, to detect 
any diversion to military applications, in the 
framework of possible arms control agreements 
that might ban the introduction of specified 
technology into weapons systems. 
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7.7. Lastly, the committee calls for the Council 
to report annually to the Assembly on progress 
being made on the IEPG list of priority emerging 
technology projects, and for the agency for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions to report annually to the Assembly on the 
conclusions of its study proposed in the previous 
paragraph. 
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Country National currency unit 
1981 
(0) (I) (- 5) 
Belgium ................... Million B. Frs. 125,689 
France (c) .................. Million F. Frs. 129,708 
Germany .................. Million DM 52,193 
Italy ...................... Milliard Lire 9,868 
Luxembourg ............... Million L. Frs. 1, 715 
Netherlands ................ Million Guilders 11,296 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 12,144 
TOTAL WEU ........ 
Canada .................... Million C. $ 6,289 
Denmark .................. Million D. Kr. 10,301 
Greece .................... Million Drachmas 142,865 
Norway ................... Million N. Kr. 9,468 
Portugal ..... , ............. Million Escudos 51,917 
Turkey .................... Millions L. 313,067 
United States .............. Million US$ 169,888 
TOTAL NON-WEU .... 
TOTAL NATO (d),, 
Defence expenditure Defence expenditure 
(national currency, current prices) d (current prices- US$ million) a 
1982 1983 1984 1985/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(- 4) (- 3) (- 2) (- 1) (I) (2) (3) (4) 
132,127 136,853 141,676 155,668 3,385 2,892 2,676 2,452 
148,021 165,029 176,638 186,242 23,867 22,523 21,654 20,212 
54,234 56,496 57,274 59,737 23,094 22,350 22,127 20,125 
12,294 14,400 16,433 18,059 8,681 9,090 9,481 9,353 
1,893 2,104 2,234 2,317 46 41 41 39 
11,921 12,149 12,765 12,885 4,527 4,464 4,257 3,978 
13,849 15,952 16,923 18,572 24,627 24,242 24,198 22,614 
88,228 85,602 84,434 78,773 
7,655 8,086 9,320 10,263 5,245 6,205 6,561 7,196 
11,669 12,574 13,045 13,750 1,446 1,400 1,375 1,260 
176,270 193,340 271,922 321,722 2,578 2,639 2,195 2,412 
10,956 12,395 12,688 15,431 1,650 1,698 1,699 1,555 
63,817 76,765 92,009 111,522 844 803 693 629 
447,790 556,738 803,044 1,198,125 2,815 2,755 2,469 2,190 
196,390 217,198 277,052 266,642 169,888 196,390 217,198 237,052 
184,466 211,889 232,190 252,293 
272,694 297,491 316,625 331,066 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
GDP in purchasers' values Population (thousand) (current prices- US $ million) a 
1985/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
2,241 95,730 84,251 80,087 76,046 73,586 9,852 9,856 9,856 9,852 
19,233 572,371 542,746 516,317 489,428 472,025 54,182 54,480 54,729 54,947 
18,835 683,239 659,849 653,883 613,159 576,699 59,790 59,761 59,562 59,336 
9,048 353,254 347,862 354,884 348,385 336,357 56,502 56,639 56,825 56,983 
36 3,818 3,437 3,374 3,235 3,123 366 366 366 366 
3,595 141,412 138,139 132,595 123,059 115,138 14,247 14,310 14,362 14,420 
22,034 513,978 483,864 455,443 424,679 409,567 56,379 56,335 56,377 56,488 
75,222 2,363,802 2,260,149 2,196,584 2,077,991 1,986,494 251,318 251,747 252,077 252,392 
7,539 291,539 299,061 324,003 332,492 338,035 24,366 24,657 24,904 25,150 
1,210 57,247 56,003 56,321 54,635 53,343 5,122 5,119 5,114 5, Ill 
2,379 36,941 38,140 34,813 33,466 33,509 9,730 9,790 9,848 9,910 
1,690 57,091 56,277 55,064 54,736 52,772 4,100 4,ll6 4,130 4,141 
635 23,928 23,365 20,668 19,310 19,624 9,970 10,030 10,099 10,170 
2,422 57,666 53,032 51,147 49,858 55,144 45,757 46,780 47,804 48,720 
266,642 2,934,911 3,045,279 3,275,728 3,634,522 3,870,830 230,043 232,345 234,538 236,681 
282,518 3,459,322 3,571,157 3,817,743 4,179,079 4,423,257 329,088 332,837 336,437 339,883 
357,740 5,823,124 5,831,306 6,014,327 6,257,070 6,409,751 580,406 584,584 588,514 592,275 
Defence expenditure as %of 
GDP in purchasers' values 
1985/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985/ 
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
9,852 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 
55,222 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 
59,217 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 
57,154 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
366 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
14,492 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 
56,544 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.4 
252,847 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
25,427 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 
5,104 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 
9,989 7.0 6.9 6.3 7.2 7.1 
4,153 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.2 
10,231 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 
49,792 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.4 
239,048 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.9 
343,744 5.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.4 
596,591 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.6 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (I) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in 
exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns ( 16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Units per US$ 
Country National currency unit 1981 1982 1983 
(0) (I) (1) (2) (3) 
Belgium Million B. Frs. 37.12900 45.69100 51.13200 
France Million F. Frs. 5.43460 6.57210 7.62130 
Germany Million DM 2.26000 2.42660 2.55330 
Italy Milliard Lire 1.13680 1.35250 1.51880 
Luxembourg Million L. Frs. 37.12900 45.69100 51.13200 
Netherlands Million Guilders 2.49520 2.67020 2.85410 
United Kingdom Million Pound Sterling 0.49312 0.57127 0.65920 
Canada Million C.$ 1.19890 1.23370 1.23240 
Denmark Million D. Kr. 7.12340 8.33240 9.14500 
Greece Million Drachmas 55.40800 66.80300 88.06400 
Norway Million N. Kr. 5.73950 6.45400 7.29640 
Portugal Million Escudos 61.54600 79.47300 110.78000 
Turkey Million Turkish Lira 111.22000 162.55000 225.46000 
United States Million US$ 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
Note b: 6 months' average. 
Note c : France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures 
are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e - Preliminary estimate. 
f - Forecast. 
* - WEU Office of the Clerk estimates. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25. 
1984 1985 b 
(4) (5) 
57.78400 63.76700 
8.73910 9.68360 
2.84590 3.17150 
I. 75700 1.99590 
57.78400 63.76700 
3.20870 3.58440 
0.74833 0.84289 
1.29510 1.36130 
10.35660 11.36200 
112.72000 135.23000 
8.16150 9.13020 
146.39000 175.62000 
366.68000 494.64000 
1.00000 1.00000 
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Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as% of total WEU (current prices- US$) a 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985/ 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
344 293 272 249 248 3.84 3.38 3.17 3.11 3.25 
440 413 396 368 348 27.05 26.31 25.65 25.66 25.57 
386 374 371 339 318 26.18 26.11 26.21 25.55 25.04 
154 160 167 164 158 9.84 10.62 11.23 11.87 12.03 
126 113 112 106 99 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
318 312 296 276 248 5.13 5.22 5.04 5.05 4.78 
437 430 429 400 390 27.91 28.32 28.66 28.71 29.29 
351 340 335 312 298 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
215 252 263 286 297 5.95 7.25 7.77 9.14 10.02 
282 274 269 246 237 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.60 1.61 
265 270 223 243 238 2.92 3.08 2.60 3.06 3.16 
402 412 411 375 407 1.87 1.98 2.01 1.97 2.25 
85 80 69 62 62 0.96 0.94 0.82 0.80 0.84 
62 59 52 45 49 3.19 3.22 2.92 2.78 3.22 
739 845 926 1.002 1' 115 192.56 229.42 257.24 300.93 354.47 
561 637 690 742 822 209.08 247.53 275.00 320.28 375.58 
470 509 538 559 600 309.08 347.53 375.00 420.28 475.58 
92 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1052 
B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1985 
Period of compulsory 1 Total in armed forces 2 Total armed forces 2 
military service military personnel (military and civilian) 
(months) (thousands) as percentage 
of active population 
Army Navy Air force (e) (e) 
Belgium 10 3 103 10 3 108 2.7 
France 12 12 12 563 ! 2.9 
Germany 15 4 15 4 15 4 495 
I 
2.4 
Italy 12 18 12 531 2.5 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 0.9 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 103 2.1 
United Kingdom voluntary 335 2.0 
ToTAL WEU 2,136 I 2.5 
Canada voluntary 83 1.0 
Denmark 9 5 95 9 5 29 1.4 
Greece 22 26 24 206 6.2 
Norway 12 15 15 41 2.5 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 101 2.6 
Turkey 18 18 18 825 4.6 
United States voluntary 2,289 
I 
2.9 
TOTAL NON-WEU 3,574 3.1 
TOTAL NATO 5,710 2.8 
Sources: 
1. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. To be eighteen months from 1989. 
5. To be twelve months in combat arms. 
e = estimate. 
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1972 
Belgium 0.0 
France 11.3 
Germany 5.4 
Italy 0.8 
Netherlands 0.9 
United Kingdom 10.7 
United States 1 12.0 
United States 2 
APPENDIX II 
TABLE I 
Expenditure on defence research and development 
(as % of total defence expenditure) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
- - 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 
12.1 11.5 10.7 10.4 10.2 10.6 11.4 
5.1 4.7 4.6 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 
1.3 1.4 0.8 2.6 1.7 1.4 1.1 
0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 
12.0 11.0 10.9 10.2 12.8 12.4 13.2 
12.1 11.5 11.4 11.8 12.5 12.9 
10.5 10.4 
Source: WEU countries estimated by WEU secretariat. 
1. Science and technology indicators, OECD, 1984. 
2. Annual reports ofDRE, United States Department of Defence. 
1972 
Belgium 0.24 
France 633 
Germany 364 
Italy 24 
Netherlands 12 
United Kingdom 735 
TABLE II 
Expenditure on defence research and development 
(ECU million at 1975 prices and exchange rates) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
- -
1 1 2 1 3 
780 792 926 929 934 1,052 1,175 
418 455 475 509 486 503 513 
42 44 26 82 54 43 39 
14 18 21 23 22 24 22 
832 898 989 1,086 1,123 1,070 1,234 
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1980 1981 1982 1983 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12.0 15.0 14.5 13.5 
4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 
1.3 1.9 1.5 1.8 
0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 
13.8 14.0 13.3 12.5 
9.5 9.4 10.1 9.6 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
1 1 1 1 
1,275 1,621 1,589 1,514 
450 395 412 438 
47 71 61 77 
21 20 20 24 
1,324 1,343 1,372 1,350 
United States 7,715 7,900 7,788 8,296 9,800 10,705 
Source: WEU countries - WEU secretariat. 
Annual reports ofDRE, United States Department of Defence. 
TABLE Ill 
Defence research and development indicators 
(1) (2) (3) 
1980 Defence R & D as% of total 
1979 Total R & D civil public financed R & D 1980 Defence R & D as% of 
and defence as% ofGDP (in brackets defence and aerospace total defence expenditure 
research as a total of all public 
financed R & D) 
Belgium 1.40 0.3 0.0 
France 1.81 40.1 (49.3) 12.0 
Germany 2.40 15.3 (24.4) 4.2 
Italy 0.84 2.7 1.3 
Netherlands 1.99 3.1 0.9 
United Kingdom 2.20 59.4 (64.8) 13.8 
United States 2.38 47.3 (63.7) 9.5 
Japan 2.10 4.9 (16.8) 
Source: (1), (2) Science and technology indicators, OECD, 1984. 
(3) Estimates ofWEU secretariat (United States figures from annual DRE reports, Department of Defence). 
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1. Air-land battle and FOFA target arrays 
Target 
density 
Army targets: 
Air force targets: 
First echelon targets 
Combat vehicles 
Artillery 
Command and control 
Air defence 
Close air support 
1. Reference to Chapter V, paragraph 5.12. 
Source: United States Department of Defence. 
100 
kilometres 
200 
Second echelon targets FOFA targets 
ComlJafvehicres-- ---· -------..\irfiet<ts 
Surface-to-surface missiles Air defence 
Command and control EW GCI 
Choke points Choke points 
Mana:uvre units 
Air defence 
EWGCI 
Choke points 
-
-
-0 
Vl 
N 
Operational function 
Surveillance and 
target acquisition 
Assessment, planning, 
tasking 
Strike 
Air-to-ground 
Surface-to-surface 
83 
Source: United States Department of Defence. 
2. An interim conventional interdiction system capability 
will be in place by the late 1980s 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming Canada's participation in NATO, OECD, ESA and other interJational organisations 
and conferences together with WEU member countries; 
(ii) Considering Canada's achievements in the scientific, technological and aerospace sectors such as 
V-STOL aircraft, the Canadarm, the Candu nuclear reactor, energy from conventional and non-
conventional sources, polar ocean research and communication techniques; 
(iii) Considering that Canada is an associate member of ESA and that a new agreement will have to 
be signed in 1988; · 
(iv) Considering Canada's wish to develop further its high technology industqes and also its close 
industrial and political relations with several Western European countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member states: 
1. To study the possibilities of Canada participating in projects of the In~ependent European 
Programme Group and other high technology European ventures provided there is reciprocity and that 
Canada likewise adopts a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and production; 
2. To promote closer collaboration with Canada in the European Space Agency by: 
(a) extending its associate membership from five to ten years; 
(b) widening the range of programmes in which Canada should partiCipate to include new 
application programmes such as ERS-II and TDRSS and also scientific programmes; 
(c) asking the Canadian authorities to use European hardware such as Ariane in joint ventures; 
(d) inviting the Canadian space authorities to participate in European manned space 
programmes such as Hermes and Hotol; 
3. Also to promote Canadian collaboration in Eureka projects; 
4. To approach the Canadian authorities for the promotion of European hardware in the interna-
tional organisations in which they participate. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. For budgetary reasons, the committee's 
visit to Canada planned for July 1985 was not 
agreed to by the Presidential Committee when it 
was requested in the spring of 1985. However, 
at a later stage, after a letter of protest from the 
Chairman of the committee, it was finally agreed 
on condition that no special funds were required 
for interpretation purposes. The visit had to be 
postponed from July to October and eventually 
took place from 22nd October to 1st November 
1985. 
2. Once the Presidential Committee had 
agreed to the visit, a draft programme was drawn 
up through the good offices of the Canadian 
Embassy in Paris. The Department of External 
Affairs finalised the programme on 18th October 
1985. 
3. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his 
and the committee's gratitude to the Canadian 
officials from the Department of External 
Affairs the Embassy in Paris, the secretariat for parlia~entary relations of the houses of parlia-
ment and the ministries, both federal and 
provincial, and private industries involved in 
the organisation of the visit. 
4. During the visit, the emphasis was on the 
science and technology policies of the provincial 
governments rather than of the federal govern-
ment. The committee obtained a good impres-
sion of what could be done at provincial level to 
promote science and technology in order to 
advance the economies of the provinces and 
research activities at industrial and university 
level. 
5. In Ottawa, the committee was received on 
29th October 1985 by the Parliamentary Secre-
tary to the Minister of State for Science and 
Technology, Mr. Bernard Valcourt, and Mr. 
Tackart, Vice-President of the European-Cana-
dian Parliamentary Group. The reception was 
followed by a lunch at which Mr. Valcourt 
underlined that Canada's future was dependent 
on science and technology. Canada needed for 
the 1990s some 20,000 young scientists but 
would probably obtain only some 8,000. The 
government would do everything in its power to 
increase this number. 
6. Another matter of concern for the Cana-
dian Government was the huge budget deficit in 
1985. Here again the government would have 
to give high priority to lowering this deficit. 
general agreement with the United States for the 
execution of military contracts in Canadian 
industries. Canada did not therefore need a 
special memorandum of understanding for its 
industry to take part in research and develop-
ment connected with the strategic defence initia-
tive. The government as such however would 
not participate as it did not consider this to be in 
the interest of Canada. On the other hand, the 
government considered the SDI a good initiative 
for the United States. 
8. Finally, Mr. Valcourt pointed to the 
healthy relationship between Canada and the 
European Space Agency. Taking into account 
Canadian budgetary problems, this relationship 
should nevertheless continue as it allowed 
Canada to remain competitive on the world 
market oftelecommunications and satellites. 
9. The co-ordination of Canadian research 
and development at federal level is organised by 
the National Research Council which has many 
laboratories dealing with all types of sciences; 
the committee saw several of these laboratories 
during its visit. It noticed the interaction of the 
federal and provincial research bodies and of 
those with the universities and the private 
sector. The most important body for research 
and development is the National Research 
Council which was created over a century 
ago. Its laboratories are located all over Can-
ada. The committee visited a number of them. 
Other science-based departments and agencies 
have also a number of research facilities 
across the country such as the departments of 
agriculture, fisheries and oceans. 
10. The committee had an interesting general 
discussion with the Chairman of the Science 
Council of Canada, Dr. Stuart L. Smith, on 
29th October 1985. The Science Council is a 
non-government body whose role is to give 
policy advice on science and development to 
government policy makers. He indicated that 
the Canadians had come to realise that science 
and technology had a crucial role to play in 
restoring the competitiveness of Canada's tradi-
tional industries and in developing new high-
technology, knowledge-intensive industries. 
They realised that more research and develop-
ment was needed at all levels to secure Canada's 
place in international markets and that science 
and technology must therefore have greater 
prominence in the full cycle of the educational 
system. 
11. There was general awareness that it was 
7. As far as the American strategic defence simply not enough to achieve economic growth 
initiative - SDI - was concerned, Canada had a or to increase exports but that special govern-
lOO 
mental policies would be needed to ensure that 
wealth creation in knowledge-intensive indus-
tries should be balanced by job creation in 
labour-intensive fields. 
12. The strategic options had to be thoroughly 
discussed by all segments of society to reach 
broad agreement on how best to manage the 
change from a resource-based to a knowledge-
based economy. 
13. However, the new government had deci-
ded to cut in half the Can.$5 million budget of 
the Science Council with the result that a num-
ber of topics could no longer be discussed by the 
Science Council and some of its staffwould have 
to be dismissed. 
14. The Council's approach in giving advice 
to the government was directed towards achie-
ving concrete results. For that reason the 
Council organised follow-up meetings to ensure 
a full and wide-ranging discussion of the issues 
which were raised in its reports in order to 
stimulate implementation of its recommen-
dations. 
15. With this in mind, the Council was 
convinced that Canada should spend a large part 
of its research and development funds first and 
foremost on agriculture where Canadian achie-
vements in science and development have 
always been extremely successful. 
16. The second area was biotechnology which 
may provide a key for improving the interna-
tional competitiveness of Canada's natural 
resource industry while creating a range of spin-
off, knowledge-intensive companies. Applica-
tions included pharmaceuticals, agriculture, 
forestry, mineral extraction and waste manage-
ment. 
17. The third area was energy resources. 
Canada has very important resources in oil, gas, 
coal, etc. 
18. In general, the future was in high value-
added technology products. The people were 
not yet convinced that knowledge and know-
how were needed to establish innovative enter-
prises. 
19. The Council believed that more must be 
done to enhance Canadian industrial competi-
tiveness and encourage change. There were 
four areas of weakness on which the Council 
made recommendations designed to enhance 
entrepreneurship, improve Canada's technolo-
gical capacity for future development, encourage 
industry to look outward to international markets 
and promote co-operation among the various 
interest groups in the Canadian industrial struc-
ture. 
20. The role of government should be to 
promote this knowledge and know-how if 
Canada was to stand on its own in the 
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next century. Governmen)t strategy must also 
include policies and prograJ!Ilmes that will create 
a market for and accelerate the diffusion of new 
and existing technologies. Although technology 
transfer had received consi erable impetus from 
federal and provincial in tiatives in creating 
research programmes an institutes, govern-
ments could do more to ncourage the use of 
new technology in indu try. For example, 
a government-supported 1 asing company for 
state-of-the-art machinery . or equipment, run 
along the lines of the J~pan Robot Leasing 
Company, would speed th~ diffusion of domes-
tic technology. Governmept purchasing was an 
important part of this strate~y. 
21. Dr. Smith also poin~ed to the greenhouse 
effect which might take pla~e in the next century 
and which would mean that the North American 
climate would get warmer iand that the United 
States would become drie~. Canada, with its 
abundance of water resources, would then 
become the major agricultural producer. 
11. Oceanography 
I 
22. The first subject the ommittee came into 
contact with in Canada wa oceanography which 
is not very astonishing as its first stop was at 
St. John's, the capital c ty of the province 
of Newfoundland and brador. This most 
easterly and oldest city in North America was 
settled in the early 150Qs. Its seaport is a 
naturally sheltered harbqur and centre for 
inshore and offshore fishing, fish processing and 
offshore oil and gas drilling. 
23. Its university, Memorial University- thus 
named in memory of Newfoundlanders who lost 
their lives in active service during the first world 
war when Newfoundland was still a British 
dominion separate from <Canada - focuses its 
research on oceanography and ocean engineering 
in view of its proximity to the oil-rich Grand 
Banks. 
24. Navigation in Canacijan waters is domina-
ted by ice for much of the :year, storms bringing 
severe winds and wave ~onditions. Icebergs 
frequently move southwards between Canada 
and Greenland. i 
25. The risk of collision between ocean-going 
vessels and icebergs, accor ing to Mrs. Deborah 
Diemand of the Centre fo Cold Ocean Resour-
ces Engineering, was a ery real threat and 
impediment to the safe !development of the 
natural resources of Canada's eastern shelf 
zone. Damage from icebergs may occur either 
as a direct collision with a vessel or offshore 
structure or by the crushing and ploughing of 
seabed installations such as wellheads, mooring 
systems, pipelines and telecommunications 
cables, by grounding and scouring icebergs. 
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26. The damage resulting from such a colli-
sion could range from moderate property loss to 
major loss of life or environmental damage. In 
order to remove or mitigate the danger posed by 
icebergs a far greater understanding of the 
problem was needed. A credible risk analysis 
must include not only statistics on the number 
of icebergs, which were at present available from 
various sources, but also information on the 
physical properties of the ice itself, the beha-
viour of small ice masses in heavy seas and of 
the large icebergs during a grounding event as 
well as the frequency of such groundings. Most 
of these factors would vary with latitude and 
time of year. Very little information was avail-
able on any of these aspects. 
27. Having quantified the problem through a 
risk and hazard analysis including these proper-
ties of icebergs in general and icebergs indivi-
dually, it then remained to reduce the danger. 
28. Work in the institutes and universities 
had concentrated on the development of colli-
sion avoidance techniques and on improving 
techniques for the remote identification of 
approaching icebergs. This was of little use to 
an endangered immobile structure such as a 
wellhead unless it could be buried deeply enough 
to escape the damaging effects of a large, 
scouring iceberg. Work had been undertaken to 
develop a method to split such an iceberg in 
order to reduce its draft. It was felt that this 
could be achieved through the introduction of 
heat into the cold core of the iceberg and conse-
quent massive thermal shock. 
29. The overall objectives of oceanographic 
research were to build a collision probability 
model for iceberg risk analysis, and to develop a 
means of mitigating the danger of a catastrophic 
oil spill by preventing iceberg damage to seabed 
structures. This would contribute to the deve-
lopment of a sound and economical basis for 
marine management of the Canadian North 
Atlantic coast. 
30. During its stay at St. John's on 23rd and 
24th October 1985, the committee visited 
Nordco Ltd., the engineering and applied 
sciences division of the Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, the Institute for Marine Dyna-
mics - a newly created laboratory of the Federal 
National Research Council, the Centre for Cold 
Ocean Resources Engineering and finally the 
provincial parliamentary Assembly of New-
foundland and Labrador. 
(a) Nordco Ltd. 
31. According to Mr. John Foster, director, 
activities in the oil and gas and the fishery 
sectors of the east coast of Canada needed 
companies able to offer a general approach to 
research and development in all aspects of ocean 
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resources development such as studies of ice-
bergs, shipbuilding, weather forecasting, elec-
tronic instrumentation design and maintenance. 
32. The company was set up with federal 
government funds and had to become self-
sufficient within five years. In the end the 
federal government would hold 10% to 20% of 
the shares and the employees the other 80%. Its 
main activities (70%) were related to offshore oil 
and gas exploration and exploitation, some 20% 
to fishery and 10% to other activities. Nordco 
used advanced technology in many fields includ-
ing satellite tracking systems and computer 
modelling techniques. It was involved in the 
detection, measurement and prediction of ice-
bergs, in continuing studies of marine transpor-
tation through pack-ice, and it provided valuable 
information on hull forces encountered during 
ice-breaking operations. All these data were 
directly applicable to the problems of year-round 
use of ports in Arctic and sub-Arctic areas. 
Radar development was also of great impor-
tance, especially over-the-horizon radar for ships 
and aircraft. As often in these waters, visual 
observation was not possible. The Canadian 
radar satellite, Radarsat, for instance, would be 
used for offshore mapping, and would be in 
general use in poor visibility conditions. 
33. Nordco provided geophysical project 
management logistics and data interpretation 
capabilities for applications ranging from marine 
structure design and pipeline routing studies to 
mineral and hydrocarbon location and extrac-
tion programmes. 
34. Nordco had two subsidiary companies, 
CANAM Offshore Systems Ltd. which provided 
services to determine the ability of vessels to 
operate under specific environmental condi-
tions. It used special operational guidance 
monitoring and communication systems. 
35. The other subsidiary company was Geo-
nautics Ltd. which provided its clients with 
geophysical services and offshore engineering 
projects. It provided detailed mapping of the 
seabed and located drilling hazards beneath the 
seabed. Special surveys were made for laying 
pipeline and cable and this required accurate 
knowledge of the geology of the seabed. 
(b) The engineering and applied sciences division 
of the Memorial University of Newfoundland 
36. The committee was received by the Dean 
of the university, Dr. G.R. Peters, who explained 
that at the university there were some 11,000 
students, 600 of whom were in the faculty of 
engineering. Each year some 80 students would 
finish their studies in civil or hydrological 
engineering. Of these, about 30 would specia-
lise in ocean engineering; naval architecture was 
an important discipline and this university was 
the only one in Canada where it could be 
studied. Every year some 50 students would 
obtain a PhD. The Memorial University is one 
of the rare universities having a co-operative 
programme which provides for students to 
spend roughly half of their time in university 
and the other part in industry; so that, coming 
out, a number of them are able to create their 
own companies. 
37. Dr. D.B. Muggeridge, Chairman of the 
ocean engineering faculty, explained that the 
ocean engineering research group was formed of 
some 35 professors doing research in ocean-
related problems. 
38. The faculty had several research facilities 
and laboratories for undergraduate teaching and 
graduate research. There were laboratories for 
electrical engineering, remote sensing, heavy 
structures, materials, etc. Facilities were avail-
able for interpreting aerial photographs, plotting 
and image analysis. The faculty also had 
several computer facilities for the exclusive use 
of students. 
(c) The Institute for Marine Dynamics 
39. As Canada had a long coastline and vast 
inland waterways, research into the design of 
ships and offshore structures destined for frozen 
Arctic seas was of great importance. Naviga-
tion was dominated by ice for much of the year; 
storms brought severe wind and wave condi-
tions. Future exploitation and transportation 
of natural resources in the Arctic and off the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts depended on the 
development of ships and of exploration and 
production platforms which could operate in 
severe conditions. 
40. Research into marine dynamics and the 
performance of high-capability vessels required 
a major investment in facilities such as ice tanks, 
sea-keeping and manreuvering tanks and towing 
tanks and several associated workshops for 
manufacturing models and instrumentation. 
41. Research projects included evaluation of 
the ice-breaking capability of different designs 
for ice-breakers and ice-transiting vessels, and 
also the effects of ice on offshore platforms. 
Research into the performance of propellers or 
other propulsion devices made it necessary to 
study basic physics of cavitation which might be 
the cause of propeller damage, noise or ship 
vibration. The committee toured the institute. 
(d) The Centre for Cold Ocean Resources 
Engineering 
42. The location of the Institute for Marine 
Dynamics at St. John's placed it at the centre of 
a vital marine-oriented research group, such as 
the Memorial University and the Centre for 
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Cold Ocean Resources i Engineering. This 
centre had been establishedlin 1975 and was part 
of the faculty of scienc~ of the Memorial 
University. 1 
I 
43. The main subjects rwere geotechnology, 
acoustics, communication 1nd telemetry, hydro-
dynamics, ice and icebergs, 
1
ocean characteristics 
and engineering and econo~ic impact studies. 
I 
44. The impact of offshore oil and gas on the 
Newfoundland construction industry was impor-
tant. The repercussions ~f North Sea oil in 
Norway and Scotland wer~ being examined as 
representative cases. Specilal attention was paid 
to education and training, technology develop-
ment and spin-off develo~' ent for small local 
businesses; government s ctures, administra-
tion and social structure d organisation were 
additional subjects. The c mmittee visited the 
centre. ' 
I 
(e) The provincial parliamentary Assembly of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
45. The committee was received in the 
chamber of the parliameptary assembly and 
witnessed a question and answer period. 
Ill. The Industrial Materials Research Institute 
46. On Friday, 25th October 1985, the com-
mittee visited the Industrial Materials Research 
Institute of the National Research Council of 
Canada at its new permanent facilities at 
Boucherville in the vicinity of Montreal. The 
committee was received by Mr. Georges Bata, 
the director of the institutel He explained that 
materials engineering was ~rticularly important 
for Canada because of th~ extensive develop-
ment of its primary and !secondary industrial 
sector which could benefit cjonsiderably from the 
introduction of data-processing methods and 
improve materials. 
47. The establishment of an industrial mate-
rials research institute in the province of 
Quebec, which would co-~perate with existing 
research institutes, would have a significant 
effect on the economic health of Quebec manu-
facturing industries and . should benefit the 
Canadian industrial sector as a whole. 
48. The federal governm:ent had put in some 
Can.$500 million which should generate econo-
mics of Can.$1 billion. The institute was 
wholly funded by the federal government. 
49. Another federal government priority was 
the provision of better opportunities for French-
speaking scientists, engineers and technicians to 
participate more directly in the research activi-
ties of the National Research Council and 
broaden their contact wit}) industrial research. 
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The institute used French as a working language 
in order to integrate better the industrial and 
research communities of Quebec. The institute 
had a staff of 139 of whom 39 were research 
workers and trainees. 
50. The institute's activities were divided into 
four sections: the first section was concerned 
with the optimisation of manufacturing pro-
cesses with special regard to metals and 
polymers. A future subject would be ceramics; 
the second section was involved in the develop-
ment and characterisation of new materials; the 
third section was concerned with studies which 
tried to represent the working environment of 
new materials, their lifespan and conditions of 
utilisation; the fourth section was involved 
mainly in the development of sensors in order to 
measure the chemical and physical properties of 
materials. 
51. In each section there was great emphasis 
on strong collaboration with industrial partners 
who would come in as early as possible in any 
new research project. They were invited to 
make their own research effort in order to take 
out a licence which, when the research stage was 
finished, would be handed to the industrial 
partner. 
52. Examples given were the improvement of 
welding productivity - the institute was develop-
ing systems to be used in computer-aided manu-
facturing welding systems - and plastics, as most 
plastic processors in Canada were too small to 
have a research staff. The institute was basi-
cally concerned with developing background 
knowledge on which improvements in the 
characteristics of plastics would be based. 
53. Half of the advisory board of the institute 
was composed of industrialists and the other half 
of government-nominated members and univer-
sity professors. It gave advice on how to run 
the institute and how to introduce in private 
industry the new technologies developed in the 
institute. The purpose was to make Canadian 
industry more competitive with foreign, mainly 
American, industry. 
54. Each programme had its own manager 
who was responsible for ensuring that the 
programme was completed and that the spin-off 
reached the industry concerned. 
55. The National Research Council had 
contacts with several European countries and 
followed in detail what was being done in 
countries such as France and Germany. 
56. The institute might be expanded to 
employ some 250 or 300 employees and was 
keenly interested in defence-related research. 
57. The institute had an important library 
which was organised by the Canadian Institute 
for Scientific and Technical Information based 
104 
in Ottawa at the headquarters of the National 
Research Council and was responsible for disse-
minating scientific and technical information on 
materials science and engineering. 
IV. The Armand-Frappier Institute 
58. Also on 25th October 1985, the committee 
visited the Armand-Frappier Institute in Laval, 
near Montreal, which was a teaching and 
research institute for microbiology. Its goal was 
twofold: the promotion of human and animal 
health and the development of the bio-industry. 
It is also run as a private company. The 
committee was received by Dr. Aurele Beaulnes, 
director, and Dr. Claude Vezina, assistant 
director. 
59. After the committee had been welcomed 
by the director, Dr. Vezina compared the 
institute to the Institut Pasteur in France. 
60. The institute was a non-profit-making 
organisation, governed by a board of fifteen 
directors representing various sectors of society. 
61. The research activities were organised 
around six centres: bacteriology, epidemiology 
and preventive medicine, immunology, compa-
rative medicine (veterinary medicine included), 
applied food sciences and virology. 
62. The institute had a staff of 600, including 
75 scientists, and was the largest centre for bio-
industrial research and development in Canada. 
63. It was pointed out that biotechnology 
might change our lives in a number of ways. It 
was one of the advanced technologies which was 
expected to produce quantum jumps in produc-
tivity in various fields of economic activities. 
Like microelectronics, it was a pervasive techni-
que in the sense that it might find its application 
in many fields of activity. It could be defined 
as the integrated application of biochemistry, 
microbiology and process technology aimed at 
economic use of micro-organisms. 
64. Modem biotechnology was now being 
tested and applied in many fields such as 
pharmaceuticals (old and new drugs), forestry 
(propagating forest trees by cloning), agriculture 
(plant and animal breeding), the chemical 
industry (pesticides and new plastics), the energy 
sector (the conversion of biomass into gasohol), 
mining (enhanced oil recovery - concentrate 
metals), waste treatment and many other fields, 
even in regard to human beings. 
65. In the East-West relationship the impact 
of biotechnology might make itself particularly 
felt in agriculture. In the Soviet Union, bio-
technology would play a more and more 
important role in its production. This might 
lead to fewer exports from Canada to the Soviet 
Union, especially in animal feed products. 
66. On the other hand, the increased use of 
biotechnology might particularly increase the 
demand for various kinds of industrial equip-
ment and know-how, also in microelectronics 
and computer technology which would play 
an important role in large-scale fermentation 
processes. For these technologies the Eastern 
European countries were still largely dependent 
on the West. 
67. Increased use of biotechnology processes 
could lead to a substantial reduction in western 
energy demand and therefore Soviet oil exports 
to Western Europe might be reduced signifi-
cantly. 
68. The institute was also responsible for 
teaching at scientific and professional level and 
its public health services related to hospitals and 
universities, production of vaccines, biochemical 
and diagnostic products. 
69. About 55% of the cost of the institute was 
covered by its earnings from the production of 
goods and services. Apart from vaccines for 
human beings and livestock, the institute now 
also had an AIDS (acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome) screening laboratory and a large 
research programme which was especially for the 
use of the medical community in greater 
Montreal. 
70. After this introduction, the committee 
visited the department of vaccine production, 
the biomass laboratory, and the department of 
biochemical products. 
V. Energy research 
71. During its visit, the committee paid 
special attention to energy research in Canada. 
The projections of energy supply and demand 
in Canada as elsewhere had changed frequently 
and substantially in recent years. Moreover 
energy policy in Canada was a matter for the 
provinces which had quite different policies and 
energy markets and which had of course strongly 
influenced the major changes at a federal level. 
72. The committee visited Hydro-Quebec 
International, Hydro-Ontario, the oil sands 
research department of the Alberta Research 
Council and the federal laboratory of mines and 
resources. 
(a) Hydro-Quebec International 
73. On 25th October 1985, the committee 
visited the Hydro-Quebec International head-
quarters in Montreal, where it was received by 
Mrs. Caroline Reed and Mr. Jean-Paul Fontaine. 
After a general introduction given by Mrs. Reed, 
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Mr. Fontaine explained t e plans and pro-
gramme of the James Bay droelectric project. 
The project covered some 176,000 sq.km in 
the heart of the province of uebec where about 
18,000 workers were transfo ming a vast system 
of lakes and rivers into one f the largest hydro-
electric projects in the w rld. In ten years 
Hydro-Quebec had doubled its power output. 
The total cost ofthe project .f.as about Can.$14.6 
billion of which Can.$1 0 bi~lion had been used 
to carry out the project fnd the remainder 
allocated to the constructi n of energy trans-
mission lines. 
74. Harnessing the nort~ern Quebec rivers 
had made it possible to increase the share of 
electricity in the energy sup ly of the province -
some 25,000 megawatts - nd triggered explo-
sive growth in experience a d expertise in many 
Quebec firms. 
75. The James Bay projec had started in 1971 
and since then five airpo and 1,500 km of 
permanent roads had been built. Two commer-
cial airlines provided daily ,service between the 
James Bay villages and the major cities of 
Quebec. t 
76. Hydro-Quebec now h d 95% of its energy 
supply from hydro powe stations. It was 
selling all its excess output to the state of New 
York and the New England states at a profit. 
At the same time it also imported hydroelectric 
power generated by the fChurchill Falls in 
Labrador. The Churchill alls could generate 
5.4 million kilowatts. 
77. Hydro-Quebec was xporting its energy 
and also its know-how of hydroelectric works. 
In developing the hydroelectric potential of the 
James Bay region, the Jam Bay energy society 
had taken great care not to isrupt the balance of 
the fragile environment wh n it transformed the 
vast network of lakes, riv rs and forests into 
hydroelectric power plants. Its environmental 
protection policy called fo environmental fac-
tors to receive the same attention as technical 
and economic factors at every stage of the 
execution of the project. 
78. The project would ~e completed in the 
early 1990s. The first pha e was completed in 
1985. 
(b) Hydro-Ontario 
79. On 30th October 1 ?85, the committee 
visited the Pickering nucletpower station near 
Toronto where it was re eived by Mr. Fred 
Kee, who briefed the c mittee about the 
workings of this power stati<l>n. 
80. Although Canada had large oil and gas 
reserves and much hydroelectric power, the 
electricity generating statio111s in Ontario and in 
some other provinces were ruclear. The reason 
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was that Hydro-Ontario believed that nuclear 
reactors were a more economical and safe source 
of energy. Moreover, there were large deposits 
of low-cost uranium in Canada, which provided 
an economic alternative to fossil fuels. 
81. Canada had developed its own Candu 
system using heavy water as the moderator, 
which was material to slow down the neutrons 
produced in the fission reactor. Its major 
advantage was that natural uranium could be 
used as fuel and enriched uranium was not 
required as in light water reactors. 
82. The Pickering generating station in 
Toronto was the first nuclear power station in 
Canada, Hydro-Ontario now operated four 
nuclear power stations with a total of ten 
reactors and an additional twelve reactors were 
under construction. 
83. When all these reactors were operating in 
the early 1990s, Hydro-Ontario would be self-
sufficient in energy and would produce a lot of 
cheap electricity from its nuclear power plants. 
84. The figures given in Canadian dollars per 
kilowatt hour were: hydroelectric power 6 cents, 
oil6 cents, coal 3.4 cents and nuclear power 1.80 
cents. This would make the Ontario electricity 
rates one quarter those of New York. 
85. In the early 1990s, 68% of Ontario's 
electrical energy would be from nuclear sources, 
22% from hydro and 10% from coal and other 
sources. At the end of the century, nuclear 
power would therefore be the main energy 
source for this province. 
(c) Oil sands 
86. On 31st October 1985, the committee was 
received at the energy resources division of the 
Alberta Research Council in the oil sands 
research department where the committee was 
briefed by Dr. Daniel R. Prowse, manager of the 
engineering research section. 
87. The Alberta Research Council was a 
crown corporation of more than 500 employees 
promoting responsible economic development 
of the province of Alberta through a broad range 
of research in science and technology - oil sands, 
coal, industrial and engineering research, natural 
resources and frontier sciences. 
88. Ever since it was founded in 1921, the 
Alberta Research Council had been engaged in 
oil sands research. Dr. Karl Clark had obtai-
ned a patent in 1929 for a hot water process for 
extracting bitumen from oil sands by open-cast 
mining. However, 90% of Alberta's oil sands 
deposits could not yet be economically processed 
by deep underground mining methods. Re-
search therefore was now focused on the in situ 
recovery of bitumen from deep layers of oil 
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sands and on ways to make these techniques 
more economical and more productive. 
89. Researchers were developing a detailed 
understanding of the chemical characteristics of 
the relationship between water and bitumen and 
water/mineral interfaces. 
90. The Alberta oil sands deposits were 
among the largest hydrocarbon deposits in the 
world and would certainly play a major role in 
Canada's future energy production. 
91. Although the technology for the surface 
mining technique was now well developed, there 
were still many technological processes to invent 
and develop for the separation of bitumen from 
sands and other materials some 50 to 800 m 
underground. 
92. Bitumen was so viscous that it acted more 
like a solid than a liquid and therefore had to be 
heated or mixed with solvents to reduce its 
viscosity to allow it to flow through the porous 
spaces between the sand grains. Hot fluids such 
as steam were injected into deposits to provide 
the necessary heat and pressure to drive the 
bitumen into production wells. The successful 
development of the in situ recovery process 
required a detailed understanding of the geolo-
gical features of the deposits. 
93. Moreover, although there were very large 
deposits of crude bitumen in Alberta, each 
presented its own specific challenge when it had 
to be extracted; two large open pits were being 
exploited using the hot water separation process 
and the bitumen was then upgraded by a refinery 
process to a synthetic crude oil. 
94. The main difficulty with available deep-
mining technology was that it was too expensive 
and therefore not competitive with conventional 
crude oil. 
95. The major economic factors that would 
determine the rate of oil sands development 
were oil prices, fiscal conditions and the finan-
cing capabilities of the industry and markets. 
96. Government policy at both federal and 
provincial levels could have a major impact on 
these factors. Consequently, there was a large 
degree of uncertainty in any forecast of future oil 
sands production. Depending upon economic 
factors, in situ bitumen production could be as 
low as 15,000 cu.m per day or as high as 50,000 
cu.m per day in the year 2005. 
97. The Alberta Research Council had an oil 
sands analytical laboratory which provided 
special advisory service to industry and com-
mercial laboratories through research into the 
physical and chemical properties ofbitumen and 
oil sands, and the measurement and analysis of 
bitumen, water and solids in oil sands. It 
determined the content of each of these mate-
rials on the basis of small and large samples of 
oil sands, tailings, sludge and emulsions. 
98. After the briefing, the committee toured 
the laboratory. 
(d) Coal 
99. In the afternoon of 31st October 1985, the 
committee was received by Mr. T. David 
Brown director of the federal coal research 
laboratory, and Mr. R. Gary Martin, head of 
the coal research department of the Alberta 
Research Council. 
100. Mr. Brown explained that Canada was a 
major producer of coal, most of it by open~c~st 
mining in Saskatchewan, Alberf:a and . Bntlsh 
Columbia. In the eastern provmces, m New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, mines were under-
ground. 
101. In Alberta, the mining of coal was the 
cheapest of all. It had most of Canada's coal 
reserves; it had some 39 mines - 240 in all of 
Canada - but 10 mines in Alberta produced 91% 
of all coal. 
102. They exported some 23 million tons 
representing Can.$1.8 billion. The mining in-
dustry had some 15,000 employees and in 
Alberta coal cost Can.$6 a ton compared with 
Can.$25 a ton in Eastern Canada and some 
Can.$60 a ton in Europe. 
103. The extent, quality and availability of coal 
reserves underneath the Alberta plains made 
coal a major potential source of liquid fuel to 
meet the energy demands of future years. Coal 
could be converted to many products such as 
fuel, gas and synthetic gas for hydrogen .and 
ammonia production, but liquid fuels remamed 
the most attractive because they could be 
transported cheaply over long distances. 
104. The Alberta Research Council was investi-
gating methods of making coal economical~y 
competitive as a future source of synthetic 
fluids. As coals were different in physical and 
chemical structure, the Alberta Research Council 
had developed coal conversion technology suit-
ed to local coal characteristics and production 
capabilities. 
105. The Alberta Research Council and the 
Federal Canadian Centre for Mineral and Energy 
Technology had set up a coal research centre and 
laboratory which were developing new and more 
efficient methods of preparing "washed" coal 
for the market. One other major programme 
concerned the technology of liquefying coal. 
Yet another research field was the processing of 
coal with bitumen and heavy oil to provide a 
synthetic fuel which could easily be. tran~porte<;l. 
Some 154 scientists were workmg m this 
laboratory. 
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106. The laboratory operate a permanent pilot 
plant unique in Canada and 11re in the world. 
I 
VI. Communicl!tions 
i 
I 
107. The committee visited I the David Florida 
Laboratory of the Feder~ Department of 
Communications in Ottawa. It was briefed on 
Canadian space developments and experience 
with communications satellites and visited the 
Microtel Pacific Research Cel)tre at Vancouver. 
(a) The David Florida Labora~ory 
108. The committee was re eived by Dr. Rolf 
Mamen, director of the labor tory, in Ottawa on 
29th October 1985. Accordmg to Dr. Mamen, 
the laboratory was Canadals main spacecraft 
assembly, integration and testing centre maintai-
ned and operated by th~ Federal Depart-
ment of Communications. On a cost recovery 
basis the laboratory supplied government and indu~try with the specialised! rooms, equipment 
and support personnel necessary for assembling 
and checking spaceworthines$ of complete space-
craft, their subsystems or ml\ior functional parts 
and their components. . 
I 
109. The laboratory had befn built in the early 
1970s to support the development ofthe Hermes 
communications technology satellite. It was 
named after the late Mr. !)avid Florida, who 
was director of the Canad~an National Space 
Telecommunications laboratpry and manager of 
the ISIS (international satellites for ionospheric 
studies) programme, a Can,dian-United States 
project to study part of the e~rth's atmosphere. 
110. Many countries and a~encies had used the 
laboratory since 1972 as follows: 
Canada: Anik C-2 telecommunications satellite, 
partially integrated and tes~ed; Anik D-1 and 
Anik D-2 telecommunicati<lms satellites, built, 
assembled and tested; the National Research 
Council Canadian space sci~nce projects; Cana-
dian a~rospace compani~~. testing antenna, 
microwave and ground equi~ment 1• 
United States: Sarsat subsystems tested, for the 
international Cospas/Sarsat ~tellite-aided sea~ch­
and-rescue project credited ith saving 305 hves 
in just over two years of peration; Ameri~an 
satellite subsystems, testedi by the Canadian 
manufacturer, ComDev Ltd.; Canadarm subsys-
tems, tested for Spar Aer~sJI>ace Ltd., the_ Cana-
dian company that desigp.ed and bUilt_ the 
remote manipulator systerp. for the NatiOnal 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
space shuttles. 
1. See Appendix. 
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Brazil: The Brasilsat telecommunications satel-
lites, built, assembled and tested. 
Sweden: Viking scientific research satellite pay-
load tested for Canadian Astronautics Ltd. 
European Space Agency: Olympus 1 testing. 
111. Canadarm and Olympus were two high-
lights of the laboratory's testing career. The 
Canadarm developed for the United States space 
shuttles by Spar Aerospace had proved itself 
indispensable to space development, playing a 
major role in the deployment and retrieval of 
satellites. The testing of the remote manipu-
lator system was the intriguing challenge of how 
to test, in full gravity, delicate equipment 
designed to operate only in conditions of zero 
gravity. A special pneumatic support system 
had been developed to allow the arm to 
function, in one plane at a time, as it would in 
space. 
112. Because it provided all the necessary 
world-class equipment and expert aerospace 
personnel in one location, the David Florida 
Laboratory had been chosen by the European 
Space Agency for the major work of testing three 
models of Olympus 1, the first in a new genera-
tion of large, multipurpose " bus " satellites that 
would carry more equipment and provide more 
power than Canadian satellites of the Anik series 
or the European ESA/Marecs spacecraft. The 
testing of the thermal and structural models of 
Olympus 1 had begun in 1985 and the proto-
flight model that would actually be launched 
into space in 1987 was soon expected to arrive at 
the laboratory. 
113. After the briefing, the committee visited 
several facilities such as the spacecraft assembly 
area, the radio frequency testing facility, the 
vacuum chambers and support equipment such 
as computers, etc. 
(b) Dr. J.G. Chambers and Dr. D.J. Mabey 
briefed the committee on Canadian space 
developments. 
(i) Space communications 
114. Space communications were and would be 
in the future of great importance to Canada. 
Canadians relied more and more on satellites for 
telephone, data and broadcasting services as well 
as for special applications such as distant 
education, search and rescue and emergency 
communications. 
115. The objectives of the Canadian space 
programme were (a) to ensure that the potential 
of space technology for practical applications to 
meet Canadian needs was fully developed, (b) to 
encourage the development of competitive space 
industries and (c) to ensure that Canada 
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maintained a position of excellence in the 
worldwide scientific exploration of space. 
116. Together with NASA, Canadian industry 
had been working to extend space services even 
further through the so-called mobile satellite 
programme MSAT. This programme would 
involve a communication satellite powerful 
enough to send and receive voice and data 
signals from small mobile terminals anywhere in 
Canada. These mobile terminals could be 
installed in cars, trucks, trains, ships or even 
aeroplanes. The system was a new communica-
tions system, to bring a two-way mobile service 
to many businesses, industries and government 
agencies which depended on mobile communi-
cations for their work. It would facilitate the 
economic development of rural and remote parts 
of Canada and improve the safety of the 
public. The mobile satellite, MSA T would be 
launched in 1989 and would cover virtually the 
entire nation. The system would be operated 
by Telesat, Canada, which was the national 
satellite communications carrier. The system 
could be operational in 1990. The United 
States would adopt the same system based on a 
separate MSAT. 
(ii) Space station 
11 7. Canada would take part in the American 
space station but only on a small scale. The 
station might be used to test satellites which 
might be brought down for servicing either by 
man or by robots. Of great importance would 
be the Canadarm, the remote manipulator 
currently used in the United States space 
programme. It was developed by the National 
Research Council and Spar Aerospace Ltd. of 
Toronto. The Canadarm had been in use since 
1981. 
(iii) Radar research and Radarsat 
118. Canada's main effort in radar research and 
development was centred in the radar and 
military communications laboratory of the 
Communications Research Centre. CRC is 
presently assisting the Federal Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources in developing 
Radarsat, a surveillance satellite which will use 
microwave and optical sensors to monitor the 
Canadian environment and to support resource 
development. Radarsat is scheduled for launch 
in 1990. 
119. The radar research group was closely 
involved in the SHARP project, the proposed 
use of pilotless aircraft as relay stations. Its 
responsibility here was to develop ground 
transmitters to send microwave radiation to the 
aircraft to serve as a power source. This project 
was of great importance for northern Canada 
which was often completely covered by clouds. 
The development of the system had so far cost 
some Can.$20 million. 
(iv) Sarsat 
120. Planning for a satellite-aided search and 
rescue system had begun early in the 1970s, 
when experience had shown that a satellite, 
equipped to receive emergency transmissions 
from aircraft or ships, could locate distress sites 
within minutes and to an accuracy of some 
10 km. Canada's vast and sparsely-populated 
territory, its varied geography and inhospitable 
climate made it extremely difficult and costly to 
locate missing aircraft and ships. Canada there-
fore played an important role in developing this 
type of satellite. 
121. Canada, the United States and France 
were now testing Sarsat in co-operation with the 
Soviet Union's Cospas system. With three 
satellites in operation, an emergency signal 
would be detected in less than four hours. The 
Department of National Defence managed Sar-
sat and was responsible, in co-operation with the 
Canadian coastguards, for search and rescue 
activities. Although still in a development 
phase, the system had already worked in several 
cases since 1982. Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom had joined the 
system. The Department of National Defence 
was contributing Can.$12.7 million and the 
Department of Communications nearly Can.$1 
million. 
(v) L-Sat 
122. Another major high technology project 
with important international implications was 
the large telecommunications satellite (L-Sat 
programme) of the European Space Agency. 
Canada had been involved since 1980. The 
satellite was now called Olympus and was in the 
construction and testing stages. The launch was 
planned for 1987. 
123. Canada was contributing some Can.$80 
million which amounted to 11% of the total cost 
of the ESA programme. 
124. Canada's prime interest in Olympus was 
in gaining experience with a large spacecraft in 
preparation for future domestic and export 
programmes. There was a limit to the number 
of communications satellites which could ope-
rate in geostationary orbit above the equator. 
The trend was therefore towards larger satel-
lites. Olympus was twice the weight and would 
provide close to four times the power of the 
largest Canadian satellite now in orbit. 
125. Spar Aerospace would design and manu-
facture the solar arrays and parts of the commu-
nications equipment. 
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(vi) Canada and the EuropeanJ, Space Agency 
126. Canada had conclud~ an agreement of 
co-operation with ESA in 19 9, which had been 
renewed in 1984 for a fi rther five years. 
Canada contributed to ESA's general budget and 
participated in two optional programmes -
Olympus and the remote-sepsing satellite pro-
gramme ERS-1. The latter 'fould be the proto-
type of a European remote-sensing satellite 
which would become operational in the 1990s. 
127. It would be placediin a quasi-polar 
circular orbit at an altitud of 780 km. Its 
objectives were both econom c and scientific: to 
establish, develop and explo~·rt the coastal ocean 
and ice applications of remo -sensing data with 
a view to improving knowl ge of ocean para-
meters and sea state conditio s. These applica-
tions were particularly important with regard to 
offshore and coastal activitie~in the 200 nautical 
mile zone. It would prod ce images of land 
surfaces in all weather condi ions thanks to the 
synthetic aperture radar and, finally, it would 
increase the scientific understanding of coastal 
zones and global ocean p1ocesses in general 
world weather conditions. 
128. In three years' time the Canadian Govern-
ment would have to consider whether it would 
continue to collaborate with j~SA. No decision 
has been taken by the new fe~eral cabinet on the 
Canadian space programme for the next five 
years. 
129. Canada had a great n~ed for application 
satellites, but there were maqy budgetary restric-
tions. It had also to reckon with its geographic 
position: 75% of its total tirade was with the 
United States and it was als?. involved with the 
United States in the contineDfll defence effort. 
(vii) Microtel 
130. On 1st November 1Q85, the committee 
visited Microtel, Vancouver, where it was 
received by the director, Mr. Larry Rhodes, 
who briefed the committee pn Microtel Pacific 
Research Ltd., western Canatla's largest telecom-
munications research and deVelopment facility. 
131. The telecommunications industry in 
Canada had strong domestic manufacturing and 
research capabilities. Bell lcanada enterprises 
included Northern Telecom Ltd., one of the 
world's leading telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers, and Bell It-forthern Research, 
Canada's largest private ind~Jstrial research and 
development organisation. I Bell Canada Tele-
phone was affiliated with Microtel Ltd. and 
Microtel Pacific Research. Microtel Ltd., the 
parent company of Microt!l Pacific Research, 
was also associated with ~TE of the United 
States. 
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132. Microtel Pacific Research was a private 
manufacturing company for telephone equip-
ment, microwave and automatic transmission 
facilities. It had some 2,500 employees and a 
Can.$200 million turnover. 
133. Canada had two national telecommunica-
tions systems, Telecom Canada and CNCP tele-
communications (Canadian Pacific). The tele-
phone systems of Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba were owned by the provincial gov-
ernments; all other telephone companies were 
privately owned. 
134. Microtel Pacific Research offered the 
market the most sophisticated telecommunica-
tions systems, transmission systems, switch-
boards, etc., all of which products had to be 
competitive in order to find a market in Canada 
and in the rest ofthe world. 25% of its products 
were for export; no products were exported to 
the United States where GTE serviced the 
market. Although Canada had several private 
and public telecommunications companies, the 
systems were nevertheless interconnected on a 
national and international level. 
VII. Miscellaneous 
135. Your Rapporteur does not wish to con-
clude his report without mentioning several 
most interesting discussions and visits at uni-
versity and political level. 
(a) Lava! University 
136. In Quebec the committee visited the 
Laval University on 28th October 1985. This 
was the first French-speaking university in 
North America; it had some 1,400 full-time 
professors and nearly 30,000 students. 
137. Charters for the university had been 
granted in 1852 by the Pope and Queen Victoria, 
although the university had existed since 1663. 
138. In 1971 a new charter was established; the 
government now paid 85% of its budget and 15% 
had to be collected from private sources. It was 
mainly a regional university. Compared with 
the English-speaking universities, the Laval 
University had only one-third ofPhDs per 1,000 
students; it was therefore the policy of the 
university to increase its number of PhDs in ten 
years' time to the same level as the English-
speaking universities. 
(b) The National Assembly of Quebec 
139. The committee was received at the Natio-
nal Assembly of Quebec by the Clerk, Mr. Pierre 
Duchesne. As the Assembly was not in session, 
the committee was able to visit the building and 
hold a committee meeting. Lunch was then 
given by the Clerk. 
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140. During lunch, the committee was addres-
sed by Mr. Camille Limoges, Minister of State in 
the Ministry for Higher Education, Science and 
Technology of the Government of Quebec. He 
underlined that his ministry tried to establish a 
close relationship between industry, small enter-
prises and the universities of the province. For 
this purpose it had established a large number of 
specialised centres where university professors 
could explain their teaching activities and how 
they related to the life of private industries and 
other enterprises. The ministry also encour-
aged professors to work from three months to 
one year in a private industry or in a small busi-
ness to get used to the industrial and entrepre-
neurial climate. These secondments were 
highly appreciated on both sides. 
(c) The House of Commons of the Federal 
Canadian Parliament 
141. On 29th October 1985, the committee was 
received at the House of Commons of the 
Federal Parliament of Canada. It attended a 
question and answer period. Its presence was 
acknowledged by the Speaker and the full 
assembly. 
(d) The Legislative Assembly of Ontario 
142. On 30th October 1985, the committee was 
received at the Legislative Assembly of the 
province of Ontario, in Toronto. It was addres-
sed by the Speaker, Mr. Hugh Edighouffer, 
who explained the workings of the assembly and 
the political situation of the province. 
(e) The Legislative Assembly of Alberta 
143. On 31st October 1985, the committee 
visited the Legislative Assembly of Alberta in 
Edmonton. There it was received for lunch by 
the Speaker, Mr. Gerard Amerongen, who 
explained the political situation in Alberta and 
underlined the many agricultural problems 
which Canada and especially Alberta had to 
solve. As more and more countries in the 
world such as China, India, Indonesia and others 
became self-sufficient in food production, it 
became increasingly difficult for Canada to 
export its agricultural products. The problem 
was the more acute as agricultural science and 
technology led to increasing productivity and 
production. If it were not for the Soviet Union, 
Canadian agricultural products would no longer 
have an outlet. As in the United States, 
farmers in Alberta were becoming more and 
more indebted to the banks without much 
chance of repaying their debts. If no solution 
was found, this might lead to a catastrophic 
situation for both the banks and the farmers. 
(f) The British Columbia Research Council 
144. On 1st November 1985, the committee 
was received at the office of the British 
Columbia Research Council, where it was 
briefed by Dr. T.E. Howard, executive director. 
145. The British Columbia Research Council 
conducted research, development and other 
technical work under contract for sponsors in 
industry and government. Its divisions were 
chemical, physical and fisheries technology, the 
environment, health, operations management, 
extractive metallurgy, biotechnology and busi-
ness assistance. 78% of its income came from 
local, national and international contracts with 
industry and government. 
146. Forest production accounted for 50% of 
British Columbia's resources. The export of 
wood products went mainly to Japan and 
Europe. The home market of British Columbia 
was very small since there were only 2,500,000 
inhabitants. 
147. Important sources ofincome were mining 
and tourism, the latter especially from Japan. 
Electronics and fishery products were of major 
importance for the province. 
148. British Columbia had a famous university 
with some 25,000 students. However, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult for graduates to 
find work in the province. 
(g)EXP086 
149. On 2nd November 1985, the committee 
visited the 1986 world exposition site at 
Vancouver. It was received by Mr. Leslie 
Millin, director, who informed the committee 
that the main themes of the exposition would be 
transportation and communications. He expec-
ted that some 15 million visitors would come to 
this world exposition and expressed the hope 
that many would come from Europe. 
150. Major issues of the three symposia to be 
organised in 1986 were: 
- major regional, national and interna-
tional transportation and communica-
tions systems; 
- maintaining the transportation infra-
structures in the industrialised countries 
and the creation of systems in develo-
ping countries; 
- technological development in transpor-
tation systems and its capital costs; 
- the social benefits of transportation and 
communications systems. 
After the introduction, the committee toured the 
grounds. 
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VIII. Canadian defetlce policy 
151. For a better understankiing of Canadian 
defence policy, your Rapporteur learnt that it 
should be considered in the !light of Canadian 
defence policies in the nin~teenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In the rlineteenth century, 
the main threat to Canada w~s from the south, 
from the United States. In the early twentieth 
century, this feeling remained 1in part to give way 
subsequently to a strong political relationship 
between the United Kingdom land Canada. 
152. During the first and sec~md world wars the 
main war effort was directed tbwards helping the 
mother country, Great Britai!l.. Canadians who 
were not of British descent were not of course 
over-enthusiastic and during ~he first world war 
especially there were several major conscription 
crises. I 
153. After the second wgrld war, Canada 
became increasingly aware that what happened 
in Europe was of major importance to Canadian 
security. In the early 1950s the Soviet threat -
through aircraft and missile$ - became reality, 
particularly since Canada's cqntinental shelf was 
contiguous with the Soviet coptinental shelf. 
154. The Canadian GoveFcment was then 
keenly aware that if North A erica was a target 
in any air or missile war Canada would be 
involved automatically. · 
155. The second major risJ for Canada was a 
conflict in Europe where major Canadian forces 
were stationed. One consequence was that 
Canada had to keep the ~a lanes open for 
supplying its troops stationed in Europe. 
156. Since the 19 50s a fairly high degree of 
consensus had developed Oil- the perception of 
the threat. The Canadian Government of the 
day had an active foreign poljicy, not only on the 
American continent but also in the United 
Nations. I 
157. In t.h~ defence revi~w ~r 1984, the Deputy 
Pnme Mtmster, Mr. Enc Nielsen, Minister of 
Nation~l De~ence, ~tat~d th.t the government's 
two mam pohcy objectives ~ere the preservation 
of peace and freedom andl the prevention of 
nuclear confrontation. 
158. Although Canada wJs less exposed to 
attack by conventional mpitary means than 
most other countries, mainly because of its 
geographical position, whichl made a conventio-
nal attack over the Arctic area hardly possible, it 
could not be sheltered from the effects of a 
nuclear exchange between the superpowers. 
159. Canada's defence pohcy required sove-
reign control over its vast tettfitory and maritime 
areas. Canada recognised its inability to pre-
vent war on its own. As ~ result, its defence 
policy reflected the need to join with all like-
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minded nations in peacetime to deter aggres-
sion. Its defence effort was aimed above all at 
the prevention of war and deterrence through 
collective defence. 
160. The defence systems of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation were vital for Canada. It 
should make every effort to meet its agreed 
commitments and carry its share of the burden 
in upholding the principle of collective defence. 
161. Nevertheless, Canada had a regular force 
of only 83,630 men and women to defend a 
territory larger than the United States. The 
budget was only 2% of its gross national product 
which was less than that of any ally, apart from 
Iceland and Luxembourg. 
162. The government which had taken office in 
September 1984, under Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, had announced in March 1985 that 
1,200 more men would be sent to reinforce the 
NATO contingent in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
163. A major priority would remain the moder-
nisation of the obsolescent North American air 
defence system in co-operation with the United 
States. Canada had to supply two squadrons of 
F-18 interceptors and 24 long-range radar 
stations. 
164. The northern air defence system was now 
being modernised; this process would take five 
or six years and involve new aircraft, new radar 
systems and radar satellites. 
165. The Canadian Government was convin-
ced that in future defence systems would require 
greater reliance on all types of satellites, commu-
nications, early warning, detection and land and 
ocean surveillance. Whether Canada would 
aim to build its own military satellite system 
would depend mainly on the Soviet Union's 
plans in this field; much would depend on the 
nature of the threat. 
166. Because of Canada's cold climate, troops 
were trained in winter warfare more than any 
other army. A force of 3,200 men had the task 
of repelling any invasion of Canadian territory. 
167. One battalion of 850 men was committed 
to defend northern Norway. Other troops 
concentrated in Europe were 4 Canadian mecha-
nised brigade groups and 1 Canadian air 
group. These formations were stationed near 
the Black Forest in Western Germany. The 
total military strength was approximately 5,900 
men. 
168. The maritime forces were most in need of 
re-equipment of surface ships and submarines. 
The fleet was divided between the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans, but most of the Canadian 
destroyers were based in the Atlantic -
13 compared with 8 in the Pacific. 
112 
169. The development of the Canadian navy 
runs parallel with the development of modern 
navies in other NATO countries. The admiralty 
wants the most up-to-date ships which are there-
fore very expensive. Consequently, fewer ships 
can be procured. 
1 70. A highly-sensitive political issue is the 
north-west passage to the Sea of Beaufort. This 
passage is considered Canadian national terri-
tory. To patrol this passage, Canada has 
ordered a polar icebreaker for Can.$500 million. 
171. Canada also has a coastguard of 6,561 
men and women, 25 icebreakers and some 
16 patrol vessels, helicopters and other rescue 
craft. 
172. In order to back up the regular units, the 
armed forces rely on 23,800 reserve forces called 
the militia. 
173. The biggest impediment to increasing the 
armed forces was lack of money; only 9% of the 
federal budget was earmarked for defence. 
174. During the last three years, the Canadian 
defence budget has been increased regularly by 
3% in real terms pursuant to the NATO decision 
on this issue. However, the Canadian deficit is 
one of the largest in the world and savings will 
have to be made to reduce this deficit. An 
effort is already being made in the social budget 
and military reductions will have to follow. 
175. Of political importance is the contribution 
of peace-keeping forces to the United Nations 
force in Cyprus where Canada has 515 men. 
176. In the Middle East, in the United Nations 
truce supervisory organisation and the United 
Nations disengagement observer force, Canada 
has some 254 military personnel. Finally, it has 
observers in the United Nations military obser-
ver group in India-Pakistan. 
177. Most important was the unification of 
Canada's military forces which was effected 
about ten years ago. Much was expected of 
unification in economic terms since the three 
services would have common administrative 
regulations and could combine intendant and 
supply units. Rivalry between the three servi-
ces could be greatly reduced. On the other 
hand regimental identification and esprit de 
corps was lost. The new government has 
decided that the services would revert to 
different types of uniforms. However, the 
military personnel is not now very keen to 
receive them, being quite satisfied with the 
situation as it has developed. The veterans of 
the armed forces did not share this opinion 
however. 
SDI 
178. As explained earlier, the Canadian 
Government has decided not to participate in 
the SDI programme as such. Nevertheless it 
considers the American attitude prudent as 
research in this field is certainly most important 
and necessary. The Canadian Government is 
rully aware that the Soviet Union is conducting 
Its own research in this area and that its 
utterances are more ritualistic than threatening. 
The government has a general agreement with 
t~e Unite~ ~tates Government for the produc-
tiOn of mihtary hardware and this agreement 
could ~e applied to any sharing of defence 
productiOn. The question of spin-off and 
industrial secrecy would need an agreement 
along the same lines as the one the United King-
dom Government has concluded with the 
United States Government. 
179. As long as there is no general discussion in 
NATO about the strategic consequences of SDI 
and armaments production, there is no need for 
the_Canadian Government to change its present 
pohcy. 
IX. Conclusions 
180. Your Rapporteur has given as faithful an 
account as possible of the committee's visit to 
Canada. From this account it may clearly be 
s~en how much authority is invested in provin-
Cial governments and their research and deve-
lopment. councils. It is interesting to note that 
with highly-developed provincial autonomy 
research and development in the provinces is 
geared mainly to provincial requirements. It is 
therefore logical that oceanographic studies and 
studies of the physical properties and behaviour 
of icebergs is conducted in the maritime 
provinces. A similar example is Alberta where 
the research council has directed its activities to 
research on oil sands and coal. 
181. Another interesting development is that in 
Queb~c where a close relationship has been 
established between the universities of the 
prov:in~, industries and small firms, many 
specialised centres have been established where 
un~v~r~ity professors explain their teaching 
activities and how they are linked to the life of 
P;ivate. i~dustry a~d small firms. The provin-
cial Mimstry of Higher Education, Science and 
Technology also encourages professors to work 
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from three mo~ths to a year i~a private industry 
or a. small ~usmess to acquai t themselves with 
the mdustnal and entreprene rial atmosphere. 
182. Canadian space develdpments are under 
federal government authority. Canada's wide 
experience in communicatio~s satellites - the 
geograp~ica~ situation of the jcountry, its sparse 
populatiOn m the north and frontiers with the 
United States in the south aqd the Arctic in the 
north :- were subjects of spe~ial interest for the 
committee. However, Canadian relations with 
the European Space Agency ray not be altoge-
ther satisfactory. 
1_83. Canadian interest lies i~ practical applica-
tions rather than scientific s~ace studies. Your 
~apporteur believes this shoiUld be rectified by 
mcreased Canadian participa1ion in ESA's scien-
tific programme. For Europe and Canada a 
continuous association would be fruitful for b~th 
sides but, to succeed, assqciate membership 
should be extended from fivelto ten years. Five 
years seems too short in term~ of space activities 
which all require long-term research and deve-
lopment. Second, the range of programmes 
should be widened. Your Rapporteur has 
already mentioned the scientlfic programme but 
new application programmts should also be 
included. 
184. ~owever, association I means loyalty on 
both sides and the Canadian•American relation-
ship might in some way~ detract from a 
Canadian-European relationshlip if Canada wished 
to rely on the United State~ 1 for advanced tech-
nology. Europe on the ot~er hand wishes to 
remain autonomous vis-a-vis American space 
technology. 
185. The same conditions i of reciprocity and 
loyalty for co-operation in ~pace developments 
are also relevant for other s ctors. It might be 
useful for the European c untries if Canada 
participated in programmes pf the Independent 
European Programme Groqp and other high-
technology European ventures. This would 
stren~then the Atlantic Allilltnce and European 
secunty. I 
186. Your Rapporteur hasJ"ncluded these ideas 
in the draft recommendatio which he thinks is 
self-explanatory. · 
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APPENDIX 
Canada in space 1 
After the Soviet Union and the United 
States, Canada was the first country to venture 
into space. With its vast distances and its 
widely spread population, Canada quickly recog-
nised how space technology could improve 
domestic communications. 
Canada's first satellite, Alouette 1, was 
launched on 29th September 1962 from Vanden-
berg Air Force Base, California. Like all other 
Canadian satellites that followed, it continued to 
function much longer than expected. For ten 
years Alouette 1 sent back useful data on the 
ionosphere. In 1965 it was followed into orbit 
by Alouette 2, which extended the programme of 
measurements from the top side of the iono-
sphere. 
Then came two more research satellites -
international satellites for ionospheric studies, or 
ISIS. ISIS 1 was launched in 1969 and ISIS 2 in 
1971, and both are still sending back valuable 
information. Since Canada completed its ISIS 
programme in March 1984, Japan has continued 
to receive and analyse data from these satellites, 
by special agreement with the Department of 
Communications. Anik A-1, launched in 1972 
by Telesat Canada, was the world's first 
domestic communications satellite in geostatio-
nary orbit. This orbit allowed it to remain in 
the same position over the earth to bring 
Canadians continuous reliable telecommunica-
tions services. 
Anik A-1 was followed in 1973 by Anik 
A-2, which served initially as an orbiting spare 
or back-up satellite. Then Anik A-3, launched 
in 1975, provided additional capacity. Toge-
ther the Aniks brought network radio, television 
and improved telephone service to northern 
Canada and other remote areas. 
Hermes, the communications technology 
satellite launched in 1976, was the world's most 
powerful communications satellite - the product 
of combined Canadian and United States 
expertise. Over the next four years both 
countries successfully tested it for direct broad-
casting to remote areas, for use in tele-medicine, 
tele-education and other applications. 
Anik B, in orbit since 1978, continues to 
assist this work, while serving many other 
l. Extract from Reaching for tomorrow, Canadian 
Government Department of Communications, 1985. 
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experimental and commercial purposes. 
Through a number of Anik B pilot projects, 
government, business and special interest groups 
have explored new applications of space techno-
logy. 
Anik D-1, launched in 1982, was the first 
Canadian-made communications satellite, built 
by Spar Aerospace Limited. Anik D-2, the 
second in this series, was placed in storage orbit 
in November 1984, ready for future use. Anik 
C-3 and Anik C-2 were launched in 1982 and 
1983 respectively, and Anik C-l was expected to 
join them in spring 1985. 
Scheduled for launch in 1989 is MSA T 
(mobile satellite), being developed by Canadian 
and United States industry in co-operation with 
the United States National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). MSATs over 
both countries will provide reliable communica-
tions for vehicles outside large metropolitan 
areas, as well as for ships, boats and aircraft. 
The owner and operator of the MSA T system 
will be Telesat Canada, a company owned 
jointly by the Canadian Government and 
Canada's long-distance telephone companies. 
Radarsat, to be launched in 1990, will 
keep track of Arctic ice conditions for northern 
shipping and the Department of Energy, Mines 
and Resources. From a height of 1,000 km, it 
will also serve a number of other government 
departments. Unaffected by the weather, it will 
send back data on sea conditions, oil spills, 
crops, forests, mineral deposits and other resour-
ces, in Canada and around the world. 
Radarsat will circle the earth in polar orbit 
- an orbit that passes over both poles. It will 
cover every part of the globe in 16 days, while 
completing a northern hemisphere ice survey 
every three days. 
A proposed direct broadcast satellite 
(DBS) could beam radio and television broad-
casts directly into the homes of people living in 
remote areas. This could be launched as early 
as the end of the decade, but no firm plans have 
yet been made. Meanwhile, the Anik C satel-
lites already have the potential to provide 
medium power direct-to-home television ser-
vice. 
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Amendment 1 
Canadian-European co-operation in high technology 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Hill and Mr. Spies von Biillesheim 
3rd June 1986 
1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft recommendatiod and insert: 
" To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research insltitutions with Eureka 
projects; " I 
Signed: Hill, !Spies von Bullesheim 
l. See 6th sitting, 4th June 1986 (amendment agreed to). 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 
1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial 
organs ofWEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration; 
(b) each ofthese budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explana-
tory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a 
document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and trans-
mitted to the Council; 
(c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned docu-
ments and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a 
regular basis; 
(d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extra-
ordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the 
evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero 
growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments; 
(e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the 
sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of 
the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in 
October 1984 to have the Assembly " play a growing role "; 
(f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs 
increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a 
better guarantee of its autonomy and independence; 
(g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body 
should be given responsibility for this task; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the 
Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been 
rejected; 
(b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a 
telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services ofWEU as well as by parliamentarians; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has 
adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different 
documents; 
(b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories 
of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolu-
tion of these budgets; 
2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its bud-
getary decisions; 
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3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure fo approving Assembly 
budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and indefendence; 
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3lposts which are given 
top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986; 
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an ind~pendent body for the 
administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with ~ other co-ordinated 
organisations; 
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay ~wn a general rule on 
the subject applicable to all WEU staff; · 
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it bei~g understood that the 
telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and 
cost-sharing to be agreed among them; 
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs ofWEU .o achieve future cost-
saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investi-
gate this matter and make recommendations. 
119 
DOCUMENT 1054 
Explllnatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Sinuio, RtqJporteur) 
I. Preliminary considerations 
1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter 
of the Assembly, " the Assembly shall express its 
views in the form of an opinion or recommenda-
tion on the annual budget of Western European 
Union as soon as it has been communicated". 
2. For this purpose, a member of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
is instructed to submit a report which has to be 
mainly of a technical nature since the committee 
is responsible only for budgetary and administra-
tive matters. 
3. In fact, there can be no question of the 
committee dealing with matters relating to the 
activities of the Council and of the various min-
isterial organs since these are referred by the 
Presidential Committee to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, the General 
Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
4. In the specific context in which it has to 
give its opinion, the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration therefore wishes to 
study the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU from the standpoint of the restructuration 
of these organs which took place as from 1985 
and which, on the basis of a supplementary bud-
get for 1985 and a 1986 budget, led to a new pre-
sentation of the latter. 
11. Aspects of the 1985 budget (revised) 
and the 1986 budget 
5. After the meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters in Rome in October 1984, the Budget and 
Organisation Committee and the Secretary-
General had agreed that the 1985 budget should 
follow traditional lines and be based on the exist-
ing administrative structure. When the Council 
had approved measures for reform that would 
have budgetary consequences, the necessary 
funds would be sought in a revised 
budget. Your Rapporteur will return in the 
next chapter to the budgetary implications of this 
decision which laid down precise guidelines for 
preparing the revised budget for 1985 and the 
1986 budget. A few remarks may first be made 
however about the structure of these budgets. 
6. As is customary, the budgets for 1985 
(revised) and for 1986, after consideration by the 
Budget and Organisation Committee, were set 
out in documents C-B (85) 15 of 29th October 
1985 (cf. Appendix I) and C-B (85) 17 of 17th 
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January 1986 (cf. Appendix 11) respectively, 
which incorporated the changes recommended 
by that committee. But as these documents 
contained only one set of tables showing 
amounts under the various heads and sub-heads 
of the two budgets, it was necessary to refer to 
the basic documents submitted to the Budget 
and Organisation Committee under references 
B (85) 14 and B (85) 17. It was in these docu-
ments that your Rapporteur was able to find the 
information necessary for preparing his report. 
7. As usual, the revised budget for 1985 - set 
out in document B (85) 14 - was presented in 
three sections: Section A for the budget of the 
Secretariat-General, Section B for the interna-
tional secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and Section C for the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. Conversely, because of 
the reorganisation of the ministerial organs, in 
the 1986 budget in document B (85) 17 the for-
mer Sections B and C have been replaced by a 
new Section B grouping the reorganised Agency 
for the Control of Armaments and the three new 
agencies for security questions. 
8. As in the past, the two budgets are pre-
sented in three parts: the first giving overall 
tables, the second the explanatory memorandum 
and the third the pensions budget. 
9. In regard to the explanatory memorandum 
in particular, it should be noted that on some 
important points the latter refers to other docu-
ments which have to be consulted in order to 
understand the reasons for certain Council deci-
sions with budgetary implications. These docu-
ments are produced during the year and are the 
result of the permanent contacts which the 
Secretariat-General maintains with the Budget 
and Organisation Committee and with the Coun-
cil in order to keep them informed of the require-
ments of the ministerial organs. 
10. Thus, when examining the explanatory 
memorandum, account must be taken of the fol-
lowing documents which were not appended to 
the budget but which your Rapporteur con-
sulted: 
- C (86) 10 of 13th January 1986 on the 
organisation of the Secretariat-General 
and the agencies for security 
questions 1; 
1. Since these documents are classified " Restricted ", they 
have not been appended to the present report. 
- B (85) 11 of 13th August 1985 on o~ce 
modernisation at the Secretanat-
General ( c£ Appendix IV); 
- C-B (85) 13 of22nd July 1985 reviewing 
in general terms the present overall 
situation'; 
- B (84) 10 of 15th August 1984 on the 
long-term maintenance . and 
modernisation programme of the Lon-
don office (c£ Appendix VI). 
11. On the other hand, your Rapporteur was 
unable to consult the records of Council meet-
ings at which budgetary decisions were taken 
since these records, or extracts from them, have 
not been transmitted to the Office of the Clerk 
due to their confidential nature. 
12. In view of the above considerations, your 
Rapporteur, while respecting the prerogativ~s 
and responsibilities of the ministerial organs m 
this connection, wonders whether it would be 
possible for a single budgetary document to show 
and justify the evolution of requirements in rela-
tion to the aims to be attained and the tasks 
assigned to these organs by the Council. It 
would also seem possible to simplify the explana-
tory memorandum by deleting the detailed 
breakdown of expenditure (travelling expenses, 
daily allowances, water, ~~· electricity, .etc.) 
which, apart from a few additiOnal explanat~ons, 
is a mere repetition of the details of expenditure 
set out in the first part. The presentation of the 
budget would gain in simplicity and clarity. 
13. The third part showing pensions expendi-
ture and receipts fully meets the need to separate 
the operating budget from the pensions 
budget. It conforms to a general principle of 
budgetary methods and allows the zer~ growth 
rate criterion to be applied to the operatmg bud-
get only as advocated in Recommendations 409 
and 426 already communicated to the Council in 
the Assembly's opinion on the budgets of the 
ministerial organs for 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
14. In regard to pensions and in view of the 
growing burden of managing them in WEU 2 and 
the other co-ordinated organisations, your 
Rapporteur considers it necessary to return to 
the proposal the Assembly made to the Council 
in Recommendation 357, adopted on 2nd 
December 1980 ( c£ Appendix XIII), and, in con-
sultation with the other co-ordinated 
organisations, study the desirability. of sett~ng up 
an independent body for the admmistratwn of 
pensions as a natural extension of the joint pen-
sions administrative section. In its reply to this 
recommendation, the Council said it considered 
"that the setting-up of an independent intema-
1. Since these documents are classified " Restricted ", they 
have not been appended to the present report. 
2. The evolution of expenditure on pensions paid b) \\ EU 
since 1982 is shown at Appendix XVI. 
121 
DOCUMENT 1054 
tional body for the admiml:tration of pensio~s 
for the co-ordinated organis tions could be desir-
able in the long term ". Time no~ having 
passed, this body seems no longer desirable but 
necessary. 
Ill. Budgetary i II]Jlications 
of the restruc~ration 
of the ministeri41 organs 
i 
15. As mentioned in parzgraph 5 above, the 
WEU Budget and Organisa ion Committee and 
the Secretariat-General agre d to base the budget 
estimates of the ministerial organs for 1985 on 
the existing administrati*e structure. The 
implications of such a decis on should b~ cons~­
dered since many posts alr ady vacant m Pans 
continued to be taken into a~count in the budget 
estimates. The 1985 budglt allowed consider-
able excess resources to be uilt up which could 
subsequently be used for estructuration pur-
poses. 
16. In fact, the savings in! the first half of the 
year have been gre~ter than were 
expected. Some of those s vings were used to 
employ temporary staff an some to purchase 
new office machinery - both made necessary by 
the increasing volume of ~c~ivity surrounding 
the reactivation process. "{his means that the 
excess mentioned in paragraph 15 was used 
solely to strengthen the Secretariat-General. 
17. Your Rapporteur ven~ures to note that the 
effects of these decisions weqt beyond the frame-
work of the ministerial orga:Qs with very negative 
repercussions on the Assembly. Justification is 
to be found in the interp~tion of paragraph 
111.3(1) of the Rome decl ation in which the 
Council of Ministers said t was necessary to 
" ensure that the various arrangements proposed 
remain within the present liipits in terms of staff 
and the organisation's bud!t, without weaken-
ing WEU's ability to play its role ".. lnd~~d, the 
Permanent Council mterpr ed this declSlon as 
meaning that, on the one hand, some .o~ th~se 
arrangements applied only to the mmistenal 
organs which could thetfore use all the resour~es released by the res cturation, and, on 
the other hand, " the limits n ter:ms of staff and 
the organisation's budget " applied also to t~e 
Assembly, which was thut forced to remam 
within the limits of its prev ous budget _be~use 
of the application of the ze growth cntenon. 
18. To say the least, y~ur Rapporteur.believ~s 
this interpretation is arbitrafY and partial: arbi-
trary insofar as the aim WBrS to devote all the 
resources which became 1 available to the 
strengthening of the Secretariat-General and to 
apply the constraints only t~· the Assembly; par-
tial because it took no acco nt of other sectwns 
of the Rome declaration in hich the ministers 
expressed their wish for the Assembly to . " play a 
growing role " and " supported the Idea of 
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greater contact between the Council and the 
Assembly". The contradiction is clear. 
19. The consequences of this interpretation 
for the Assembly are well known. Its draft 
budgets for 1985 and 1986, showing its real 
requirements in the context of reactivation, were 
severely and unilaterally reduced, although it 
was made quite clear that the reactivation of 
WEU necessarily implied a change in its struc-
ture and means. Consequently, as Mr. Ferrari 
Aggradi said in the report he submitted at the 
Assembly's June session, " the Assembly's action 
is hindered by the inadequacy of its secretariat 
for the tasks incumbent upon it and by the 
reduction in real terms of its operating 
budget" 3• 
20. The budgetary implications of the 
restructuration of the ministerial organs carried 
out following the Rome declaration are set out in 
the tables at Appendices VII and VIII. As a 
whole, and compared with its initial 1985 bud-
get, the Secretariat-General was granted an 
increase of £130,450 (revised 1985 budget) and 
then a further increase of £175,573 (1986 
budget). Conversely, the initial 1985 budget of 
the Paris agencies was reduced by F 750,000 
whereas their 1986 budget was increased by 
F 547,570 over the revised 1985 budget. 
21. Some comment is necessary on the figures 
in Appendices VII and VIII. In regard to the 
overall reduction ofF 750,000 included in the 
revised budget of the Paris agenc~es, it should be 
noted that this is far lower than the savings 
made. In fact, by decision of the Council, some 
of the savings allowed additional expenditure for 
security-related work and additional unforeseen 
expenditure (F 800,000 approximately) to be 
included in the revised budget. 
22. Thus, these extraordinary factors distort 
any analysis of the budgetary trend insofar as 
they hinder a comparison between the 
budgets. This is the case for instance for 
expenditure on pensions which was estimated at 
F 6,737,200 in the revised budget for 1985 but 
reduced to F 5, 787,500 in 1986. The differ-
ence, which was due to the non-recurring nature 
of leaving allowances payable in 1985, is so large 
that it has a considerable effect on statistical data 
relating to the budgets concerned. Thus, the 
pensions budget of the Paris agencies, instead of 
being reduced by 16.99% compared with the pre-
vious year, should show an increase, which 
would be logical. 
23. It therefore seems evident that if all this 
extraordinary expenditure were left out of the 
statistical comparison between the budgets, the 
general rate of increase in the budgets ofthe min-
isterial organs for 1986 compared with the previ-
3. Cf. Document 1017, May 1985, Volume I, page 153. 
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ous budget would prove to be far higher than the 
5.9% indicated by the Council. 
24. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that 
henceforth WEU budgets should be presented in 
two parts: operating budget and pensions budget, 
and that each part should be in two sections: 
ordinary expenditure and extraordinary 
expenditure. This breakdown would make it 
easier to follow the trend of the budget from a 
statistical point of view and at the same time 
allow the agreed growth criterion to be applied 
more objectively, be it zero growth or any other 
criterion agreed by the governments. 
25. In conclusion, the trend in the budgets of 
the ministerial organs for 1985 (revised) and for 
1986 covering the restructuration of the minis-
terial organs may be summed up as follows, not 
taking into account the remarks made in para-
graph 21 above: 
Secretariat-
General 
Paris 
agencies 
1985 . . . . . . . . 100 100 
1985 (revised) 111.74 97.50 
1986 . . . . . . . . 127.54 99.32 
26. In the explanatory memorandum to the 
1986 budget, it is specified that the increases 
" reflect the consequences of the reorganisation 
taking place especially the need now to fill all 
posts and modify the establishment by the addi-
tion of some posts. The estimates, in some 
cases, must be tentative until a new pattern of 
activity emerges more clearly and long-term 
needs, in the new framework, can be more accu-
rately assessed. The Secretary-General has 
emphasised the need for flexibility especially in a 
transitional period expected to last until the end 
of 1987; "the Council recognises that 
need". It will therefore be possible to take up 
this matter again at the end of this transitional 
period. 
IV. The new organisation of the Secretariat-
General and of the agencies for security ques-
tions 
27. The Secretary-General has communicated 
the latest version of the establishment tables of 
the Secretariat-General and of the Paris 
agencies. These establishment tables were 
approved after the budgets of the organs con-
cerned had been prepared; it is also to be 
assumed that the budget estimates for 1986 were 
based on planned staff levels. 
28. Consideration of the establishment tables 
in question shows a new factor, i.e. that there is 
not always, as was the case in the past, a specific 
grade for each type of duty. Certain duties are· 
in fact assigned two or three different grades 
(A3/4, A2/3 and B2/3/4). This allows some 
degree of flexibility in recruitment and also 
makes it possible to promote officials in the 
course of their careers. Your Rapporteur can 
but welcome this decision which brings the dual-
grading criterion to the forefront again; this has 
been discussed for many years and, inter alia, 
was the subject of Assembly Recommendations 
240, 250 and 340 (cf. Appendix XII). It there-
fore seems desirable for the matter to be studied 
fully and in detail and for the Council to lay 
down a general rule applying to all WEU staff, 
including the Office of the Clerk of the Assem-
bly. 
29. Moreover, the attribution of a range of 
grades to certain duties prevents an accurate idea 
being obtained, grade by grade, of variations in 
staff compared with previous establishment 
tables. These variations are therefore given in 
the table at Appendix IX solely according to cat-
egories of staff. 
30. This table shows that the number of Grade 
A, L and B staff in the Secretariat-General has 
increased by five. This increase is partly offset 
by the loss of one HG post, transferred to Paris, 
and one Grade C post. 
31. The staff in Paris has been reduced by 
eight Grade A and L officials and increased by 
one HG post transferred from London. In real-
ity, your Rapporteur understands that two Grade 
B posts in the establishment table will remain 
vacant until further investigation and experience 
during 1986 show whether and in what part of 
the establishment list a reduction in the number 
of B-grade staff may be effected. 
32. The various aspects of the establishment 
table of the Secretariat-General thus strength-
ened seem balanced and well-adapted to the 
duties of each service. Conversely, the same is 
not true of the establishment table of the Paris 
agencies: the latter's tasks have still not been 
clearly defined, with the result that the establish-
ment table is not definite. A possible reason is 
the Council's concern about retaining all existing 
staff. This is also how the Council's guidelines 
referred to in paragraph 31 above can be inter-
preted. 
33. However, the decision to keep two Grade 
B3 posts vacant, which will not be filled without 
prior consultation with the Council, is open to 
criticism if the general situation ofWEU, includ-
ing the Assembly, is examined. In the context of 
the reactivation of WEU and on the occasion of 
the presentation of its 1986 budget, the Assembly 
referred to the serious shortcomings in its pre-
sent structure and gave top priority to two addi-
tional Grade B3 posts needed to bring its staff up 
to strength. As this proposal was not accepted, 
it has to be noted that the refusal came just when 
the Council authorised a reserve of posts in the 
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Paris agencies which can ceqainly not be used in 
the immediate future. 1 
34. The establishment tab\le of the Paris agen-
cies calls for another remarlkelating to the attri-
bution to the Head of the dministration and 
Legal Affairs Division of th duties of Chairman 
of the Budget and Organisajon Committee hith-
erto the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary-
General in London. This c mmittee, consisting 
of financial experts from !e governments of 
member states, verifies tha the budgets of the 
ministerial organs and oft .e Assembly remain 
within the limits of the ~erall amount ear-
marked by the governme ts for WEU as a 
whole. If it is considered hat the budgets of 
these separate parts are in *petition with each 
other, your Rapporteur can ut wonder to what 
extent it is possible to be obj ctive in the exercise 
of these important duties in ·ew of the fact that 
the official exercising them -~whose loyalty is not 
questioned - is responsible for and defender of 
the budgets of the Paris age cies. 
35. Your Rapporteur therJfore wishes the pro-
cedure for approving Assetbbly budgets to be 
revised and the Assembly~o be given greater 
independence in budgetary atters. This is not 
a new problem and it is inte esting to recall how 
it developed. 
36. At the second part of I the fifth session of 
the Assembly, Dame F1orelce Horsbrugh and 
others tabled a motion for a ecommendation on 
the " reform of present meth ds of approving the 
Assembly's budget" (cf. Appendix X) recom-
mending that the Council tr,nsfer to the Presi-
dential Committee the exe cise of its annual 
examination of the draft bu get of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the A~sembly. This text 
was referred by the Assemblf to the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs. 
37. Following the joint nteeting between the 
Council and the Bureau of ti* Assembly on 30th 
October 1959, new proc{dure was consi-
dered. This procedure wa approved by the 
Presidential Committee on 1 th March 1960 and 
is still in force (cf. Appendix XI). 
38. However, with time a~d in recent years in 
particular, it has proved inapequate for settling 
the fundamental differences ~etween the Council 
and the Assembly, and espe~ially: 
- the adoption by the !Council of the zero 
growth criterion ana the consequences 
of its strict application for the total bud-
get, including pensiQns; 
- the fact that this critLrion makes no dis-
tinction between thr various categories 
of expenditure (whi~h are in reality sub-
ject to different infl~tion rates); 
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- the meticulous discussion of all items in 
the budget and the drastic cuts made by 
the WEU Budget and Organisation 
Committee - a consultative body of the 
Council - after a report on the budget 
had been drawn up by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion and by the Presidential Commit-
tee; 
- the determination of the Council and its 
Budget Committee not to give the 
Assembly all the means it requested in 
order to take part in the reactivation of 
WEU, as explained in Chapter Ill 
above. 
All this has again brought to the fore the question 
of the Assembly's budgetary independence. 
Moreover, at the second part of its thirty-first 
session, the latter recommended that the Council 
" guarantee the Assembly full independence in 
all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its 
overall budget between the various heads while 
respecting the regulations governing the staff of 
the co-ordinated organisations " (Recommenda-
tion 429 at Appendix XV). At the time this 
report was being drafted, the Council's reply to 
the recommendation had not been received. 
39. A last remark about the establishment 
tables of the Secretariat-General and of the Paris 
agencies relates to the number of staff assigned to 
supporting services such as administration, gen-
eral services, security, etc. In this connection, 
your Rapporteur can but refer to the various 
Assembly recommendations on the reunification 
of the two seats4• While leaving it to the politi-
cal committees to work out the conditions and 
political constraints of such an operation, he 
considers it would enable the supporting services 
to be merged, thus improving their efficiency 
and simplifying their organisation. 
V. Office modernisation programme 
40. The study of the restructuration of the ser-
vices of the Secretariat-General was accompa-
nied by a programme for modernising office 
equipment, submitted to the Budget and 
Organisation Committee for approval (cf. Docu-
ment B (85) 11 at Appendix V). The major 
equipment which sums earmarked for this pur-
pose allowed the Secretariat-General to purchase 
included: 
- a personal computer for financial man-
agement; 
- an electronic typewriter with word-
processing functions; 
- two tempested word processors. 
4. Cf. Recommendations 406, 409 and 426. 
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Your Rapporteur understands that the two word 
processors are incompatible with the equipment 
which has been in use in the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly since 1984. This is regrettable 
in that it precludes any exchange in disc form of 
important documents between the Secretariat-
General and the Assembly. Such documents 
include committee reports and the annual report 
of the Council which has to be completely 
retyped for printing. 
41. The modernisation programme of the 
ministerial organs still makes no provision for 
purchasing a telex. It should be recalled that 
some time ago the Budget and Organisation 
Committee rejected such a proposal by the 
Secretariat-General and that when the 
Assembly's 1986 budget was discussed negative 
opinions were again expressed in response to a 
similar request by the Assembly. 
42. It should however be stressed that it is 
necessary for all the WEU organs to be able to 
use a means of communication universally 
employed. Whether it should be telex or teletex 
- which seems to be the new-generation equip-
ment - is a problem to be considered in the light 
of running costs and the size of the network 
using each system. What matters and must be 
emphasised is that it is inconceivable that there 
should be any discussion about the usefulness of 
such equipment in this day and age. Your 
Rapporteur believes a single system would suf-
fice for all the WEU organs in Paris. The Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly and the agencies 
would have to agree on methods of use and cost-
sharing. 
VI. Action taken on Assembly 
Recommendation 426 
43. The reply of the Council to Recommenda-
tion 426 is provisional since it envisages no solu-
tion to the problems raised by the Assembly. 
44. Regarding the application of the zero 
growth criterion to the net total of the budget, 
including pensions, the Council says that it 
" will continue to monitor how far these costs 
have an adverse effect on operating 
expenditure". Yet the budget ofthe ministerial 
organs as well as that of the Assembly show that 
adverse effects are already being felt and will 
become increasingly grave and insupportable 
since in 1986 and the next two years many offi-
cials who have been serving in the organisation 
for a long time will be reaching the age of retire-
ment. 
45. As a member of the Budget Committee of 
the Chamber of Deputies of his country, your 
Rapporteur cannot endorse the Council's affir-
mation that " the strict application of the zero 
growth criterion is the objective of member 
states for both their national budgets and those 
international budgets to which they contribute". 
No comparison is possible as long as the charac-
teristics and aims of these two types of budgets 
are inherently different. It is certain that in 
national budgets expenditure on pensions is not 
a constraint for operating expenditure. The 
absurdity of the criterion which means that an 
increase in expenditure on pensions in WEU has 
to be compensated by a proportional reduction 
in the operating budget is becoming more fla-
grant every year. This problem can be solved 
satisfactorily only by creating an independent 
body for managing pensions, as explained in par-
agraph 14 of the present report. 
46. Regarding the application of the zero 
growth criterion to the overall budget, which 
does not take account of the fact that some cate-
gories of expenditure may show higher increases, 
the Council also affirms that it is " necessary to 
exercise restraint in other areas of 
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expenditure". One may onder whether, by 
adding this restraint to pension restraints 
mentioned above, the orga s of WEU will not 
one day have to reduce or terminate their retire-
ment benefits. 
47. The continuing study for improving the 
status of staff mentioned by' the Council has now 
been under way for a very l~ng time. In view of 
the present impossibility jof the co-ordinated 
organisations reaching a common solution, the 
principle of twin grades ad~pted by the Council 
for the restructuration of the ministerial organs 
(cf. paragraph 28 above) cduld possibly offer an 
immediate response to the legitimate expecta-
tions of the WEU staff. 
48. The question of establlishing a single seat is 
extremely complex and wilifinevitably have to be 
examined in the light of it~ advantages and dis-
advantages as the Counqil says. Here your 
Rapporteur merely refers to the considerations 
expressed in paragraph 39 of the present 
report. 
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APPENDIX I 
Revised WEU budget for 1985 1 
1. The Secretary-General circulates herewith a revised WEU budget for 1985. This budget was ori-
ginally circulated under reference B (85) 14 (and corrigendum) and was examined at the Budget and 
Organisation Committee's meeting in London on 24th and 25th October 1985 (BR (85) 2, V, to be circu-
lated). 
2. In their examination and discussion of the budget, delegations noted: 
(a) that the increases in Section A largely followed those described 
C-B (85) 13; 
earlier in document 
(b) that the estimates in Section A would be modified to take account of transfers agreed under 
the silent procedure (cf. B (85) 4 and 10), which had the effect of reducing Chapter A.l., item 
1, by £6,800 and of increasing Chapter A.IV, item 2, by a corresponding sum; 
(c) that the estimates for Sections B and C were reduced to the level suggested when the 1985 
budget was approved subject to the freezing of a sum ofF 750,000 (see cover note to C-B (84) 
7, page 2); 
(d) that in fact the Paris offices had achieved savings greater than F 750,000 which had enabled 
them to meet unforeseen expenditure, e.g. pensions and security measures, without any 
increase being sought; 
(e) that increased Paris expenditure arising from the installation of car telephones for the ungra-
ded officials and language courses for staff should have been submitted for approval before 
commitments were entered into. 
3. Subject to the foregoing, the committee could recommend the Council to approve the WEU revi-
sed budget for 1985. 
1. Document C-B (85) 15 of 29th October 1985. 
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WEU revised budget for 1985 
Summary 
Section A Section B 
£ F 
Salaries and allowances -6,236 -516,600 
Travel 8,210 -
Other operating costs 55,730 16,700 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 7,000 -
Buildings - 126,500 
Total expenditure 64,704 -373,400 
WEU tax -25,360 - 124,300 
Other receipts -7,975 -2,000 
Total income - 33,335 - 126,300 
Net expenditure 98,039 -247,100 
Net pensions 32,420 311,600 
NET TOTAL 130,459 64,500 
1985 budgets 1,111,210 9,314,690 
REVISED TOTALS 1,241,669 9,379,190 
A - Secretariat-General. 
B - International secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
WEU revised budget for 1985 
Section A 
Budget 1985 
£ 
Salaries and allowances 1,296,910 
Travel 39,750 
Other operating costs 212,600 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 2,720 
Buildings -
Total expenditure 1,551,980 
WEU tax 486,840 
Other receipts 43,620 
Total income 530,460 
Net expenditure 1,021,520 
Net pensions 89,690 
NET TOTAL 1,111,210 
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I 
Section C 1 Total B + C 
F 
I 
F 
- 1,915,20~ - 2,431,800 
- -
-
I 16,700 
- -
228,00b 354,500 
- 1,687,20b -2,060,600 
-727,10b -851,400 
- 12,30b - 14,300 
-739,400 -865,700 
-947,800 - 1,194,900 
133,3qo 444,900 
- 814,5qo -750,000 
20,739,440 30,054,130 
19,924,940 29,304,130 
I 
Amendments! Revised 
proposed estimates 
£ I £ 
-6,236 1 1,290,674 
+ 8,2101 47,960 
+ 55,7301 268,330 
+ 7,000 9,720 
- I -
+ 64,7041 1,616,684 
- 25,36Q 461,480 
-7,9751 35,645 
- 33,33~ 497,125 
+ 98,03~ 1,119,559 
+ 32,42 122,110 
+ 130,459 1,241,669 
I 
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Contributions 
600ths 
Belgium 59 
France 120 
Germany 120 
Italy 120 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 59 
United Kingdom 120 
600 
* Budget increase 
Less £45,000 for security work already funded 
Net sum required 
Sections B and C 
Budget 1985 
F 
Salaries and allowances 34,936,550 
Travel 724,900 
Other operating costs 1,875,880 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 96,400 
Buildings 70,000 
Total expenditure 37,703,730 
WEU tax 12,164,200 
Other receipts 763,400 
Total income 12,927,600 
Net expenditure 24,776,130 
Net pensions 5,278,000 
NET TOTAL 
30,054,130 
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£ 
8,403,47 
17,091,80 
17,091,80 
17,091,80 
284,86 
8,403,47 
17,091,80 
85,459,00* 
130,459 
45,000 
85,459 
Amendments 
proposed 
F 
-2,431,800 
-
+ 16,700 
-
+ 354,500 
-2,060,600 
-851,400 
- 14,300 
-865,700 
- 1,194,900 
+ 444,900 
-750,000 
APPENDIX I 
Revised 
estimates 
F 
32,504,750 
724,900 
1,892,580 
96,400 
424,500 
35,643,130 
11,312,800 
749,100 
12,061,900 
23,581,230 
5,722,900 
29,304,130 
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Secretariat-General 
I 
Credits Amendments i Revised approved proposed estimates for 1985 I 
£ £ I £ 
Current expenditure i 
: 
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations 
to personnel, provident fund, social and I 
supplementary insurances 1,296,910 - 6,236 I 1,290,674 
A.II. Travel 39,750 + 8,210 I 47,960 
A. Ill. Other operating costs 212,600 + 55,730 I 268,330 
1,549,260 + 57,704 I 1,606,964 
Capital expenditure I 
I 
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 2,720 + 7,000 I 9,720 
A. V. Buildings - -
I 
-
Total expenditure 1,551,980 + 64,704 1 1,616,684 
Income I 
A. VI. WEU tax 486,840 -25,360 I 461,480 
A. VII. Other receipts 43,620 -7,975 I 35,645 
Total income 530,460 -33,335 I 497,125 
NET TOTAL 1,021,520 + 98,039 I 1,119,559 
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Details by item 
Credits Amendments Revised 
approved proposed estimates for 1985 
£ £ £ 
Current expenditure 
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to 
personnel, social and supplementary insu-
rances 
1. Basic salary 1, 118,140 -52,875 1,065,265 
2. Expatriation allowance 58,846 -4,126 54,720 
3. Household allowance 25,505 +280 25,785 
4. Children's and dependants' allowance 22,640 -2,720 19,920 
5. Language allowance 452 - 452 
6. Representation allowance 3,857 - 3,857 
Total 1,229,440 - 59,441 1,169,999 
7. Installation allowance 1,500 + 12,325 13,825 
8. Rent allowance 15,000 + 3,500 18,500 
9. Overtime 1,800 - 1,800 
10. Payment for unexpended leave - + 425 425 
11. Home leave 1,800 - 1,800 
12. Contribution of WEU to provident 
fund 14% of basic salary 21,150 -6,620 14,530 
13. Allowance on termination of contract - + 1,985 1,985 
14. Temporary staff 1,400 + 43,200 44,600 
15. Social insurance (employer's part) - - -
16. Supplementary insurance - premium 
paid by WEU 22,400 - 1,610 20,790 
17. Education allowance 2,420 - 2,420 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.l. 1,296,910 -6,236 1,290,674 
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Credits Amendme~ s Revised 
approved 
for 1985 proposed estimates 
£ £ £ 
A.ll. Travel 
1. Travel on official business 
(a) Travelling expenses 19,520 -3,500 16,020 
(b) Subsistence allowance 14,560 + 3,500 18,060 
2. Travel on initial recruitment, transfer or I 
departure 400 + 1,350i 1,750 
3. Removal of household effects 1,000 + 7,860, 8,860 
4. Travel under Article 60 (b) of the Staff 
Rules 
(a) Travelling expenses 2,325 -500 1,825 
(b) Subsistence allowance 1,945 - 5ooi 1,445 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.ll. 39,750 + 8,2101 47,960 
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Credits Amendments Revised approved proposed estimates for 1985 
£ £ £ 
A.III. Other operating costs 
1. Premises 
( a) Rent and rates 20,555 -900 19,655 
( b) Maintenance and repairs 94,000 + 45,000 139,000 
( c ) Gas, electricity and water 12,385 - 12,385 
(d) Cleaning (contract) 8,340 - 8,340 
2. Furniture/equipment 
(a) Rental 2,100 - 2,100 
( b) Maintenance, repair 2,320 + 1,055 3,375 
3. Office supplies 8,740 + 2,160 10,900 
4. Communications 
( a) Telephone/telegraph charges 10,800 - 10,800 
(b) Postage 950 - 950 
5. Other expenses 
(a) Audit 3,680 -400 3,280 
( b) Bank charges 380 + 150 530 
( c) Hospitality 6,385 - 6,385 
( d) Motor vehicles 3,150 -150 3,000 
( e) Information, documentation, 
periodicals 3,845 + 1,000 4,845 
(f) Uniforms 1,035 - 1,035 
(g) Linguists' fees and other professio-
nal charges 4,645 + 7,415 12,060 
( h) Medical examinations 870 - 870 
( i ) Insurances 3,585 - 3,585 
(j) Printing 1,500 - 1,500 
( k) Appeals board p.m. - -
( I ) Miscellaneous 500 +400 900 
(m) Inter-organisational charges 22,335 -500 21,835 
6. Allowance for contingencies 500 + 500 1,000 
ToTAL CHAPTER A.III. 212,600 + 55,730 268,330 
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Credits Amendments Revised 
approved proposed: estimates for 1985 
' 
£ £ I £ 
Capital expenditure 
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 
1. Furniture for 8-9 Grosvenor Place 2,045 - 2,045 
2. Office machines and equipment 150 + 6,800 6,950 
3. Library 525 +200 725 
4. Motor vehicles - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER A.IV. 2,720 + 7,000 9,720 
A. V. Buildings - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER A.V. - - -
Credits Amendments Revised approved proposed estimates for 1985 
£ £ £ 
Income 
A. VI. WEU tax 
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of 
the WEU Taxation Regulations 477,791 -22,446 455,345 
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of 
the WEU Taxation Regulations 9,049 -2,914 6,135 
TOTAL CHAPTER A. VI. 486,840 -25,360 461,480 
A. VII. Other receipts 
1. Bank interest 20,000 -4,000 16,000 
2. Reimbursement of VAT 13,500 - 13,500 
3. Social insurance benefits and family 
allowance 1,420 -700 720 
4. Miscellaneous - + 150 150 
5. Temporary levy - A/L 8,700 -3,425 5,275 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VII. 43,620 - 7,975 35,645 
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lnteriUltional secretariat of the Standing At11Ul111ents Committee 
s.,., 
Credits Amendments 
approved proposed for 1985 
F F 
Current expenditure 
B.l. Salaries, wages and other remuneration 
to personnel, provident fund, social and 
supplementary insurances 11,206,900 -516,600 
B.II. Travel 174,400 -
B. Ill. Other operating costs 760,790 + 16,700 
12,142,090 -499,900 
Capital expenditure 
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 22,500 -
B. V. Buildings 25,000 + 126,500 
Total expenditure 12,189,590 -373,400 
Income 
B. VI. WEU tax 3,922,500 -124,300 
B. VII. Other receipts 234,500 -2,000 
Total income 4,157,000 -126,300 
NET TOTAL 8,032,590 -247,100 
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Revised 
estimates 
F 
10,690,300 
174,400 
777,490 
11,642,190 
22,500 
151,500 
11,816,190 
3,798,200 
232,500 
4,030,700 
7,785,490 
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Credits Amendmen~ Revised approved 
for 1985 proposed estimates 
F F F 
Current expenditure 
I 
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to 
personnel, provident fund, social and sup-
I 
plementary insurances 
1. Basic salary 9,040,500 -240,000 8,800,500 
I 
2. Expatriation allowance 397,000 
- 54,0~ 343,000 
3. Household allowance 238,000 -28,0 210,000 
4. Children's allowance 306,000 
- 5~,001 255,000 
5. Language allowance - -
6. Representation allowance - - -
Total 9,981,500 - 373,00< 9,608,500 
7. Installation allowance 41,900 
- 41,90~ -
8. Rent allowance 8,800 +6,00 14,800 
9. Overtime 29,500 I 29,500 -
I 10. Payment for unexpended leave - - I -
11. Home leave 37,700 
-29,9, 7,800 
12. Contribution of WEU to provident 
fund 14 % of basic salary 112,500 + 1,200 113,700 
13. Allowance on termination of contract - -
I 
-
14. Temporary staff - - -
15. Social insurance (employer's contribu-
- 2o,ooq tion) 720,000 700,000 
16. Supplementary insurance (premium 
payable by WEU) 195,000 
- 19,00~ 176,000 
17. Education allowance 80,000 -40,00 40,000 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I. 11,206,900 - 516,60< 10,690,300 
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Credits Amendments Revised approved proposed estimates for 1985 
F F F 
B.III. Other operating costs 
1. Premises 
(a) Rent and rates 10,950 -2,500 8,450 
(b) Maintenance and repairs 100,200 - 100,200 
(c) Water, gas, electricity, heating 121,500 - 121,500 
(d) Cleaning (by contract) 86,750 -7,500 79,250 
2. Furniture and equipment 
(a) Rental 33,950 + 1,000 34,950 
(b) Maintenance and repair 16,200 + 1,000 17,200 
-3. Office supplies 90,000 + 5,000 95,000 
4. Communications 
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges 110,000 + 13,000 123,000 
(b) Postage 13,400 - 13,400 
5. Other expenses 
(a) Audit and accountancy charges - - -
(b) Bank charges 50 - 50 
(c) Hospitality 39,000 - 39,000 
(d) Motor vehicles 15,540 - 15,540 
(e) Information, documentation, 
periodicals 30,550 - 30,550 
(f) Uniforms 7,800 - 7,800 
(g) Linguists' fees and other profes-
sional charges 25,000 + 12,500 37,500 
(h) Medical exams 9,100 - 1,800 7,300 
( i) Insurances 22,700 -4,000 18,700 
(j) Miscellaneous 17,900 - 17,900 
(k) Non-recoverable tax payments 9,350 - 9,350 
( /) Translation fees - - -
6. Allowance for contingencies 850 - 850 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.III. 760,790 + 16,700 777,490 
136 
APPENDIX l DOCUMENT 1054 
Credits Amendmerts Revised approved 
for 1985 proposed estimates 
F F F 
! 
Capital expenditure : 
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 
1. Furniture and equipment 15,000 - 15,000 
2. Office machines 7,500 - 7,500 
3. Library - - -
4. Motor vehicles - - -
' 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.IV. 22,500 - 22,500 
B. V. Building 25,000 + 126,50p 151,500 
ToTAL CHAPTER B. V. 25,000 + 126,5op 151,500 
Credits Proposed I Revised approved 
for 1985 amendmen~s estimates 
F F F 
Income 
B. VI. WEU tax 
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the 
WEU Taxation Regulations 3,875,000 - 124,300 3,750,700 
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 ( 1) of 
the WEU Taxation Regulations 47,500 - 47,500 
TOTAL CHAPTER B. VI. 3,922,500 - 124,300 3,798,200 
B. VII. Other receipts 
1. Bank interest 114,500 - 114,500 
2. Reimbursement of purchase tax - - -
3. Social insurance benefits and family 
allowances 10,700 - 10,700 
4. Miscellaneous 8,000 - 8,000 
5. Exceptional levy on the basic salaries 
of A and L personnel 101,300 - 2,oop 99,300 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VII. 234,500 - 2,00b 232,500 
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Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Summary 
Credits Proposed Revised 
approved 
for 1985 amendments estimates 
F F F 
Current expenditure 
C.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations 
to personnel, provident fund, social and 
supplementary insurances 23,729,650 - 1,915,200 21,814,450 
C.II. Travel 550,500 - 550,500 
C. Ill. Other operating costs 1,115,090 - 1,115,090 
25,395,240 - 1,915,200 23,480,040 
Capital expenditure 
C.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 73,900 - 73,900 
C. V. Building 45,000 + 228,000 273,000 
Total expenditure 25,514,140 - 1,687,200 23,826,940 
Income 
C. VI. WEU tax 8,241,700 -727,100 7,514,600 
C.VII. Other receipts 528,900 - 12,300 516,600 
Total income 8,770,600 -739,400 8,031,200 
NET TOTAL 16,743,540 -947,800 15,795,740 
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C.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to 
personnel, provident fund, social and sup-
plementary insurances 
1. Basic salary 
2. Expatriation allowance 
3. Household allowance 
4. Children's allowance 
5. Language allowance 
6. Representation allowance 
Total 
7. Installation allowance 
8. Rent allowance 
9. Overtime 
10. Payment for unexpended leave 
11. Home leave 
12. Contribution of WEU to provident 
fund 
13. Allowance on termination of contract 
14. Temporary staff 
15. Social insurance (employer's contribu-
tion) 
16. Supplementary insurance (premium 
payable by WEU) 
17. Education allowance 
TOTAL CHAPTER C.l. 
139 
Credits 
approved 
for 1985 
F 
19,100,000 
1,380,000 
560,000 
401,700 
6,500 
21,448,200 
149,000 
49,000 
28,250 
90,900 
36,300 
1,432,000 
402,000 
94,000 
23,729,650 
Proposed 
amendment 
F 
- 1,566,20b 
- 232,00b 
- 5o,oob 
- 1,848,200 
- 149,000 
+ 2,oob 
+ 80,000 
- 1,915,200 
DOCUMENT 1054 
Revised 
estimates 
F 
17,533,800 
1,148,000 
510,000 
401,700 
6,500 
19,600,000 
49,000 
28,250 
90,900 
38,300 
1,432,000 
402,000 
174,000 
21,814,450 
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Credits Proposed Revised 
approved 
for 1985 amendments estimates 
F F F 
Capital expenditure 
C.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment 
1. Furniture and equipment 25,000 - 25,000 
2. Office machines 36,000 - 36,000 
3. Library 12,900 - 12,900 
4. Motor vehicles - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER C.IV. 73,900 - 73,900 
C. V. Buildings 45,000 + 228,000 273,000 
TOTAL CHAPTER c. V. 45,000 + 228,000 273,000 
Credits Proposed Revised 
approved 
for 1985 amendments estimates 
F F F 
Income 
C. VI. WEU tax 
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of 
the WEU Taxation Regulations 8,226,500 - 727,100 7,499,400 
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 ( 1) of 
the WEU Taxation Regulations 15,200 - 15,200 
TOTAL CHAPTER c. VI. 8,241,700 -727,100 7,514,600 
C. VII. Other receipts 
1. Bank interest 230,000 - 230,000 
2. Reimbursement of purchase tax - - -
3. Social insurance benefits and family 
allowances 21,400 - 21,400 
4. Miscellaneous 14,500 - 14,500 
5. Exceptional levy on the basic salaries 
of A and L personnel 263,000 - 12,300 250,700 
TOTAL CHAPTER C. VII. 528,900 - 12,300 516,600 
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Revised pensions budget 
Summary 
Section A Section B Section C Total B + C 
£ F F F 
Expenditure 
I. A. Pensions 
1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pensions 4,550 - - -
(b) Invalidity pensions 530 - - -
(c) Survivors' pensions 9,700 1,800 - 1,800 
(d} Orphans' pensions 1,650 - 1,000 1,000 
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 325 6,400 - 6,400 
(b) Dependants' allowance 1,785 31,400 - 31,400 
(c) Education allowance - - - -
(d) Hardship allowance - - - -
3. Leaving allowance 13,345 263,000 75,000 338,000 
4. Supplementary insurance 
(premium payable by WEU) 285 - - -
ToTAL CHAPTER A.l. 32,170 302,600 76,000 378,600 
Income 
VIII. Pension receipts 
1. Contributions (7%) -250 -9,000 -57,300 -66,300 
2. Reimbursement of provident 
fund withdrawals - - - -
3. Other receipts - - - -
-
ToTAL CHAPTER VIII. -250 -9,000 -57,300 -66,300 
NET TOTAL 32,420 311,600 133,300 444,900 
Approved for 1985 89,690 1,282,100 3,995,900 5,278,000 
REVISED ToTAL 122,110 1,593,700 4,129,200 5,722,900 
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Secretariat-General 
Credits Proposed Revised 
approved 
for 1985 amendments estimates 
£ £ £ 
Expenditure 
A. I. A. Pensions 
1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pensions 92,480 + 4,550 97,030 
(b) Invalidity pensions 10,930 + 530 11,460 
(c) Survivors' pensions 21,075 + 9,700 30,775 
(d) Orphans' pensions 5,225 + 1,650 6,875 
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 4,450 + 325 4,775 
(b) Dependants' allowance 1,915 + 1,785 3,700 
(c) Education allowance - - -
(d) Hardship allowance - - -
3. Leaving allowance p.m. 13,345 13,345 
4. Supplementary insurance (premium 
payable by WEU) 1,815 + 285 2,100 
5. Bank charges - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I.A. 137,890 + 32,170 170,060 
Income 
A. VIII. Pension receipts 
1. Contributions (7%) 39,110 -250 38,860 
2. Reimbursement of provident fund 
withdrawals 3,780 - 3,780 
3. Other receipts 5,310 - 5,310 
TOTAL CHAPTER A. VIII. 48,200 -250 47,950 
NET TOTAL 89,690 + 32,420 122,110 
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International secretariat of the Standing Armaments Commit1ee 
Credits Proposed Revised approved 
for 1985 amendmen s estimates 
F F F 
Expenditure 
B.I.A. Pensions 
1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 1,109,000 - 1,109,000 
(b) Invalidity pension - - -
(c) Survivors' pension 405,000 + 1,80Cl 406,800 
(d) Orphans' pension - - -
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 54,400 +6,, 60,800 
(b) Dependants' allowance 11,100 + 31,40 42,500 
(c) Education allowance - - I -
(d) Hardship allowance - - -
3. Leaving allowance - 263,000 263,000 
4. Supplementary insurance (premium 
i payable by WEU) 31,600 - 31,600 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I.A. 1,611,100 + 302,60D 1,913,700 
Income 
B. VIII. Receipts relating to pensions 
1. Contributions (7%) 329,000 - 9,00~ 320,000 
2. Reimbursement of loans and with-
I 
drawals - - -
I 
3. Other receipts - - I -
TOTAL CHAPTER B. VIII. 329,000 -9,000 320,000 
NET TOTAL 1,282,100 + 311,60D 1,593,700 
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Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Credits Proposed Revised approved 
for 1985 amendments estimates 
F F F 
Expenditure 
C. I. A. Pensions 
1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 2,290,000 - 2,290,000 
(b) Invalidity pension - - -
(c) Survivors' pension 817,300 - 817,300 
(d) Orphans' pension 51,000 + 1,000 52,000 
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 167,700 - 167,700 
(b) Dependants' allowance 81,200 - 81,200 
(c) Education allowance - - -
(d) Hardship allowance - - -
3. Leaving allowance 1,272,000 + 75,000 1,347,000 
4. Supplementary insurance (premium 
payable by WEU) 68,300 - 68,300 
TOTAL CHAPTER C.I.A. 4,747,500 + 76,000 4,823,500 
Income 
C. VIII. Receipts relating to pensions 
1. Contributions (7%) 751,600 -57,300 694,300 
2. Reimbursement of loans and with-
drawals - - -
3. Other receipts - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER C. VIII. 751,600 -57,300 694,300 
NET TOTAL 3,995,900 + 133,300 4,129,200 
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APPENDIX II 
WEU budget for 1986 1 
1. The draft budget was examined by the 
Budget and Organisation Committee at its meet-
ing on 24th-25th October 1985 (B (85) 17 ; BR 
(85) 2, VI) and the estimates were subsequently 
modified in accordance with the committee's 
recommendations. 
2. The budget was apprbved by the Council 
on 15th January 1986 (C-B (85) 17; CR (86) 1, 
VII, 1), subject to the proviso outlined in docu-
ment C (86) 10. 1 
1. Document C-B (85) 17 of 17th January 1986. 
WEU budget estimates for 1986 
Proposed expenditure and income 
Section A - London I 
£ 
Expenditure I 
Salaries and allowances 1,549,357 
Travel 54,620 
I Other operating costs 251,890 
Purchase of furniture and equipment 5,215 
Building 
Total 
Income 
WEU tax 
Other receipts 
NET TOTAL 
Net pensions 
Contributions required* 
Budget surplus 1984 
Net contributions 1986** 
* Difference 1986/1985. 
(Total + 5,89 %) 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Contributions** 
600ths 
59 
120 
120 
120 
2 
59 
120 
600 
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-
I 
I 
1,861,082 
i 
573,330 
39,155 
612,485 I 
1,248,597 
168,645 
I 
1,417,242 
569 
I 
1,416,673 I 
14.14% I I 
I 
£ 
139,306,118 
283,334.60 
283,334.~0 
283,334. 0 
4,722.24 
139,306.18 
283,334.60 
1,416,673.00 
Section B - Paris 
F 
34,723,600 
690,000 
2,160,700 
65,000 
70,000 
37,709,300 
12,130,000 
478,100 
12,608,100 
25,101,200 
4,750,500 
29,851,700 
921,391 
28,930,309 
1.87% 
F 
2,844,813. 72 
5,786,061.80 
5,786,061.80 
5,786,061.80 
96,434.36 
2,844,813. 72 
5,786,061.80 
28,930,309.00 
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Secretariat-General 
Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1986 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and 1985 in 1984 
£ £ £ £ 
Current expenditure 
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remune-
rations to personnel, provident 
fund, social and supplementary 
insurances 1,549,357 1 290,674 258,683 1,215,930 
A.II. Travel 54,620 47,960 6,660 36,035 
A. Ill. Other operating costs 251,890 268,330_ - 16,440 194,571 
1,855,867 1,606,964 248,903 1,446,536 
Capital expenditure 
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equip-
ment 5,215 9,720 -4,505 14,630 
A. V. Buildings - - - -
Total expenditure 1,861,082 1,616,684 244,398 1,461,166 
1986/1985 + 15.12% 
Income 
A. VI. WEU tax 573,330 461,480 111,850 453,783 
A.VII. Other receipts 39,155 35,645 3,510 44,763 
Total income 612,485 497,125 115,360 498,546 
1986/1985 -23.21% 
NET TOTAL 1,248,597 1,119,559 129,038 962,620 
1986/1985 + 11.53% 
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Details by item 
Credits Diffetence Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and \985 in 1984 
£ £ £1 £ 
Current expenditure 
i 
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunera-
tions to personnel, social and supple-
mentary insurances 
1. Basic salary 1,331,545 1,065,265 266,k8o 1,042,197 
2. Expatriation allowance 75,160 54,720 20J40 52,228 
3. Household allowance 29,030 25,785 3,~45 24,308 
4. Children's and dependants' 
5J4o allowance 25,360 19,920 20,980 
5. Language allowance 1,015 452 $63 371 
6. Representation allowance 3,857 3,857 - 3,857 
Total 1,465,967 1,169,999 295,968 
I 
1,143,941 
7. Installation allowance 8,570 13,825 - 5,255 -
8. Rent allowance 26,545 18,500 8,045 13,856 
9. Overtime 2,500 1,800 700 1,625 
10. Payment for unexpended leave - 425 
-125 -
11. Home leave 2,500 1,800 700 2,036 
12. Contribution of WEU to provi- ! 
dent fund - 14% of basic salary 10,335 14,530 - 4,~95 20,899 
13. Allowance on termination of 
contract - 1,985 - 1,985 -
14. Temporary staff 3,200 44,600 -41,400 10,625 
15. Social insurance (employer's part) - - - -
I 
16. Supplementary insurance pre-
mium paid by WEU 25,820 20,790 5,Q30 20,962 
17. Education allowance 3,920 2,420 1,loo 1,986 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I. 1,549,357 1,290,674 258,683 1,215,930 
1986/1985 + 20.04% I 
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Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and 1985 in 1984 
£ £ £ £ 
A.II. Travel 
1. Travel on official business 
(a) Travelling expenses 21,925 16,020 5,905 17,508 
(b) Subsistence allowance 18,065 18,060 5 16,360 
2. Travel on initial recruitment, 
transfer or departure 1,500 1,750 -250 149 
3. Removal of household effects 8,860 8,860 - -
4. Travel under Article 60 (b) of the 
Staff Rules 
(a) Travelling expenses 2,325 1,825 500 909 
(b) Subsistence allowance 1,945 1,445 500 1,109 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.II. 54,620 47,960 6,660 36,035 
1986/1985 + 13.89% 
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Credits Diff~rence Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and [1985 in 1984 
£ £ £ £ 
A.III. Other operating costs 
I 
1. Premises ! 
( a) Rent and rates 20,210 19,655 555 19,273 
( b) Maintenance and repairs 100,000 139,000 - 39,bOO 83,718 
( c) Gas, electricity and water 13,230 12,385 845 10,235 
(d) Cleaning (contract) 8,200 8,340 -l40 7,810 
2. Furniture/equipment 
i (a) Rental 13,150 2,100 11,050 697 
( b) Maintenance, repair 5,680 3,375 2,f05 2,874 
3. Office supplies 11,550 10,900 650 10,387 
4. Communications I 
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges 11,220 10,800 420 9,194 
(b) Postage 975 950 125 780 
5. Other expenses 
1,915 (a) Audit 5,195 3,280 3,671 
( b) Bank charges 200 530 
-130 350 
( c) Hospitality 6,895 6,385 510 5,789 
( d) Motor vehicles 3,350 3,000 350 2,613 
I ( e) Information, documenta-
tion, periodicals 5,135 4,845 ~90 3,812 
(f) Uniforms 1,095 1,035 60 438 
(g) Linguists' fees and other i 
professional charges 11,700 12,060 - J60 7,745 
( h) Medical examinations 1,060 870 ,90 773 
( i ) Insurances 3,450 3,585 -135 2,787 
( j ) Printing 3,000 1,500 1,500 460 
( k) Appeals board p.m. p.m. - -
( I ) Miscellaneous 900 900 - ! 899 
(m) Inter-organisational charges 24,695 21,835 2,860 20,053 
6. Allowance for contingencies 1,000 > 1,000 _I 231 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.III. 251,890 268,330 - 16,440 194,571 
1986/1985 - 6.13% 
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Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and 1985 in 1984 
£ £ £ £ 
Capital expenditure 
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and eqmp-
ment 
1. Furniture for 8-9 Grosvenor 
Place 2,110 2,045 65 2,958 
2. Office machines and equipment 2,380 6,950 -4,750 4,678 
3. Library 725 725 - 356 
4. Motor vehicles - - - 6,638 
TOTAL CHAPTER A.IV. 5,215 9,720 -4,505 14,630 
1986/1985 -46.35% 
A. V. Buildings - - - -
TOTAL CHAPTER A. V. - - - -
1986/1985 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and 1985 in 1984 
£ £ £ £ 
Income 
A. VI. WEU tax 
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 
of the WEU Taxation Regula-
tions 569,010 455,345 113,665 444,870 
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 
(1) of the WEU Taxation Regu-
lations 4,320 6,135 - 1,815 8,913 
ToTAL CHAPTER A. VI. 573,330 461,480 111,850 453,783 
1986/1985 + 24.24% 
A. VII. Other receipts 
1. Bank interest 15,000 16,000 - 1,000 18,322 
2. Reimbursement of VAT 20,160 13,500 6,660 19,024 
3. Social insurance benefits and 
family allowance 650 720 -70 1,219 
4. Miscellaneous - 150 - 150 500 
5. Temporary levy- A/L 3,345 5,275 - 1,930 5,698 
TOTAL CHAPTER A. VII. 39,155 35,645 3,510 44,763 
1986/1985 + 9.85% 
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Agencies for security questions 
Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1986 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised betweei 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 985 in 1984 
F F F 
Current expenditure I 
B. I. Salaries, wages and other remunera-
I tions to personnel, provident fund, 
social and supplementary insuran-
2,218~850 ces 34,723,600 32,504,750 31,737,027.62 
'" B.II. Travel 690,000 724,900 - 34~900 762,911.15 
B. Ill. Other operating costs 2,160,700 1,892,580 268,120 1,625,701.41 
37,574,300 35,122,230 ,I 2,452,070 34, 125,640.18 
Capital expenditure 
I 
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equip-
ment 65,000 96,400 
-311400 85,176.60 
B. V. Buildings 70,000 424,500 - 354j500 70,000.00 
Total expenditure 37,709,300 35,643,130 2,0661170 34,280,816.78 
1986/1985 + 5.80% 
Income 
I 
B. VI. WEU tax 12,130,000 11,312,800 817,200 11,090,708.14 
B. VII. Other receipts 478,100 749,100 - 27lj000 745,579.19 
Total income 12,608,100 12,061,900 546;200 11,836,287.33 
1986/1985 + 4.53% j 
NET ToTAL 25,101,200 23,581,230 1,519!970 22,444,529.45 
1986/1985 + 6.45% 
I 
I. Total credits of sections B and G. 
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Details by item 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 1985 in 1984 
F F F F 
Current expenditure 
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remunera-
tions to personnel, social and supple-
mentary insurances 
1. Basic salary 27,963,800 26,334,300 1,629,500 25,704,550.33 
2. Expatriation allowance 1,582,100 1,491,000 91,100 1,582,463.98 
3. Household allowance 770,800 720,000 50,800 719,129.09 
4. Children's and dependants' allow-
ance 764,500 656,700 107,800 639,966.83 
5. Language allowance 7,000 6,500 500 6,134.16 
6. Representation allowance - - - -
Total 31,088,200 29,208,500 1,879,700 28,652,244.39 
7. Installation allowance 190,000 - 190,000 47,996.17 
8. Rent allowance 62,000 63,800 - 1,800 53,665.89 
9. Overtime 61,800 57,750 4,050 50,342.34 
10. Payment for unexpended leave - - - -
11. Home leave 136,300 98,700 37,600 57,753.44 
12. Contribution of WEU to provi-
dent fund - 14% of basic salary 159,000 152,000 7,000 148,139.72 
13. Allowance on termination of con-
tract - - - -
14. Temporary staff - - - 20,000.00 
15. Social insurance (employer's part) 2,214,000 2,132,000 82,000 1,963,567.02 
16. Supplementary insurance pre-
mium paid by WEU 576,800 578,000 1,200 526,720.03 
1 7. Education allowance 235,500 214,000 21,500 216,598.62 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I. 34,723,600 32,504,750 2,218,850 31,737,027.62 
1986/1985 + 6.83% 
1. Total credits of sections B and C. 
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Credits DifferJnce Expenditure 
Proposed Revised betweefff 986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 1 85 in 1984 
F F F F 
B.II. Travel ! 
1. Travel on official business 
(a) Travelling expenses 190,000 202,600 
- 12,t00 291,089.74 
(b) Subsistence allowance 290,000 268,700 21, 00 332,423.22 
2. Travel on initial recruitment, 
- B,6oo transfer or departure 20,000 33,600 15,640.64 
3. Removal of household effects 190,000 220,000 -30,000 123,757.55 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.ll. 690,000 724,900 - 34,9oo 762,911.15 
1986/1985 -4.81% 
1 
1. Total credits of sections B and C. 
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Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 1985 in 1984 
F F F F 
B.III. Other operating costs 
I. Premises 
(a) Rent and rates 33,700 28,160 5,540 21,154.37 
(b) Maintenance and repairs 307,700 280,500 27,200 253,894.77 
(c) Gas, electricity and water 373,200 340,200 33,000 262,287.81 
(d) Cleaning (contract) 265,500 235,400 30,100 196,708.62 
2. Furniture/equipment 
(a) Rental 127,900 69,990 57,910 69,872.70 
(b) Maintenance, repairs 37,700 35,350 2,350 28,555.01 
3. Office supplies 190,000 174,060 15,940 151,082.17 
4. Communications 
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges 317,150 317,150 - 291,909.14 
(b) Postage 23,500 22,400 1,100 16,427.30 
5. Other expenses 
(a) Audit - - - -
(b) Bank charges 100 100 - 112.50 
(c) Hospitality 118,500 79,000 39,500 75,618.82 
(d) Motor vehicles 40,000 32,340 7,660 25,105.76 
(e) Informationjdocumenta-
tionjperiodicals 80,000 66,650 13,350 69,188.23 
if) Uniforms 26,600 19,800 6,800 21,633.79 
(g) Linguists' fees and other pro-
fessiona1 charges 44,500 44,500 - 19,414.69 
(h) Medical examinations 27,600 24,000 3,600 15,765.46 
(i ) Insurances 54,700 43,500 11,200 38,134.86 
(j ) Miscellaneous 47,550 44,800 2,750 36,214.57 
(k) Non-recoverable tax pay-
ments 32,500 23,150 9,350 22,422.25 
(I) Translation fees 10,500 9,830 670 9,215.40 
6. Allowance for contingencies 1,800 1,700 100 983.19 
TOTAL CHAPTER B.III. 2,160,700 1,892,580 268,120 1,625,701.41 
1986/1985 + 14.17% 
1. Total credits of sections B and C. 
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Credits Differdnce Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 1~85 in 1984 
F F F F 
Capital expenditure ! 
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equip-
ment 
5looo 1. Furniture and equipment 45,000 40,000 57,676.78 
2. Office machines - 43,500 
_ 43r500 22.152.29 
3. Library 20,000 12,900 7,100 5,347.53 
4. Motor vehicles - -
-I -
TOTAL CHAPTER B.IV. 65,000 96,400 - 31l4oo 85,176.60 
1986/1985 - 32.57% 
I 
B. V. Buildings 70,000 424,500 (-) 354l5oo 70,000.00 
TOTAL CHAPTER B. V. 70,000 
1986/1985-83.51% 
424,500 (-) 354~500 70,000.00 
I. Total credits for sections B and C. 
i 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between ~986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 19 5 in 1984 
F F F F 
! 
Income 
B.VI. WEU tax 
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 
I 
of the WEU Taxation Regula-
tions 12,062,000 11,250,100 811,~00 11,028,286.52 
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 
(1) of the WEU Taxation Regu-
5Joo lations 68,000 62,700 62,421.62 
TOTAL CHAPTER B. VI. 12,130,000 11,312,800 817,400 11,090,708.14 
1986/1985 + 7.22% 
B.VII. Other receipts 
- 44Joo 1. Bank interest 300,000 344,500 529,268.26 
2. Reimbursement of VAT - - - -
3. Social insurance benefits and I 
family allowance 32,100 32,100 - 53,138.60 
4. Miscellaneous 10,000 22,500 - 12,Soo 33,080.13 
5. Temporary levy- A/L 136,000 350,000 -214,000 130,092.20 
TOTAL CHAPTER B. VII. 478,100 749,100 - 211,doo 745,579.19 
1986/1985 - 36.18% 
I 
I. Total credits for sections B and C. 
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ANNEX 
WEU pension budget for 1986 
Proposed expenditure and income 
Section A Section B 
London Paris 
£ F 
Expenditure 
Pensions 
Retirement 145,730 3,625,800 
Invalidity 12,065 -
Survivors' 33,140 1,280,200 
Orphans' 7,065 53,800 
Allowances 
Household 7,350 241,500 
Dependants' 4,780 108,000 
Education - -
Hardship - -
Leaving 12,700 372,000 
Supplementary insurance 2,775 106,200 
Bank charges 325 -
Total expenditure 225,930 5,787,500 
Income 
Contributions (7%) 50,365 1,037,000 
Reimbursement of provident 
fund withdrawals 1,570 -
Other receipts 5,350 -
Total income 57,285 1,037,000 
NET TOTAL 1986 168,645 4,750,500 
NET ToTAL 1985 122,110 5,722,900 
Difference + 46,535 -972,400 
+ 38.11% - 16.99% 
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Section A - Secretariat-General 
Credits Differ~nce Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 and 1985 in 1984 
£ £ £1 £ 
Pensions budget 
I Expenditure 
A. I. A. Pensions 
i 1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pensions 145,730 97,030 48,7~0 87,056 
(b) Invalidity pensions 12,065 11,460 6 5 10,871 
(c) Survivors' pensions 33,140 30,775 2,365 20,675 
(d) Orphans' pensions 7,065 6,875 1r0 3,455 
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 7,350 4,775 2,5v 4,019 (b) Dependants' allowance 4,780 3,700 1,0 0 1,881 
(c) Education allowance - - -
(d) Hardship allowance - - - -
3. Leaving allowance 12,700 13,345 -645. 20,710 
4. Supplementary insurance pre- 6Vs mium paid by WEU 2,775 2,100 1,753 
5. Bank charges 325 - 325 -
TOTAL CHAPTER A.l.A. 225,930 170,060 55,87o 150,420 
1986/1985 + 32.85% 
Income ! 
A .VIII. Pension receipts 
1. Contribution 7% 50,365 38,860 11,5@5 35,813 
2. Reimbursement of provident 
fund withdrawals 1,570 3,780 
- 2,21~ 3,783 
3. Other receipts 5,350 5,310 4,823 
TOTAL CHAPTER A. VIII. 57,285 47,950 9,315 44,419 
1986/1985 + 19.47% 
NET TOTAL 168,645 122,110 46,5{5 106,001 
1986/1985 + 38.11% 
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Section B - Agencies for security questions 
Credits Difference Expenditure 
Proposed Revised between 1986 and income 
for 1986 for 1985 1 and 1985 in 1984 
F F F F 
Pensions budget 
Expenditure 
B.I.A. Pensions 
1. Pensions 
(a) Retirement pensions 3,625,800 3,399,000 226,800 3,087,995 
(b) Invalidity pensions - - - -
(c) Survivors' pensions 1,280,200 1,224,100 56,100 1,236,975 
(d) Orphans' pensions 53,800 52,000 1,800 47,861 
2. Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 241,500 228,500 13,000 200,837 
(b) Dependants' allowance 108,000 123,700 - 15,700 82,375 
(c) Education allowance - - - -
(d) Hardship allowance - - - -
3. Leaving allowance 372,000 1,610,000 - 1,238,000 865,821 
4. Supplementary insurance pre-
mium paid by WEU 106,200 99,900 6,300 89,441 
TOTAL CHAPTER BJ.A. 5,787,500 6,737,200 -949,700 5,611,305 
1986/1985 - 14.10% 
Income 
B. VIII. Pension receipts 
1. Contributions 7% 1,037,000 1,014,300 22,700 984,805 
2. Reimbursement of loans and 
withdrawals - - - -
3. Other receipts - - - 26,889 
TOTAL CHAPTER B. VIII. 1,037,000 1,014,300 22,700 1,011,694 
1986/1985 + 2.24% 
NET TOTAL 4,750,500 5,722,900 -972,400 4,599,611 
1986/1985 - 16.99% 
I. Total credits of sections B and C. 
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APPENDIX V 
Office modernisation at the Secretariat-Genera/ 1 
1. Document B (83) 8 contains a number of 
observations concerning the introduction of 
" tempested" word-processing equipment. No 
provisions were made for this equipment in the 
1984 budget. The subject was discussed at the 
Budget and Organisation Committee meeting on 
20th June 1983 (BR (83) 1, VI), and it was then 
agreed to keep the matter under review. 
2. In B (84) 10 it was observed that, under 
the long-term renewal programme for typewrit-
ers, due to recommence in 1988, electronic type-
writers might be introduced; the more sophisti-
cated machines include word-processing 
functions. 
3. The discussions on the reactivation of 
WEU, which started in 1984, were further 
advanced following the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in October 1984. New work 
programmes are already being followed which 
call for extra meetings of working groups. In 
addition there is a much-increased production of 
documents, as well as regular Council meetings 
with extended agendas and a need for more rapid 
follow-up action, greater secretarial assistance 
and increasing demands on the translation ser-
vices. 
A forewarning of the effect on the (Lon-
don) budget was given in B (84) 15, part II, 
paagraph 1, and B (84) 10, page 7. 
4. Some temporary measures to improve sec-
retarial services have been taken, and transfers 
requested to take advantage of savings obtained 
by maintaining vacancies temporarily to the 
extent possible. 
(i) With B (84) 20 one electronic typewriter 
was supplemented by a VDU and a micro pro-
cessor to become a true word processor. This is 
a non-tempested word processor, to be used in 
the office of administration for non-classified 
documents only. This equipment is also very 
valuable in providing practical experience with 
word processors. 
1. Document B (85) ll of 13th August 1985. 
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I 
(ii) Approval of B (85) 4 tpade it possible to 
purchase a personal computer, to be used for the 
modernisation and computerisation of the finan-
cial administration. 
(iii) With B (85) 10 funds were made available 
by transfer to permit the purchase of two elec-
tronic typewriters, with attachments for floppy-
disc memories so as to permii the storing of clas-
sified information, to be used by the General 
Affairs Division. 
5. The required quality, quantity and speed 
of secretarial assistance and production of classi-
fied documents now calls for the introduction of 
tempested word-processing equipment. Bearing 
in mind the requirement that1all documents need 
to be produced in the two official languages 
simultaneously, it would be ~ great advantage to 
have two stand-alone, complete word processors 
so as to enable the English and the French sec-
tions to work in parallel. 
(i) As an alternative to 1 outright purchase, 
leasing could cover three years or five years. In 
effect, it means that over those periods the pur-
chase sum plus approximately 10% annual inter-
est would be paid. 
(ii) A typical cost comparison is given in 
annex. 
(iii) Delivery time of a tempested word proces-
sor is three months. 
6. It is difficult at this stage to judge exactly 
how the introduction of two1 word processors for 
the general typing and ~cretarial functions 
would affect the staffing situation. This would 
be a matter for subsequent review in the light of 
experience. 
7. The approval of the1 Budget Committee 
will be sought at its next ~eeting on 24th-25th 
October 1985, for either tjle purchase of one 
word processor in 1986 and one in 1987, or the 
lease of two word processors for a period of 3 or 
5 years. 
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Budgetary cost calculations for tempested word processor 
A. Purchase £ 
( i) 1 standard word processor 10,830 
additional software for French language 200 
automatic paper feeder for printer 560 
acoustic hood for printer 550 
ancillaries (110/220 V. convertor, floppy discs, etc.) 1,000 
13,140 
+15%VAT £15,111 
(ii) training one operator free, second operator 200 
(iii) maintenance contract £96 pjmonth 
£1,152 p/annum 
B. Lease 
Amount oflease based on purchase value £13,100 (excl. VAT) £15,100 (incl. VAT) and at com-
pletion of lease period equipment may be purchased for a token amount, or returned to seller. 
(i) 5-year lease at £26 per thousand per month; £ 
(excl. VAT) per month 341 
per annum 4,087 
(incl. V AT) per month 392 
per annum 4, 711 
(ii) 3-year lease at £37 per thousand per month; 
(excl. VAT) per month 
per annum 
(incl. V AT) per month 
per annum 
(iii) maintenance as for A. Purchase 
(iv) training as for A. Purchase 
C. Budget comparison (for 2 word processors) excl. VAT 
Budget Purchase 3-year year lease 
£ £ 
1986 13,140 11,632 
1,152 2,304 
200 400 
14,492 14,336 
1987 13,140 11,632 
2,304 2,304 
200 
15,644 13,936 
1988 2,304 13,936 
1989 2,304 2,304 
1990 2,304 2,304 
Totals 37,048 46,816 
162 
5-year 
lease 
£ 
8,174 
2,304 
400 
10,878 
8,174 
2,304 
10,478 
10,478 
10,478 
10,478 
52 790 
485 
5,816 
559 
6,704 
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APPENDIX VI 
Long-term maintenance and modernisation programme - London ofl!ce 1 
I 
1. On 11th May 1983, the Secretary-General 
circulated document B (83) 8 setting out an 
updated programme of future maintenance and 
modernisation plans. 
2. The programme has again been updated 
and is attached. 
3. This document will be on the agenda of 
the next meeting of the Budget and Organisation 
Committee. 
A. MainteiUlnce of the building 
1. Delegations are reminded that the building 
is leased, on behalf of WEU, by the British 
Government. The lease has a duration of 42 
years and expires in 1998. The annual rental 
was fixed for the whole term at £10,500 per 
annum. That is equivalent to £0.74 per square 
foot per annum. Similar properties in the same 
area today command at least £15 per square foot 
per annum and leases nowadays provide for peri-
odic rent reviews. 
As is customary in the United Kingdom, 
the lease makes the tenant responsible for all 
maintenance. That work is carried out by the 
British Government's Department of the Envi-
ronment which is reimbursed by WEU. 
2. The lease calls for the periodic redecora-
tion of the building, both inside (about seven 
years) and outside (every three years), with the 
full internal cleaning of walls and paintwork 
within the seven year interval. Outside brick 
and stonework has also to be cleaned and reno-
vated according to the landlord's requirements 
but not more than once every ten years. Other 
work is carried out as and when necessary, as 
determined by the surveyors and engineers of the 
Department of the Environment. 
3. In response to a request for details of work 
to be carried out in the 1985 financial year, the 
Department of the Environment has submitted 
the following estimate: 
(a) Stone cleaning front 
facade from 1st floor 
to roof ............ . 
This is a lease commit-
ment and must be 
done. 
I. Document B (84) 10, 15th August 1984. 
£34,500 
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(b) Major roof rep:;tirs 
(new felt, battens jlnd 
slates) .......... 1 •.• 
This is in a very poor 
state of repair. 
(c) Gents toilet in base-
ment (eradicate daJ!np) 
Toil et is in a very uoor 
state of repair and-lwill 
soon be unfit tol be 
used. 
(d) Repairs to parapetland 
pointing to brickwork 
on rear elevation -
including scaffoldipg 
Parapet will soon ~e in 
a dangerous state., 
(e) Day-to-day mai!nte-
nance .......... 1 ... . 
(f) For work to be earned 
out to meet the 1 fire 
officer's recommenda-
tions ........... 1 •••• 
ThTAL 
£55,200 
£25,000 
£34,500 
£34,500 
£31,000 
£214,700 
The comments accompanying the above 
estimates are those of the 
1 
Department of the 
~nvironment's official respqnsible for this build-
mg. 
4. Actual maintenance expenditure over 
recent years has been as fo1lows: 
1981 - £41,017 
1982 - £93,375 
1983 - £64,834 
I 
1984 - £87,000 (estimate) 
5. Aware that member I governments would 
not wish to see, in 1985, ~n increase of almost 
150% for this expenditure, tp.e Department ofthe 
Environment was asked to rxamine the possibil-
ity of reducing its estimate. In reply it was sug-
gested that items (b), (c) and (d) could now be 
postponed until 1986 but tl:llat the amount under 
(e) be increased by £10,000 to cover interim 
remedial work that may be ~equired as a result of 
the postponement. This ~roposal would not be 
wholly satisfactory in term~ of reaching an even 
spread of the costs and, fot that reason, the Sec-
retary-General suggests the following alloca-
tions: 
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1985 budget 
(a) Stone cleaning 
(c) Gents toilet in base-
ment .............. . 
(for the most urgent 
work) 
(e) Day-to-day mainte-
nance with extra pro-
vision for remedial 
work (parapet) ..... . 
(f) One-third of the cost 
of the fire precautions 
work (to be spread 
over three years) .... 
TOTAL 
1986 budget 
(b) Roof repairs 
(c) Gents toilet - balance 
of work if required .. 
(d) Repairs to parapet/ 
brickwork ......... . 
(e) Day-to-day mainte-
nance ............. . 
(f) One-third of fire pre-
cautions work 
TOTAL 
£34,500 
£15,000 
£44,500 
£10,350 
£104,350 
(+ 20 %) 
£55,200 
£10,000 
£34,500 
£34,500 
£10,350 
£144,550 
These figures for 1986 will, obviously, be subject 
to confirmation during 1985. 
6. Finally, it is noted that the fire precautions 
work mentioned above was originally foreseen in 
the period 1980 to 1982. It was not then carried 
out because of objections raised by the owners of 
the building. Their approval is still outstanding 
but the Department of the Environment now 
seems reasonably confident that it will be given. 
1984 1985 1986 
Furniture 645 725 725 
Carpets/lino 1,525 1,320 1,320 
Net curtains 645 725 725 
Heavy curtains - 1,320 1,320 
Total 2 815 4090 4,090 
APPENDIX VI 
Note: 
Routine maintenance 
This involves regular inspections and serv-
icing by technical staff of: 
(i) central-heating boiler/hot water sys-
tem; 
(ii) lift installation; 
(iii) electrical system including replace-
ment of lamps; 
(iv) plumbing installations. 
Annual estimates 
The approved estimate for routine mainte-
nance in 1984 amounted to £27,500. It is not 
possible to break down this estimate to establish 
the cost of the various types of maintenance 
because the Department of the Environment is 
unable to provide such details (see B (80) 6, page 
2, paragraph A.2). 
B. Office furniture and equipment 
Suggested programme for renewals (at estimated 
1985 prices) 
Carpets, furniture, etc. 
1987 
725 
(a) All worn carpets will continue to be 
renewed in annual allotments. Lino 
will also be renewed as required. 
(b) As was stated in B (80) 6, all furniture 
would be repaired or, where essential, 
replaced in annual allotments until 
completion in 1983. Thereafter only 
incidental maintenance would be 
required. 
(c) The remplacement of net curtains has 
begun three years later than was fore-
seen in 1980 and will span the years 
1984-1986. 
(d) Heavy curtains: rear side of building 
full curtains to be replaced by side cur-
tains, where necessary. 
£sterling 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
725 725 725 725 725 
1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 
- - - - - -
1,320 - - - - -
3,365 2,045 2,045 2 045 2 045 2,045 
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Office machines 
Office machines are expected to have a 
working life of ten years. Earlier replacement 
may, however, be necessary occasionally. When 
1984 1985 1986 
Typewriters - - -
Reproduction equip-
ment - - -
Tape recorders - - -
Microphone system 1,900 - -
Desk top calculators - - -
Dictating machine - - -
Word processors - - -
Totals 1,900 - -
Notes: 
1. Prices for 1985 and beyond are based on 
those anticipated in 1985 and will, of course, be 
subject to adjustment at the appropriate time. 
2. The typewriter replacement programme 
refers to the machines used by secretaries and 
typists ( 18 including 3 for special work and one 
reserve). 
3. The typewritter modernisation 
programme was completed in 1983 and all oper-
165 
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I 
the typewriter renewal prograptme recommences 
in 1988, it will be preceded by a study ofthe new 
generation of electronic machines now being 
introduced. The more sophisticated of these 
include word-processing funqtions. 
£sterling 
1987 1988 1989 199q 1991 1992 
- 1,200 1,200 1,20b 1,200 1,200 
I 
- - - - - -
600 600 600 60b f- -
- - - -I - -
180 180 -
- I - -
- - - - - 350 
- - -
- I 
- -
780 1,980 1,800 1,8do 1,200 1,550 
ational typewriters are now 1electric typewriters. 
4. In 1983 an off-set prlnting machine was 
purchased and put into bperation. Back-up 
equipment, either another 1similar machine or 
more sophisticated photocopying equipment, 
may be required if the volume of work continues 
at the level experienced in the first half of 
1984. In any event, it will ~e necessary to make 
temporary arrangements in this respect for the 
second half of 1984 and the beginning of 1985. 
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Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1985 and 1986 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1985 1985 revised 1986 1985 1985 revised 1986 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff 1,296,910 1,290,674 1,549,357 34,936,550 32,504,750 34,723,600 
11. Travel 39,750 47,960 54,620 724,900 724,900 690,000 
Ill. Other operating costs 212,600 268,330 251,890 1,875,880 1,892,580 2,160,700 
IV. Purchase of furni-
ture and equipment 2,720 9,720 5,215 96,400 96,400 65,000 
V. Buildings - - - 70,000 424,500 70,000 
Total expenditure 1,551,980 1,616,684 1,861,082 37,703,730 35,643,130 37,709,300 
Receipts 530,460 497,125 612,485 12,927,600 12,061,900 12,608,100 
Net total 1,021,520 1,119,559 1,248,597 24,776,130 23,581,230 25,101,200 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and allowances 137,890 170,060 225,930 6,358,600 6,737,200 5,787,500 
Pension receipts 48,200 47,950 57,285 1,080,600 1,014,300 1,037,000 
Net total 89,690 122,110 168,645 5,278,000 5,722,900 4,750,500 
NET GRAND TOTAL 
(A + B) 1,111,210 1,241,669 1,417,242 30,054,130 29,304,130 29,851,700 
1985 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff 1,296,910 
II. Travel 39,750 
Ill. Other operating 
costs 212,600 
IV. Purchase of fur-
niture and equip-
ment 2,720 
V. Buildings -
Total expenditure 1,551,980 
Receipts 530,460 
Net total 1,021,520 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and, allowan-
ces 137,890 
-~ 
P~nsiQns r~ceiQ~ts 48,200 
-
Net total 89,690 
NET GRAND TOTAL 1,111,210 
(A + B) 
Differences 1986/ 
1985 
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Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs 
for 1985 (revised) and 1986 compared with previous budgets 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1985 revised % 1986 % 1985 1985 revised % 1986 (+ or -) (+ or -) (+ or -) (+ or-) 
-6,236 + 258,683 34,936,550 -2,431,800 + 2,218,850 
+ 8,210 + 6,660 724,900 - -34,900 
+ 55,730 - 16,440 1,875,880 + 16,700 + 268,120 
+ 7,000 -4,505 96,400 - - 31,000 
- - 70,000 + 354,500 -354,500 
+ 64,704 4.17 + 244,398 15.11 37,703,730 + 2,060,600 -5.46 + 2,066,170 
-33,335 + 115,360 12,927,600 -865,700 + 546,200 
+ 98,039 9.59 + 129,038 11.52 24,776,130 - 1,194,900 -0.48 + 1,519,970 
+ 32,170 23.33 + 55,870 32.85 6,358,600 + 378,600 5.95 - 949,700 
-250 + 9,335 1,080,600 -66,300 + 22,700 
~-
-
-
--
-
-
--
+ 32,420 36.14 + 46,535 38.10 5,278,000 444,900 8.43 -972,400 
+ 130,459 11.74 + 175,573 14.14 30,054,130 -750,000 -2.49 + 547,570 
-
..... 
- -
........ 
27.54% -0.67% 
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Grades 
H. G. 
A 
L 
B 
c 
APPENDIX IX 
Comparison between the staff of the ministerial organs of WEU 
in 1985 and 1986 
Secretariat-General Paris agencies 
1985 1986 Variation 1985 1986 
3 2 - 1 2 3 
8 11 +3 26 20 
4 5 + 1 6 4 
22 23 + 1 29 29 
11 10 - 1 17 17 
48 51 +3 80 73 
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Variation 
+ 1 
-6 
-2 
-
-
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APPENDIX X 
APPENDIX X 
Reform of present methods of approving the Assembly's budget 1 
The Assembly, 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
tabled by Dame Florence Horsbrugh 
and several of her colleagues 
DOCUMENT 1054 
Anxious to respect both the ultimate financial responsibility vested in the C~uncil, and the dig-
nity of a parliamentary Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
I 
1. That it transfer the exercise of its annual examination of the draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, for a trial period of two 
years, on the condition that the total expenditure does not exceed the budget for the financial year 1960. 
2. That, in the event of circumstances necessitating an increase in this expenditure, the prior permis-
sion of the Council be sought at a joint meeting. 1 
Signed: Dame Florence Horsbrugh, MM. Altmaier, Russe/1, Duynstee, Lucifero, M me Reh/ing, 
MM. Linden, de la Val/ee Poussin, Cadorna, Pisani, Taylor 
I. Document 155, 30th November 1959. 
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APPENDIX XI 
Procedure for approving Assembly budgets 
adopted by the Council on 24th February 1960 
and approved by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly 
on 18th March 1960 
APPENDIX XI 
(i) The Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration produces a draft budget 1; 
(ii) this draft, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, is sent to the Council for an opinion 2; 
(iii) the Council gives its opinion, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing 
amendments; 
(iv) in the latter case, if the Council's amendments are not acceptable and the matter cannot be settled 
by correspondence, they are discussed at a joint meeting; 
(v) the draft budget, as eventually agreed, then continues through the Assembly's normal procedure; 
(vi) the budget, as then approved by the Assembly (during the second part of the annual session), goes 
back to the Council and, if it has not been further amended by the Assembly, the Council can for-
mally approve it without further discussion. 
1. In accordance with Article VIII of the Charter of the Assembly, the draft budget is prepared by the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration "in consultation" with the Presidential Committee. Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assem-
bly and Article 2 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly provide that this draft budget is prepared by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration "in collaboration" with the Presidential Committee. 
2. The draft budget is considered first by the Budget and Organisation Committee at a meeting with the representative of the 
Office of the Clerk ofthe Assembly. The Council then gives its opinion on the basis of recommendations made by that commit-
tee. 
170 
APPENDIX XII DOCUMENT 1054 
APPENDIX XII 
Extracts from Assembly Recommendations 240, 250 and 34() 
and replies of the Council I 
I. Extract from Recommendation 240 adopted by the Assembly on 20th Novrmber 1973 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
2. (b) the provision of dual grades at every level of employment. 
Extract from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 240, communicatfd to the Assembly on 
29th April 1974 
2. (b) Discussions between co-ordinated organisations have shown that idtplementation of the 
Assembly's recommendation for the provision of dual grades, at every level of employment, 
would create very serious difficulties for the organisations. It is recognised! however, that WEU 
has a special problem in this respect because promotion prospects are more ~imited for reasons of 
structure and numbers. · 
The Secretary-General has put a numbers of proposals to the Counc'l concerning B-grade 
~ff ' 
11. Extract from Recommendation 250 adopted by the Assembly on 19th JunJ 1974 
The Assembly, 
Ill. 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
11. In the framework of WEU: 
5. Give urgent consideration to dual grades at every level in order to offset p!l'omotion difficulties. 
! 
Extract from the reply ofthe Council to Recommendation 250, communicated to the Assembly on 
28th October 1974 
5. While recognising that the position of WEU staff gives rise to certain special problems as 
regards promotion prospects, the Council feel unable to act upon the Assef1bly's recommenda-
tion for the introduction of a general system of dual grading at every level. They consider that 
individual special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connec-
tion. 1 
I 
Extract from Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly on 4th Decejber 1979 
The Assembly, 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy 
and in particular: 
- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy; 
Extract from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 340, communicated to the Assembly on 
14th May 1980 
3. (a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the prob-
lems are still under consideration at the administrative level. 
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APPENDIX XIII 
Recommendation 357 on improving the status of WEU staff 
and reply of the Council 
RECOMMENDATION 357 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff2 
The Assembly, 
DOCUMENT 1054 
Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated 
organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisationls still remain unre-
~~ . 
Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340; 
Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommendation 
and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters, ' 
REQUESTS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. 1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desirabil-
ity of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on from the 
joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals; 
2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pebsions in the light of 
experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-ordinated 
organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations; 
3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may ~ave come to on the 
problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue their 
studies and to report without avoidable delay; 
4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee of 
Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration ofthese meetings, the subjects ~iscussed and the pos-
itive decisions which resulted; 
II. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice_ of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades 
arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others. I 
i 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (I Oth Sit-
ting). I 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 862)_ 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 357 
I.l. The Council recognise that the setting-up of an independent international body for the adminis-
tration of pensions for the co-ordinated organisations could be desirable in the long term. 
However, the joint pensions administrative section, set up and organised as a result of the 149th 
report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, is a purely consultative body 
which only started its operational work on 1st January 1980. In accordance with the aim which led to 
its establishment, namely uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme, valuable experience 
is being gained, the scope of its work expanded and new fields of co-operation and exchange explored 
under the initiative, guidance and supervision of the co-ordinated organisations. 
The Council consider it preferable that during this formative phase, the existing organisational 
structure should be maintained. However, they are following developments closely so as to be able to 
judge, together with the other co-ordinated organisations, if and when they should study arrangements 
for modifying the existing structure of the joint pensions administrative section. 
2. As already explained in the reply to Recommendation 340, the creation of a single appeals board 
to deal with matters concerning pensions depends on the developments referred to in paragraph 1 
above. But as things stand at present, namely decisions on the implementation of the pension scheme 
being taken by the Secretary-General of each co-ordinated organisation, the appeals board of each 
organisation should retain its full responsibility, particularly in the matter of pensions. 
This being so, and in keeping with the concern expressed by the Assembly, every effort has been 
made to avoid divergent decisions being taken by appeals boards with respect to similar 
cases. Accordingly, the CAPOC* is generally consulted before the confirmation of any decision that 
might give rise to an appeal and the boards inform each other of their decisions, always providing rea-
sons in full. 
3. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of tangible progress made with the matters raised 
under point 3 of Recommendation 340, which are still under discussion between the various co-ordina-
ted organisations. 
4. Details of the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held in 
1980 are provided in Chapter VI of the twenty-sixth annual report. 
II. Notices about staff vacancies are being exchanged with other organisations whenever vacancies 
cannot be filled by promotion from within the organisation concerned. 
* The Administrative Committee on Pensions of the Co-ordinated Organisations (CAPOC) was set up by the Standing Com-
mittee of Secretaries-General on 11th September 1974 in implementation of Article 52 of thle pension scheme rules. The 
CAPOC is assisted in its work by the staff of the joint pensions administrative section. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1981. 
174 
APPENDIX XIV 
APPENDIX XIV 
Recommendation 426 on the budget of the ministerial organJ 
The Assembly, 
of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 1 
and reply of the Council 
RECOMMENDATION 426 1 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial years 1984 and 1985 2 
DOCUMENT 1054 
I 
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VII (c) of the Charter; i 
(ii) Having taken note of the contents; 
(iii) Considering that: 
(a) the new structure ofthe ministerial organs ofWestern European Union depends essentially on 
the tasks devolving upon them in the framework ofthe institutional refopn announced in the 
Rome declaration of 27th October 1984; 
(b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union foi 1984 and 1985 are 
merely a renewal of the budget for 1983; 1 
(c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost+effectiveness basis; 
(d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criteria~ of zero growth was 
applied; 
I 
(e) since .198.4 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated 
orgamsatwns, I 
I 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view td specifying that this 
criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets; 
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each fategory of expendi-
ture instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget; 
I 
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the 
Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject; i 
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibilHy of a single seat for 
the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies w~ich at present have 
offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision 
on this matter. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (lOth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee o~ Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 1031 ). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 426 
1. The strict application of the zero growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their 
national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute. In principle, this objective 
applies to the overall total of the budget. As far as pension costs are concerned, it is recognised that these 
will continue to increase until the pension scheme has been in operation long enough for the levelling-
off stage to be reached. It is also recognised that, by the very nature of the scheme and its impact on 
the relatively small budget ofWEU, erratic variations in expenditure from year to year will result. The 
Council will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating expenditure. 
2. While the zero growth target is applied to a total budget, it is, of course, appreciated that some 
expenditure items may attract increases that exceed that target. In such circumstances, it is customary 
and necessary to exercise restraint in other areas of expenditure so that the overall objective may be 
attained. These principles have long been recognised and applied in the case of the budgets of Western 
European Union. 
3. Improvements in the status of staff remain the subject of a continuing study in the framework of 
co-ordination. Difficulties requiring reappraisal and causing delays can and do arise. This and other 
matters of concern to staff remain an important preoccupation of the Co-ordinating Committee. 
4. The Council has taken note of point 4 of the Assembly's recommendation. The question of 
establishing a single seat should in any case be examined in the light of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such an option. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th March 1986. 
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Recommendation 429 on WEU and the strategic defence initiatire-
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
RECOMMENDATION 429 1 
on WEU and the strategic defence initiative 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 2 
The Assembly, 
DOCUMENT 1054 
(i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to 
make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the ahiance, disarmament 
and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Tr9aty; 
(ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to .achieve this end; 
(iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framclwork to achieve this 
end; 1 
(iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration1 Bonn communique 
and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness 
with which these intentions are transformed into decisions; 
1 
(v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation; 
I 
(vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the 
Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people ; 
(vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council givtjs the Assembly, but 
hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communique, the Council will 
increasingly inform the press of its activities; 
(viii) Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer 
institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs ofWEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will 
be prepared separately, I 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the 
Assembly; 
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic ~onsequences of the 
development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the
1 
answers of member 
countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative; 
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of defence questions and 
the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, by giving them, insofar as p~ssible, all the neces-
sary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their respective tasks; 
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disarm-
ament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned; 
i 
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security: 
(a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appro-
priate means; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1034). 1 
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(b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of 
training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the 
seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public 
opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of 
security problems; 
6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its 
overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations; 
7. Pursue its efforts to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the 
continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees 
of the Assembly; 
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the 
European Community in a joint security policy. 
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Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1982 
(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1982-1986) 
1982 
Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget 
total for ratio 
pensions (%) 
£ £ 
Secretariat-
General 
················· 
1,113,957 104,880 9.41 
F F 
Standing 
Armaments 
Committee .............. 7,969,630 1,199,500 15.58 
Agency for 
the Control of 
Armaments .............. 16,461,940 2,803,100 17.02 
Office of 
the Clerk ................ 12,282,000 126,000 1.03 
1982 
Pensions SG ACA SAC D of( 
Retirement 
····················· 
7 18 13 2 
Survivors' ...................... I 9 3 I 
Orphans' ....................... - Jl - I 
Invalidity 
······················ 
I - - -
Totals 
······················· 
9 28 16 4 
~-
-Total- - - -f- --- ~~- -~ --
establishment 2 ............... 45 51 
SG = Secretariat General. 
ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
SAC = Standing Armaments Committee. 
ASQ = Agencies for Security Questions. 
0 of C = Office of the Clerk. 
27 
l. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension. 
2. Excluding hors cadre officials. 
26 
1983 1984 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget Budget priations budget Budget 
total for ratio total for ratio total 
pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ £ £ 
1,028,515 67,830 6.59 1,069,190 65,265 6.10 1,111,210 
F F F F F 
7,313,890 1,131,450 15.47 8,839,380 1,206,130 13.65 9,314,690 
14,910,050 2,004,500 13.44 19,126,150 3,106,300 16.24 20,739,440 
13,893,000 240,000 1.73 14,762,200 677,000 4.58 15,470,900 
(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1982-1986) 
1983 1984 
Total SG ACA SAC b of( Total SG ACA SAC D ofC Total SG 
40 7 20 14 3 44 7 23 13 2 45 9 
14 I 9 3 I 14 2 9 4 I 16 3 
2 - I - I 2 3 I - - 4 3 
I I - - - I I - - I 2 I 
57 9 30 17 5 61 13 33 17 4 67 16 
-
-
-
-
~- - - -
-
~- - ~-
149 45 51 27 27 !50 45 51 27 26 149 45 
1985 
Appro- Pension/ 
priations budget Budget 
for ratio total 
pensions (%) 
£ £ 
89,960 8.07 1,417,242 
F F 
1,282,100 13.76 
29,851,700 
3,995,900 19.27 
' 683,500 4.42 116,809,900 
1985 
ACA SAC 0 ofC Total SG 
23 13 2 47 11 
9 4 I 17 4 
I - - 4 4 
- - I 2 I 
33 17 4 70 20 
-
-
- ~ 
-
51 27 26 149 49 
1986 
Appro- Pension/ 
priations budget 
for ratio 
pensions (%) 
£ 
168,645 11.90 
F 
4,750,500 15.91 
928,000 5.52 
1986 
ASQ 0 ofC Total 
38 4 53 
13 I 18 
I - 5 
- I 2 
52 6 78 
1-
70 26 145 
>< 
< 
....... 
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Draft Recommendation 
on scientific, technological and aerospace questions 
and Western European defence 
The Assembly, 1 
DOCUMENT 105 5 
(i) Aware that by the 1990s information technology might become the largest manufacturing activity 
in the West; 
(ii) Considering that Western Europe's industrial success in this technology will probably depend on 
the promotion of a European civil and military computer market; 
(iii) Aware of the report on the armaments sector of industry in the member co~tries prepared by the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council's answer on 20th March f986 to Written Ques-
tion 262 put by Mr. Lenzer on the activities of that committee complementary to those of the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group; 
(iv) Disappointed by the Council's answer on the lack of practical steps to be I taken to enhance the 
competitiveness of the European defence industry in general and of information technology in particu-
lar; 
(v) Considering Europe's important role in space and its activities in space trJnsportation, satellites 
and scientific matters such as the Giotto programme; 
(vi) Considering that the importance of this role demands a strong European etfurt as well as effective 
co-operation with the United States; 
(vii) Considering the need for co-operation between NASA and Arianespace bn worldwide launch 
price policies; 
(viii) Considering that the agency for the development of co-operation in arm,ments should play a 
well-defined intermediary role in co-operation on weapons development projects such as the European 
fighter aircraft; 
(ix) Deploring the Council's lack of political will in not preparing its thirty-first annual report on its 
activities which cannot now be taken into account in preparing the present rep9rt, 
I 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Instruct Agency Ill, i.e. the agency for the development of co-operation in ~rmaments, to initiate 
studies on: 
(a) the establishment of an integrated Western European civil and militaf computer market; 
(b) the possibilities of creating networks of supercomputers in Europe for c~vil as well as military 
purposes; I 
2. Define, in co-operative weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft, a 
useful co-ordinating role for the agency for the development of co-operation in ar~aments, with particu-
lar regard to European military industrial matters, taking into account the activities of the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Independent European Programme Group; 
3. Provide the Assembly with full details of this role in the thirty-second anlnua1 report. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. More than ever, your Rapporteur is con-
vinced of the need to reverse Western Europe's 
economic decline and that high technology 
industrial developments are a must for survival 
in the twenty-first century. It is most important 
for W estem European high technology industries 
to prepare themselves here and now in order to 
gain a worldwide technological lead. Europe's 
shrinking share of the global population- proba-
bly 5% by the year 2010 - and the competition 
and industrial growth of developing countries, 
especially in South-East Asia, will force Europe 
to seize every opportunity to remain a leading 
economic and political force in the world. 
2. In its reply to Recommendation 419 
appended to your Rapporteur's first report on 
the military use of computers, the Council stated 
that European computer technology had reached 
a high level and that it realised that the military 
use of computers was but one aspect of the wide-
ranging application of advanced computer 
technology. Your Rapporteur agrees that exam-
ination of the military use of computers cannot 
therefore be separated from the civilian applica-
tions. 
3. However, Europe's annual trade deficit on 
large mainframe computers alone is $10 billion 
and by 1990 the present balance in the telecom-
munications trade is expected to sink to a $16 
billion deficit. Europe's share of the world mar-
ket in these products tells the same story even 
more convincingly. Europe's industry for 
instance now has 6% ofthe world market for tele-
communications equipment compared with 
Japan's 12% and America's 39%. 
4. In semiconductors, European producers 
have recently tried to make a comeback but their 
present share of the world market is only 8.5% 
which is two-thirds of the 1979 figure. 
5. In its abovementioned reply, the Council 
mentions efforts to make the computer systems 
of Western European countries interoperable, in 
certain conditions, in line with military 
requirements. As in many other areas, the pre-
requisite for this is the early harmonisation of 
national operational requirements by the author-
ities concerned. 
6. Your Rapporteur doubts whether this will 
be sufficient. The protectionism inherent in 
government procurement systems of the various 
European countries has fragmented European 
industry at a time when market logic should 
have been pushing it into cross-frontier 
partnerships. Only European groupings will be 
able to afford the scale of investment that the 
technological revolution is demanding. 
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7. If there is to be European co-operation, 
governments must promote cross-frontier 
links. The EEC Commission is now promoting 
an information technology research effort called 
Esprit and Siemens and Philips, for instance, will 
spend some $1.5 billion to produce microchips 
jointly in an attempt to capture part of the world 
market. 
8. In March 1986, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) loaned Philips (Netherlands) the 
equivalent of 4 70 million francs to finance a vast 
investment programme aimed at mastering 
submicronic technology, i.e. the technology that 
will be used to produce the next generation of 
integrated circuits (megachip programme). The 
first type of product of this generation will be a 
static memory with semiconductors with a stor-
age capacity of 1 megabit (1 million bits) per 
chip. The megachip programme is the fruit of 
combined efforts by Philips and Siemens. 
9. One of the main aims of the European 
Investment Bank is to encourage the develop-
ment of modem technology in order to improve 
Europe's competitivity. The megachip 
programme is of crucial importance in this 
connection. By developing the mega-memory 
chip, Philips and Siemens intend to enhance 
their position on the international chip 
market. Europe's share of the world semicon-
ductor industry fell from 13.9% in 1979 to 8.5% 
in 1984. Phihps will present prototypes of the 1 
megabit static memory in 1988 and start large-
scale production in 1989 at the latest. Philips 
and Siemens are each investing 30,000 million 
francs in the megachip programme. 
10. If a common market for high technology 
hardware is not established soon, costs in 
Europe's protected national markets will rise 
sharply. For instance, per capita spending on 
telecommunications in Europe is now one-third 
of the level in the United States. In this market 
protectionism is costing Europe's PTTs $20 bil-
lion in lost revenues. 
11. If the technology gap with Japan and 
America is ever closed, the battle will have been 
won by Europe's highly-developed research insti-
tutes and university laboratories, but if the battle 
is lost, responsibility will rest with Europe's 
short-sighted policy makers. 
12. The forecasts are that by 1990 information 
technology will have become the largest manu-
facturing activity of all. In the EEC, a recent 
forecast presented Europe's existing 4 million 
high technology-related jobs as being the key to 
60 million jobs in the long term. This might 
come about if Europe makes up for lost time in 
manufacturing its own computers and telecom-
munications equipment and promotes the use of 
microelectronics regardless of the country of ori-
gin. 
13. Here the ministries of defence could play a 
very important role by promoting a single Euro-
pean market for military computers and particu-
larly supercomputers which would give impetus 
to the civil market as well. Interoperability 
alone would not be sufficient to attain this goal. 
II. European co-operative efforts 
in high technology 
14. The balkanisation of Europe's computer 
industry has caused an appalling waste of 
resources and many parliamentarians in national 
parliaments, in the EEC and in the Council of 
Europe have pressed for a new, more active and 
more united technological policy. This could 
certainly be established as Europe has the neces-
sary resources, brains and basic structures. 
15. In his first report, your Rapporteur men-
tioned the European strategic programme for 
research and development in information tech-
nology (Esprit) which covers most areas of infor-
mation technology such as microelectronics, 
software engineering, computer integrated manu-
facturing and communication logistics. 
16. The first phase of the programme was to 
examine whether it was possible to overcome 
earlier lack of confidence and see whether former 
competitors could work together. During a 
five-year period a total of 1.5 billion ECUs will 
be spent by industry and the Community 
together to achieve a competitive position on the 
world market. Twelve important European 
electronics industries will try to collaborate and 
overcome nationalistic ambitions. Intercompany 
agreements have been concluded on standards 
for the use of UNIX 5 as a compatible operating 
system for their products. Siemens, Bull and 
ICL have established joint research and develop-
ment facilities in Munich. 
1 7. It is yet too early to indicate whether 
Esprit will be a success. However, after the first 
enthusiasm, difficulties have emerged mainly 
because of political trading of a budgetary nature 
in the EEC. 
18. European industries should realise that the 
leading United States computer companies - not 
IBM - have also begun a major effort to develop 
standards that will allow computers made by dif-
ferent manufacturers to share information. If 
this succeeds it will have major ramifications for 
the computer industry and its users. The lack 
of standards has frustrated computer users for 
many years and General Motors, for instance, 
has developed its own standards for connecting 
computers, machine tools, robots and other elec-
tronic gear in their factories. 
19. Following the start of Esprit in February 
1984, the EEC Council adopted, in July 1985,. a 
programme for research and development m 
advanced communications technologies for 
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Europe (Race). Its main 1aim was to promote 
competition in the European telecommunica-
tions industry and to make available new tele-
communications services. I The programme will 
be implemented in the same way as Esprit. 
20. Although these COIJ1munity programmes 
are important, the amount lof money involved is 
relatively small and the unanimity rule for bud-
getary matters remains a 1ajor obstacle. 
21. In the introduction to the first part of his 
report, your Rapporteur aljready mentioned the 
Eureka project, although h~ was not able to say 
much about it since it was first proposed only in 
April 1985. For the ~ment the Eureka 
programme has secured m inly political support 
from some eighteen Eur pean governments. 
Your Rapporteur believes lhat the governments 
committed to participating I in Eureka should act 
more quickly and establish I European-wide stan-
dards for new technologies, ~rovide financing for 
Eureka projects and estab~ish an authority to 
define these projects accumtely. On the other 
hand, private industry shofld participate in the 
financing of such projects. 
22. At the Hanover conference on 5th and 6th 
November 1985, ten res~arch projects were 
established in fourteen c6untries costing the 
equivalent of some $312 million. 
23. For the list of Eurekal projects endorsed in 
Hanover, your Rapporteur refers to the 
appendix. Dozens of COIIllpanies and research 
institutes are involved inl such questions as 
microcomputers, lasers, water filtration, 
optoelectronics, robots, etc.f but in spite of this 
Eureka still remains vague pending far stronger 
commitments than have been entered into so 
far. A point of political djsagreement between 
the participating countries •s whether the Com-
mission of the EEC should play a modest or a 
leading role in direcpng the Eureka 
programme. · 
24. Whatever the outcomF of this conflict, t~e 
most important effort to b~ made should be m 
stimulating a European comeback in electronics 
and information technolpgy. This implies 
European projects in !microelectronics, 
optoelectronics, artificial intelligence, computer 
integration and manufacturitg high performance 
supercomputers. Compute manufacturing and 
artificial intelligence especi lly will be the key 
technologies for the years t~ come. 
25. So far, the Americans and Japanese have 
used intensively the results of European univer-
sity research, but Europe it~elf seems unable to 
apply this research and de'[elopment for mass-
produced products and conquer large markets, 
nor has it been able to stell). the brain drain. 
26. It is all very well to put great emphasis on 
a strong technological base, ~ut one cannot disre-
gard the need for a completely free internal Euro-
pean market. Your Rapporteur agrees that it is 
extremely difficult to sw~ep away national 
bureaucratic hindrances andl override more than 
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300 rules and regulations which now block parts 
of the European internal market. 
27. As your Rapporteur wrote in paragraph 13 
of his first report, it should be realised that an 
open and unified market will cause a consider-
able upheaval among certain European electron-
ics companies. But this does not mean that 
only large concerns will be able to succeed in the 
computer business. Many small enterprises in 
Europe as well as in the United States have 
proved to be both dynamic and capable in turn-
ing to new technology. 
28. The construction of supercomputers 
which forms a fast and growing market should 
also be stimulated in the coming years and a net-
work of this type of computer set up in Europe. 
29. Your Rapporteur mentions these Euro-
pean developments as they are also important 
for the development of military computers. 
Nevertheless, he would stress that Esprit, Race 
and Eureka are for civil purposes. The Eureka 
charter as adopted in Hanover on 5th November 
1985 states as one of its objectives that Eureka 
projects will serve civilian purposes only and will 
be directed to the private and public sector mar-
kets. 
30. Although enough public money is avail-
able for the Eureka project as it now exists, more 
ambitious projects will need substantial addi-
tional financing. 
31. A question which arises in this connection 
is whether the participation of European compa-
nies, universities and individual scientists in the 
development of SDI will have a strong, a moder-
ate or little influence on Eureka. To answer this 
question, one has to know how individual coun-
tries will react to the American President's SDI 
proposal. 
32. The United Kingdom has signed a memo-
randum of understanding and discussions 
between the German and the United States Gov-
ernments led to agreement in April 1986. Italy 
will make a preliminary approach similar to the 
one the Federal Republic of Germany negotiated 
in Washington. 
33. In the last six months, the argument in 
most European governments has centred not on 
whether to encourage their companies to take 
part in this research programme but rather on 
how best to do so. Countries like the Nether-
lands, Canada and France already allow their 
national companies to take part in the 
~rogramme but have refused official participa-
tiOn and government-to-government agree-
ments. 
34. The strategic defence initiative is 
extremely important to the subject under discus-
sion, namely military computers, because com-
puters more than space segments will be relevant 
for ·the success or failure of the SDI. 
35. At the end of January, the Eureka Council 
of the eighteen participating countries met again 
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in London and agreed to fourteen new projects 
for a total sum of$500 million. These fourteen 
new projects will be added to the twenty-four 
Eureka projects adopted at the Hanover meet-
ing. 
36. The latest projects include research into 
the use of laser techniques searching for faults in 
end-products. 
37. Other projects are concerned with elec-
tronic circuits, computers with artificial intelli-
gence, production of new types of chips and 
mobile robots. Environmental and medical 
research and development are also covered. 
Ill. Space aspects 
38. 1986 will be one of the most crucial years 
for European space activities as the long-term 
space programmes approved at the ministerial 
meeting held in Rome in January 1985 have to 
be acted upon this year. 
39. The main decisions to be taken concern 
the configuration ofthe Ariane 5launcher, Euro-
pean participation in NASA's international space 
station, particularly definition of the Columbus 
module specifications, and last but not least the 
immediate impact of the loss of the Challenger 
shuttle on European space programmes. 
40. At its meeting on 27th February 1986, the 
committee was addressed on Ariane develop-
ments by Arianespace's deputy manager. Your 
Rapporteur does not want to go into great detail 
but would point out that in the years to come 
Arianespace will be able to offer its civil custom-
ers a family of launchers fully adapted to their 
satellites. The three different types of Ariane 
launchers now being used are all derived from 
Ariane 1 with the addition of a number of boost-
ers in accordance with the size of the satellites 
and the number of satellites to be launched. 
41. According to the European Space Agency 
programme adopted in 1981, Ariane 4 is now 
under development. ESA's objective is to have 
Ariane 4 operational in 1986. Six variants of 
the Ariane 4 version are available for single or 
dual payload configuration launching of satellites 
with a weight of between 1,900 and 4,200 kg. 
42. A key element of Europe's future space 
planning is the Ariane 5 heavy-lift launcher 
which will provide a payload lift capability equal 
to that of the American space shuttle. Ariane 5 
is designed mainly for launching commercial sat-
ellites but it will also be capable of orbiting the 
proposed Hermes spacecraft. 
43. The Hermes manned space plane has been 
promoted by France as part of the long-term 
European space package deal, in addition to 
Ariane 5 and Europe's participation in the NASA 
space station. Ariane 5 can therefore launch 
unmanned satellite payloads and also the 
Hermes manned space vehicle. 
44. Ariane officials are of the opinion that for 
the orbiting of telecommunications, observation 
and scientific payloads a manned launcher is not 
needed. However, to serve the space station, 
manned missions might be essential. 
45. The next generation space vehicle might 
be the Hotol (horizontal take-off and landing) 
vehicle which the British Government and 
industry (British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce) are 
planning to produce for the early years of the 
next century. The concept evaluation will last 
two years, starting in the second half of 
1986. The Hermes and Hotol vehicles are con-
sidered to be complementary although they 
might compete for the same funding within the 
framework of the European Space Agency. 
46. Europe's role in the space station will also 
be defined in 1986. The module known as 
Columbus proposed by the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy will have to be 
defined. This module would be attached to the 
station but be so designed as to be capable of 
free-flying missions of short duration. Since 
Spacelab and its imbrication in the bay of the 
shuttle, the European Space Agency felt that the 
module should not be dependent exclusively on 
the NASA space station programme but should 
be used independently too. 
47. The loss of the shuttle Challenger on 28th 
January 1986 has brought to the fore the ques-
tion of whether expendable launchers such as the 
Thor-Delta or the Atlas-Centaur should be built 
again for commercial, military and scientific 
uses. 
48. NASA's space transportation system has 
to be kept moving and, if the shuttle is to be 
grounded for up to a year or more, production 
lines of expendable launchers will have to be 
reopened. 
49. Some Thor-Delta and Atlas-Centaur 
launchers are available for military communica-
tions and other satellites. Once these have been 
used, by April 1987 new production lines will 
have to be built which may well take up to two 
years according to General Dynamics and 
McDonnell Douglas spokesmen. 
50. If shuttle launches are started again in a 
few months' time, ESA and NASA will have to 
come to an agreement on price policies for 
launching satellites, especially since the dollar 
has lost much of its value. 
51. In a letter to the NASA Administrator, the 
Director General of ESA, Dr. Liist, has already 
expressed his concern at the low rate of NASA 
charges for commercial satellite payload custom-
ers. 
52. Pricing policy discussions have to take 
place at a high level as the risk of repercussions 
for American-European co-operation in space 
should be avoided. 
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IV. Co-operative weapons development projects 
53. Further to the reporlt by Mr. Wilkinson 
(Document 1037) on the European fighter air-
craft for the nineties, your Rapporteur wishes to 
inform the Assembly thati the fighter aircraft 
project is not progressing as expected. 
54. During a meeting in Rome on 13th and 
14th March 1986, represe~tatives of the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany 
failed to agree on design leadership, financing 
and production. The mai~ source of disagree-
ment is again the weight (j)f the aircraft. The 
United Kingdom wants a plane with a greater 
air-to-ground capability an'!ia longer range which 
would require more equip~ent, thus adding to 
the weight. The Federal Republic wishes to 
remain within the 9.75 toq range, whereas the 
United Kingdom is preparec,t to accept up to 12.5 
tons. ' 
55. Apart from the disa~ement over weight, 
other problems are France's request to join in 
this project nevertheless nd also to discuss 
transport planes, traii~ers and weapon 
systems. Discussions between defence officials 
will be continued at a meetilng of defence minis-
ters in Madrid at the end of April 1986. 
56. Also at issue is a pro~osal by the United 
States Secretary of Defence, 'Mr. Weinberger, for 
transatlantic co-operation in building the new 
American fighter aircraft. 
1
This aircraft would 
largely fulfil the same role as the European 
fighter aircraft for the nineties. 
57. A lighter combat aircraft might be devel-
oped in parallel with the European fighter air-
craft by France and the four European nations 
that operate the General DEamics F-16 - Bel-
gium, Denmark, the etherlands and 
Norway. The French Das ault-Breguet Rafale 
demonstrator aircraft could be used as a baseline 
for the five-nation light Cfmbat aircraft pro-
Ject. 
58. The new aircraft woul<il be a more sophisti-
cated follow-up to the F-16. I It would also meet 
the requirements of the French air force and 
navy and would be adapted for ground attack 
and air superiority roles. I 
59. Here again, the representatives of the 
countries concerned hope that the new aircraft 
will have as much compon~nt commonality as 
possible with the larger aircraft. Commonality 
would reduce development costs and increase 
interoperability. 
60. The American Departtbent of Defence and 
NASA have taken steps to develop an aerospace 
plane, a potential successor to the space 
shuttle. This plane is destiped to fly at super-
sonic speeds; for instance, it is expected to be 
able to link New York and Tokyo in two 
hours. It would be able to py above the atmo-
sphere in low earth orbit. · 
61. The first contracts awarded by the Depart-
ment of Defence and NA~A are worth some 
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$300 to $400 million. This will cover acceler-
ated research into propulsion systems, high per-
formance materials and other technology 
required for the aerospace plane. 
62. Feasibility studies will take some three or 
four years. It will have scramjet (supersonic 
combustion ramjet) engines which have been 
undergoing tests in the NASA research centres 
for many years. They will use hydrogen not 
hydrocarbon fuel. Nuclear energy might also be 
used for propulsion in space. 
63. The aerospace planes will be part of the 
space station programme which aims to establish 
human settlements on the moon by 201 7 and on 
Mars by 2027. Other vehicles to be developed 
are advanced rocket vehicles. The main deci-
sions for the total programme will have to be 
taken by 1992. 
64. Other co-operative programmes cover the 
development of helicopters. France and Ger-
many are co-operating to build a new attack heli-
copter and Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are working on a medium-sized mili-
tary transport helicopter. Here again the differ-
ent partners are trying to increase the 
commonality of the various versions of the heli-
copter as the lack of commonality causes exces-
sive development costs. 
65. The United Kingdom and the United 
States are starting joint research and develop-
ment on a follow-up plane for the Harrier which 
is a short take-off and landing aircraft used by 
the British and American navies. 
66. Another fighter aircraft study is being con-
sidered by Northrop of the United States and 
Dornier of Germany as well as by McDonnell 
Douglas and MBB. These two studies might 
lead to tactical fighter aircraft for the German 
and American air forces. 
67. One of the difficulties of collaboration 
with the United States is its concern about tech-
nology transfer. The United States believes that 
the Soviet Union has made and is making a 
large-scale effort to obtain military technology 
developed in the West and providing American 
technology to European allies might increase the 
possibility of the Soviets gaining access to it. 
68. The main disagreement among the allies is 
over dual-use technology. The Europeans 
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would like to be able to use some of this techno-
logy for civilian purposes to produce items for 
the open market. The United States prefers not 
to put such technology to civilian uses. The 
European countries however rely heavily on 
international commerce and communication to 
keep pace with progress and there is a strong feel-
ing that censorship could severely hamper their 
scientific and industrial development and there-
fore weaken the alliance. 
69. One of the main reasons for American pre-
ponderance in technology transfer is the United 
States spending on research and development. 
The United States Government spends about 
$40 billion on military research and develop-
ment, whereas the main European countries, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
which account for more than 90% of all research 
and development in Europe, spend only about $8 
billion yearly. 
70. The Europeans should increase their mili-
tary research and development budget and 
reduce useless duplication of effort. 
71. Europeans are in a serious political 
dilemma ; on the one hand they want to 
strengthen the alliance and the European contri-
bution to it, which means that intra-European 
defence co-operation should be promoted, and 
on the other hand not to co-operate with the 
United States might be harmful. 
72. Apart from aerospace collaborative pro-
jects, your Rapporteur wishes to mention the 
next generation of air defence systems which 
would include new airborne radar installations, 
guided munition programmes, friend-or-foe 
identification equipment, communications sys-
tems, new computer language and the next gene-
ration of air defence missiles, with particular 
regard to command and control systems, which 
will require co-operative efforts at component 
level if not for the whole of the programmes. 
73. Mention should al!i.O be made of the devel-
opment of new types of destroyers and frigates 
and of new tanks. 
74. Finally, your Rapporteur recalls that our 
thinking must take account of the proposal by 
the German Defence Minister, Mr. Manfred 
W orner, which might lead to a European strate-
gic defence initiative. 
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APPENDIX 
Eureka projects endorsed in Hanover 
1. Creating a European standard for personal 
and educational microcomputers: United King-
dom, France and Italy are partners to this 
project. Turkey seems interested. 
2. Compact vector computers for high-speed 
calculations: partners are France and 
Norway. Italy is interested. 
3. Manufacture of amorphous silicon for 
solar powered cells: partners are France and Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. 
4. Robotic lasers for fabric cutting: partners 
are France and Portugal. Spain and Turkey 
seem interested. 
5. Membrane microfilters: France and Den-
mark are partners. The Netherlands is inter-
ested. 
6. High-powered lasers: partners: Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, United 
Kingdom. Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Bel-
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gium, Greece and the Netherlands are inter-
ested. 1 
7. EUROTRAC (Study o~ the transport and 
transformation ofpollutants in the troposphere): 
partners: Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, the European 
Communities. Italy, Swede}> Denmark, Switz-
erland and Turkey are inter~ted. 
8. European Research *etwork: partners: 
Federal Republic of Germany Austria, the Euro-
pean Communities, Finland, france, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Switzerlanf. Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Sp,ain and Turkey are 
interested. 
! 
9. Diagnostic kit for sex~ally transmissible 
diseases: partners: Spain and the United King-
dom. 
10. Flexible manufacturing based on seeing-
robots system: partner~: France and 
Italy. Switzerland seems int~rested. 
i 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions 
and Western European defence 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Fourre 
3rd June 1986 
1. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
" Considering that the importance of this role demands an independent European effort within 
the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires 
effective co-operation with the United States;". 
2. Leave out paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"the establishment of a European civil and military computer market". 
I. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendments agreed to). 
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Signed: Fourre 
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Amendments 3 and 4 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions 
and Western European defence 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Gansel 
2rd June 1986 
3. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add la new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament 
exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even. those which support 
international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards itilproved defence co-
operation; " I 
4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Elaborate joint criteria for armament export policies of member countrie~, with preference in 
the field of defence co-operation, ensuring that no weapons or defence equigment be exported to 
non-member countries when this would be against the security interests of the alliance; " 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendment 3 agreed to; amendment 4 withdrawn). 
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and public interest in WEU matters 
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by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The general situation in member parliaments 
(i) Mention of WEU in parliamentary speeches 
(ii) Governmental reports to parliament on WEU 
Ill. Activities of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
(i) Action taken on recommendations adopted by the Assembly of WEU 
(ii) Information meetings in member parliaments 
IV. The situation regarding relations with the public and public opinion 
V. Activities of the ministerial organs in improving public information 
VI. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Questions and answers in national parliaments 
11. Information meeting held in the German Bundestag, Bonn - Thursday, 20th 
February 1986 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Dame Ji/1 Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca (Alternate: Mrs. Francese), Enders (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere, De Bondt (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas), Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Goerens (Alternate: Linster), Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Terlezki), MM. Noerens, Senes, Stojfelen, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra 
(Alternate: Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers). 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Resolution 
on the promotion of parliamentary and 
public interest in WEU matters 
. I DOCUMENT 1056 
(i) Considering the increasing urgency of giving tangible shape to efforts to impr<)ve parliamentary 
and public awareness of the Assembly's role and contribution to the creation of a European security 
dimension; i 
(ii) Convinced that, in addition to relations with parliaments and the press, c~ntacts with non-
governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies and other institutipns with political 
influence on public opinion are important for promoting public interest in WEU matters; 
(iii) Welcoming the public information activities already conducted by the Presidehl ofthe Assembly, 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and individual representati'fjs of the Assembly 
as well as by the Secretary-General of WEU; 
(iv) Regretting, however, that the Assembly is still lacking the minimum technic~~ requirements for 
public information which exist in most member parliaments such as telexes or computer-controlled doc-
umentation systems; 
(v) Convinced that no great success can be expected in improving public relations ,if the Assembly has 
to continue working under present financial and technical conditions, 
INVITES member parliaments to impress upon the governments of the WEU st~tes the urgency of 
allocating to the Assembly the financial resources needed for the effective pursuit of tts public relations 
activities; 
ENCOURAGES its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to pursue i1s action for bring-
ing the work of the Assembly to the attention of parliaments, the public and the press in member coun-
tries including the organisation of special hearings in member parliaments. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Since its responsibilities were extended, 
the committee has to report on its activities and 
action taken in parliaments and also on its 
efforts to elaborate proposals for improving pub-
lic awareness ofthe work of the Assembly. The 
report will therefore be divi~ed into. two. ma~n 
sections: the first dealing w1th the s1tuat10n m 
parliaments, the second with problems regarding 
public opinion. 
2. The subject of the present report was origi-
nally chosen in conjunction w_ith th~ previous 
report on parliaments, pubhc opmwn and 
defence which covered more general aspects of 
the duties ofWEU parliamentarians vis-a-vis the 
public. The purpose of the present report was 
initially to elaborate concrete proposals for the 
Assembly's public relations policy, but in view of 
the Assembly's critical financial situation, partic-
ularly where public relations are concerned, 
many necessary proposals and suggestions will 
remain somewhat theoretical. 
3. The WEU Council is responsible for 
informing the public about its o~n 
activities. The Assembly should keep a contm-
uing watch over its activities iJ?- th~s regar~, par-
ticularly because such informatwn 1s very Impor-
tant and cannot be communicated by the 
Assembly. After the interesting briefin~ of the 
Committee on Parliamentary and Pubhc Rela-
tions by the Secretary-General in London on 5th 
November 1985, the committee wishes to be 
kept informed of the future public relati~ns 
activities of the Secretariat-General and·the mm-
isterial organs. Consequently, a section of this 
report will be devoted to putting questions on 
these matters. 
II. The general situation 
in member parliaments 
(i) Mention of WEU 
in parliamentary speeches 
4. In the previous report it was suggested 
inter alia that, apart from putting questions to 
their governments, every member should _ma~e 
an effort to mention Western European U m on m 
speeches at plenary sessio~s of n!ltional 
parliaments. It seems that th1s suggestwn has 
been followed up in several member parliaments 
during the last half year. 
5. In Luxembourg, a general debate on for-
eign policy was held in the Chamber of Deputies 
on 5th and 6th March 1986 in which Mr. Hengel 
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underlined the firm determination to reactivate 
WEU, but its structures and financial means had 
to be revised. In the same debate, Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges advocated new initiatives 
under the Luxembourg presidency of the WEU 
Council. She said that the reactivation ofWEU 
should not lead to a weakening of NATO. 
6. In a debate in the Belgian Senate on 1Oth 
December 1985, Mr. Pecriaux made a long 
speech in which he strongly advocated usiJ?-g 
Western European Union as a real European pil-
lar of the Atlantic Alliance. With reference to 
the December session of the Assembly, he asked 
what attitude would the government adopt 
towards Belgium's participation in the SDI 
research what stage had been reached in 
harmonising the views of member states in 
WEU, what was the position vis-a-v~s the Eureka 
project, the enlargement of WEU w1th the acces-
sion of Portugal and Spain and what progress 
had been made with the European fighter aircraft 
programme. In a debate in the Belgian Cham-
ber of Representatives on 11th December 1985 
on the results of the European Council meeting 
on 2nd and 3rd December, the relationship 
between European political co-operation and 
WEU and NATO was discussed in speeches by 
Mr. Van Wambeke and Mr. Tindemans, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs. 
7. In the Netherlands, Western European 
Union was prominent in debates in the Second 
Chamber on 9th and 18th December 1985 and 
22nd January 1986. On 9th December, Mr. van 
der Spek discussed problems of co-ordination 
between the new agencies of WEU and the 
IEPG. On 18th December, Mr. Engwirda 
referred to critical comments by Mr. Caro, Presi-
dent of the WEU Assembly, during the session 
last December with regard to the activities of the 
Council and asked if the government would 
comment on the fact that revitalisation of WEU 
in practice did not mean very much. This pro-
vided an opportunity for Mr. de Ruiter, Minister 
of Defence, to make a longer statement on sev-
eral aspects ofWEU's activities and on the Neth-
erlands role in its reactivation. 
8. Still in the Netherlands, in a debate on 
22nd January 1986, MM. Frinking, Blaauw and 
Schutte asked questions about co-ordination 
problems between the different. ~EU and NA !0 
institutions and European pohtlcal co-operatwn 
and the role of French nuclear power, which 
were answered by Mr. van den Broek, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. de Ruiter, Minister 
of Defence. On the problem of avoiding dupli-
cation of work between WEU and the IEPG, Mr. 
de Ruiter said that WEU should concentrate its 
attention and its work on studies and general 
political stimulation with a view to achieving 
effective co-operation, whereas the IEPG is more 
directly concerned with practical co-operation 
and the implementation of programmes. On 
the working group created last year in the IEPG 
composed of independent experts, he said that 
this working group was to submit proposals for 
improving the competitiveness of the European 
armaments industry. Mr. de Ruiter said that 
IEPG had insisted explicitly on independent 
experts, whereas in WEU deliberations were 
being pursued only at the level of governmental 
representatives. The use of independent experts 
had the advantage of minimising direct national 
influences. Progress might thus be easier. Ar-
rangements had been made for avoiding duplica-
tion of work between the IEPG and the WEU 
agency whose activities should be complemen-
tary. 
9. In the French National Assembly, at a 
meeting on 22nd October 1985 of the Defence 
and Armed Forces Committee on the 1986 
defence budget, Mr. Pignion put a question on 
the absence of appropriations for Western Euro-
pean Union in the defence budget, in spite of the 
recent reactivation of that organisation, an oper-
ation which had not been carried fully into 
effect. Mr. Quiles, Minister of Defence, said 
inter alia that WEU, whose importance should 
not be underestimated, "cannot be the start of a 
European defence community". On 6th 
November 1985, in the debate on the budget for 
1986, Mr. Koehl in a lengthy speech on the prob-
lems of European defence paid tribute to the 
increasing role of WEU in armaments co-
operation. In a further debate in the National 
Assembly on 8th November 1985, Mr. Lagorce 
underlined the importance of WEU for giving 
political impetus to European security and paid 
special tribute to the role of its Assembly. In 
the same debate, Mr. Pignion emphasised the 
need for WEU to be granted sufficient funds for 
its activities, which was not the case at present; 
he also stressed the importance of the WEU 
Assembly and reported on the visits of its 
Defence Committee to the French forces in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and to the Dis-
armament Conference in Geneva. He also 
asked how co-ordination was ensured between 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence in 
WEU matters and requested more information 
about the recent activities of the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG). 
10. In the United Kingdom House of Lords, a 
debate on the address concerning foreign affairs, 
overseas aid and defence was held on 7th 
November 1985. Lord Mayhew made a state-
ment in which, without mentioning WEU explic-
itly, he strongly supported the idea of basing the 
alliance on two pillars, which called for greater 
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to ensure its security and whether WEU would 
be the appropriate organisational framework for 
this. In that debate, Mr. Mollemann, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs, emphasised that 
questions of strategy had to be discussed by the 
alliance as a whole. Modifications of the politi-
cal and strategic security concept could be 
decided only by the whole alliance. It was 
important to harmonise specific European 
aspects previously in WEU. This was also true 
for the relevant aspects of the SDI programme. 
15. From Italy the Rapporteur has no specific 
information regarding action or speeches related 
to WEU matters in plenary sessions of parlia-
ment during the last half year. 
(ii) Governmental reports to parliament on WEU 
16. Another suggestion made in the previous 
report was that member governments should be 
requested to report regularly to parliament on 
WEU matters and their activities there. On 
26th February 1986, Mr. Murphy put two writ-
ten questions in the House of Commons, one on 
a government report to parliament on WEU 
Assembly sessions and one on a government 
statement to parliament on the work of 
WEU. The answer to the first question was 
negative, but it is worth quoting the second ques-
tion because the answer was partly positive: 
" Mr. Murphy asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if 
he will arrange for a government statement 
on the work of Western European Union 
to be presented to parliament annually. " 
Mr. Eggar, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, answered: 
" The annual reports of the Council of 
Western European Union to the Assembly 
(on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December of each year) 
are published. Copies are placed in the 
library of the House. However, I would 
be happy to adopt the suggestion of my 
hon. friend and would propose to make 
such a statement after the autumn minis-
terial meeting of Western European 
Union." 
17. The initiative taken by Mr. Murphy is 
most welcome and it is recommended that mem-
bers in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands put similar pressure on their 
respective governments. (In Germany, the Fed-
eral Government issues a written half-yearly 
report to parliament on WEU matters.) 
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Ill. Activities of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations 
(i) Action taken on recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly of WEU 
18. The Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations continued its traditional duties, 
selecting from the texts adopted by the Assembly 
those which, in its opinion, should be debated in 
the parliaments. From recommendations 
adopted during the second part ofthe thirty-first 
ordinary session in December 1985 the commit-
tee selected: 
- 425 on disarmament; 
- 428 on WEU and the strategic defence 
initiative (defence aspects); 
- 429 on WEU and the strategic defence 
initiative - the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance; 
- 430 on WEU and the strategic defence 
initiative - guidelines drawn from the 
colloquy on the space challenge for 
Europe (proposals). 
19. These texts were transmitted as usual with 
a letter from the President ofthe Assembly dated 
5th December 1985 to the presidents of member 
parliaments expressing the hope that they would 
be of interest and provide subject matter for 
speeches or questions to ministers. 
20. The Office of the Clerk has so far no spe-
cific information on whether these texts have 
been used for questions or speeches in 
parliament. However, on 9th December 1985, 
when Mr. Heseltine, then Secretary of State for 
Defence, made a statement in the House of Com-
mons on British participation in the United 
States strategic defence initiative research 
programme and announced that agreement had 
been reached with the United States in the form 
of a confidential memorandum of understanding 
on an information exchange programme, Sir 
John Osborn took the opportunity to ask the Sec-
retary of State for Defence whether he was aware 
that this was a major subject of debate in West-
ern European Union and that before then it was 
a concern of the WEU Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions as well 
as industrialists throughout Europe. He asked 
inter alia whether the government was able to 
share with America the application of any 
results, if positive, and to what extent will that 
fall within the orbit of Western European Union 
or even NATO. In his answer, Mr. Heseltine, 
Secretary of State for Defence, said that this was 
a bilateral agreement between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Therefore it did not 
fall within WEU or the NATO alliance arrange-
ments. 
21. Since all the subjects treated in the 
abovementioned recommendations remain topi-
cal (disarmament and SDI), it is strongly recom-
mended that all members use these reports for 
parliamentary action and questions in their 
home countries. The Rapporteur is pleased to 
note that several questions have been put in par-
liaments on Recommendations 416, 41 7, 419, 
420, 421 and 423. 
22. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Masciadri put 
several questions on various recommendations. 
In January 1985, he put a question on Recom-
mendation 414 on United States-European 
co-operation in advanced technology and on 
Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union 
and the Atlantic Alliance. Both questions were 
answered by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, on 27th June 1985, but the texts 
of the replies reached the Office of the Clerk only 
in February 1986. On 22nd October 1985, Mr. 
Masciadri put questions on Recommendations 
417 on East-West relations ten years after the 
Helsinki final act, 419 on the military use of 
computers - reply to the thirtieth annual report 
of the Council, and 423 on the state of European 
security - the central region. So far, only the 
answer of the Minister of Defence to the last 
question has been communicated. On 16th 
January 1986, Mr. Masciadri put a question on 
Recommendation 426 on the budget of the min-
isterial organs of WEU for the financial years 
1984 and 1985. The answer of the Italian Gov-
ernment is not yet known. The full texts of the 
documents mentioned in this paragraph are 
reproduced at Appendix I. 
23. On 15th October 1985, several Italian sen-
ators joined in tabling two motions on WEU, 
one concerning the study by WEU countries of 
the possibility of setting up military intervention 
units under integrated command and of estab-
lishing a European agency responsible for indus-
trial policy in defence matters and one concern-
ing the location of the three new WEU agencies 
for security questions in Italy. 
24. On 13th December 1985, Mr. Enders put 
two questions in the Bundestag on Recommen-
dations 420 and 421 which were answered by 
Mr. Mollemann, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. On 5th November 1985, Mr. Hengel 
put a question on Recommendation 421 in the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies which was 
answered by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The full texts are reproduced at Appen-
dix I. 
25. Special action was taken by Mr. Coleman 
in the House of Commons on 6th February 1986 
when he put eight questions on Western Euro-
pean Union to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs. These questions 
concerned: 
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- the United King om posttlon on 
Portugal's applicat~ n for membership 
and the enlargemen of WEU (Recom-
mendations 420 an 429); 
- possible Spanish rit mbership of WEU 
(Recommendation 29); 
- the WEU Public A ministration Com-
mittee; 
- the measures taken I by the government 
to improve public information about 
the Western Europran Union Council 
and about the oth~r organs of WEU, 
and what measures are currently being 
taken by WEU in thts direction (Recom-
mendation 429); 
- the budgetary impl~ations of the mea-
sures which have peen taken, and of 
those which are' being taken, to 
reinvigorate West~J.1n European Union 
(Recommendation 426); 
- the new agencies e~tablished by WEU 
(Recommendation: ~29); and 
- the new posts cEated within the 
Secretariat-General and other organs of 
Western European nion. 
26. From the different I answers given by 
Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
texts of which are given: ~t Appendix I, the 
answer on public information is of special 
interest. Mr. Eggar said: 
" The government mJintain contact with 
representatives of the media, academic 
life, and members of1parliament to inform 
them about the activi~ies of the WEU and 
its Council. Minist~s regularly address 
the six-monthly ses ions of the WEU 
Assembly in Paris. s part of the process 
of reorganising WEU institutions, a new 
post has been created ~n the WEU secretar-
iat in London with responsibility for pub-
lic relations and infO!fmation. The gov-
ernment support this I initiative and other 
publicity activities of.the WEU. " 
It appears from his answer Ion 7th March 1986 
that the new A.4 post for public relations created 
in the Secretariat-General ,as still vacant. 
27. One can only congratulate Mr. Coleman 
for his initiative which coveted some of the most 
topical problems of WEU'~ reinvigoration and 
reorganisation. This examr.le is worth follow-
ing in other parliaments. he Rapporteur will 
revert to some of the sub ects treated in Mr. 
Coleman's questions in th chapter on public 
relations. · 
I 
28. Sometimes questions are useful in order to 
allow governments to clarif~ the areas of respon-
195 . 
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sibility of different European organisations. 
Asked by Mr. Taittinger on 16th May 1985 
whether the European Economic Community is 
considering a joint response to the American SDI 
initiative, Mr. Dumas, Minister for External 
Relations, answered on 6th February 1986: 
" The European Economic Community 
has no responsibility for security and 
defence matters. It is consequently not 
the appropriate framework for the possible 
co-ordination of national policies in this 
area. Conversely, the seven member 
states of Western European Union 
decided, at the ministerial meeting in 
Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, to 
consider together matters raised by the 
American invitation to take part in the 
SDI programme. This brought out com-
mon elements of analysis which, at their 
last meeting in Rome on 14th November 
1985, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
asked to be examined in greater detail. " 
(ii) Information meetings in member parliaments 
29. After holding such meetings in the French 
Senate (17th April 1985) and in the Italian Sen-
ate (11th June 1985), the committee organised an 
information meeting in the German Bundestag 
in Bonn on 20th February 1986. The commit-
tee wishes to repeat its gratitude to the President 
of the Bundestag and the German Delegation for 
inviting the committee, and particularly Mr. 
Enders, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, for 
organising the programme on 19th February in 
the representations of the Under Nordrhein-
W estfalen and Hessen. 
30. The information meeting began as usual 
with short briefings by committee members in 
order to guide the discussion. First, Mr. 
Murphy spoke about the duties of the renewed 
Western European Union and its importance for 
the parliamentary and public debate on security 
and defence issues. Second, Mrs. van der W erf-
Terpstra gave information about the Assembly of 
Western European Union and, finally, Mr. 
Goerens spoke about relations between WEU, 
NATO and other Western European 
organisations and countries. The texts of the 
speeches are given at Appendix 11. 
31. After these briefings an interesting discus-
sion was held on the basis of prepared questions. 
Answering a question put by Mr. Goerens on 
how best to co-ordinate and share tasks between 
the European and Atlantic bodies in security 
matters, Mr. Abelein, Vice-President of the 
North Atlantic Assembly and member of the 
WEU Assembly, stressed that the European posi-
tion played an increased role in the discussions 
of the North Atlantic Assembly. After the 
reactivation of WEU, it was important to estab-
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lish close relations between the two 
assemblies. The activities should be 
co-ordinated and the secretariats should 
co-operate. Mr. Abelein also advocated estab-
lishing close contacts between members of the 
North Atlantic and WEU Assemblies. 
32. Answering a question put by Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra on the role of the Bundestag Com-
mittee on European Affairs, Mrs. Hellwig, Chair-
man of that committee, believed it would be 
advisable to create similar parliamentary institu-
tions in each national parliament of Western 
Europe. The committee had consultative status 
but did not have the competence of regular par-
liamentary committees. Its motions were to be 
presented to the competent committees which 
would transform them into recommendations. 
At present, the Committee on European Affairs 
did not debate security questions but Mrs. 
Hellwig did not exclude this for the future. 
33. Referring to questions put by Dame Jill 
Knight, Chairman of the committee, and Dr. 
Miller, Mr. Gansel said that the written reports 
about the sessions of the North Atlantic Assem-
bly and of the WEU Assembly were issued rather 
late. Requests had therefore been made for 
these reports to be sent out earlier. Very few 
Germans were aware of the historical and politi-
cal background of the presence of allied troops in 
Germany and of Germany's membership of 
WEU and NATO. Sometimes there were diffi-
culties with allied troops who had their own 
regulations. There was close co-operation with 
the French forces stationed in Germany, but the 
non-integration of these forces in NATO posed a 
major problem. Reactivation of WEU should 
not lead to Franco-German domination. 
34. Referring to a question put by Dame Jill 
Knight, Chairman of the committee, Mr. Borcier 
pointed out that for 1986 the amount available 
to the Assembly for public information was 
F 300,000 in comparison with some F 7,000,000 
in the information budget of the Council of 
Europe. 
35. Mr. von Kageneck, a German journalist, 
was interested in information on the Assembly's 
activities in disarmament matters. Dame Jill 
Knight, Chairman of the committee, explained 
that the Assembly regularly examined the prob-
lems of arms control and disarmament which 
was one of the main preoccupations of its 
Defence Committee. On the basis of that com-
mittee's reports, the Assembly regularly adopted 
important recommendations on these matters 
and they were transmitted to the Council in 
London. She particularly referred to Recom-
mendation 425 on disarmament adopted by the 
Assembly on 2nd December 1985. 
36. In an address during the luncheon she 
gave in honour of the committee at the end of 
the visit to Bonn, Mrs. Renger, Vice-President of 
the German Bundestag, paid tribute to the com-
mittee's efforts in visiting the member parlia-
ments in order to enhance the knowledge and 
interest of parliamentarians with regard to the 
importance of WEU's reactivation. Recognising 
the difficulties of achieving this aim for various 
reasons, particularly because of the many domes-
tic preoccupations of parliamentarians, she 
encouraged the committee to continue its 
work. Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the com-
mittee, expressed the committee's warm grati-
tude to the German Bundestag for this 
invitation. She was satisfied that the informa-
tion meeting was a very interesting event with a 
useful and instructive exchange of views. In the 
early afternoon, the committee followed the ple-
nary session of the Bundestag from the diplo-
matic tribune. Its presence there was officially 
announced by the presidency. 
37. The Rapporteur will refer again to the 
results of the three information meetings held so 
far in the conclusions of this report. But it can 
be recorded already that these meetings have 
been very instructive experiences and most use-
ful for the committee's future public relations 
activities. 
IV. The situation regarding relations with 
the public and public opinion 
38. According to amended Rule 42 bis, para-
graph 3(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
"shall make all necessary proposals with a view 
to bringing the work of the Assembly to the 
attention of the public and the press in member 
countries". On the other hand, in his address 
to the committee on 5th November 1985 in Lon-
don, the Secretary-General of WEU stated that 
in regard to means of stimulating public interest 
the situation was not very easy. Money was 
needed and it was not the right time for budget-
ary generosity. 
39. Consequently, at present only proposals or 
suggestions which may be implemented without 
major additional expenditure should be taken 
into consideration. In the previous report, for 
instance, it was suggested that members should 
seize every opportunity of taking part in public 
conferences and discussions on security ques-
tions where large audiences may be found. For 
financial reasons members should concentrate 
on local events. It would be most important to 
explain the role of the WEU Assembly on these 
occasions. The Office of the Clerk will always 
be ready to provide the representatives con-
cerned with necessary documentation. 
40. Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, con-
tinues to set a good example in this respect. For 
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instance, on 18th Novembe~ 1985 he took part in 
a debate on WEU and the J:>olitical aspects of 
European defence organised py the Cercle Mars 
et Mercure which was repirted by the local 
press. On 9th January 1986 he made the intro-
ductory speech at an intern tional colloquy on 
new technologies and defence in Europe 
organised in the French Senate in Paris by the 
Centre d'etude des prob!fmes strategiques 
(CEPS). 
41. In May 1985, the European Institute of 
Public Administration in Maastricht, Nether-
lands, organised a rou~d table on the 
reactivation of Western European Union - the 
effects on the European Oommunity and its 
institutions. The main contlributions were pub-
lished in working papers ofJhat institute. The 
preface was written by the ~ecretary-General of 
WEU and Mr. Caro, Presid~nt of the Assembly 
of WEU, contributed an atjticle on WEU and 
European security. It is worth noting that the 
institute regularly organist$ conferences and 
round tables on different subjects related to 
European co-operation and publishes a bulletin 
every two months. 
42. In the absence of a regular WEU informa-
tion review all forums should be used for pub-
lishing articles on WEU m~t~ers which are likely 
to be widely propagated. During the 1985 win-
ter session, a British journaHst was seconded to 
the United Kingdom Delegation of the Assembly 
of WEU in order to examine ways of improving 
the interest of newspapers I in reporting WEU 
matters. This journalist sbould be invited to 
the next information meeting in London to give 
the committee the benefit df his advice. 
I 
43. In Belgium, by privaie initiative, a quar-
terly information review wa~ started at the begin-
ning of 1986 to examine Euifopean defence with 
special attention to WEU chatters. In the first 
number of this publication ~ated 15th February 
1986, both Mr. Caro, Presicfunt of the Assembly, 
and the Secretary-General ~f WEU contributed 
articles on the reactivation lof WEU. 
44. The suggestion has been made to receive 
and inform more groups of hsitors at the seat of 
the Assembly, but the lim~ted financial means 
allow this to be done onlly occasionally. On 
12th March 1986, a groul\l from the Atlantic 
Association of Young Pqlitical Leaders was 
received at the seat of th~ Assembly in Paris 
where it was briefed on topical problems in the 
evolution of WEU. In mo~t cases, these groups 
are briefed by officials froPI the Office of the 
Clerk. It would be useful if representatives of 
the Assembly could partiqipate or handle these 
briefings themselves. Thi~ is difficult however 
outside periods of plenary *ssions or committee 
meetings. It is therefore !suggested that such 
groups be received either d4ring plenary sessions 
or on days when one of tllel political committees 
, I 
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meets in Paris. The chairman of a committee, a 
rapporteur or another suitable representative 
could then brief the group of visitors. 
45. The information report on parliamentary 
coverage of defence matters - keeping national 
parliaments informed about WEU - submitted 
on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments on 17th November 1981 by Mr. 
Berchem, Rapporteur (Document 896), con-
tained a list of regular Assembly publications 
designed to keep members of the Assembly 
informed about the activities of WEU. It is 
important that not only members of parliament 
but also the wider public be kept informed about 
WEU and particularly its Assembly. In this 
respect, it might be useful to draw up a list of 
those who regularly receive or request Assembly 
documents. This list would not cover the great 
number of journalists or international 
organisations, such as NATO, EEC, ESA, or 
national or European parliaments which all 
receive these documents regularly, but it would 
be interesting to know to what extent such infor-
mation is used by other people who have close 
contacts with the public. 
46. Among the WEU member countries, it has 
been ascertained that France is the country 
where Assembly documents are distributed in 
the greatest numbers. WEU Assembly publica-
tions are regularly sent to some 45 institutes in 
France, 16 in the United Kingdom, 15 in Ger-
many, 15 in Belgium, 13 in the Netherlands, 8 in 
Italy and 4 in Luxembourg. It is worth studying 
this in greater detail so as to be able to make a 
more accurate assessment. The following table 
shows the wide range of recipients in member 
countries. 
Regular receivers of WEU Assembly publications 
Belgium France Germany Italy Luxem- Netherlands United bourg Kingdom 
Research institutes 6 7 
Universities, 
post-graduate 
training institutes, 
libraries 5 16 
Industry 4 10 
Political parties 3 
Government public 
relation services 2 
Others 7 
Total 15 45 
47. It is gratifying that many international and 
national research institutes dealing with foreign 
and defence questions are kept regularly 
informed about the Assembly's activities. This 
might help to intensify contacts with such insti-
tutes which may have a considerable influence 
on politicians and the more educated 
public. Without claiming to be exhaustive, 
some important institutes in Europe should be 
kept in mind: 
(a) International institutes 
- International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London; 
- Institut Atlantique in Paris; 
- SIPRI in Stockholm; 
- NATO Defence College in Rome; 
- European Institute of Public Adminis-
tration in Maastricht; 
7 
4 
3 
1 
15 
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5 6 6 
2 2 6 8 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
8 4 13 16 
- Centre International de Formation 
Europeenne; 
- College d'Europe in Bruges. 
(b) National institutes 
Belgium: 
- Institut Royal des Relations 
Internationales in Brussels; 
- Institut Royal Superieur de Defense. 
France: 
- Institut Francais des Relations 
Internationales (IFRI) in Paris; 
- Institut des Hautes Etudes Europeennes 
in Strasbourg; 
- Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense 
Nationale; 
- Centre d'etude des problemes 
strategiques (CEPS) in Paris. 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
- Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik in 
Bonn; 
- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in 
Ebenhausen; 
- Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr in 
Hamburg; 
- Stiftung Europakolleg in Hamburg. 
Italy: 
- Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome; 
- Centra Alti Studi Militari in Rome; 
- Bertrand Russell research and training 
centre for international relations. 
Netherlands: 
- Netherlands institute for international 
relations " Clingendael "; 
- European research centre in The 
Hague. 
United Kingdom: 
- Royal Institute for International Affairs 
(Chatham House) in London; 
- Royal United Services Institutes for 
Defence Studies (RUSI) in London; 
- Royal College of Defence Studies in 
London. 
48. Of these institutes, only the European Ins-
titute of Public Administration in Maastricht, 
Chatham House, RUSI and the Clingendael do 
not regularly receive Assembly documents. It 
would be useful to encourage these institutes to 
ask for these documents. The Assembly should 
intensify relations with research institutes. It is 
important to know their yearly programme of 
work and representatives should be informed of 
dates and places of important conferences and 
colloquies. In recent years the Assembly itself 
has organised several very successful colloquies 
on armaments co-operation and aerospace ques-
tions. Another possibility might be to organise 
a wide-ranging political colloquy under the chair-
manship of the General Affairs Committee 
bringing together members of parliament, 
governments, political research institutes and 
journalists. 
49. To improve the organisation of further 
information meetings under the aegis of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions, the directors or other competent experts 
from the abovementioned institutes in member 
countries should be invited to attend and pro-
vide information about their activities with par-
ticular reference to WEU matters. 
50. It should not be forgotten that there are 
also important scientific institutes which should 
take a more regular interest in the Assembly's 
DOCUMENT 1056 
activities in scientific and echnological ques-
tions. There are for instan e institutes such as 
the International Institute fo Aerial Survey and 
Earth Sciences in Enscheqe and the Deutsche 
Forschungs- und Versuchsa stalt fur Luft- und 
Raumfahrt e.V. in Cologne hich have already 
participated in Assembly coli quies. So far they 
have not received Assembly information docu-
ments on a regular basis. 
51. The importance of ost-graduate study 
institutes and training inst tutes dealing with 
political matters also shoultl not be underestim-
ated. At present, for instan e, the Ecole Natio-
nale d'Administration (EN ) in Paris regularly 
receives Assembly documen s but this is not so 
for the German Verwalqmgshochschule in 
Speyer. l 
52. As for universities a libraries, the num-
ber of institutes requesting EU documentation 
varies considerably from untry to country. 
The best figure is to be n ted in France with 
sixteen institutions. In the other member coun-
tries the number is below ten for each coun-
try. In view of the many universities and libra-
ries throughout Western Eur$pe, these figures are 
not very impressive. 1 
53. It is interesting to no~e that in only two 
member countries, i.e. in Belgium and France, 
some major industries and commercial compa-
nies are regularly requestilllg Assembly docu-
ments. In France, they i*lude Aerospatiale, 
Breguet ~viation, Societe nfl i?n~le d'etude et de 
constructiOn de moteurs d'la 1at10n (SNECMA), 
CEA Marcel Dassault, Air F ance, Service Tech-
nique des Programmes Aer<lnautiques, Departe-
ment Helicopteres (STPA), Antenne construc-
tions aeronautiques (CEDOCAR), direction 
commerciale Thomson and, Lockheed Corpora-
tion International. In Bel~um there are Belgo-
space, Chief Marketing M LE, Texaco Europe 
and United Technologies ~ urope) Inc. 
54. Considering the impdrtance of industrial 
co-operation in armaments and high technology 
- the subject of many Assembly recommenda-
tions and colloquies - it w]uld be certainly an 
advantage if similar interest ould be encouraged 
in the other five member~ untries too. There 
is no doubt about the int rest of many more 
industries and technical ~search institutions 
considering the large number of companies that 
took part in colloquies organised by the Commit-
tees on Scientific, Technolqgical and Aerospace 
Questions and on Defence ~uestions and Arma-
ments. Rapporteurs are ten briefed by their 
representatives in prepariX Assembly reports. 
I 
55. The interest of political parties in recei-
ving Assembly documents directly from Paris 
seems moderate. Some party offices in four 
countries (France, Germaey, Luxembourg and 
the United Kingdom) recehte them directly. Of 
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course all political parties always have the possi-
bility of obtaining information through the dele-
gation secretariat. Nevertheless, it might be 
worth considering, in the political groups of the 
Assembly, whether the supply of documentation 
is satisfactory for all political parties in all mem-
ber countries. 
56. Although it is ensured that Assembly 
documents are available in all the appropriate 
ministries of member governments, it is surpri-
sing that at present governmental information 
and public relations services in only two mem-
ber countries (France and Germany) receive 
them directly from Paris, i.e. the German Presse-
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, the 
Service de !'information et des relations publi-
ques (French Ministry of the Interior) and the 
Service d'information et de relations publiques 
des armees. It has been an oft-repeated request 
that governments should do more about infor-
ming the public ofWEU matters. It is therefore 
essential for their information services to be pro-
vided with the necessary documentation inclu-
ding Assembly publications. 
57. With reference to information about 
Assembly activities in NATO member countries 
which are not members of WEU it is to be noted 
that in the United States some thirteen institu-
tions regularly receive Assembly documents, i.e. 
seven universities, three libraries and three 
research institutes. In Canada, Assembly docu-
ments are available in the parliamentary library 
of Ottawa. Among European NATO countries, 
Assembly documents are sent to the parliamen-
tary libraries of Denmark, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain (they are also available in the Oviedo Uni-
versity), but there are no recipients in Iceland, 
Norway or Turkey. 
58. In Ireland, Assembly documents are avai-
lable in the Direachtas Library in Dublin. Of 
the countries of the Council of Europe, only 
Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Malta do not regularly 
receive Assembly publications. Conversely, it 
is worth noting that the following countries show 
a regular interest in such documentation: Aus-
tria, India, Israel, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Yugoslavia. In recent years, 
requests have been transmitted by institutes in 
the GDR and the USSR. 
59. To complete the picture, it might be noted 
that the publications department of the Assem-
bly currently has contracts with sales agents in 
four countries. The sales agents are responsible 
for the distribution of all Assembly publications 
for sale in a given country. At present there is a 
contract with an agent in New York for sales in 
the United States and Canada. This agent has a 
selling capacity of about 75 volumes of the 
Assembly proceedings per year. In Europe, 
there are sales contracts with agents in France ( 1 
or 2 volumes), Germany (13 volumes) and Italy 
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(2 volumes). Former contracts with agents in 
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom have not been renewed. 
If possible, contracts should be established in all 
WEU member countries at least. 
V. Activities of the ministerial organs in 
improving public information 
60. In his address to the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on 5th November 
1985 and in his speech to the Assembly on 2nd 
December 1985, the Secretary-General of WEU 
stressed the importance of public information 
on WEU matters. It is to be welcomed that he 
is personally extremely active in this respect. 
Again, the relevant efforts of the Council, its 
ministerial organs and, last but not least, of the 
national governments cannot be without interest 
for the Assembly. 
61. This committee is not authorised to draw 
up recommendations for transmission to the 
Council, but it can ask questions and make sug-
gestions concerning the public relations activities 
of the ministerial organs since all proposals for 
bringing the work of the Assembly to the atten-
tion of the public and the press in member coun-
tries might be affected by the corresponding acti-
vities of the Council and its ministerial 
organs. If the Council does nothing, the subs-
tance of such proposals will be quite different 
from what might be appropriate if the Council 
shows some degree of activity. 
62. It is therefore crucial for the Assembly to 
be regularly informed about the public relations 
activities of the Council and its ministerial 
organs. In a letter to the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, the President of the Assembly has 
already said that the Assembly has not been 
informed of how the Council keeps the public 
informed of its work. The Assembly should ask 
for the annual report of the Council to contain a 
section on its public information activities. 
63. In his address to the Assembly, the Secre-
tary-General announced that the Secretariat-
General would henceforth have an information 
and public relations unit. Thanks to the ques-
tion put in the House of Commons by Mr. Cote-
man concerning new posts created within the 
Secretariat-General, we know through the Uni-
ted Kingdom Government's answer on 7th 
March 1986 that the A.4 post created for public 
relations in the Secretariat-General was still 
vacant. It would be interesting to know when 
this information unit will be ready to operate. 
64. In the Council's document entitled WEU 
and public awareness, approved in Bonn on 
22nd and 23rd April 1985, it was affirmed that 
"Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to 
further develop good and comprehensive rela-
tions with the press". After the Bonn meeting, a 
joint communique was issued, but after the 
Rome meeting on 14th November 1985 only a 
press conference was given by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council. 
65. With reference to the new agencies for 
security questions, it should be recalled that the 
document on the institutional reform of WEU 
attached to the Rome declaration of 27th Octo-
ber 1984 underlined that the restructuration of 
the agencies was guided by the intention "to have 
available a common basis of analysis which 
could form a useful point of reference for the 
work of both the Council and the Assembly and 
also for informing public opinion". In the 
abovementioned document on WEU and public 
awareness, the Council stressed, inter alia: "The 
Council may commission the Paris agencies of 
WEU to contribute to information activity in the 
following ways: ... preparing material specifically 
for public relation use; ... preparing material spe-
cifically for publication and dissemination to the 
press ... " What has been done so far in this res-
pect? 
66. Still with reference to the same document, 
what has been done by national governments in 
order to put across subjects related to the role of 
WEU in the context of European security? It 
was said that "other national information chan-
nels should also be used more effectively to gene-
rate greater public awareness of policies which 
the alliance and WEU members follow. The 
Permanent Council will be instructed to look at 
this problem periodically during its regular ses-
sions. When the Permanent Council considers 
it appropriate, such national information activi-
ties could be co-ordinated in order to enhance 
their effect. The overall aim of this work by the 
Permanent Council will be to improve the image 
of the WEU member countries in the field of 
defence and security questions." What activi-
ties has the Permanent Council developed so far 
and what was the result of its consultations in 
this respect ? 
VI. Conclusions 
67. It is encouraging to note that during the 
last six months representatives in several mem-
ber parliaments have made some effort to speak 
about the role of Western European Union in 
plenary session. In Belgium and the Nether-
lands, speakers have even made specific r~fe­
rence to the Assembly's December 1985 sessiOn. 
Important speeches in favour of the Assembly's 
activities were also made in parliamentary deba-
tes in France and Luxembourg. Taking into 
account the large number of plenary debates on 
foreign and security policy in every national par-
liament, it is recommended to intensify efforts in 
other member parliaments too, emphasing the 
importance of WEU in the European and Atlan-
tic security framework. 
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68. Regarding the results I of action taken in 
parliaments on recommenda ions adopted by the 
Assembly, it remains diffic t to obtain a com-
plete picture since only very few representatives 
inform the Office of the Cle though their dele-
gation secretariat about their interventions or the 
questions they actually p~ to their govern-
ments. So far the Rappo teur has obtained 
information about parliame tary questions only 
from Germany, Italy, Luxe bourg and the Uni-
ted Kingdom. In order to s ttle the old problem 
of co-ordination, the propqsals for improving 
procedure so far submitted ~n Mr. Eysink's ear-
lier report on p1;1rliaments, public opinion and 
defence should be implem(jnted as quickly as 
possible. All recommendations selected by the 
committee on 5th Decemb~ 1985, i.e. 425 on 
disarmament and 428 to 430 1 on the SDI, are still 
topical. It is therefore strongly recommended 
to continue using these texts including the expla-
natory memoranda for parliamentary interven-
tions and questions. The 1Italian Senate still 
gives the only example where several members 
join in tabling motions for resolutions on WEU 
matters. Is similar action qot possible in other 
member parliaments ? · 
69. With reference to the information meet-
ings organised by the Corn ittee for Parliamen-
tary and Public Relation~ in member parlia-
ments, it is possible to con~l de after three such 
meetings held in France, Ge any and Italy that 
these efforts are useful and ecessary. But the 
committee's true role can be fulfilled only if it is 
provided with the wherewi al to maintain an 
intensive and continuing cdntact with member 
parliaments and with the lpublic in member 
countries. Regular visits to member parlia-
ments are essential for the fulfilment of its 
duty. The Rules of Procedure request the com-
mittee to "make all necessary arrangements': 
If for financial reasons, this action is to remain 
sporadic, the results of efforts to promote parlia-
mentary and public interest in WEU matters will 
remain sporadic too. 
70. For organising future information meet-
ings, the following improveritents might be pro-
posed: 
- directors or expert from international 
or national resear h institutes dealing 
with foreign and' ecurity policy loca-
ted in the host cou try should be invi-
ted to attend and o give briefings on 
their institutes' ac ivities; 
- the rapporteur of la topical Assembly 
recommendation ~r the chairman of 
one of the three »olitical committees 
should be present;· 
- the British journalist seconded to the 
United Kingdom Delegation during 
the winter 1985 session of the Assem-
bly in order to examine how to 
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improve the interest of British news-
papers in reporting on WEU matters 
should be invited to the next informa-
tion meeting in London in order to 
give his advice to the committee. 
71. For the necessary improvements in infor-
ming the public about the Assembly's work, it is 
not realistic to make proposals which, for finan-
cial reasons, have no chance of being implemen-
ted. As long as the financial situation of the 
Assembly remains unchanged with a public 
information budget of some F 300,000 per year. 
there is no chance of achieving visible success in 
public relations activities. Without even a 
telex, the most interesting and topical press relea-
ses are useless to the larger international infor-
mation agencies if they have to be transmitted by 
post. 
72. Thus, existing means of "showing the flag" 
remain very modest. Every representative may 
participate in public colloquies, conferences and 
political discussions organised by the various 
institutions in every country where a large 
audience can be found and where he has a possi-
bility of explaining the role of WEU for Euro-
pean security. All opportunities should be 
seized to write articles on WEU matters which 
are likely to reach a wide public. The Office of 
the Clerk can always be asked to provide the 
necessary documentation. Groups of visitors to 
the seat of the Assembly should be received and 
briefed - if possible - by Assembly representa-
tives instead of just officials of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
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73. Relations with important political and 
scientific research institutes should be intensi-
fied. The existing interest of industries and 
technological research institutions in the work of 
the Assembly in some member countries could 
be encouraged throughout all WEU member 
countries. The publications department of the 
Assembly should make an effort to draw up new 
sales contracts for Assembly publications with 
agencies in all member countries at least. 
74. Turning to the activities of governments, 
it is to be regretted that - with few exceptions -
major statements on Western European Union 
by ministers in parliaments have been very 
rare. When ministers occasionally mentioned 
WEU this was not always done in a very encou-
raging manner. After Mr. Murphy's initiative 
in the House of Commons requesting that a regu-
lar governmental report on the work of WEU be 
presented to parliament annually, it is recom-
mended that similar pressure be brought to bear 
on the governments of Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (in Germany 
the government presents a written half-yearly 
report on the activities of WEU to the Bundes-
tag). 
75. With the exception of the United King-
dom Government's answer to a question put by 
Mr. Coleman on the public relations activities of 
governments and the Council, the Assembly has 
no concrete information so far. The Council 
should therefore be requested to report regularly 
on its activities in this area and particularly to 
devote a section of the annual report to this 
question. 
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Questions and answers in national parliaments 
Italy 
Senate 
23rd January 1985 
Question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommenda-
tion 414 
To ask the Prime Minister to give the 
government's opinion on Recommendation 414 
on United States-European co-operation in 
advanced technology adopted by the WEU 
Assembly on 4th December 1984 and to ask 
what steps it intends to take to follow it up. 
In this recommendation, the governments 
of member states are invited to submit a plan to 
the United States Government on how to colla-
borate in military programmes such as fighter 
aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system plat-
forms and under-water weapon systems. The 
WEU Assembly also advocates exchanging infor-
mation with the United States on future nuclear 
energy plants. 
In particular, it invites member govern-
ments to promote a common European policy on 
the first space station programme in the frame-
w_ork of which European and American compa-
mes s~ould co-operate on an equal footing in the 
~perat10n of the space station, with the participa-
tiOn of European crews. 
Finally, it invites the United States to 
reconsider its attitude towards the draft conven-
tion on the law of the sea. 
27th June 1985 
Answer by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to the question put by Mr. Mas-
ciadri on Recommendation 414 
Armaments research in co-operation with 
the United States is at present being conducted 
by the Italian Government in NATO in the 
framework of the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors. 
Regarding the exchange of nuclear infor-
mation with the United States, periodical bilate-
ral consultations have already been held fre-
quently at all levels. The discussions cover 
multilateral and bilateral co-operation for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Regarding space co-operation, at the ESA 
conference in Rome on 30th and 31st January 
1985, the European countries members of the 
Agency adopted two important resolutions on: 
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- the launching of a t~n-year programme 
centred on two fundamental elements: 
(a) the developmen~ of the Ariane 5 
launcher (total cost about 3,600 billion 
lire); (b) the develdpment of a small 
orbital station of Italp-German concept, 
Columbus (total cost about 3,600 billion 
lire). Other programmes were agreed 
to covering meteorological, remote sen-
sing, telecommunicaitions, microgravity 
and basic research; ! 
- the decision to ~ccept President 
~eagan's proposal t~ take part in buil-
dmg a manned orbital station, it being 
specified that Colunllbus should be the 
main element of the ~uropean contribu-
tion and co-operatiQn should be estab-
lished on an equal fboting. 
The conference thus ~fined an indepen-
dent European strategy in space transport and 
manned flights, encouragin~ important steps 
towards international co-ope~ation such as those 
now being taken with the Upited States. 
Italy's partners were u~animously grateful 
to it for having proposed a(ld prepared a con-
ference which was decisive for the future of 
ESA. The importance of ltjaly's commitments 
in the Columbus and Ariane! 5 programmes lays 
the foundations for an extension of our influence 
and ability to act in a strateg\c technological sec-
tor. · 
23rd January i~85 
Question put by Mr. Masciadh on Recommenda-
tion 416 
To ask the Ministers !for Foreign Affairs 
and Defence to give their qpinion on Recom-
mendatiOn 416 on WEU, European union and 
the Atlantic Alliance adodted by the WEU 
Assembly on 5th December i ~84 and to say what 
action they intend to take td follow it up. 
In this recommendat~on, the Assembly 
asks the Council of Ministtrs to increase the 
powers of the Permanent 1 Council (in this 
connection, it asks member qountries to appoint 
a permanent representation ~o the Council and 
to give the Secretary-Generalipowers of initiative 
allowing him to assume 
1 
responsibility for 
applying Article VIII of thd modified Brussels 
Treaty); t~ ensure the exist~nce, operation and 
strengthemng of the WEU technical bodies 
(Agency for the Control of Alimaments and Stan-
din~ Armaments Commit~ee), giving these 
bodtes new tasks relating io the security of 
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Europe and events occurring outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems 
relating to disarmament and the control of arma-
ments, European armaments co-operation and 
an active policy for improving relations between 
East and West; to prepare joint measures to 
allow Europe to play an active part in internatio-
nal negotiations on disarmament and to develop 
co-operation between WEU and the European 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, parti-
cularly in the joint production of armaments, 
bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to 
WEU. 
27th June 1985 
Answer by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to the question put by Mr. Mas-
ciadri on Recommendation 416 
Recommendation 416 adopted by the 
WEU Assembly on 5th December 1984 seems to 
correspond perfectly with the government's 
intentions as expressed when it adopted the 
Rome declaration on 27th October 1984, which 
was also agreed to by the six other members of 
WEU. The principles it formulates are being 
examined closely by the Permanent Council and 
the working group which has been set up specifi-
cally to define appropriate solutions for the 
accomplishment of the new tasks attributed to 
the organisation and consequently to indicate 
possible changes. 
In this respect, the government's intention 
is to foster the process of revitalising WEU so as 
to ensure the achievement of the aims it was set, 
which extend from the strengthening of peace 
and security to the progressive integration of 
Europe, including, for instance, closer co-opera-
tion with the member countries and other Euro-
pean organisations. 
In view of the indivisible nature of secu-
rity, this process should naturally take account 
also of the joint defence of all the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance which remains a basis of Euro-
pean security. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Bundestag 
13th December 1985 
Question put by Mr. Enders on WEU and the 
strategic defence initiative (Recommendation 
420) 
Does the Federal Government consider it 
useful to try in the framework ofWEU to harmo-
nise the positions of the member states of that 
organisation towards the strategic defence initia-
tive and, if so, what steps has it taken itself in 
this sense? 
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Answer by Mr. Mollemann, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 
In adopting a position on the SDI on 27th 
March 1985, the Federal Government stated that 
it was pursuing its efforts in regard to the SDI for 
Europeans to reach a joint position in the course 
of consultations. 
At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd-23rd 
April, the WEU Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and Defence "agreed to continue their collective 
consideration in order to achieve as far as possi-
ble a co-ordinated reaction of their governments 
to the invitation of the United States to partici-
pate in the research programme and instructed 
the Permanent Council accordingly". 
The Permanent Council formed a special 
working group which, during a series of mee-
tings, drew up an interim report which was 
endorsed by the WEU ministers at their meeting 
in Rome on 14th November 1985. The minis-
ters stated unanimously that they would not pre-
vent their industries from taking part in the 
research programme. They considered that 
since armaments co-operation with the United 
States had so far been governed by different 
contracts according to different procedure in the 
various member countries their positions could 
but differ on the question of whether and to what 
extent the participation of firms in the SDI 
research programme required the agreement of 
the government. 
The ministers also agreed on the impor-
tance of the politico-strategic repercussions of 
the SDI on European security. However, all 
ministers agreed that it was yet too soon to give 
final views on this matter. They decided to 
continue their joint reflection on the SDI in the 
framework of WEU. 
Question put by Mr. Enders on the joint produc-
tion of observation satellites by members of WEU 
(Recommendation 421) 
What is the position of the Federal Gov-
ernment on the joint production of observation 
satellites by the WEU member countries in order 
to have an independent means of surveillance in 
the control of armaments and security? 
Answer by Mr. Mollemann, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 
The Federal Government has not yet had 
an opportunity of examining the joint produc-
tion of observation satellites by WEU member 
countries. 
It considered a plan of this type with 
France. At the last Franco-German summit 
meeting we informed France that because of the 
high cost of such a system we could not envisage 
implementing this plan for the time being. 
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Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies 
5th November 1985 
Question put by Mr. Hengel on the joint produc-
tion of observation satellites, the control of arma-
ments and disarmament (Recommendation 
421) 
What is the government's position 
towards observation satellites being produced 
jointly by Western European countries so as to 
have an independent source of information on 
armaments control and security matters? 
What is the position in this connection? 
What new initiatives are being taken by 
the government to ensure that the WEU coun-
tries regularly examine all matters relating to the 
control of armaments and disarmament and 
adopt a joint position in the Atlantic Alliance, in 
particular on: 
- preventing an arms race in outer 
space; 
- banning chemical weapons; and 
- totally banning nuclear tests? 
Answer by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 
On the possibility of observation satellites 
being produced jointly by Western European 
Union countries so as to have an independent 
source of information on armaments control and 
security matters, I wish to inform the honourable 
member that no definite plan exists. On the 
other hand, there is France's well-known propo-
sal for setting up an international agency for 
supervision by satellite whose aim is the 
same. This proposal, discussed at the 
Stockholm conference on disarmament in 
Europe and the bilateral talks between the Presi-
dent of the Republic and the General Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
meets the same concern as expressed by the 
honourable member, although placed in a wider 
multilateral context. Such a satellite would pro-
vide an objective source of information for all 
states taking part in the CSCE process. 
The WEU countries are harmonising their 
reactions to the American strategic defence initi-
ative, as agreed at the last WEU ministerial 
meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985. 
The Luxembourg Government has often 
expressed its wish to prevent an arms race in 
outer space and this was moreover one of the 
aims of the Soviet-American negotiations in 
Geneva, as set out in the joint communique 
issued by Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko on 8th 
January 1985. Luxembourg continues to sup-
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port this aim in appropriate! forums and in its 
bilateral contacts with the tlwo countries con-
cerned. 1 
On banning chemical, eapons, I wish to 
recall the recent answer to a q estion put by Mrs. 
Flesch in parliament, wh~ the government 
recalled that it advocated the adoption of a con-
vention banning the producti n, stockpiling and 
use of chemical weapons. 
Finally, on totally bannling nuclear tests, at 
the third conference of partjies responsible for 
studying the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, held in Geneva from 27th 
August to 21st September 1985, the Luxembourg 
Government again said it w~s in favour of con-
cluding a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, 
accompanied by true control and verification 
measures. 
Italy 
Senate 
22nd October 1985 
Question put by Mr. Masciadti on Recommenda-
tion 423 , 
To ask the Ministe!r of Defence what 
action has been taken on R<e ommendation 423, 
adopted by the WEU Asse bly on 22nd May 
1985, and in particular on t e fundamental aim 
for Europe's defence which i the establishment 
of a European defence induistry for improving 
standardisation and interoperability of weap-
ons. 
Answer by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence, to 
the question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommen-
dation 423 
In the sector mentioned by the author of 
the question, the action of the Defence Ministry 
is indirect and intended mainly to help the quali-
tative improvement and degree of integration of 
industry in this sector both a~ national level and 
in the wider framework ofE9rope, NATO and at 
the international level. . 
To this end, the mail. means of action is 
researc~, definition and, in ' propriate cases, the 
launchmg of European arm ments programmes 
in co-operation with the oth r allied countries in 
the appropriate institutional bodies and in par-
ticular in the framework qf the Independent 
European Programme Groun (IEPG), which has 
existed since 1976. In ~s framework, the 
achievement of programme$ which have been 
harmonised between the th~ee European coun-
tries concerned is entrusted to consortia of Euro-
pean firms similar to those £ormed for develop-
ing and producing weapons systems such as 
Tornado and the FH-70 howitzer. 
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Furthermore, the co-operation of Euro-
pean defence industries is being pursued by pro-
moting the creation of informal and official insti-
tutions such as the European Defence Industrial 
Group (EDIG). In addition to these steps 
which contribute more directly to improving the 
European defence base and the standardisation 
of armaments, the Defence Ministry is also 
encouraging research on this matter. 
16th January 1986 
Question put by Mr. Masciadri to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 
Considering that: 
The Assembly of Western European 
Union adopted, at its sitting on 2nd December 
1985, Recommendation 426 on the budget ofthe 
ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 
1984 and 1985; 
This recommendation recommends that 
the Council: 
" 1. Re-examine the problem of applying 
the zero growth criterion with a view to 
specifying that this criterion is to be 
applied only to operating budgets and not 
pension budgets; 
2. In order to apply this criterion cor-
rectly, establish a rate of increase for each 
category of expenditure instead of fixing a 
single rate of increase for the net total of 
the budget; 
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status 
of staff in the framework of consultation 
and inform the Assembly of the conclu-
sions of studies on this subject; 
4. In the framework of present 
reorganisational studies, re-examine the 
possibility of a single seat for the minister-
ial organs of WEU in order to improve 
liaison between these bodies which at pres-
ent have offices in London and in Paris, 
thus reducing costs by integrating support-
ing staff, and reach a decision on this mat-
ter. " 
What steps has the government taken or 
does it intend to take to follow up the text 
adopted by the WEU Assembly? 
United Kingdom 
House of Commons 
6th February 1986 
Written questions by Mr. Coleman on United 
Kingdom Government policy toward WEU and 
its future and replies by Mr. Eggar, Parliamen-
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tary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: ( 1) what 
is the policy of Her Majesty's Government 
towards Portugal's application for membership 
of Western European Union; and if he will make 
a statement; (2) why a decision has not been 
taken by the Western European Union on 
Portugal's application for membership; when a 
decision is expected to be taken; and if he will 
make a statement; (3) what is the policy of Her 
Majesty's Government towards enlargement of 
the Western European Union; and if he will 
make a statement. 
Mr. EGGAR. - The question of the possible 
enlargement of the WEU is currently under 
consideration. Ministers agreed at Bonn on 
22nd-23rd April 1985 that, once the process of 
reactivating and reorganising the WEU had been 
completed, the Council should consider the prin-
ciples which should govern possible WEU 
enlargement. The Council would then, on the 
basis of these general principles, consider indi-
vidual cases, particularly that of Portugal which 
applied for membership in October 1984. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what 
approaches have been received by the Western 
European Union from Spain about possible 
Spanish membership of the organisation; and if 
he will make a statement. 
Mr. EGGAR. - Spain has not applied to join 
the WEU. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs who is 
the representative of the United Kingdom on the 
Western European Union Public Administration 
Committee. 
Mr. EGGAR.- The United Kingdom is rep-
resented on the Western European Union Public 
Administration Committee by a Home Civil 
Service principal grade officer in the Cabinet 
Office (Management and Personnel Office). 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what 
discussions he has held with the Spanish Gov-
ernment covering possible Spanish membership 
of the Western European Union. 
Mr. EGGAR. -None. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what 
specific measures the government are promoting 
to seek to improve public information about the 
Western European Union Council and about the 
other organs of the Western European Union; 
and what measures are currently being taken by 
the Western European Union in this direction. 
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Mr. EGGAR. - The government maintain 
contact with representatives of the media, aca-
demic life, and members of parliament to inform 
them about the activities of the WEU and its 
Council. Ministers regularly address the six-
monthly sessions of the WEU Assembly in 
Paris. As part of the process of reorganising 
WEU institutions a new post has been created in 
the WEU secretariat in London with responsibil-
ity for public relations and information. The 
government support this initiative, and other 
publicity activities of the WEU. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what are 
the budgetary implications of the measures 
which have been taken, and of those which are 
being taken, to reinvigorate the Western Euro-
pean Union; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. EGGAR. - The measures agreed by the 
Council of the Western European Union to 
reinvigorate the organisation have been under-
taken with respect for existing budgetary 
limits. It is the government's policy, and the 
policy of many of our allies, to maintain zero real 
growth in the administrative budgets of interna-
tional organisations, inclusive of pensions. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what 
new agencies have been established by the West-
ern European Union since the Rome declaration 
of October 1984; what relationship is envisaged 
between these agencies and the Standing Arma-
ments Committee and the Agency for the Con-
trol of Armaments; and what relationship is 
envisaged between the new agencies and the 
Assembly of the Western European Union, and 
between the new agencies and the Council. 
Mr. EGGAR. - WEU ministers decided at 
Bonn in April1985 that three new agencies ofthe 
Western European Union should be 
established. They were: (i) the agency for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions; (ii) the agency for the study of security and 
defence questions; (iii) the agency for the devel-
opment of co-operation in the field of arma-
ments. 
These agencies were established with effect 
from 1st January 1986. 
The Director of Agency I has a dual capac-
ity as Director for the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; his deputy in that capacity is a 
member of the staff of Agency I. 
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The role of WEtJ in armaments 
co-operation is to help pr~ide the necessary 
political impetus for, and prtctical contribution 
to, the various efforts uncte aken in this field, 
including those carried out y the Independent 
European Programme Grou~· , the main forum 
for European equipment eo operation, and the 
Conference of National Ar aments Directors. 
The Standing Armaments ~ommittee will help 
ensure that the work of Agency Ill is fully 
co-ordinated with the activities of these other 
organisations. 
The new agencies will ~e responsible to the 
WEU Secretary-General in Lbndon and, through 
him, to the WEU Council.. The Council will 
maintain overall control ofl the agencies' work 
programmes. The Council considers that the 
agencies should provide tec~nical assistance to 
the Assembly on a case-by-e se basis and in con-
formity with criteria to be a reed in the light of 
individual requests. 
Mr. CoLEMAN asked Hie Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commompealth Affairs what 
new posts have been created within the 
Secretariat-General of the~Western European 
Union and within other or ans of the Western 
European Union since the ome declaration of 
October 1984; what respoq$bilities and salaries 
these posts carry; which of tlllem have been filled 
and by whom; by what meads new staff are being 
recruited; and what steps aabeing taken to keep 
(a) parliament and (b) the ssembly of Western 
European Union, informe of such develop-
ments occurring in the co~rse of the Western 
European Union reinvigoraFon process. 
Mr. EoGAR. - I am arranging for the 
detailed information reque~ted on posts to be 
assembled and to be publi~hed in the Official 
Report as soon as possible. Information about 
developments arising from tEU reactivation is 
reported regularly by the C unci! and Secretary-
General to the WEU Assem ly, British members 
of which are drawn from prrliament. 
7th March 1~86 
I 
Reply by Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, Foreign rnd Commonwealth 
Office 
Mr. EGGAR (pursuant to his reply, 6th F eb-
ruary 1986. -We are now ~le to supply the fol-
lowing information: I 
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Places and name New posts Responsibilities Starting salaries Post filled 
ofWEU (A-Grade) (net monthly) or vacant 
organisation £ 
London: 
Secretariat-General A6 Head Political Affairs Division 2,369 Filled (Italy) 
A3/4 Head General Policy and 1,533 to 1,763 Filled (United 
Research Section Kingdom) 
A2/3 General Policy and Research 1,242 to 1,533 Vacant 
A4 Public Relations 1,763 Vacant 
Paris: 
Agency I 1 Hors Grade Director 3,145 Filled (Italy) 
5 Officials (A2 to A6) Research/Study 1,242 to 2,369 All filled* 
Agency 11 1 Hors Grade Director 3,145 Filled (United 
Kingdom) 
4 Officials (A2 to A6) Research/Study 1 ,242 to 3,369 3 Filled*; 1 Vacancy 
Agency Ill 1 Hors Grade Director 3,145 Filled (France) 
4 Officials (A2 to A6) Research/Study 1,242 to 2,369 Filled* 
Joint Administration 7 Officials (A2 to A6) Administration, Security, 1 ,242 to 2,369 All Filled* 
Offices Documentation, Translation, 
Interpretation and General 
Services 
* Nineteen out of 20 A-grade positions in Paris have been filled. They have been allocated as follows: 
Belgium: 3 
Federal Republic of Germany: 4 
Luxembourg: 1 
United Kingdom: 2 
France: 4 
Italy: 3 
Netherlands: 2. 
The overall effect of recent changes on personnel in London is a reduction of one hors-grade (assistant secretary-general) post 
and one former A-grade post balanced by the creation of the four new A-grade posts. 
The overall effect on WEU personnel of recent changes in Paris is the creation of one new director and a reduction of six 
A-grade officials. 
Vacancy notices are issued to the national representatives in the Permanent Council for onward transmission to their capitals; 
they are also sent where appropriate to other international organisations. Contracts for employment will in principle be of short-
term duration in the first instance in view of the transitional period which extends to the end of December 1987. 
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Information meeting held in the German Bundestag, Bonn 
20th February 1986 
Participants 
Parliamentarians 
Mrs. Renger, Vice-President of the German Bundestag 
Mrs. Hellwig, Chairman of the Bundestag Committee on European Affairs 
Mr. Abelein, Vice-President of the North Atlantic Assembly 
Mrs. Pack 
MM. Vogelsang 
Buchner 
Wulff 
Gansel 
Spies von Bullesheim 
German Foreign Office 
Mr. Brecht (WEU Department) 
Journalists 
Mrs. Marthe (AFP) 
MM. Merkow (APN) 
Renken (Das Parlament) 
von Kageneck (Die Welt) 
Kurilin (Soviet Television and Broadcasting) 
Committee members 
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Dame 
Mrs. 
Mrs. 
Dr. 
MM. 
Jill Knight, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
Fischer 
van der Werf-Terpstra 
Miller 
Enders 
Goerens 
Noerens 
Jung 
Murphy 
Secretaries of delegations 
Mrs. Dossier-Carzou (France) 
Mr. Moreau (France) 
Mr. de Gou (Netherlands) 
Mr. Moller (Federal Republic of Germany) 
Mr. Cairncross (United Kingdom) 
Mr. Dillenburg (Luxembourg) 
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Texts of briefings 
The duties of the renewed 
Western European Union 
and its importance for the parliamentary 
and public debate on security 
and defence issues 
Briefing by Mr. Murphy 
Since it is one of the main duties of our 
committee to establish relations with parlia-
ments and the public of the member countries of 
Western European Union we of course follow 
with interest political discussions and debates in 
these countries- especially those on security and 
defence matters. 
Having the pleasure today to be invited to 
the Bundestag, and provided you do not consider 
it out of place to exchange compliments between 
parliamentarians, we will not hesitate to congrat-
ulate the German Parliament for the high quality 
of its political work. Here, parliamentary life in 
a divided country at the point of contact between 
East and West is particularly intensive and inter-
esting, especially with regard to problems of our 
joint security. 
Of course we are not here to tell you that 
Western European Union is the philosophers' 
stone for all our problems, and tomorrow other 
groups from other international organisations 
will convince you that there are other philoso-
phers' stones. 
Our concern has a more general 
aspect. We think that the debates in parlia-
ments and among the public with regard to the 
various problems of our security should be con-
ducted more and more in a context of creating a 
common European security dimension. 
The first reason for doing so is the situa-
tion with regard to the Atlantic Alliance. There 
is broad agreement on both sides of the Atlantic 
that NATO has preserved peace in Europe for 
more than thirty-five years and that the alliance 
remains the foundation of western security. On 
the other hand, the international situation today 
is quite different in comparison with 1949 when 
NATO was founded. The need to strengthen 
the European pillar of the alliance is an oft-
repeated request asking the European partners to 
increase their contribution to transatlantic secu-
rity. 
tion to joint defence efforts. But naturally the 
weight of Western Europe can increase only if 
member countries manage to co-ordinate and 
harmonise their security policies so as to speak 
with one voice. Of course, this is a difficult 
objective to achieve and we are far from it. 
These considerations lead to a second 
aspect regarding the future evolution of the con-
struction of Europe. The construction will be 
incomplete if Europe fails to acquire a security 
dimension parallel with the economic dimension 
now achieved through the European Communi-
ties and a foreign policy dimension through 
European political co-operation. 
But living in the present we have to realise 
that more than thirty years after the failure to 
create a European defence community efforts to 
harmonise security policies in other frameworks, 
such as, for instance, the European Community, 
have not so far been really successful despite the 
various efforts and projects discussed during 
recent European summit conferences. It would 
be going too far to enumerate all the reasons for 
the difficulties, but as a matter of fact they have 
finally led to initiatives to revitalise a small but 
useful institution called Western European 
Union. 
When ministers in their Rome declaration 
of 27th October 1984 underlined their determi-
nation to make better use of the WEU frame-
work in order to harmonise security policy and 
decided some important institutional reforms 
with regard to its ministerial bodies, these were 
important but only first steps. They may lead 
to the creation of an appropriate and efficient 
motor for a European security dimension and at 
the same time to a strengthening of the Atlantic 
Alliance. But it has still to be proved that polit-
ical will and determination will overcome 
scepticism. The renewed Western European 
Union must justify its qualifications for its new 
role by actions and deeds related to actual politi-
cal issues in security matters. This is particu-
larly difficult because of the magnitude of the 
problems. 
But we think that after being freed from 
most of its former control functions Western 
European Union is perfectly fit to play its new 
role to the full because this small but homoge-
But the situation among the European neous body has all the necessary administrative 
partners in NATO has become more difficult and democratic structures including a parliamen-
since a few of its members adopt separate politi- tary assembly which is still the only one at inter-
cat positions on security and defence national level authorised by treaty to deal with 
policy. On the other hand there are complaints security and defence matters. But we need a 
that Europe's influence within the alliance does strong and permanent determination to seek 
not correspond to the importance of its contribu- co-operation in its framework. 
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This is not a matter to be left entirely to 
governments. We believe that parliamentary 
participation in security and defence matters at 
European level is absolutely imperative. There 
must be steady and relentless pressure from the 
Assembly vis-a-vis the Council but also from 
national parliaments and the public vis-a-vis 
member governments in order to strengthen this 
determination. We particularly need strong 
parliamentary solidarity and continuing support 
for our Assembly activities in all national 
parliaments. Why is this so important? 
According to the treaties, our Assembly 
has only very imperfect means of supervising or 
following up the activities of the Council. The 
latter is merely obliged to report once a year to 
the Assembly about its activities. Of course, the 
Assembly continues to bring pressure to bear on 
the Council, sending recommendations, asking 
questions and seeking all possible means to 
enhance its dialogue with the various ministerial 
organs, but true governmental responsibility vis-
a-vis parliamentarians exists only at national 
level. We therefore think we should take 
advantage of the fact that all members of the 
Assembly are at the same time members of 
national parliaments. Our activities in Paris 
can be successful only if we continue this work at 
home. We think that not only members of the 
Assembly but all parliamentarians interested in 
defence and security matters should participate 
in this work. 
What is the practical significance of 
this? A larger number of parliamentarians 
should know more about our actual concerns 
and preoccupations in the Assembly of Western 
European Union in order to take up these mat-
ters in their contacts with their government. I 
admit that in the Bundestag you are already in a 
fairly privileged position compared with other 
parliaments of WEU member countries since the 
Federal Government is so far the only member 
government to communicate to the parliament 
written half-yearly reports on the evolution of 
WEU. Since reports are also regularly drawn up 
by the delegation after each part-session of the 
Assembly, there are several opportunities for 
engaging a debate with the government. But in 
the area of security policy we have so many and 
such urgent problems that we think WEU issues 
should become an important part of the perma-
nent parliamentary dialogue with the govern-
ment. 
I would recall that in implementation of a 
decision taken by the Council of Ministers at 
their Rome meeting in October 1984 three new 
agencies are being established in the place of the 
previous two institutions, i.e. the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and the Standing Arma-
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was informed by the Secretary-General 
that Agency I for the study of arms con-
trol and disarmament is to monitor the 
progress of curren~ negotiations on the 
control, limitation and reduction of 
armaments, analysing their possible 
implications for European security and 
attending to the essential problem of 
verification; 
- tasks of Agency II for the study of secu-
rity and defence qu~stions include threat 
assessment and the contribution of 
WEU states to the response to that 
threat; and 
- Agency Ill for the development of 
co-operation in the field of armaments is 
to help to perform WED's role of pro-
viding political ! impetus in arms 
co-operation and, in close co-operation 
with the IEPG and CNAD, to keep 
under review a changing world market 
and the situation of our industries in 
that respect including the study of 
emerging technologies. 
In connection with these new organs, vari-
ous questions could be put to governments, espe-
cially with regard to their missions, the break-
down of their work in relation to other 
institutions such as IEPG and CNAD and their 
co-operation with other international and 
national research institutes, or the possibility for 
parliamentarians to be informed of the results of 
their work. 
Last but not least, there is the question of 
the enlargement of WEU. If, through every 
member parliament, governments were pressed 
to accelerate the consultation procedure with 
regard to the decision to be taken on Portugal's 
application for membership, it would be most 
helpful for the relevant activities of our Assem-
bly. 
In quoting these examples, I in no way 
wish to suggest that national parliaments should 
do the work of the WEU Assembly. But I 
repeat that we really need lil support at national 
level and my intention w~s to promote your 
interest in raising WEU questions in your parlia-
ment by pointing out the various possibilities 
and subjects covered by WEU. 
* 
* * 
The Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Briefing by Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra 
ments Committee: What I shall try in the next few minutes is 
- at the December 1985 session, the to deepen your understanding and to win your 
Assembly of Western European Union sympathy for a parliamentary assembly at the 
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European level which has to work under fairly 
difficult and even contradictory conditions. 
The Assembly of Western European 
Union has one privilege. It is the only interna-
tional parliament with responsibilities in defence 
and security matters. But this is its only 
privilege. In terms of constitutional working 
conditions it must be admitted that although 
WEU has a democratic structure its true powers 
are very limited. 
It is true that the modified Brussels Treaty 
mentions the WEU Assembly only in the context 
of the annual report which the Council has to 
submit to the Assembly on its activities. The 
Assembly's status is a purely consultative 
one. It can take no real sanctions against the 
Council and does not even decide upon its own 
budget. 
This last aspect must be most surprising 
for parliamentarians who are accustomed to 
national practice whereby parliaments decide on 
their own budget and also on that of their 
governments. In WEU, the situation is just the 
opposite. The Assembly's budget has to be 
approved by the member governments which 
form the Council. I should like to revert to this 
particularity in a few moments. 
According to the treaties, the Assembly is 
composed of the representatives of the Brussels 
Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. In other words, parlia-
mentarians have a dual mandate in these two 
assemblies, although their vocations are quite 
different. As you know, this makes it difficult 
to form national delegations. Furthermore, 
many representatives are overburdened with 
their triple mission in one national and two 
international assemblies. 
On the other hand it should be recalled 
that defence and security policy still remains 
wholly under the sovereignty of national 
governments. From this point of view it is an 
advantage that the idea of electing the Assembly 
by direct universal suffrage, as for the European 
Parliament, has so far not been envisaged. But 
we have the impression that sometimes mem-
bers of national parliaments interested in Euro-
pean defence policy are not sufficiently moti-
vated or are not asked to become 'members of 
their country's parliamentary delegation to the 
WEU Assembly. It would be interesting to 
learn something about your experience in the 
Bundestag so far and what conclusions might be 
drawn. 
Within the Assembly, consideration is 
being given to certain suggestions, for instance: 
the presidents of national parliaments might be 
informed and asked to urge political groups in 
their parliaments to attach greater importance to 
the participation of parliamentarians interested 
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in WEU matters when appointing members of 
their country's parliamentary delegation. To 
this end, the interest of chairmen of defence and 
foreign affairs committees should be 
aroused. Again consideration might be given, 
when forming national delegations to the Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe, to appointing a rel-
atively large number of parliamentarians who 
would be required to give priority to meetings of 
the WEU Assembly. 
Turning to the specific activities of the 
Assembly, they seem to be fairly limited com-
pared with the means and possibilities of other 
international parliaments. Normally, the 
Assembly meets only twice a year in plenary ses-
sion, for four days each time, generally in Paris 
where its seat and secretariat are located. 
Even so, this Assembly is doing very com-
prehensive and useful work. Everybody who 
has had the opportunity of taking part in its 
work, namely within its three main political 
committees, i.e the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, the General Affairs Com-
mittee and the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions, knows the 
quality of its reports and recommendations on 
various topical political issues. The extent to 
which the Assembly is able to influence decisions 
and positions adopted by governments repre-
sented in the WEU Council cannot be described 
accurately, but it is a fact, and in no way denied 
by governments, that efforts to revive Western 
European Union have been made largely because 
of Assembly initiatives and pressure. 
Nevertheless, we are still far away from 
true parliamentary participation in reflection 
and decision-making regarding defence and secu-
rity matters at European level. Considering 
that these questions concern our very existence, 
it is worth giving serious thought to all means of 
strengthening the powers and influence of our 
Assembly. I will consider our meeting success-
ful if I can make an effective contribution to 
encouraging you to continue and intensify your 
reflections in this respect. This process of 
reflection has to be channelled through the 
national parliaments since any change in the sta-
tus quo has to be decided by member 
governments. As there is at present practically 
no chance of convincing governments to alter the 
treaties to increase the Assembly's responsibili-
ties and powers, there is no choice but to 
improve its working conditions within the exist-
ing framework. In our view help could be 
afforded by national parliaments and the public 
in at least two respects: 
First and foremost is the most difficult 
financial situation of our Assembly. There is a 
fundamental contradiction between the duties 
we are required to fulfil and the financial means 
at our disposal. 
APPENDIX Il 
In the Rome declaration of 27th October 
1984, the Council of Ministers recalled the 
importance of the WEU Assembly which - and I 
quote from this declaration - " as the only par-
liamentary body mandated by a treaty to discuss 
defence matters, is called to play a growing 
role ". In the same declaration, ministers 
instructed the Permanent Council to ensure that 
the various arrangements proposed with regard 
to the institutional reform " remain within the 
present limits ... of the organisation's 
budget". In other words, the principle of strict 
zero growth has to be applied; but the Council 
applies this principle to the Assembly as 
well. The situation has deteriorated even fur-
ther because, taking the inflation rate into 
account, the financial means accorded to the 
Assembly during the last years fell even below 
zero growth. Attempts to offset these losses 
have been rejected by the Council. As a conse-
quence, the problem is now becoming critical. 
If you wish to help us, it would be 
extremely useful if you could stress these contra-
dictions, either in plenary session, for instance 
during budget discussions, or on other occasions 
in the budget committee or in direct contact with 
the government. We do not deny that every 
government in every member country has to 
make economies. But we should avoid trying to 
save money in the wrong places. 
The second possibility of improving our 
working conditions and the effectiveness of our 
activities would be to intensify the follow-up 
action to be taken in parliaments with regard to 
initiatives and recommendations adopted by the 
Assembly. A fundamental condition is of 
course that our work is made sufficiently known 
in national parliaments. And perhaps we 
should improve the procedures we have followed 
so far. If members of the German Delegation 
could make comments or suggestions in this 
respect, we would certainly be grateful, for these 
problems are among the main concerns of our 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions. 
At the end of every part-session, our com-
mittee selects from the texts adopted by the 
Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be 
debated in national parliaments. These texts 
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ferent aspects of SDI were e*-amined on the basis 
of reports presented by the three political com-
mittees according to their qefence, political and 
technological aspects, also :taking into account 
guidelines drawn from the cblloquy on the space 
challenge for Europe organ~ed in Munich from 
18th to 20th September 1985 by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions. The three relevant recommenda-
tions were transmitted to national parliaments 
for discussion together with a recommendation 
on disarmament. We know that it is difficult to 
obtain translated texts in time, but you will agree 
that the earlier you make use of these texts for 
interventions with your government the more 
you can influence its position in the WEU Coun-
cil where the replies to the different recommen-
dations are worked out. 
Apart from putting written or oral ques-
tions to the government, would it not be worth 
considering incorporating recommendations or 
other initiatives of the WEU Assembly in wider 
motions for resolutions, interpellations or 
"major questions" (Grosse Anfragen) so often 
debated in committees and in plenary session of 
the Bundestag? 
At the very end, I would like to take up the 
question of the activities of the three new WEU 
agencies already mentioned by our colleague, 
Mr. Murphy. 
It is in fact important to know what these 
agencies are doing. 
I therefore draw your attention to Recom-
mendation 425 on disarmament, adopted last 
December, which recommends that the Council 
instruct the agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions (Agency I) to study 
the verification and observer regime which 
should be agreed in the Conference on Disarma-
ment in Europe, and to co-ordinate the activities 
of observers from WEU countries invited to 
Warsaw Pact manoeuvres. 
I would also refer you to Recommenda-
tion 428 on WEU and the strategic defence initi-
ative which recommends that the Council 
instruct the same agency to report annually on 
the arms control impact of SDI. 
are transmitted by the President of the Assembly Finally I would memtion Recommenda-
to the presidents of member parliaments under tion 429 which recommends that the Council 
cover of an official letter expressing the wish that have the appropriate agency conduct a continu-
these texts be used as material for speeches or ing study of the strategic consequences of the 
questions to ministers. May I ask if the texts development of new weapons. Furthermore, 
transmitted at the end of the last plenary session that the Council play an active part in informing 
from 2nd to 5th December 1985 have reached Europeans about matters relating to their secu-
anyone present in this room and has anyone had rity by instructing the new agency handling 
the time and opportunity to study them? I am defence questions to promote the organisation of 
convinced that these selected texts can be very training courses for nationals of the seven coun-
useful in national debates. The agenda of the tries so as to allow them to have a better under-
session last December was largely dominated by standing of the European dimension of security 
the question of SDI and disarmament. The dif- problems. 
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By mentioning these few examples of the 
Assembly's activities and initiatives, I wanted to 
encourage you to continue and intensify your 
efforts to use our work in your national activi-
ties, because, to achieve a European security 
dimension, we need strong parliamentary and 
public participation in all member states. 
* 
* * 
Relations between Western European Union, 
NATO and other Western European 
organisations and countries 
Briefing by Mr. Goerens 
For some time now, there has again been 
talk of Europe. 
There is an impression that the initiative 
taken to reactivate WEU may have influenced 
and even speeded up deliberations in other Euro-
pean forums and also in the Atlantic Alliance. 
A spirit of competition is perhaps sometimes 
necessary and useful in order to give fresh impe-
tus elsewhere. 
At its meeting in Luxembourg on 2nd and 
3rd December 1985, the European Council 
reached an agreement of principle on reforming 
the Community institutions. The parties con-
sidered that closer co-operation in European 
security matters was likely to make an essential 
contribution to the development of a European 
identity in external policy matters and were pre-
pared to co-ordinate their positions on the politi-
cal and economic aspects of security more 
fully. They also expressed their determination 
to safeguard the technological and industrial con-
ditions necessary for their security. 
Subject to the consequences of the refusal 
of the Danish Parliament to associate itself with 
this agreement, it may be noted that the proposal 
aims at bringing about important elements of a 
European security dimension. However, these 
are still only elements and are not sufficient to 
reach a true common defence and security pol-
icy. 
The agreement consequently specified that 
the provisions of the treaty were not an obstacle 
to the existence of closer co-operation in security 
matters between certain high contracting parties 
in the framework of Western European Union 
and of the Atlantic Alliance. 
There is an important fact which should 
be borne in mind: the seven WEU member states 
- Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom- are all represented in the 
European Community, European political 
co-operation and the Council of Europe. They 
are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and, with the exception of France, 
of Eurogroup, the unofficial association of Euro-
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pean partners of the alliance. Conversely, 
France takes part with the other WEU member 
states in the Independent European Programme 
Group (IEPG) set up by Eurogroup to strengthen 
European co-operation in the field of armaments 
and defence equipment. 
WEU is therefore not only one of the 
major elements of the European edifice but also 
has special responsibility to assume as a forum 
for reflection and consultation on security mat-
ters with a view to giving political impetus to 
this aspect of European integration. 
This implies: 
- full application of the vast responsibili-
ties conferred on the WEU Council by 
the modified Brussels Treaty which, in 
its preamble, affirms the resolution of 
the parties " to promote the unity and to 
encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe " and also provides for the clos-
est possible co-operation with the Atlan-
tic Alliance; 
- close co-ordination and co-operation 
with the other elements of the European 
edifice and with the organs of the alli-
ance, while avoiding duplication. A 
concern constantly expressed by the 
Assembly is that the WEU Council 
must abandon none of its responsibili-
ties, even when its sometimes over-
scrupulous desire to avoid duplication 
of work encourages it to reduce the 
scope of its activities in favour of 
NATO or other European 
organisations. 
In the first place, all this comes within the 
intergovernmental context since it is the govern-
ments that conclude treaties and in practice 
apply them. But what is our role as parliamen-
tarians in this connection? 
Our task of control and supervision 
requires that we be kept permanently and thor-
oughly informed about the present state of Euro-
pean security co-operation and the activities of 
the executive bodies. This is why we put ques-
tions and encourage all our parliamentary col-
leagues and also the public to put questions or 
make proposals. In view of the fact that exter-
nal security matters are highly controversial, a 
public debate on the basis of sound information 
is essential to prevent ignorance and/or 
disinformation forming an ever-larger obstacle to 
understanding of the difficult conditions of our 
security. 
One of the fundamental questions put to 
governments is therefore whether they are pre-
pared to make a substantial improvement in the 
information they give parliaments and the public 
about European defence and security matters 
APPENDIX 11 
and about European and transatlantic 
co-operation in this area. 
Like us, you have to put questions to know 
how the WEU Council effectively shows its 
determination to co-ordinate its activities with 
NATO and with European political 
co-operation. On several occasions, the Assem-
bly has asked the Council to hold consultations 
in WEU prior to meetings of the North Atlantic 
Council in order to give greater weight to purely 
European concerns in regard to defence and dis-
armament. 
The creation of new agencies raises the 
problem of how to co-ordinate their work with 
that of the corresponding bodies of the 
alliance. How is this done? 
How does the WEU Council give tangible 
form to its determination to give new political 
impetus to the efforts of the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group (IEPG) and ofthe Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD)? 
What new impetus can WEU give to the 
progress of the joint production of armaments 
and in particular of standardisation and 
interoperability? How does it intend to 
co-ordinate the technological and industrial 
aspects of security with the European Commu-
nity? 
In what framework should Europeans 
co-ordinate their views on matters relating to 
disarmament and the control of armaments? 
But as parliamentarians we also have to 
think about possible ways of improving the 
co-ordination of our own activities in 
interparliamentary forums. On the one hand, 
relations with national parliaments must be 
developed and, on the other, there must be 
co-ordination at international level. Where 
Portugal is concerned, our Presidential Commit-
tee has just decided that members of the Portu-
guese Parliament may be invited to attend all 
meetings of Assembly committees as observers. 
Our Assembly has also always 
endeavoured to co-ordinate its work with that of 
the other European parliamentary assemblies 
and it has adopted several recommendations and 
resolutions in this sense and on the unification of 
European activities. Documents and observers 
are at present exchanged between an Assembly 
committee and the Security and Disarmament 
Subcommittee of the European Parliament. 
Our Assembly has always constantly fol-
lowed the work of the North Atlantic 
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Assembly. Admittedly, it has no links or offi-
cial relationship with that assembly but since 
there are a few cases of dua1 mandates and many 
of the subjects dealt with by the two assemblies 
are almost identical there would be good reasons 
to improve co-ordination 'of their work. The 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments of our Assembly already holds occasional 
meetings with the Military Committee of the 
North Atlantic Assembly. 
Although, because of the composition of 
the two organisations, it is relatively easy to 
share tasks between the WEU Assembly and the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, some care 
has to be shown when ch<)osing the dates and 
places of meetings. 
In their Rome declar,tion, the WEU min-
isters stressed " the value, in their eyes, of devel-
oping a dialogue between the Assembly and 
other parliaments or parliamentary institu-
tions ". 
The ministers' view , is useful because it 
allows the governments concerned to be 
reminded that the development of a true 
interparliamentary dialogue does not depend 
solely on good will but also on the granting of 
fair financial resources. In view of the 
Assembly's present budgetary position, the pro-
motion of interparliamentary relations is practi-
cally impossible. This is a particularly regretta-
ble situation since the Assembly does not 
consider itself to be an exclusive club. We are 
not wrapped up in our own activities. We want 
a dialogue. As you will have noticed, I have 
made ample reference to the activities of other 
European and Atlantic institutions. The 
Assembly has in fact always reported on the 
activities of others. Moreover, there is some-
times an impression that it is customary in cer-
tain other international organisations to gloss 
over all activities emanating from our Assembly 
in total silence. But was it by sheer chance that, 
during the last plenary session of the North 
Atlantic Assembly, which inter alia tackled prob-
lems relating to the strengthening of the Euro-
pean pillar of the alliance, not one speaker men-
tioned the activities of WEU? 
We are convinced that, if our work is to be 
successful, we should rather endeavour to ascer-
tain areas in which we could achieve some 
degree of unification of interparliamentary 
action. If this is not possible in present circum-
stances, we must at least take note of each other's 
work and seek to make more of each other's 
results. 
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For a European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism - Memorandum 
from Jean-Marie Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, to the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council, 17th April 1986 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Alternate: De Bondt) (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der We/ff(Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts (Alternate: Pecriaux), Burger, Close, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hill 
(Alternate: Murphy), Mrs. Kelly (Alternate: Mrs. Fischer), MM. Koehl (Alternate: DreyjUs-Schmidt), Lagorce, Lord Mackie (Alter-
nate: Dame Jilt Knight), MM. Martino (Alternate: Cavaliere), Masciadri, Mal/er, Prouvost, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der 
Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on security and terrorism -
the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is an essential basis for European 
co-operation in external policy matters; 
(ii) Considering that in certain areas no western organisation is able to replace the WEU Council for 
the application of this article of the treaty; 
(iii) Deploring the fact that the seven governments have not yet made use of the WEU Council to 
examine matters which constitute a threat to international peace and stability; 
(iv) Recalling that the Rome declaration confirmed the WEU Council's vocation to play an active 
part in the application of Article VIII; 
(v) Recalling that relations between certain member countries and countries outside Europe call for 
continuous exchanges of views between the WEU countries; 
(vi) Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to international 
peace and security; 
(vii) Considering that the recrudescence of international terrorism is also a serious threat to interna-
tional peace and security and may seriously unsettle western society if effective countermeasures are not 
taken; 
(viii) Welcoming the fact that international society has started to take up the challenge of terrorism, but 
regretting the absence of any significant agreement about the means to be used to this end and deploring 
the consequences of this division, considering how essential it is to agree on the measures to be taken; 
(ix) Regretting that no effective co-ordinated measures, whether preventive or repressive, have been 
taken against terrorist actions before the United States action against Libya, recalls that the members of 
the Assembly give preference to political and diplomatic channels for solving the pnoblem of internatio-
nal terrorism, while not precluding any other appropriate measures if it proves impossible to succeed by 
negotiation; 
(x) Welcoming as a modest step forward the intentions announced by the Twelve on 27th January 
and 14th and 22nd April 1986; 
(xi) Considering that only the co-ordination of measures taken by the states in q,estion can meet the 
situation created by international terrorism; 
(xii) Recalling that this co-ordination is all the more necessary after the launching by Libya of two mis-
siles towards the island of Lampedusa, which constituted a true act of war against a member country of 
WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1.1. Effectively apply Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty as it planned when adopting para-
graph 8 of the Rome declaration in October 1984 and, in particular, meet each time crises outside the 
North Atlantic Treaty area require it to do so and whenever consultations among the Twelve seem unli-
kely to meet the situation; 
2. Follow attentively developments in the war between Iraq and Iran and: 
(a) promote the return to a fair, lasting peace; 
(b) strongly denounce any violation of the laws of war by either side; 
(c) concert action by member countries to prevent any extension of the war and to ensure the 
safety of navigation in the Gulf; 
3. Confirm that the development of international terrorism brings into play the application of Arti-
cle VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in this context: 
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(a) promote and participate effectively in international consultations to counter terrorist action; 
(b) apply systematically the decisions set out in the twelve-power declarations of 27th January 
and 14th and 22nd April 1986; 
(c) draw up a charter specifying the principles which its signatories would undertake to follow in 
the event of terrorist action; 
(d) co-ordinate the preventive and repressive measures which member countries are obliged to 
take because of the development of terrorist operations; 
(e) concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from 
affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism. 
II. For these purposes, the Assembly endorses the call for action its President addressed to the Coun-
cil and recommends that the Council instruct the appropriate WEU agencies to report without delay on 
the various aspects of the threat international terrorism constitutes for the western defence system, indi-
viduals and public freedoms and define the measures which member countries should take to counter 
terrorism effectively. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In October 1985, the General Affairs Com-
mittee decided to ask for a report on WEU and 
member countries' commitments outside the 
North Atlantic Treaty area to be included in the 
agenda of the June 1986 session. Its intention 
was then to explore the prospects offered by para-
graph 8 of the Rome declaration which, in appli-
cation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, whose paragraph 3 specifies that: 
" At the request of any of the high con-
tracting parties the Council shall be imme-
diately convened in order to permit them 
to consult with regard to any situation 
which may constitute a threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat should arise, or a 
danger to economic stability", 
indicates for its part that the ministers " may also 
consider the implications for Europe of crises in 
other regions of the world ". 
2. Since then, the Presidential Committee 
has referred to the committee two motions for 
recommendations. One, dated 21st May 1985, 
was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others and was 
published as Document 1022. It concerned the 
war between Iraq and Iran and reads as fol-
lows: 
"The Assembly, 
Aware of the continued crisis arising from 
the Iran-Iraq conflict which presents a 
threat not only to regional stability, but to 
global security; 
Concerned at the aggressive character of 
the Khomeini regime, which has already 
cost enormous numbers of lives; 
Noting the apparently increasing concern 
of many Iranian people that a cease-fire 
should be arranged and that negotiations 
for peace should commence; 
URGES member states to express further 
their desire for peace and to use their 
diplomatic, political and economic 
influence to secure this end." 
3. The other was tabled by Mr. Bianco and 
others on 3rd December 1985 and was published 
as Document 1047. It reads as follows: 
" The Assembly, 
Considering the serious human and finan-
cial losses caused by the war between Iran 
and Iraq; 
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Considering the prestnt regime's insis-
tence on continuing thle war between Iran 
and Iraq, which is a serious threat to peace 
and tranquillity in the area and throughout 
the world; 
Considering the will of the Iranian people 
to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion, 
which finds a positive point of reference in 
the peace plan of the National Resistance 
Council; 
Considering further the resolutions sub-
mitted to and adopted by the Council of 
Europe, 
CoNDEMNS the policy of the Iranian 
regime, which continues to be based on 
recourse to war and the violation of 
human rights, as dramatically demonstra-
ted by the list of 12,028 victims in the 
Mujaheddin publication. " 
4. Finally, at its meeting on 20th January 
1986, the Presidential Committee decided to ask 
the General Affairs Committee to examine the 
question of international 11errorism. Anxious 
not to increase the number of reports on the 
agenda of the next session but to tackle matters 
while they were still topical, the Presidential 
Committee decided to change the title of the 
report proposed by the General Affairs Commit-
tee and to include in the agenda ofthe June 1986 
session a report on security and terrorism - the 
implications for Europe of crisis situations in 
other parts of the world. 
5. These are obviously three separate sub-
jects but all relate to the application of Article 
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and paragraph 8 of the Rome 
declaration. Your Rapporteur therefore pro-
poses to deal with them in three chapters leading 
up to a single draft recommendation. 
6. A working paper prepared by your 
Rapporteur was given a first !reading by the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee on 17th March. This 
brought out no major disagreement among mem-
bers of the committee, but it allowed your 
Rapporteur to make broad changes in his text in 
order to take many useful suggestions into 
account. He has also been able to obtain further 
information, most of which is included in the 
present document, the text of which was con-
cluded on 15th April. In view of the events 
then occurring, your Rapporteur well realises 
that certain aspects of this report will soon be out 
of date. He feels nevertheless that the expected 
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course of events should not undermine the fun-
damental principles he has endeavoured to set 
out here. 
11. Application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration 
7. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
specifies the area in which the Atlantic Alliance 
is to operate, the modified Brussels Treaty, while 
defining an area in which the casus foederis is to 
be automatically applied - the territory of mem-
ber states in Europe - gives the WEU Council 
responsibility for tackling matters relating to the 
rest of the world. However, it does not give the 
Council the task of examining such matters in all 
circumstances but links this commitment to the 
initiative of one of its members. Consequently, 
the application of Article VIII is not without 
ambiguity since, whereas the convocation of the 
Council by one of its members is a right, the 
treaty specifies in paragraph 4 of that article that 
" the Council shall decide by unanimous vote 
questions for which no other voting procedure 
has been or may be agreed", which obviously 
covers any application of paragraph 3. Thus, it 
would appear that the decision to include in the 
agenda of a Council meeting a matter governed 
by Article VIII may be taken at the request of a 
single member country, but any subsequent deci-
sion is subject to the unanimity rule, which may 
make the decision to convene the Council quite 
pointless. 
8. Moreover, the convening of meetings of 
ambassadors in London is probably not the best 
means available to the governments for consult-
ing each other in the event of crisis since the 
ambassadors are not able to commit their gov-
ernments in matters for which they have no 
responsibility. Meetings of Ministers for For-
eign Affairs, of ambassadors in the country or 
countries in which the crisis arises and of perma-
nent representatives to the United Nations might 
be meaningful and up to 1971 meetings of the 
Seven ambassadors to the United Nations were 
effectively held. Since then, they have been 
held in the framework of the Nine, then the Ten 
and now the Twelve. Conversely, as far as your 
Rapporteur knows, the ambassadors of the 
Seven in London have never met at the initiative 
of one of them to tackle a crisis. Nor have the 
ministers ever met in the framework of the 
Seven in such circumstances. 
9. Yet it has often seemed that crises arising 
outside Europe might be most detrimental to 
relations between WEU member countries and 
neither consultations between representatives of 
governments in NATO nor those sometimes 
held in the context of European political 
co-operation were fully able to take the place of 
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those which could have been held in 
WEU. The first in fact were mainly consulta-
tions between the United States and its allies and 
could not achieve a truly European consensus 
when that might be necessary. The second 
practically excluded from the consultations the 
steps to be taken to implement any joint deci-
sions taken if they implied recourse to force. 
10. It is true that the commitments stemming 
from the modified Brussels Treaty imply no mil-
itary action outside Europe. The WEU member 
countries have moreover adopted extremely dif-
ferent positions of principle in regard to the pos-
sibility of using their armed forces outside 
Europe. For instance, its basic law forbids the 
Federal Republic to take any action of this kind, 
whereas the United Kingdom and France have 
forces permanently stationed overseas, have con-
cluded defensive alliances with certain third 
countries and have intervened on several occa-
sions since the end of the second world war in 
various areas of the world. Italy, the Nether-
lands and Belgium, without totally banning 
them, have limited such actions as far as possible 
in recent years but have taken part in certain 
operations under the aegis of the United Nations 
or, in the case of Italy, of the multinational buf-
fer force in Beirut. 
11. The question inevitably arises therefore a.s 
to what extent countries bound by an alliance 
involving extremely strict commitments in 
Europe can launch themselves unilaterally into 
operations outside Europe which may lead to 
unforeseeable situations which may bring them 
into opposition with each other or have repercus-
sions on peace in Europe itself. In any event, 
any redeployment or major losses among the 
forces of one or other of its members will reflect 
on the deployment of alliance forces as a whole 
and thereby weaken them. 
12. Among recent affairs, the Falklands crisis 
in 1982 involved several of these drawbacks 
since the British expeditionary force included 
parts of units withdrawn from the Rhine Army 
and, above all, warships normally assigned to the 
defence of the North Sea. The latter suffered 
losses which the Royal Navy has not yet been 
able to replace in full. Finally, some of these 
losses were caused by missiles manufactured in 
France and sold by France to Argen-
tina. Furthermore, the procurement of such 
missiles by Peru at the very time the British and 
Argentinian forces came to grips seems to have 
made it possible for Peru to pass these arms on 
to Argentina, further adding to the losses of the 
Royal Navy. 
13. Less serious for the cohesion of WEU was 
the deployment of British, French and Italian 
forces with the multinational buffer force in 
Beirut in 1984, where they were at the side of 
American forces. However, the conditions in 
which these units were deployed and their subse-
quent withdrawal following attacks on the Amer-
ican and French contingents precluded the 
co-ordination which would have been essential 
for the force to achieve maximum 
efficiency. Although there was almost a consen-
sus in Europe in favour of their deployment, this 
action was never expressed as a joint step by the 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance or of WEU. 
14. The third matter in which a WEU member 
country has been involved recently is that of 
Chad, where France, in application of its treaty 
of alliance with Chad, sent a force in 1983 to sup-
port the army of the Chad Government, threat-
ened by Chad insurgents backed by Libya. It 
was learned that the French intervention was 
encouraged and assisted by the United States, 
but the latter was dissatisfied that France merely 
pushed the rebel forces back to the north of the 
country and did not try to prevent Libyan forces 
establishing themselves permanently in that 
area. Early in 1986, a further attempt by forces 
opposed to the Chad Government, with the 
active support of Libya, induced France to 
redeploy troops and equipment in that country, 
again with American support. The French air 
force led the bombing of an aerodrome occupied 
by the Libyan air force. As soon as the situation 
of Chad Government forces had recovered, the 
French forces deployed on Chad territory 
stopped playing an active role but they are still 
there and ready to intervene. 
15. These three operations and their repercus-
sions for Europe have been considered carefully 
by the WEU Assembly, where they have been the 
subject of major debates on reports by Mr. 
Cavaliere for the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments (Documents 907 and 935) 
on the Falklands affair, by Lord Reay for the 
General Affairs Committee (Documents 965 and 
978) on Lebanon and by Mr. Muller for the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee (Document 957) on 
Chad. These reports and the accompanying 
debates showed, not unanimous agreement, but 
the Assembly's broad understanding for coun-
tries which had taken the initiative of armed 
intervention. They showed that it was possible 
to reach a very wide consensus in these areas 
between the elected representatives of the peo-
ples of the seven member countries. 
16. It may therefore be wondered why the gov-
ernments for their part have not applied Article 
VIII of the treaty and above all why those who 
have taken up arms have done nothing to inform 
their allies of their intentions or possibly to ask 
them for their moral and diplomatic 
support. This would probably have avoided 
misunderstandings which were regrettable for 
European cohesion and, in most cases at least, 
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it is very easy to understand why a government 
intending to take armed action wishes to move 
with the utmost discretion and secrecy right up 
to zero hour, there can be no explanation for that 
government not reaching agreement with its per-
manent allies at the appropriate time. 
1 7. According to information received by the 
Assembly, the only consultations held by the 
Council on these matters related to its answers to 
Assembly recommendations. In other words, it 
tackled questions a long time after they had been 
settled and probably only in order to find a 
wording which was sufficienrtly vague and ambi-
guous to allow it to obtain the necessary unani-
mous vote. It is clear that even if there is some 
interest in resorting to such methods, this has lit-
tle to do with the consultations provided for in 
Article VIII of the treaty. 
18. Moreover, the Council regularly justifies 
its lack of action by invoking consultations held 
or which could have been held in NATO. Thus, 
in its answer to Recommendation 391 on the 
Falklands crisis it said: 
" ... The detailed consequences for NATO 
of the deployment of1British forces to the 
South Atlantic will be discussed within the 
alliance as part of the normal planning 
process ... 
As regards the implications for members 
ofthe alliance of events beyond the NATO 
area which threaten vital allied interests, 
and in particular the consequences for 
NATO of deployment outside the area to 
meet such threats, the Council note that 
these are already under study in the 
alliance. The Council emphasise that the 
question of consultation within the alli-
ance on threats outside the NATO area to 
the purely national interests of allies is a 
matter for ad hoc dee~:ision at the time. 
Insofar as the accurate assessment of infor-
mation permitting the early identification 
of attack is concerned, the Council wish to 
stress that this activity represents a contin-
uing concern of the alliance. 
The Council note the Assembly's interest 
in the field of policy concerning the export 
of defence equipment to non-allied coun-
tries, and stress in this regard that policy 
on the export of arms is a matter for indi-
vidual countries, although consultation on 
the subject takes place within the alliance 
when appropriate. " 
ensured an expression of European solidarity 19. As for the economic aspects of the crisis, 
which would have enhanced their position in the i.e. the answers to be given to Latin American 
battle area and throughout the world. Although countries whose trade with Western Europe was 
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seriously affected at that time, the same answer 
shows that these matters were examined in the 
EEC. The answers to Recommendations 403 
and 412 on the Middle East refer to examination 
of the situation in the area only in the context 
of European political consultations. Only the 
answer to Recommendation 402 men-
tions exchanges of views among the Seven with-
out specifying, however, what they were about or 
in what framework they were held. It says that: 
" ... The member countries of WEU can-
not remain indifferent to the crises which 
develop in Africa, especially when outside 
interference or intervention are 
involved. They have on various occa-
sions exchanged views on this subject... " 
20. The Assembly has never criticised the gov-
ernments' view that the commitment to hold 
consultations under Article VIII of the treaty 
should be exercised in the widest possible con-
text, provided the Council does not relinquish its 
responsibilities and testifies to this by keeping 
the Assembly duly informed of such 
consultations. However, it would appear that 
in many cases the choice of wider frameworks 
than WEU has not allowed exchanges of views 
among the Seven to lead to measures satisfactory 
for their security, either because the framework 
chosen did not allow consideration of military 
action or because such action depended too 
much on the American allies. Making consulta-
tions a normal, habitual activity is not just a 
matter which concerns Europe's security, it also 
enhances the cohesion of Europe, which is essen-
tial for the establishment of a future European 
union. 
21. It was therefore normal that, insofar as it 
was intended to make WEU a European pillar of 
the alliance, the Rome declaration should have 
asked the Council effectively to apply Article 
VIII. But, as far as your Rapporteur knows, 
this has hardly been followed up. 
22. However, it should be recalled that, from 
the days of their colonial empires, a number of 
member countries have commitments which 
they cannot easily relinquish but which do not 
directly concern the other member 
countries. First, certain territories, always 
small, often islands, have remained dependent 
on their former parent state with various statutes 
and generally with the consent of the popula-
tion or at least a majority of that 
population. However, many of them are exper-
iencing disturbances from within, as in the case 
of French New Caledonia, or from without as in 
the case of the British Falklands or of Mayotte, 
which was separated from the Comoro Islands 
when that archipelago became inde-
pendent. Generally speaking, the principle of 
maintaining a link between the parent state and 
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its former colonies is criticised by many coun-
tries which themselves are former colonies. 
23. The modified Brussels Treaty extends the 
guarantee of its Article V only to the territories of 
member countries located in Europe, which 
includes Gibraltar, but excludes the other depen-
dent territories of European countries. It is 
therefore for each country to deal with any prob-
lems stemming from its dependencies due to 
external threats or internal difficulties. The 
Falklands problem was a matter for British sov-
ereignty and France, without any attempt to con-
sult its allies, and without interference from 
them, is handling the problems raised by the sta-
tus of New Caledonia. 
24. Nevertheless, even in cases of this kind, 
the existence of a defensive alliance as formed by 
the modified Brussels Treaty implies, in your 
Rapporteur's opinion, a number of commit-
ments for each and every signatory. 
25. (a) Member countries with overseas terri-
tories must take account, in their attitude, of the 
sensibilities of public opinion among their 
partners. For instance, to introduce ethnic dis-
crimination in any territory dependent on a 
WEU country would be completely unacceptable 
to the others and would jeopardise 
solidarity. In other words, it is an obligation for 
WEU countries facing such situations to seek 
democratic solutions and humane ways of han-
dling local problems. Moreover, it cannot be 
said that any member country is at present 
infringing this principle systematically, even if 
there may have been occasional regrettable inci-
dents. 
26. (b) If member countries with difficulties 
in their overseas territories took the trouble to 
inform and consult the other members ofWEU, 
it might lead to mutual declarations of solidarity 
of principle, moral support and even, where 
appropriate, joint measures such as temporary 
economic assistance or decisions not to supply 
arms in general, or at least certain categories of 
arms, to powers with which they were directly or 
indirectly in conflict. Without such demonstra-
tions of solidarity, the very content of the treaty, 
with its Articles V and VIII, would lose credibil-
ity because of the tension which would inevitably 
emerge between the signatory countries to the 
detriment of the deterrent aspect. The positions 
adopted by the Assembly on such matters as the 
Falklands war showed that its members were 
fully aware of this twofold obligation. 
27. (c) This means constantly exchanging 
information on the problems which may arise in 
these territories, on the threats which may affect 
them, on the parent states' intentions and on the 
probable reactions of other countries to develop-
ments in those territories. This is precisely 
what should be done in the WEU Council but 
never has been done. 
28. A second case concerns the various trea-
ties of alliance and agreements associating one or 
more WEU member countries with third coun-
tries. These are governed by Article VII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, which specifies that: 
" The high contracting parties declare, 
each so far as he is concerned, that none of 
the international engagements now in 
force between him and any other of the 
high contracting parties or any third state 
is in conflict with the provisions of the 
present treaty. 
None of the high contracting parties will 
conclude any alliance or participate in any 
coalition directed against any other of the 
high contracting parties. " 
29. This is an important provision of the 
treaty since it implies certain limits on member 
countries' right to enter into commitments vis-a-
vis other powers. It is normal insofar as such 
commitments may lead to one of them becoming 
involved in conflicts which may have repercus-
sions in Europe itself. 
30. The most important case is that of France 
which, when it granted independence to a num-
ber of African countries, concluded treaties of 
alliance with several of them. These alliances 
form part of France's overall policy which has 
economic, cultural and financial as well as mili-
tary aspects. They have led the French Govern-
ment to ask for and obtain support from the 
entire European Community for a policy of 
development assistance which now concerns 
very many states, not all of which are African, far 
from it. They have also resulted in France hav-
ing to maintain several military bases on the ter-
ritory of some of its allies to allow it, if necessary, 
to intervene on behalf of any of them which may 
be attacked, as in Chad. This French military 
guarantee is of real importance because it allows 
many West African countries to keep their mili-
tary budgets very low and to remain among 
those spending the smallest percentage of their 
GNP on defence, thus avoiding the plague which 
military expenditure constitutes for many devel-
oping countries. 
31. However, this French policy in fact indi-
rectly commits France's allies. In an affair such 
as that of Chad, the whole of Western Europe is 
liable to share the drawbacks which a conflict 
with Kadhafi's Libya may have for France. 
32. Here, too, your Rapporteur foresees no 
radical change in the situation, but he wishes to 
recall that the conditions to which action by the 
Seven is subject where their respective overseas 
territories are concerned should also govern the 
policy of all of them outside the North Atlantic 
Treaty area. Reciprocal information, support 
and consultations are as necessary in this second 
case as in the first. But it has to be noted that 
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this is not done and that France did not use the 
WEU Council to consult its partners over Chad 
any more than the United Kingdom did in the 
case of the Falklands. Similjlrly, neither France, 
Italy, Belgium or the NetMrlands bothered to 
inform its WEU partners of commitments they 
had entered into under the aegis of the United 
Nations. 
33. A third question is raised by arms supplies 
to third countries. This is obviously not a 
merely commercial question ~ince, in view of the 
sophistication of modern wtapons, the systems 
procured are complex and require training for 
those who have to use them. Sales of arms 
therefore imply co-operation between buyer and 
seller over a period of several years which may 
involve sellers in conflicts outside Europe much 
earlier than they wish. Certain countries may 
be tempted to promote the\r sales of arms for 
purely economic reasons, in spite of possi-
ble major military and political 
repercussions. Moreover, the necessary devel-
opment of European armaments co-operation no 
longer allows each participant in eo-production 
to ignore its partners when concluding agree-
ments involving the supply of arms. 
34. This is a most delicate area since govern-
ments and firms are often intent on being as dis-
creet as possible about their arms trade and wish 
to keep a free hand in the matter; the WEU 
member countries respect different principles 
and their political options are not the 
same. Your Rapporteur will examine later 
these aspects of the problem in regard to the 
Near and Middle East where differences are the 
greatest. 
35. It therefore seems very unrealistic to try to 
make member countries' arms trade subject to 
any form of control by the WEU 
Council. However, it may. be hoped that the 
studies conducted by the international secretariat 
of the Standing Armaments Committee on the 
conditions for European co-operation in this 
field will lead to harmonisation of the legal con-
ditions governing the arms trade in WEU mem-
ber countries. But it is clear that, first and fore-
most, a rapprochement of the policies pursued in 
sensitive areas may induce governments to take 
account of their partners' positions. As matters 
now stand, there is far more chance of action 
taken in application of Article VIII of the treaty 
preventing the WEU countries from playing an 
undesirable or dangerous role in conflicts outside 
the North Atlantic Treaty area than action based 
on a wish to restrict the su11>ply of arms. 
36. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that 
so far the application, to say the least restrictive, 
of Article VIII does not correspond to the voca-
tion of WEU and that the decision to revive the 
organisation will remain a dead letter if the 
Council fails to give greater content than hereto-
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fore to the section of the Rome declaration relat-
ing to problems outside the North Atlantic 
Treaty area in view of the fact that there is no 
WEU area and that the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerns all threats to Europe's security wher-
ever they may arise in the world. 
Ill. The Gulf war 
3 7. Problems arising from the Gulf war cannot 
be separated from developments in the interna-
tional situation throughout southern Asia. The 
continued presence of the Soviet army in 
Afghanistan and the pursuit of the war in that 
country mean that everything that occurs in the 
Gulf area may very quickly affect the vital inter-
ests of a great power and consequently 
internationalise a war which has already lasted 
too long in an extremely sensitive area. 
38. In December 1984, the Assembly adopted 
Recommendation 412 on the consequences of 
the Gulf war submitted by Mr. Blaauw on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee. The Assem-
bly strongly endorsed this report and the Coun-
cil's reply showed that, even if it had not been 
very active in this matter, the policies pursued by 
the seven member countries were not fundamen-
tally different from the one advocated by the 
Assembly. 
39. It is remarkable that the military opera-
tions have since led to no major changes in the 
situation in the area and in 1985 the Assembly 
was able to reiterate all the elements of the 
recommendation adopted in 1984. However, it 
would appear that certain facts might change this 
situation drastically in 1986. 
40. (a) The importance of the Gulf for 
Europe's oil supplies has diminished considera-
bly and the trends dominating the international 
oil market changed radically in 1985. On the 
one hand, the exchange rate for the United States 
dollar fell by more than 25% in one year com-
pared with most European currencies. This led 
to a corresponding drop in the price of oil 
imported from the Middle East for European 
buyers since oil prices are expressed in 
dollars. Moreover, prices themselves have 
fallen very considerably since, on 1st April 1986, 
they were around $10 a barrel compared with 
more than $30 at the end of 1984. Overall, the 
cost of oil calculated in most European curren-
cies has fallen by more than 75% in just over a 
year, which has profoundly disturbed the mar-
ket. 
41. There are many reasons for this 
disturbance. First, there has been a major 
increase in oil-producing capacity throughout the 
world. The large increase in prices as from 
October 1973 encouraged prospection and pro-
duction and supplies now considerably exceed 
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demand. Furthermore, demand itself has 
fallen, particularly in Europe, because economic 
growth has slowed down or is marking time and 
new sources of energy, especially nuclear, have 
been developed. More than 50% of electricity 
now produced in Western Europe is supplied by 
nuclear power stations. 
42. In the Middle East itself, while certain pro-
ducer countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have 
made a considerable effort to bolster prices by 
reducing production, they have not been fol-
lowed by all their OPEC partners or, a fortiori, 
by the new producers, many of which have not 
joined that organisation. Iraq for its part 
needed to push its sales back up to a high level so 
as to meet the cost of the war which is continuing 
and it has built a pipeline allowing crude oil from 
the Mosul basin to be delivered in a Turkish 
port, Dortyol. Another pipeline, towards Saudi 
Arabia, was opened in September 1985 and a 
third is under construction towards Aqaba in 
Jordan to provide a direct outlet in the Red Sea 
for oil from southern Iraq. Thus, Iraqi produc-
tion, which was 3.2 million barrels per day 
before the war, fell to 700,000 barrels in 1982 
after the destruction of the Fao terminal and 
Syria's closure of the Kirkuk-Banyas 
pipeline. Iraq can now export 1.5 million bar-
rels per day and its oil revenue rose from $9,000 
million in 1982 to $11,500 million in 
1985. However, its position is again threatened 
by the fall in oil prices, while its debts amount to 
$40,000 million of which $25,000 million to the 
Gulf Arab countries, although the latter may not 
be too demanding as long as the war 
lasts. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are in fact 
already contributing to Iraq's war effort by giving 
it the proceeds of the sale of 310,000 barrels of 
oil per day. However, Iraq has had to reduce its 
imports considerably to a figure of no more than 
$12 million in 1985 compared with $20 million 
before the war. In view of the considerable 
increase in defence procurement, the repercus-
sions of this reduction on civil investment and 
consumption are easy to imagine. 
43. Conversely, Iraqi bombing of the Kharg 
oil terminal, whose capacity fell from 1.5 million 
barrels per day before the war to 600,000 barrels 
in February 1986, after the bombing of Abadan, 
has considerably reduced Iran's export 
capacity. But the latter's threats to oil shipping 
along the southern coast of the Gulf led to reac-
tions from the coastal Arab states which, for a 
time, deterred Iran, whose air force is still rela-
tively weak, from seriously following up these 
threats. However, at the end of March 1986 
there was a further outbreak of Iranian air raids 
on tankers serving the southern coast of the 
Gulf. Iran is apparently trying to make the 
Arab countries in the area bring pressure to bear 
on Iraq to stop its operations against Iranian 
tankers and in particular those which run a shut-
tle service between the Kharg terminal and the 
floating terminal at Sinni in the south of the Gulf 
and out of range of Iraqi aircraft. This shuttle 
service, designed to allow oil from Kharg to be 
taken away in international tankers, is believed 
to have been seriously damaged in the early 
months of 1986. In any event, attacks on the 
high seas against ships of non-belligerent coun-
tries already constitute an extension of the war 
with a strong risk of it spreading even further. 
44. The present fall in oil prices is liable 
to have far-reaching effects on the 
market. Production costs in Saudi Arabia are 
low enough for it to be able, by increasing out-
put, to compete fiercely with countries in which 
costs are far higher, particularly the United King-
dom and Norway, and to make European oil and 
natural gas exporters lose much of their profits, 
natural gas prices being linked with those of 
oil. Another consequence might be to end oil 
company investments in new sites, as the Nor-
wegian authorities told the committee when it 
visited Oslo, which would perhaps lead to higher 
prices in the long term. In any event, prices 
may remain low for several years and the Middle 
East countries will find it difficult to recover 
their former share of world production. 
45. Two consequences of this new situation 
are worthy of note: first, the scarcity of oil is no 
longer making Europe press for the restoration of 
peace in the Gulf, although for political and 
humanitarian reasons it must do its utmost to 
help to bring the war to an end. Second, Iran 
and Iraq are finding it increasingly difficult to 
pay for an expensive war and the latter country's 
debts have increased dangerously in spite of the 
assistance it receives from several of its Arab 
neighbours. 
46. (b) After a long period during which large-
scale military operations were rare and air raids 
limited, on 9th February 1986 Iran launched a 
major offensive in southern Iraq and occupied 
the port of Fao which on the one hand considera-
bly limits Iraq's access to the Gulf and on the 
other brings Iranian forces closer to the frontier 
of Kuwait. Iraq has counter-attacked in the 
area but seems to be advancing very 
slowly. There are considerable losses on both 
sides. 
47. This new operation led to a re-emergence 
of the violations of the laws of war noted in Mr. 
Blaauw's report and in particular there seems no 
doubt that Iraq is using chemical weapons. For 
the first time since the war started, the United 
Nations Security Council firmly condemned 
Iraq, on 21st March 1986, for using chemical 
weapons following an inquiry conducted in Iran 
by a group of international experts. According 
to Iran, more than 12,000 Iranian soliders were 
victims of these weapons during the fighting in 
February 1986. This is a fact to which the inter-
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national community cannot remain indifferent 
or passive. The United States Government, not 
known for its sympathy towards Iran, has 
expressed its disapproval and Europe should do 
likewise. There are also r~ports of large-scale 
badly-armed fanatical forces!ofthe Iranian army 
being launched into offensiies where they have 
suffered very heavy losses, b~t to the best of your 
Rapporteur's knowledge, there has as yet been no 
sign of adolescents being used in the 1986 offen-
sive. 
48. (c) Iranian opponents of the regime set up 
by Ayatollah Khomeini have revealed a number 
of atrocities committed by the Iranian Govern-
ment against persons suspected, rightly or 
wrongly, of being against the regime. Lists 
issued by the Iranian opponents seem to prove 
that there have been 12,000 victims of 
repression. They have also revealed the exis-
tence of a widespread, active resistance move-
ment in certain parts of Iran, particularly 
Kurdistan. It has also been reported that since 
summer 1985 the Iranian Government has been 
using intensive propaganda to recruit " volun-
teers " who are sent to the front in spite of only 
cursory training and with inadequate weapons 
and equipment, among whom there are said to 
be heavy losses. 
49. But there are also reports of disturbances 
and repression among the Kurd population in 
Iraq. However, information available to inter-
national public opinion is too rare and unreliable 
to justify making a protest. The least might be 
to call upon these two countries to agree to the 
free circulation of persons and, by this means, of 
the more or less objective information which can 
be given by the international press covering 
events on their territory. Iraq for its part con-
tinues to receive correspondents from foreign 
newspapers in the theatre of operations, while 
Iran does its utmost to prevent the presence of 
such witnesses in the midst of its armed 
forces. 
50. Your Rapporteur considers that the infor-
mation now available to him, however respect-
able some of his sources may be - others seem 
more questionable, particularly in view of the 
divisions between opposition movements in Iran 
and the influence which Iraq may have on some 
of them - is not complete enough for him to be 
able to propose that the Aissembly specifically 
condemn the policy pursued by one or other of 
the belligerents within its frontiers. There 
seems to be no doubt that there is an active 
opposition, particularly in Iran, but too little is 
known about the scale of rejection of the present 
regime and of repression for him to try to make a 
valid assessment. 
51. (d) The continuation of the war and even 
more the Iranian offensive in February 1986 
have drawn the neighbouring Arab countries in 
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the Gulf increasingly closer both to give indirect 
support, mainly through large-scale financial 
assistance, to Iraq's cause and to protect them-
selves against possible Iranian moves. 
52. For this purpose, some of these countries 
have started to build up their defence capability 
very considerably and, in December 1984, the 
countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
announced the creation of an integrated joint 
force of 12,000 men under Saudi command. In 
spring 1985, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait drew up 
plans for mobilising their entire populations. In 
January, Saudi Arabia concluded a particularly 
important contract with France for the procure-
ment of an anti-aircraft defence system costing 
some $4,500 million and it has taken part in 
joint air force manoeuvres with Qatar, Bahrein 
and Kuwait. The deterrent effect of these mea-
sures was not sufficient since in May two 
Kuwaiti oil tankers and one Saudi tanker were 
attacked by the Iranian air force. On 5th June, 
for the first time, the Saudi air force intervened 
directly and shot down two Iranian aircraft over 
Saudi territory, while the United States Govern-
ment proposed to sell Saudi Arabia 1,200 Stinger 
surface-to-air missiles and 200 launchers. 
53. However, opposition in Congress pre-
vented the United States supplying Kuwait with 
surface-to-air missiles and in July 1985 the latter 
therefore turned to the Soviet Union to buy mili-
tary equipment. It had to respond to concern 
over the hijacking of a Kuwaiti civil aircraft to 
Teheran, the spread of Iranian air raids on ship-
ping along the southern coast ofthe Gulf and the 
steady deterioration in relations between these 
countries and Iran. 
54. Generally speaking, the pursuit of the Gulf 
war played an important part in grouping the 
Arab countries in two blocs in 1985, which was 
not without consequences for the Palestinian and 
Lebanese conflict: while Libya and Syria sup-
ported the Iranian cause, provoked a serious 
schism in the PLO and afforded more or less 
open support for a number of terrorist operations 
against Israel and many western countries, Jor-
dan, Egypt and all the Gulf countries, which were 
allies, at least until January 1986, of the official 
PLO, provided Iraq with economic and financial 
support and strengthened their means of defence 
against Iran and certain Islamic fundamentalist 
elements which afforded Iran active support. 
55. (e) Although there now seems to be a seri-
ous threat of the war spreading to certain coun-
tries round the Gulf, it must be noted that the 
cated weapons to moderate Arab countries 
because of Congress's hostility to such plans, has 
helped to give them the economic means they 
need, in particular by promoting the construc-
tion of the pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea. It 
has also supplied Iraq with fifty helicopters. 
56. It is as if both, feeling powerless to bring 
the war to an end, above all fear an expansion of 
the Iranian revolution and are trying to stop it 
spreading until such time as Iran is prepared to 
negociate a return to peace in conditions accept-
able to Iraq. Naturally, there may be new 
developments in the war, but there seems to be 
nothing in the international situation against the 
opening of peace negotiations, which Iraq con-
tinues to request, and which Iran continues to 
make subject to the departure of President 
Saddam Hussein, an attitude which is moreover 
implicitly condemned in the Security Council 
resolution of 21st March 1986. 
57. (f) Europe is not in a position to play an 
active role in the Gulf war. It can therefore take 
no spectacular steps to promote a return to peace 
which would be in its interests for mainly politi-
cal, not economic, reasons. It has excellent 
grounds for wanting the end of hostilities, not 
only because it disapproves of this murderous 
and seemingly endless war but also because it 
wants to find stable, peaceful partners in the 
Middle East and has every reason to fear that an 
event connected with the war may induce one of 
the two great powers to become more deeply 
involved and raise the Gulf war to the dimension 
of an international war. 
58. In such circumstances, your Rapporteur 
fears that over-active steps, even if solely aimed 
at a return to peace or even in favour of the 
opposition in one or other belligerent country, 
might have effects contrary to what Europe 
wants. However much respect one may have 
for the cause of the Iranian resistants to 
Khomeini's dictatorship, it cannot make one for-
get that Iraq, which started the war, has acted 
against the laws of war. Neither the fact that the 
Iranian regime is being challenged from within, 
nor the debatable methods it uses to recruit and 
fanaticise its troops, nor its recourse to terrorist 
action abroad nor, finally, the concern to main-
tain some degree of balance which alone can 
guarantee the survival and integrity of the Gulf 
countries should make Europe take measures 
which might internationalise the war and force 
the great powers to depart from the reserve 
which they have so far shown. 
two great powers have so far avoided anything 59. This obviously does not imply that Europe 
which might involve them in the must refrain from taking part in attempts by the 
hostilities. Both seem to fear Iranian expansion United Nations, and by its Security Council in 
which would destabilise the region and, while the particular, where in February 1986 there was a 
Soviet Union is still the principal supplier of unanimous vote in favour of a resolution calling 
arms to Iraq, the United States Government, on the good offices of the Secretary-General to 
frustrated in its intentions to deliver sophisti- obtain a cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces of 
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both sides behind their frontiers and mediation 
on every aspect of the war. Iran rejected this 
text, which was accepted by Iraq. It was very 
similar to the one adopted at the beginning of the 
same month by the League of Arab States, in 
spite of opposition by Syria and Libya. 
60. (g) From quite another standpoint, the 
fact that the superiority of the Iraqi army due to 
the standard of command and its ability to use 
sophisticated conventional weapons has not 
allowed it to beat the more numerous but less 
well-armed and less well-trained army deployed 
by Iran, is probably worthy of analysis and per-
haps might undermine the dominant western 
concepts which attribute great importance to the 
ability to use very sophisticated weapons. Your 
Rapporteur is certainly not in a position to draw 
military conclusions from developments in the 
war, about which he lacks information, but he 
wishes European experts in the use of arms to 
conduct a critical study so as to draw the neces-
sary conclusions for the security of Europe. 
IV. International terrorism 
61. In the last twenty years, there has been a 
remarkable rise in terrorist activities in many 
parts of the world, and particularly Western 
Europe, in the form of assassinations of well-
known people or individuals considered to repre-
sent a social group, the taking of hostages, the 
hijacking of aircraft and bomb attacks. This 
was obviously not a new phenomenon for there 
have always been actions of this type and there 
have been several periods of crisis in history, an 
instance being the international anarchist move-
ment at the end of the nineteenth century. But 
the present recrudescence is evident, even if it 
does not seem possible to reduce the causes to a 
simple factor. This was what led the Presiden-
tial Committee to ask the General Affairs Com-
mittee to consider the matter in the present 
report, particularly because of the many serious 
actions carried out at the end of 1985. The ter-
rorists seem to enjoy the complicity or support of 
certain states, sometimes because their activities 
may be of benefit to the specific interests of one 
of them, but also because others seem to wish to 
take advantage of international disorder in order 
to destabilise western society. 
62. Consequently, and also because available 
information about the instigators of terrorist 
action is often vague and questionable, it is diffi-
cult to draw up an inventory of motives or 
DOCUMENT 105 7 
presenting and defending them. Your 
Rapporteur does not intend to consider that 
motivation can serve as an excuse for actions 
which are to be condemne~ from every point of 
view and which should be a disservice to the 
causes they claim to sup~ort. He considers 
nevertheless that examinafon of these motives 
can help to grasp the phen mena and find ways 
to counter them. 
63. (a) Many attacks in Europe are attributa-
ble, at least so their perpetrators claim, to internal 
state matters or to the harshness of relations 
between two states: be they Irish, Corsican, 
Basque, Moluccan or Mafiosi, it is for the coun-
tries concerned alone to tackle the problems 
which those who use terrorist methods claim to 
be raising. 
64. On several occasions, however, it has been 
clear that some of them had been trained in 
specialised centres, particularly in Libya and 
Lebanon or even Iran since Khomeini's regime 
came to power and, perhaps, in Syria. The 
Americans also sometimes. quote Latin Ameri-
can countries such· as Cuba and 
Nicaragua. These countrries seem to have 
encouraged a number of 1terrorist operations, 
which at first sight had nothing to do with their 
national interests, by provi~ing the perpetrators 
of attacks with false identity papers or even arms 
and closing their eyes to the way these docu-
ments were used and to the fact that the arms left 
their territory. The same countries have often 
been accused of taking in hijackers of civil air-
craft and thus encouraging the spread of this type 
of action. 
65. Apart from the latter case, the responsibil-
ity of these countries is generally very difficult to 
prove. But insofar as it can be proved, the 
necessary arrangements should obviously be 
made to deter them from complicity in 
terrorism. Even if the terrorists' motives do not 
concern international society and the repression 
of their acts is solely a matter for the police and 
justice of the countries which are their victims 
and for the extradition agreements they may 
have concluded with countries where terrorists 
take refuge, the participatic:m, even indirect, of 
external countries in the arming, training, flight 
and hiding of perpetrator~ of attacks raises a 
more general problem for in~ernational society as 
a whole and in particular for all the countries of 
Western Europe since no unilateral gesture is 
enough to deter them from pursuing their work 
of destabilising the West. 
acts. Much of the discontent or internal conflict 66. Terrorism stemming from internal state 
in certain countries results in terrorist actions by matters or relations between two states is proba-
a kind of contagion spread by the press, radio bly not to be feared the most because only a 
and television: violent action, when presented small number of countries feel responsible for 
daily to the public, seems to be a " natural " way the situation. It is possible for them to tackle 
of appealing to public opinion for certain causes, the political problem raised and, while repressing 
even in countries where there are legal ways of terrorist action, to try to remove the causes. In 
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this connection, the conclusion of an agreement 
between the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of Ireland on 15th November 1985 should be 
welcomed. This relates to the status of North-
ern Ireland and the establishment of an 
intergovernmental conference to examine mat-
ters at issue between the two countries, develop 
co-operation and take the necessary preventive 
and repressive measures to terminate 
terrorism. 
67. (b) Another type of terrorist action ema-
nates from groups which are generally small but 
whose desire to use every means to destroy the 
order on which western society is based seems to 
have been exacerbated in the last twenty years. 
The fact that some of them subscribe to fascist 
ideology and others claim to be to the extreme 
left and close to anarchism makes little diffe-
rence but even if these groups act under different 
names from one country to another (Rote Armee 
Fraktion in Germany, Action directe in France, 
Prima Linea and Red Brigades in Italy, Cellules 
communistes combattantes in Belgium, unknown 
groups in Luxembourg, etc.), there is quite 
obviously active international complicity, at least 
within each of the two ideological families. 
It allows the exchange of hiding places, weapons, 
explosives or even persons between the groups 
and helps them to evade national police forces. 
68. In this case, it is not so much a state and 
its policy towards a specific point that are chal-
lenged as the general direction of western society, 
liberal capitalism and the system of defence 
which ensures Europe's security, particularly 
NATO, which are the targets. For instance, it is 
no secret that a booby-trapped car parked at the 
seat ofWEU in Paris in August 1984 would have 
caused considerable damage and inevitably vic-
tims if the firing device had worked. Other 
attacks on national or international civil and 
military installations have taken place in several 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance which 
are also members of WEU. Political, economic 
and military leaders have been assassinated. 
69. It is not easy to determine who manipu-
lates these terrorist groups, guides their actions, 
trains them, arms them and chooses the 
victims. It would appear that in many cases 
Near or Middle East countries, including Libya 
and Lebanon, have taken in members of these 
groups and trained them on their 
territory. However, the reasons why countries 
in that area should protect and encourage such 
terrorism are not very clear, apart from a vague, 
general intention to destabilise the West. 
70. According to certain press reports, an 
international conference of the international 
centre for the fight against imperialism, racism, 
zionism, reaction and fascism was held in a bar-
racks in the suburbs ofTripoli from 14th to 18th 
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March 1986. It is believed to have been 
attended by official representatives from coun-
tries such as Cuba and Syria and of political par-
ties in power such as the Algerian FLN and the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and leaders of cer-
tain opposition parties and various autonomist, 
separatist and revolutionary move-
ments. Addressing the conference on 15th 
March, President Kadhafi is reported to have 
called for the creation of an international revolu-
tionary army to wage war on imperialism, parti-
cularly American and French, the creation of a 
Nuremberg tribunal against zionism and the 
revolt of the 400,000 negroes in the American 
army. Among the statements by the President 
of Libya, the one to the Chad GUNT has been 
quoted, in which he said a united socialist fight-
ing front had just been achieved, directed by the 
Soviet Union, a worldwide front consisting of 
small groups and states, revolutionary move-
ments and political organisations and progres-
sive regimes and revolutionary guerrilla move-
ments. 
71. This conference and the statements made 
probably explain the uncompromising attitude 
adopted by the United States at the end of March 
on the occasion of the American Sixth Fleet's 
manoeuvres in the Gulf of Sirte. The Libyan 
Government is known to claim rights to the 
whole of this gulf while the international com-
munity does not accept the unilateral extension 
of a state's territorial waters beyond twelve nau-
tical miles from its coasts. This did not prevent 
Libya from launching surface-to-air missiles 
against American aircraft in the area it is 
attempting to appropriate, after which the 
United States took action against Libyan war-
ships and missile sites. At least one Libyan 
naval launch was sunk. These American reac-
tions were considered excessive by those who 
saw them merely as a response to what were after 
all moderate demonstrations by Libya to uphold 
its position with regard to the Gulf ofSirte. But 
there is every reason to think that this sharp 
reaction was also a response to the Tripoli con-
ference. 
72. The different ways the United States' vari-
ous allies reacted to this affair indicate that the 
former had probably not kept its partners well-
enough informed of its intentions. They also 
show that the United States' European partners 
had not had a satisfactory exchange of views on 
the situation Libya had created with the Tripoli 
conference, its claims to use arms to defend its 
unilateral positions in the Gulf of Sirte and also 
the new offensive launched by the GUNT in 
Chad with its support. 
73. In any event, several of the terrorist 
attacks perpetrated at the end of March and 
beginning of April 1986, for instance on a TW A 
aircraft between Rome and Athens and in a 
discotheque frequented by American soldiers in 
West Berlin, and the destruction of a Mexican 
Boeing 727 causing 176 deaths in Mexico on 31st 
March 1986, have been claimed by various ter-
rorist organisations as retaliation against the 
American reaction in the Gulf of Sirte. The 
American authorities have decoded a message of 
congratulations from President Kadhafi to the 
authors of the Berlin attack. This seems to con-
firm the close link between Libyan policy and the 
practice of terrorist action directed mainly 
against civilian populations and activities. 
74. There is every indication that the United 
States, which has said it will tackle the question 
of international terrorism and possible counter-
measures at the summit meeting of 
industrialised countries to be held in Tokyo at 
the beginning of May 1986, will try to press the 
West to pursue a strict policy towards Libya. It 
would be desirable for the European countries 
being represented at the summit meeting to con-
sult their partners beforehand, in WEU for 
instance, on how to address the links between 
Libya and international terrorism and the mea-
sures which should be taken to make that coun-
try give up actions which are unreasonable, mor-
ally unacceptable and dangerous for 
international peace. 
75. Some observers have revealed that objec-
tives designated by Soviet propaganda have 
often been the subject of attacks. This was so 
for the attempt against the seat of WEU follow-
ing attacks by the Tass Agency against the 
reactivation of the organisation. However this 
may be, direct links between terrorist groups and 
Soviet concerns have not been clearly proved, 
even if they were referred to in Colonel Kadhafi's 
address on 15th March 1986. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union has apparently also had attacks of 
this type in the last decade, but information 
about them is inadequate due to that country's 
systematic policy of blanketing everything relat-
ing to internal contestation. Only the attack on 
the Pope resulted in Bulgarian services being 
implicated, and they would obviously not have 
acted without Soviet encouragement, but at the 
trial in March 1986 the Italian jury considered 
the proof against these services was insufficient 
to warrant a conviction. 
76. At whatever level the decisions are taken, 
it is at least apparent that they seek to weaken 
the West's political, economic and military cohe-
sion and therefore play into the hands of its 
enemies. These attacks concern the defence of 
Europe and are a direct responsibility of WEU, 
even if the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 
Defence are not those who are generally called 
upon to fight terrorism. Faced with action at 
international level, consultation and 
co-ordination of information, methods and steps 
taken to fight terrorism are essential and should 
229 
DOCUMENT 105 7 
not be limited to occasional co-operation 
between police forces or the application of exist-
ing extradition treaties. The threat must be 
assessed, areas of activity studied and counter-
measures co-ordinated; this is a political matter 
directly affecting the security of Western 
Europe. 
77. (c) Another aspect of contemporary ter-
rorism is connected with Near or Middle East 
affairs and first of all the dispersion of Pales-
tinian refugees throughout the area. More 
recently, the Iranian revolution has given new 
impetus to this aspect. 
78. The fact that a large part ofthe Arab popu-
lation of Palestine fled or was chased off the ter-
ritory it occupied follo · ng successive wars 
between the Jewish and Ar b communities prior 
to 1949 and then between he state of Israel and 
its neighbours induced this population, deprived 
of national territory, to pu ue the fight by other 
means, terrorist operatio s being the most 
important. Attacks, first aimed at Jews and 
Israelis, subsequently spre d to Arab countries 
which did not seem to be 1rm enough towards 
Israel or came to terms wit it and later to west-
ern countries accused of roviding Israel with 
political, military or simpl moral assistance. 
79. In the last ten years the extension of the 
conflict to Lebanon, the p rsuit of a long civil 
war in that country and th n the Iranian revolu-
tion have made terrorist ac ivities so widespread 
that it is now difficult t determine who are 
behind the attacks, the ta ng of hostages, assas-
sinations or hijackings, w t their real aims are 
and what cause t ey are defend-
ing. Nevertheless, many of the most bloody 
and blind attacks seem to ave originated in the 
East. Most hijackings ha e also been the work 
of individuals or groups fi m that area. 
80. Western society has been forced to react 
with defence measures affi cting public freedom 
in all our countries in va ing degrees: searches 
in airports, guards on pub · c places, controls on 
roads and in public transp and greater flexibil-
ity in police practices sue as telephone tapping 
have become necessities. owever, they lead to 
psychological tension who e effects are difficult 
to assess but which are am ng the reasons for the 
anti-democratic reac ions within our 
societies. Even if the inse urity created directly 
by attacks is still limited, t eir destabilising effect 
and hence the propagand due to the fact that 
they are aimed at the We t's liberal civilisation 
are far from negligible. 
81. In this case as in t e previous one, any 
measures which can be ken by the national 
police forces, like the leg decisions taken, are 
quite inadequate because best they reach only 
the field operators. C nversely, retaliatory 
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action is of doubtful effect against blurred targets 
and persons whose responsibility has not been 
proved. Thus, the bombing of a PLO head-
quarters at Cartagena in the suburbs of Tunis by 
the Israeli air force harmed many Tunisian civil-
ians who had no responsibility in the 29th Sep-
tember 1985 attack at Larnaca to which the 
bombing was supposed to be a reprisal. It is 
therefore extremely difficult to practise an effec-
tive policy of defence against the dangers which 
threaten western society as a whole, and such a 
policy can be carried out only through a constant 
exchange of information and close co-operation 
between the countries concerned by the fight 
against terrorism. 
82. The many serious attacks which took place 
on 27th December 1985 at Vienna and Rome 
airports, the hijacking of several aircraft in the 
Mediterranean part of Europe, particularly the 
one on 24th November 1985 at Valetta which 
resulted in fifty-seven people being killed, and 
the hijacking of the Italian liner Achille Lauro 
brought out vast differences of views between the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance regarding the 
nature and aim of measures that should be taken 
to counter this fresh outbreak of ter-
rorism. While the United States accused Libya 
of bearing most of the responsibility for several 
of these operations, some European countries 
considered there was insufficient proof of 
responsibility to allow action against that 
country. Moreover, the United States used 
force to oppose the implementation of commit-
ments entered into by Italy to allow the Achille 
Lauro affair to be settled by forcing the aircraft 
repatriating the perpetrators of the hijacking 
which resulted in the murder of an American citi-
zen to land in Sicily. Although it would have 
been essential for the West to stand united in the 
face of terrorism and the countries backing it, 
serious differences have emerged between coun-
tries which had nevertheless agreed on the prin-
ciple of resisting the taking ofhostages and black-
mail. 
83. The matter was tackled in the context of 
European political consultations since on 27th 
January the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
twelve countries of the European Community 
adopted a declaration on international terrorism 
condemning the governments which supported 
terrorist acts. Two countries - Greece and 
Spain - are believed to have bitterly opposed any 
explicit reference to Libya. The document com-
prised two general commitments: 
- a decision not to export arms or other 
military equipment to countries which 
"are clearly implicated in supporting 
terrorism". The Twelve will examine 
in common the possibility of national 
measures in order to avoid a situation 
whereby such exports are hijacked for 
terrorist purposes; 
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- efforts to ensure that the citizens and 
industries of the Twelve do not " seek 
any commercial advantage from mea-
sures in reaction to terrorist attacks and 
other terrorist activities ", a clear refer-
ence to the non-replacement of Ameri-
cans who were to leave Libya as a result 
of retaliatory measures decided upon 
unilaterally by the V nited States. 
The Twelve have also decided to intensify their 
combined efforts concerning: 
- security at airports, ports and railway 
stations; 
- control by member states of people 
leaving or entering the Community and 
travelling within it; 
- policy on issuing visas with regard to 
the problem of terrorism; 
- abuse of diplomatic immunity. 
A permanent working group is to be given the 
task of monitoring the implementation of this 
common action. Italy has proposed that the 
group study the proposal to obtain a firm com-
mitment from all Twelve to refuse to refuel 
hijacked aircraft. Finally, the declaration con-
demns not only " the perpetrators, accomplices 
and instigators " but also the governments which 
support them and expresses the readiness of the 
Twelve to co-operate with all countries, includ-
ing those of the Mediterranean, in order to 
deprive all terrorists of support, shelter or refuge 
and affirms that "states that favour or protect 
terrorists cannot expect indulgence nor can they 
expect to have normal relations with the 
Twelve". 
84. The WEU Assembly welcomes the fact 
that the Twelve, which include the seven WEU 
countries, have managed to adopt such a joint 
declaration. It has reason to regret, however, 
that the latter did not adopt a position on the 
United States accusations against Libya. If the 
latter are considered to be well-founded, it is 
obvious that measures to deter Libya from con-
tinuing to support terrorist acts should be taken, 
inter alia by the European members of the Atlan-
tic Alliance adopting the economic boycott mea-
sures decided upon by the United States. If it is 
true that Spain and Greece, for reasons con-
nected with their own policy towards Arab coun-
tries, prevented the Twelve from openly con-
demning Libya or Syria insofar as there was no 
doubt about the responsibility of one of these 
countries, then it may be wondered whether the 
context of the Twelve was the best one for tack-
ling a question which is after all a security 
question. The WEU Council, which is smaller 
and where countries with a more homogeneous 
attitude are represented, would probably have 
been able to show greater firmness in this con-
nection. 
85. It is equally clear that even the occasional 
use by a WEU member state of methods cl?~e to 
terrorism, for whatever reasons, cannot facihtate 
the co-operation to which they must all 
contribute. The committee laid strong empha-
sis on this at its meeting on 17th March 1986. 
86. On the other hand, it is clear that when a 
country is placed in a crisis situation its gover~­
ment often has to face up to very heavy responsi-
bilities in view of the human lives at stake. In 
such conditions, even if generally speaking firm-
ness towards terrorists and takers of hostages is 
the policy which should be adopted, its allies 
cannot expect to impose their own assessment of 
the situation and the line of conduct to be 
adopted. Even less should they oppose the 
implementation of measures decided upon a.nd 
commitments entered into by a country which 
remains sovereign in the way it handles such 
problems. Thus, Italian protests at the United 
States air force intervention to prevent the 
implementation of measures which Italy had 
agreed upon in full knowledge. of the facts ~t th.e 
time of the Achille Lauro affau seem fully JUSti-
fied. 
87. But the problem of terrorism stemming 
from conflicts in the Near and Middle East is not 
only a matter of decisions taken in time of 
crisis. Generally speaking, it is a matter of 
Europe's policy towards the area and Europ~an 
solidarity in this connection. Hence there iS a 
clear link between Europe's attitude towards the 
Gulf war or the Palestinian war and its policy 
towards terrorism. It will be possible for Euro-
peans to be firmer and more interdependent in 
the second case if they are more objective and 
disinterested in the first and make a greater effort 
to promote the restoration of peace. 
88. Your Rapporteur does not believe WEU 
should define a European policy towards the East 
if it is possible to do so in a wider frame-
work. But if it appears, as seems to have been 
the case on 27th January, that the positions of 
the Twelve have been weakened or are even 
condemned to be more complacent towards 
countries which encourage terrorism, it is for the 
Seven to react in the forum at their disposal in 
WEU to work out mea11ures corresponding to 
Europe's true interests, and this is well within the 
responsibilities of the organisation. 
89. (d) In addition to these cases, mention 
might be made of the kidnapping of persons, 
inter alia from economic circles, in order to force 
governments or firms, particularly multinational 
companies, to issue statements, to extort money 
from them or, by blackmail about the lives of the 
kidnapped persons, to pursue or allow to be pur-
sued certain action. To counter this form ofter-
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rorism, the solidarity of emocratic countries, 
the co-ordination of effo by national police 
forces and firmness by co rts of justice are an 
even more obvious necessit than in other cases, 
but the very nature of t se crimes probably 
allows them to be tackled i a wider framework 
than WEU, as they are a m ter of common law. 
* 
* * 
90. Hence it can be see that the problems 
which terrorism raises for Western Europe are 
infinitely complex and thei classification, which 
your Rapporteur has just t ·ed to define, should 
not lead to an erosion of th principles on which 
their reactions should be b sed, to a weakening 
ofthe necessary counterme sures or to a division 
of Europe. But nor should the obligation to face 
up to crises veil the need to handle the more 
deep-rooted problems behi d the recent develop-
ment of terrorism in the est. 
91. The American mag zine US News and 
World Report of 8th July 1 85 quoted an inquiry 
by a specialised institute as essing the num~er of 
terrorist acts in recent years There are beheved 
to have been 293 in 1970 2,585 in 1979 and 
3 525 in 1984. Le Monde iplomatique ofFeb-~ary 1986 also quotes ani quiry by the United 
States Department of Stat according to which 
between 1973 and 1983 5,1 5 terrorist acts killed 
3,689 people and wounded ,791. In 1983, 40% 
of these attacks are belie d to have been on 
Americans, causing 271 d aths and wounding 
116. But W estem Europe s believed to come at 
the top of the list of regio of the world where 
attacks have been commi ted, with 37.2% as 
compared with 25.6% in La in America, 22.8% in 
the Middle East and North Africa, etc., but only 
0.8% in Eastern Europe an the Soviet Union. 
92. If these figures are c nsidered only from 
the point of view of the n mber of victims, it 
must be admitted that the fi ure is still low. But 
the recent increase in terro sm, the countermea-
sures which have to be tak n as a result and the 
impact on the population hanks to the media 
are a serious challenge tow stem civilisation and 
Europe cannot take this li tly. If it wishes to 
prove its existence, it m st face up to such 
problems. It is more imp rtant to do this than 
to wonder about instituti al problems: WEU 
does not have to try to im ose itself but at the 
present juncture it can b a useful forum in 
which consultations betwee Europeans can lead 
to decisions and real actio . 
93. Separate conclusions have been drawn in 
each chapter of this report nd any general co~­
clusions that may be dra on three such dis-
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tinct matters as the application of Article VIII of 
the treaty, the Gulf war and international terror-
ism will amount to very little. 
94. It should first be underlined, however, 
that, as WEU is the smallest of the European or 
western organisations, it is preferable for matters 
which concern the whole of Western Europe at 
least, or even the whole of the western world, to 
be examined in a wider framework. Although 
certain countries have not agreed to the question 
of international terrorism being included in the 
agenda of the summit meeting of major 
industrialised nations to be held in Tokyo at the 
beginning of May, it is nevertheless clear that the 
matter will be tackled by participants outside the 
official meetings. 
95. It must however be noted on the one hand 
that a number of countries, particularly the 
smaller ones, are excluded from such 
meetings. This does not therefore prevent the 
prior consideration of matters to be discussed 
there by organisations to which these countries 
have access. The usefulness of restricted meet-
ings for solving certain problems is understand-
able, but those attending them cannot be 
expected to represent others if the matters they 
are to tackle have not been the subject of prior 
exchanges of views, particularly between the 
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European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The WEU Council is fully competent 
to play such a preparatory role if the govern-
ments so wish. 
96. Furthermore, there is still the question of 
how far it is desirable to examine in the narrower 
context of WEU matters which may be of inter-
est to all members ofthe European Community, 
the Atlantic Alliance or the Council of 
Europe. It is now clear however that differences 
between members of these organisations over 
matters relating to the Middle East and measures 
to be taken to counter international terrorism 
make it difficult to use them, whereas WEU is a 
useful forum for tackling such matters because 
its members have shown that they have rela-
tively convergent approaches to them. 
97. It is not a question of having WEU replace 
other organisations, but merely of taking advan-
tage of its smaller membership and the existence 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in 
order to use it in cases where larger organisations 
cannot hold effective consultations. The WEU 
Council must still, however, show that seven-
power Europe is capable of achieving results that 
cannot be obtained by the Twelve, the members 
of NATO or those of the Council of Europe. It 
has not yet done so. 
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For a European group to co-ordinate the fight 
against terrorism 
MEMORANDUM 
from Jean-Marie Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, 
to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
17th April 1986 
For a few countries, terrorism has become 
a continuation of policy by other means, as war 
was for Clausewitz. The risk of war can no 
longer be taken in the nuclear age, hence the 
recourse to terrorist action. This requires few 
means and allows responsibilities to be 
evaded. Blind in choosing its targets, the aims 
of terrorism are not: it strikes at the free world, its 
security, its unity and its ability to take external 
action. We are already feeling the effects: the 
shiver running through society in many Euro-
pean countries because the Americans, here to 
participate in Europe's security, have become the 
target of frequent attacks. Governments' hesi-
tation to be associated in any way with the mea-
sures taken by the United States to remind Libya 
of its responsibilities, the feebleness of repres-
sion, the only too frequent refusal to extradite 
the guilty, and even the help they are afforded in 
their flight, give the impression that expressions 
of determination to counter all aggression fade 
away in face of the elusive and insidious threat of 
terrorism. 
As long as terrorists are dealing with iso-
lated countries, obsessed by their immediate 
interests and incapable of taking effective anti-
terrorist action, they will continue without great 
risk to reap the rewards of their crimes and there 
is every reason to expect that their action will 
continue to grow until they have attained their 
aim and brought about the dismemberment of the 
western world. Let there be no mistake about 
this. However horrible it may be, each attack 
has limited repercussions. But the multiplica-
tion of these crimes creates a feeling of mistrust 
and of suspicion between allies which is a serious 
threat to the West and to Europe in 
particular. The every-man-for-himself attitude 
of the Twelve at the mere thought of United 
States action against Kadhafi showed this. 
object of an armed attack n Europe " and (in 
Article VIII) " to consult wi regard to any situ-
ation which may constitute threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat s ould arise ". Who 
can deny that terrorism is n armed attack in 
Europe and a threat to pe e? In such condi-
tions, consultations with a iew to joint action 
by the Seven (Belgium, ranee, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ital , Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United ·ngdom) are a con-
tractual obligation for these ountries which they 
cannot evade. Naturally, "f the Twelve had 
managed to define a true European policy at 
their meeting in The Hague on 14th April, they 
would have fulfilled the obl gations committing 
the Seven. But the weakne s some of them sho-
wed towards the country wh se active complicity 
in terrorist operations is nev rtheless in no doubt 
at all makes one question the possibilities of 
twelve-power action. How ver this may be, the 
ministers for foreign affairs and defence of the 
Seven who form the Council Western European 
Union are to meet in Veni on 29th and 30th 
April and it would be unthin able for them not to 
tackle together a matter wh eh is so much their 
responsibility. 
What can they do? irst, of course, res-
pond to the United States' a peal to support the 
action which it seems det rmined to take to 
make Libya understand that he West will no lon-
ger tolerate it protecting, a ming and encoura-
ging terrorists. To give in Colonel Kadhafi's 
blackmail of the towns of so thern Europe would 
be extremely serious, since t would give terro-
rism the political victory it s seeking and open 
the way for other series of a tacks. There must 
be no mistake: one way or a ther, terrorism will 
strike at Western Europe fter the American 
action against Tripoli. Its weakness will not 
protect it. 
Yet Western Europe cannot evade its own ·Furthermore, even i Libya bears very 
responsibilities in face of this threat. Seven of heavy responsibility, weake ing that country is 
its members signed the 1954 Paris Agreements not enough to put an nd to terrorism. 
modifying the 1948 Brussels Treaty, by which Criminal organisations exist and will find else-
they undertook (in Article V) to "afford all the where the rear bases they now have in Libya. The 
military and other aid and assistance in their fight against terrorism must e pursued every ins-
power" to any party which "should be the tant within each country, ala g its frontiers, on its 
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airports and also through information ~btained 
abroad. This is a huge task, for wh1ch each 
country inevitably has only limited means. 
Europe has no solution other than to 
organise and co-ordinate each one's efforts. In 
a Europe claiming to be united, it should no 
longer be possible for a group having carried out 
an attack in one country to be able to take refuge, 
almost without risk, in a neighbouring country, 
for each national police force to have to work out 
and manage its own card indexes, for informa-
tion obtained to be shared parsimoniously, for 
co-operation between police forces to be con-
stantly slowed down by the need to resort to 
extremely cumbersome procedure and for extra-
dition between countries offering protection for 
the guilty to raise sometimes insoluble 
problems. Yet that is what is happening every 
day in spite of the modest but not unsuccessful 
efforts made in recent months. 
As President of the WEU Assembly, it is 
in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the 
modified Brussels Treaty that I have therefore 
announced my decision to ask the member gov-
ernments of this organisation to set up a Euro-
pean group to co-ordinate the fight against terror-
ism (GECLAT)1• 
This group should first centralise informa-
tion obtained by the relevant services of 
all member countries: police, military 
security, counter-espionage, intelligence 
services, foreign affairs, in order to deter-
mine who the terrorists are, where they are 
and what plans they have. In brief, the 
purpose is to ascertain and assess the 
threat. 
I. Groupe europeen pour la coordination de la lutte 
antiterroriste. 
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Its second role would be to plan, prepare 
and co-ordinate measures taken or to be 
taken in each country in the fight against 
terrorism, so as to prevent the national 
organisation of police forces and justice 
allowing terrorists to take advantage of the 
frontiers dividing Europe to evade mea-
sures of control, prevention and repres-
sion. 
Finally, the formation of an operational 
unit recruited from all the WEU countries 
should allow the co-ordination of the rele-
vant services, police forces and, as a last 
resort, the armed forces for rapid interven-
tion against any terrorist threat, whereso-
ever it may arise. 
A product of the political will of member 
states and having its operational unit, the 
co-ordinating group should obviously, if it is to 
be effective, maintain close relations with the 
services of member countries concerned by the 
fight against terrorism and have fast and power-
ful means of communication whose secrecy 
would have to be protected. It should include 
officials seconded from each of the national ser-
vices so as to achieve the necessary co-ordination 
in the most efficient manner. 
Only insofar as Europe has means of infor-
mation, reflection and action of this type will it 
be able to avoid the alternative which is now its 
stumbling-block. To leave it to the Americans to 
pursue the fight against terrorism at international 
level, even if this means complaining in vain a 
posteriori about the action taken, or to continue 
individually at national level a fight which is 
bound to be hopeless since terrorism itself is con-
ducted in the framework of a world war are not 
solutions for Europe. Hence my proposal. 
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Amendment 1 
Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe 
of crises in other parts of the world 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Lady Jill Knight 
1. At the end of paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
2nd June 1986 
" (/) Seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will n t refuse extradition 
applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) fterrorism was car-
ried out from political motives. " 
Signed: Knight 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendment agreed to). 
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Reactivation of WEU -
its tasks, structure and place in Europe 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the reactivation of WEU -
its tasks, structure and place in Europe 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the interest in the reactivation ofWEU shown by several European ember countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Stressing that the interest in the activities ofWEU shown by many European ember countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance is closely linked with the effectiveness of the Council's poli ical activities; 
(iii) Considering that abolition of the lists of armaments subject to control and the new direction given 
to WEU following the Rome declaration will allow consideration to be given to enl rging WEU once it 
has been given definite terms of reference; 
(iv) Recalling Portugal's application for membership of WEU and welcoming th results of the refe-
rendum held in Spain on 12th March 1986; 
(v) Considering that the delay in transmitting the thirty-first annual report o the Council to the 
Assembly makes it impossible to adopt an answer to that report in time for the fir t part of the thirty-
second session of the Assembly; 
(vi) Welcoming the efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and t e Secretary-General 
to develop a dialogue with the Assembly; 
(vii) Recalling that information which cannot be given officially to all members o the Assembly can-
not be counted as part of this dialogue; 
(viii) Noting that many texts which the Council promised the Assembly have not b en sent and that the 
Assembly is therefore not kept properly informed of the activities of the Permanen Council, the work-
ing groups and the agencies; 
(ix) Regretting that the permanent tasks assigned to the agencies are inadequat and vague; 
(x) Considering that in these circumstances the Assembly's tasks of supervisio criticism and cen-
sure of the Council remain fundamental, which means that the Assembly must rem in completely inde-
pendent of the Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Keep the European member countries ofthe Atlantic Alliance informed of an associated with its 
activities insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty allows this, particularly in regar to co-operation in 
armaments matters, in the hope that it will be possible to achieve greater rationalisa ion and overall har-
monisation in this area; 
2. Study the consequences of the possible accession of Spain and Portugal to EU so as to take 
favourable action without delay on Portugal's application and to propose that Spain accede to the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty; 
3. Ensure that the Assembly is kept regularly informed of all the Council's acti ities at a frequency 
and in time to allow a fruitful dialogue between the two organs of WEU; 
4. Present the information which it itself, its Chairman-in-Office or the Secret ry-General give the 
Assembly in such a way that it may be transmitted to all members of the Assem ly; 
5. Within reasonable time-limits, allow the Assembly to benefit from the studi s conducted by the 
agencies and working groups after expurgating those parts which are classified se ret; 
6. Ensure that, in addition to the conjunctural studies requested by the Counc·, the agencies have 
permanent tasks with due independence of action for implementing them; 
7. Inter alia, instruct Agency 11 to organise a European institute for advanced de ence studies, whose 
tasks will have been defined by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Re ommendation 429. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In November 1985, the General Affairs 
Committee decided to include in its programme 
of work a report on WEU's place in Europe. Its 
principal aim was to consider the prospects of a 
possible enlargement of WEU after its visit to 
Portugal in 1985 to study that country's applica-
tion for membership. It agreed not to conduct a 
similar inquiry in Spain, then a candidate for 
membership of the EEC on the same basis as 
Portugal, as long as the question of Spain 
remaining in NATO had not been settled by the 
March 1986 referendum. But in November 
1985 it gave consideration to following up talks 
held between Mr. Caro, President of the Assem-
bly, and representatives of the Danish Govern-
ment by visiting Copenhagen. It also decided 
to ask the Norwegian authorities to receive 
it. All the elements needed to study WEU's 
place in Europe would therefore have been 
available. Special circumstances linked with 
the Folketing's rejection of the agreement 
between the Twelve reached in Luxembourg on 
3rd December 1985 made the Danish authorities 
ask the General Affairs Committee to postpone 
its visit until after the referendum on 27th Feb-
ruary 1986. 
2. So as not to overburden the agenda of the 
June 1986 session, it was logical for the commit-
tee to link this study with its statutory reply to 
the Council's report on its activities in 1985. In 
view of the importance of the measures taken in 
the context of the reactivation of WEU, it was 
difficult to foresee the content of a report which 
would quite obviously have to break with the 
routine presentation of the Council's annual 
reports since the start of WEU and also raise the 
question of WEU's place in Europe. However, 
the annual report had not reached the Office of 
the Clerk on 1Oth April, making it impossible for 
your Rapporteur to study it in time for the com-
mittee to be able to discuss the matter at its 
meeting on 29th April at which the present 
report is to be adopted. 
3. Finally, at its meeting in Paris on 20th 
January 1986, the Presidential Committee ofthe 
Assembly decided to refer to the General Affairs 
Committee the question of action to be taken on 
a paragraph in the preamble to Recommenda-
tion 429 inserted by amendment in December 
1985. This paragraph asked that the General 
Affairs Committee set out its conclusions in a 
separate report. Anxious to avoid including too 
many reports in the agenda for the June 1986 
session, the Presidential Committee preferred to 
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associate this more detailed study with the Gen-
eral Affairs Committee's report on WEU in reply 
to the annual report of the Council, it being 
understood that it was for the General Affairs 
Committee to handle relations between the 
Assembly and the Council in that report. 
4. As a result of these various decisions, your 
Rapporteur was given terms of reference which 
ultimately covered related matters: the 
reactivation, enlargement and structure of 
WEU. In order to take account of the preroga-
tives of other committees, the wishes of those 
who tabled the amendment and the obligation to 
prepare a reply to the annual report of the Coun-
cil for 1985, your Rapporteur has taken each of 
these three questions separately in three distinct 
chapters of the present report. Your 
Rapporteur is well aware that those who tabled 
the amendment to Recommendation 429 would 
have liked the questions they raised in 1984 to be 
the subject of an entirely separate report. He 
wished to point out that it was neither he nor the 
General Affairs Committee but the Presidential 
Committee that decided to join the three ques-
tions, albeit closely linked, in a single 
report. The General Affairs Committee could 
but take note of this decision. 
5. In the end, this decision has led your 
Rapporteur to tackle the important matter of the 
reactivation of WEU from three different stand-
points: the problems of enlargement, the Coun-
cil's activities and the structure of WEU are at 
present the three aspects of this reactivation, so 
they cannot be dealt with as purely technical 
matters. The idea each of us has of the nature 
of the Western European countries' participation 
in the defence of Europe can alone guide us in 
this respect and we cannot overlook the ques-
tions which WEU will have to answer in future 
years. 
6. The development of the strategic defence 
initiative launched by President Reagan, what-
ever the degree of participation of the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, plus the 
deployment of new conventional weapons and 
the continuing Soviet-American disarmament 
negotiations are likely to change Euro-American 
relations very considerably. There is admit-
tedly nothing to indicate that NATO is being 
called in question. United States superiority in 
defence-related technology will probably mean 
more than ever that Europe's security will be 
based on the integration of American forces in 
the military system which ensures its defence. 
7. Hence it is within an Atlantic system that 
Europe will have to define its own interests bet-
ter than it has managed to do so far, and the pur-
pose of the reactivation ofWEU is not to set up a 
European deployment alongside NATO deploy-
ment but to allow Europe to express and give 
weight to its views on its security 
requirements. In other words, the reactivation 
of WEU is more political than military. 
8. It remains to be seen which Europe is pre-
pared to express its views on security matters: 
the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance? The twelve members of the Com-
munity? The seven members ofWEU? It still 
seems difficult to answer this question, even for 
those who consider that the future European 
union should group all the European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance within a community 
framework. Solutions have to be found for the 
next few years, rather than speculate on a more 
remote future. 
9. Similarly, reconsideration of the structure 
of WEU should not anticipate the future but aim 
at setting up, at parliamentary level and at the 
level of the governmental organs, something 
acceptable to the seven governments and to 
applicants for possible membership ofWEU. It 
is from this standpoint that your Rapporteur 
wishes to tackle all the problems which have now 
arisen. 
II. WEU in Europe 
10. It should be recalled that Western Euro-
pean Union came into being in 1954 following 
the adoption by the French National Assembly 
on 30th August 1954 of a prior question leaving 
out of its debates the treaty setting up a Euro-
pean Defence Community between the six coun-
tries which had just set up the European Coal 
and Steel Community. This vote meant that 
France was not prepared to discuss defence mat-
ters with its European partners on a community 
basis. The latter thought they could not or 
should not develop this community without 
France and without the United Kingdom, which 
had not signed the treaty setting up the EDC and, 
together with France, sought a framework for 
consultation on European defence on other 
bases. 
11. For this purpose, the Seven modified the 
text ofthe Brussels Treaty which, since 1948, had 
associated the United Kingdom, France and the 
Benelux countries in a defensl.ve alliance, to 
adapt it to the new circumstances in Europe. 
They extended the initial treaty to Germany and 
Italy, gave up the integrated European headquar-
ters which had been set up in 1948 in favour of 
SHAPE, which had in fact already replaced the 
Western Union headquarters, worked out a sys-
tem of declaration and control of armaments on 
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the mainland of Europe, le the United King-
dom to undertake to maintai large numbers of 
land and air forces in the Fe eral Republic and 
set up a parliamentary asse ly and a commit-
tee to promote the joint pr duction of arma-
ments. 
12. Strangely, the modifie Brussels Treaty, 
which refers in its preambl to a joint will to 
build Europe, corresponded o none of the geo-
graphical contours or ideol gical aims round 
which Europe was then in t process of taking 
shape. 
13. While the EDC grou d the six member 
countries of the very recent CSC, had commu-
nity principles and aimed at establishing a 
supranational Europe, WEU ad seven members 
and was an alliance of sov reign states. The 
only element of federal-type ntegration was the 
great novelty of including in a treaty of alliance 
the Council's right to vote by majority in anum-
ber of well-defined cases. 
14. The modified Brussel Treaty explicitly 
referred to the Europe of the Council of Europe 
in Article IX which set up ou Assembly with the 
delegations of the member c ntries of the Con-
sultative Assembly. But the xplicit links it cre-
ated with NATO practically xcluded the acces-
sion of neutral countries or n-members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, not to eak of countries 
belonging to another allian system, whereas 
the Council of Europe has always shown an 
interest in relations between the countries both 
west and east of our contin nt and includes a 
number of neutral and no -aligned countries, 
thus precluding any co-oper ion with NATO. 
15. In any event, the prese ce of arms controls 
among WEU's activities e ctively prevented 
enlargement. The balance f advantages and 
commitments granted to or imposed upon the 
various parties by the modi ed Brussels Treaty 
or its complementary texts w s subtle and fragile 
and hardly allowed other c untries to intrude 
upon defence Europe. WE was therefore not 
to be confused with the Euro ean member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance 
16. These peculiarities of s ven-power Europe 
have not always been suffi iently emphasised 
and it might have been tho ght that the acces-
sion of the United Kingdo to the European 
Communities would lead t WEU being inte-
grated in the Community sys em. This has not 
been so because the access on of the United 
Kingdom was achieved at th same time as that 
of Denmark and Ireland, whi h did not intend to 
take part in WEU and, furth r, several members 
of WEU wished to avoid at 1 costs entrusting 
the command of their arme forces to a seven-, 
nine- or twelve-power Eur pe either because 
they did not want any integ ation beyond what 
they had accepted in NAT or, in the case of 
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France, because it accepted no integration of its 
forces at all. There is nothing to show any great 
change in this situation. However, apart from 
arms controls, seven-power Europe has no very 
specific political programme and its members 
have relied on other wider organisations to exer-
cise WEU's responsibilities in defence matters 
(NATO), cultural and social affairs (Council of 
Europe), economic matters (EEC) and political 
consultation. 
17. The agreement which the Twelve reached 
in Luxembourg on 3rd December 1985 includes 
a draft treaty on European co-operation in the 
sphere of foreign policy. Article 6 of this treaty 
specifies that the high contracting parties are 
" ready to co-ordinate their positions more 
closely on the political and economic aspects of 
security" and are also "determined to maintain 
the technological and industrial conditions neces-
sary for their security ". But the same article 
specifies that: "Nothing in this treaty shall 
impede closer co-operation in the field of secu-
rity between certain of the high contracting par-
ties within the framework of the Western Euro-
pean Union or the Atlantic Alliance ". This 
wording, worked out after the ministerial meet-
ing of the WEU Council in Rome, shows as 
clearly as possible the link between what the gov-
ernments intend to do in the context of twelve-
power consultations and what they wish to keep 
for WEU. It also shows that the governments 
are well aware of the limits to co-operation 
among the Twelve in defence matters and that 
WEU is to retain its role alongside twelve-power 
Europe. 
18. Changes in WEU in 1984 and 1985 under 
the general heading of the reactivation of WEU 
nevertheless altered some of the facts of the 
problem. In fact, while the almost total disap-
pearance of arms controls weakened WEU's grip 
on its members, it no longer prevented enlarge-
ment. The question is how far and in what direc-
tion it can be enlarged. 
19. The Council was keenly aware of this new 
situation since it envisaged possible enlargement 
in the Rome declaration of 27th October 
1984. It took note of Portugal's application for 
membership on the same date but has so far 
given no answer. It also asked the Assembly to 
increase its contacts with the parliaments of the 
European member countries of the Atlantic Alli-
ance, which the Assembly has done. But the 
Assembly realised that such contacts could not 
continue indefinitely nor continue further until 
the governments had taken the basic decision 
about whether they were prepared to enlarge 
WEU and to which countries. So far, they have 
talked about the need to reorganise WEU itself 
is to be enlargement, further changes will indeed 
have to be made in WEU and it would have been 
possible to avoid a further period of adaptation 
by taking account at once of the possible acces-
sion of other countries. There indeed seems to be 
certain differences among the Seven about possi-
ble enlargement. 
20. Thus, in June 1984 Mr. Cheysson, then 
French Minister for External Relations and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, expressed his 
firm hostility towards any enlargement of 
WEU. He considered the Seven to be a sort of 
hard core of defence Europe which could but be 
softened by a territorial extension of 
WEU. This argument would have been per-
fectly valid ifWEU had had military commands 
and, a fortiori, armed forces of its own. But 
from the moment some European countries take 
part in the NATO integrated military system, 
which is not even the case for all the members of 
WEU, it is even harder to see why they should be 
kept out as four of them are now also members 
of the European Community and play a regular 
part in twelve-power European political 
co-operation. 
21. While on the other hand the abolition of 
controls of conventional weapons facilitates 
application of Article XI of the treaty providing 
for a possible enlargement of WEU, the Rome 
declaration does not affect Protocol No. 11 pro-
viding for controls on the levels of forces of 
member countries. This protocol is obviously 
of great importance since conventional arms 
controls played an essential role in verifying the 
declarations and controls regarding forces. As 
we know, SACEUR is responsible for applying 
this protocol where the forces assigned to him 
are concerned, which means no non-member 
country of the Atlantic Alliance can join WEU 
since there can be no question of SACEUR 
reporting to countries which are not members of 
the alliance on the levels of troops assigned to 
him. Conversely, the accession of member 
countries of the alliance to Protocol No. 11 
should not raise any fundamental difficulties. 
22. In fact, there is only one valid reason for 
being opposed to countries which take part in the 
same military deployment as the Seven and in 
the same effort to co-ordinate foreign policies 
joining a European defence organisation involv-
ing no integration or obligation to conform to 
decisions which are binding only on those who 
have acceded to them, and that is the possible 
difficulty of applying Article V of the treaty to 
these countries. Your Rapporteur will discuss 
this problem in respect of Greece, Turkey and 
Norway. 
before enlarging it, a purely dilatory approach, 23. There is no indication that the doctrine 
since there was nothing to prevent new members voiced by Mr. Cheysson in 1984 is or will remain 
of WEU taking part in the study of the structural that of the French Government, which would 
reforms needed for this reorganisation. If there not be very well placed to be over-punctilious 
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about WEU countries belonging to 
NATO. However, recent reactions by certain 
European members of NATO to foreign and 
defence policy matters, particularly Greece and 
Denmark, indicate that some caution is still 
necessary in the event of enlargement if WEU is 
to remain free of the kind of blockage which the 
vote in the Danish Parliament in January 1986 
might have imposed on the nevertheless most 
modest decisions contained in the Luxembourg 
agreement of 3rd December 1985 on European 
political co-operation. There is no indication 
moreover that these countries would effectively 
be prepared to join WEU, and the attitude 
adopted by the Danish Folketing towards the 
decisions taken in Luxembourg, although not 
confirmed by the referendum on 27th February 
1986, makes it most improbable that it would 
seek to take concerted action in WEU which it 
found so difficult to accept among the Twelve. 
24. When considering inviting observers to its 
sessions, the Assembly for its part hesitated for 
some time between two quite different concepts 
of the Europe it wished to help by its 
initiatives. Some wanted invitations to be sent 
mainly to member countries of the European 
Community, although they knew that at least 
one of them, Ireland, was not prepared to take 
part in a military alliance or even to tighten its 
links with WEU. They wished to confirm that 
the only future they saw for European union lay 
in the extension of the Rome Treaty to areas 
which it did not yet cover and in application of 
the Community system. Since then the appar-
ent success of the Anglo-Irish agreement of 15th 
November 1985 offers hope that the obstacles 
which had hitherto stood in the way of Ireland 
co-operating with its European partners in secu-
rity matters will be removed progressively. 
25. Others, on the contrary, were prepared to 
invite parliamentary observers from all Euro-
pean countries members of the Atlantic Alliance 
to emphasise that if WEU wished to assert itself 
as the European pillar of the alliance it would 
have to group the largest possible number of 
countries. In the end, this was the position 
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th 
January 1986 when it decided to issue a standing 
invitation to its sessions to two parliamentary 
observers from all European countries members 
of the Atlantic Alliance. Only Portugal, which 
has applied for membership of WEU, was 
invited to send a delegation corresponding to its 
delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. Finally, the Presidential 
Committee left committees free to invite observ-
ers to their meetings in the light of their agendas, 
but did not wish to make such invitations a 
political gesture. 
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are the responsibility of the ouncil and while it 
shows a certain line of thou t this in no way 
implies that the Assembly as advocated the 
immediate accession to WE of all European 
countries members of the all ance or that it has 
rejected the idea that in def1 nee matters WEU 
foreshadows a European uni n whose responsi-
bilities would no longer b limited to those 
which the treaties in force as igned to the Euro-
pean Community. It can at ost be interpreted 
as an expression of the hop that one day the 
Community will group all t e European mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance a d naturally also as 
a demonstration of support fi r Portugal's candi-
dature which the Assembly endorsed in June 
1985 (Recommendation 420 
27. The idea of the immed ate accession of all 
the European members ofthe alliance would dis-
regard certain facts, in parti ular the extremely 
binding nature of Article V o the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. Thus, no West rn European coun-
try would be anxious to hav Greece or Turkey 
join an alliance which includ d a so-called auto-
matic assistance clause as ong as those two 
countries had not found a la ing solution to the 
problems which divide them 
28. It has also been won ered whether the 
accession of Norway to sue a treaty would be 
reasonable insofar as, if that untry had to meet 
a limited aggression from the orth or against the 
Barents Sea islands, its s curity would be 
ensured mainly by the prese e of United States 
naval and air forces, wherea the Seven do not 
really have the means of part cipating effectively 
in the defence of those are s. In the circum-
stances, a moot point was c uld they hope for 
close political co-operation "th Norway? 
29. When it visited Norwa on 18th and 19th 
February 1986, the General ffairs Committee 
was able to obtain an ans er in part to this 
question. First, it could see hat the Norwegian 
authorities, with a very lar e majority of the 
Starting, viewed their rel tions with WEU 
mainly from the standpoint of their ties with 
Western Europe. These w e strained by the 
1972 referendum in which th Norwegian people 
rejected accession to the European 
Community. Since then, th close relationship 
between Denmark and No ay has to some 
extent overcome the drawba ks of this decision 
by avoiding Norway being i olated. 
30. The logical way to do t is would obviously 
be to go back on the 1972 decisions, but this 
would require another re erendum. In the 
meantime, WEU can help t satisfy the Norwe-
gian authorities, who say the welcome the regu-
lar participation of Norwe ·an parliamentary 
observers in Assembly sessio s. Again, Norway 
26. The Presidential Committee's decision is seems to be considering exa ining its relations 
quite logical and perfectly coherent. However, with WEU once the qu tion of relations 
it does not claim to anticipate decisions which between Spain and WEU ha been raised in spe-
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cific terms, particularly if the reactivation of the 
organisation is confirmed and it does not appear 
to be a divisive factor for the Atlantic 
Alliance. On all these points, the views of the 
Norwegian Government seem extremely close to 
those constantly expressed by the Assembly. 
31. In any event there are obviously no rea-
sons for leaving Greece, Turkey and Norway out 
of all WEU's activities in which they are inter-
ested, particularly those which do not relate 
directly to defence but rather to armaments. In 
this connection, the regular presence of observers 
at Assembly sessions and visits by Assembly 
committees to the countries concerned should 
offer a better idea of each one's special position 
and help to establish links between them and 
WEU which conform to what is possible and 
desirable. 
32. The two countries whose relations with 
WEU are now a problem are Portugal and 
Spain. The first applied for membership in 
October 1984 and has not yet received an answer 
from the WEU Council. This is particularly 
unacceptable since there seem to be hardly any 
obstacles to its accession, but it is obviously 
humiliating for a country to have such a serious 
commitment to WEU ignored in this way. 
33. The case of Spain is more delicate since 
the country has not applied for membership, but, 
on 21st January 1986, for instance, when its 
Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, visited the Italian 
Prime Minister, Mr. Craxi, it showed its interest 
in WEU. However, the Spanish Government 
was determined not to tackle the possibility of 
applying for membership before the 12th March 
1986 referendum on whether Spain should 
remain in the Atlantic Alliance. 
34. Answering questions put by a journalist on 
the occasion of this meeting, the two ministers 
made the following remarks: 
" Question: I should like to ask the two 
Presidents about WEU. To President 
Craxi I should like to ask about Italy's sup-
port to Spain's accession to WEU and to 
President Gonzalez if, in the course of the 
debate on foreign policy on 4th February, 
the WEU question will be raised, since it is 
on the agenda. 
President Craxi: We believe it is an excel-
lent thing for Spain to join WEU. As 
much as we deem it important that Spain 
continues to play her role in the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
President Gonzalez: I believe that Spain, 
who has not yet officially presented her 
candidature to WEU, has not done so 
because, before taking such a decision, she 
waits for the debate among the member 
states of WEU to come to a head; therefore 
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she will take part in this debate and natu-
rally, during such a debate, will reiterate 
what we have already said to Italy and to 
the other members of WEU. We are 
establishing contacts and before the end of 
the month we shall meet the Secretary-
General in order to clarify and define this 
issue, so as to be able to add it to the pro-
cess of implementation of what is known 
as the decalogue of Spain's policy for peace 
and security. As you know, it is a policy 
ofharmonisation often points, in that one 
does not opt for one point to the detriment 
of another. They are coherent points 
related to one another. Spain must 
belong to WEU and such a process will 
certainly come to fruition in the next few 
months." 
35. The Spanish Council of Ministers consid-
ered the matter on 24th January and the govern-
ment spokesman, Mr. Solana, said at the close of 
the meeting that the Spanish Government was 
preparing its integration in WEU, which was 
envisaged after the referendum on NATO. The 
Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, was to 
hold talks with Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-
General of WEU, on 29th January, during the 
latter's visit to Spain when they would discuss 
the present position of the organisation. 
36. The Spanish Government spokesman 
recalled that the European countries were reacti-
vating WEU and that the Spanish Government 
intended Spain to join in accordance with the 
intentions expressed by Mr. Gonzalez in his 
"defence decalogue" on 23rd October 
1984. Item 6 of this peace and security 
programme put forward by the Spanish Prime 
Minister specifies that: 
" Spain does not belong to the Western 
European Union for defence matters, 
although it is the only organisation with 
responsibility in this area. I consider 
Spain's participation would be desirable, 
although I think that beforehand we must 
consider the results of the process of our 
integration into Europe. " 
37. The spokesman recalled the words of the 
Prime Minister following the Italo-Spanish con-
ference in Taormina on 21st January, when he 
said that: 
" Spain has not yet applied formally for 
membership of WEU because it is waiting 
for the reactivation proposed by its mem-
ber countries to reach maturity. We shall 
receive the Secretary-General of WEU in 
order to clarify obscure points in the con-
text ofthe 'defence decalogue' whose main 
aspects are continued membership of 
NATO without military integration, a 
reduction of the American military pres-
ence in Spain, non-nuclearisation of Span-
ish territory and integration in WEU." 
He also said: 
"We are not aiming to be a member of 
one (referring to WEU) while abandoning 
the other (referring to NATO)." 
Furthermore, the WEU Secretary-General's visit 
to Madrid on 28th and 29th January was the sub-
ject of a letter to the President of the Assembly 
which has been circulated to members of the 
Assembly with the authorisation of the Secre-
tary-General. 
38. Furthermore, it seems clear that the Span-
ish Government sees the prospect of joining 
WEU as being in line with joining the European 
Communities. Even if Spain has in mind pro-
cedure in conformity with Article XI of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty for its accession to WEU, 
i.e. if it is waiting for a formal invitation from 
the Seven, the result of the referendum on the 
Atlantic Alliance should allow contacts to be 
made very quickly. If would be very disturbing 
for the future of Europe if the Seven did not take 
early steps, in a case where this is possible, to 
make WEU's frontiers coincide with those of 
Community Europe. 
39. At its meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th 
April, the WEU Council must decide on the 
action to be taken on Portugal's explicit and 
Spain's implicit candidatures. It will probably 
be unable to issue immediately the invitation 
provided for in Article XI of the treaty but will 
rather decide to examine the practical conse-
quences of the possible accession of these two 
countries for themselves, for WEU and its struc-
tures and for the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
40. Your Rapporteur wishes to make the fol-
lowing remarks based on what he has noted 
above: 
41. (i) Accession to WEU can concern only 
countries which want it and are prepared to take 
account of all the consequences of all the com-
mitments imposed by the modified Brussels 
Treaty and to move towards the establishment of 
a European union including close co-operation 
in defence matters. 
42. (ii) There can be no question of countries 
which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance 
being admitted to WEU and WEU cannot be 
considered as a substitute for NATO. 
43. (iii) The enlargement of WEU must in no 
event lead to Article V of the treaty being 
extended to countries whose relations with their 
neighbours are liable to degenerate into armed 
conflict, without this jeopardising the security of 
Western Europe as a whole. This does not neces-
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sarily prevent countries in s eh a situation taking 
part in some ofWEU's acti ities, particularly the 
production of armaments, since, in any case, 
these countries are already, · NATO, Eurogroup 
or the IEPG, co-operating ith their European 
partners in armaments mat ers. 
44. (iv) The decisions ta en by the Assembly 
about inviting parliamenta observers to ses-
sions do not mean that the Assembly has 
adopted a position in favo r of the early acces-
sion to WEU of the countri s concerned but are 
merely a demonstration of he Assembly's con-
cern that close contacts s uld be maintained 
with the European memb rs of the alliance, 
which seems to correspond o the Council's view 
on the subject. Moreover the Assembly has 
declared its support for Port gal's application for 
membership and the spec al treatment it has 
decided to grant to a dele ation of Portuguese 
observers shows that this s pport is continuing 
and is unique. 
Ill. The political activities o the Council in 1985 
45. The thirty-first annua report of the Coun-
cil had not yet reached the ffice of the Clerk of 
the Assembly when t is chapter was 
drafted. The delay makes t most unlikely that 
it will be possible to circulat the report to mem-
bers of the Assembly in tim for them to read it 
before the meeting on 29 April at which the 
General Affairs Committee s to adopt the pres-
ent report so that it may b printed and circu-
lated within the prescribed t me-limits before the 
Assembly's session. Your apporteur therefore 
proposes to examine the por ical activities of the 
Council on the basis of d cuments effectively 
received in time and sugge ts postponing until 
the December 1986 sessio the adoption of a 
reply to the annual report of the Council for 
1985. He wishes to stress t at this delay shows 
that the statutory exchanges etween the Council 
and the Assembly have slo ed down and this is 
wholly contrary to the wis es expressed by the 
Assembly in 1985 when it e ressed its intention 
to activate its exchanges wi h the Council, pro-
posing inter alia that the uncil present half-
yearly reports to the Asse bly. This is most 
regrettable since 1985 will h ve been the decisive 
year for the reactivation of WEU during which 
most of the decisions affi ting its future will 
have been taken. 
46. Indeed, the principles set out in the Rome 
declaration had to be appl" d in regard to the 
Council and its secretariat a d to the WEU tech-
nical bodies. The Assembl , on the other hand, 
had no need to take any m ·or immediate deci-
sions, but it had to try to foll w closely what hap-
pened in the Council so as to adapt its agenda 
and overall work to what t e modified Brussels 
Treaty had made it respons ble for supervising, 
i.e. the activities of the Co ncil. 
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47. Thus, more than ever in 1985 the Assem-
bly should have been kept seriously and regularly 
informed of the state of the activities of the 
Council and its dependent bodies. Your 
Rapporteur ventures to underline that this has 
not been the case at all but that in spite of the 
delay in the adoption of the thirty-first annual 
report, the Assembly has received more substan-
tial information from several sources in the first 
months of 1986, thanks mainly to fortunate initi-
atives taken by the Secretary-General. 
48. Yet the Assembly had taken a number of 
steps to facilitate and improve its dialogue with 
the Council. For instance, in spring 1985, it set 
up a Committee for Relations with the Council 
with the main task of informing the Council, 
before it took any decisions concerning WEU, of 
the Assembly's point of view on matters on the 
agenda of its meetings. Furthermore, the Presi-
dential Committee was able to meet the Council 
at the close of both its 1985 ministerial meetings 
to obtain all the information which the latter was 
prepared to give. It had also asked to meet the 
Permanent Council in London in June 1985, but 
this meeting had to be cancelled because the 
Council did not wish to guarantee that simulta-
neous interpretation would be made available for 
parliamentarians as required by the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Assembly, the seriousness of its 
work and the full participation of all its 
members. Finally, the difference between the 
Permanent Council and the Assembly was 
solved during the Assembly's session in Decem-
ber 1985 when the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Italy, consented to convene a joint 
meeting between the Presidential Committee 
and the Permanent Council to arrange for the 
organisation of regular meetings between these 
two bodies. The first of these meetings was held 
in Paris on 21st January 1986. 
49. This meeting allowed the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly to put a number of 
questions to the Council, most of which were 
summed up in a letter from the President of the 
Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, to whom he wrote inter alia: 
" Apart from budgetary matters, which 
have been the subject of a separate com-
munication to the Council, I consider that 
the principal points raised at the meeting 
were as follows: 
1. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
The Assembly continues to be 
deprived of any serious information about 
the Council's activities, apart from minis-
terial meetings. 
(a) In spite of the undertaking given by 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
244 
in December, the 1985 report of the 
working group on the SDI has not 
been communicated to the Assembly. 
(b) The new agencies were set up on 1st 
January 1986, but the Assembly has 
not been informed of: 
(i) their organogram and the staff 
available to them1; 
(ii) the tasks assigned to them and the 
time-limits set for accomplishing 
these tasks2; 
(iii) how the Ministers of Defence 
and their staff will take part in 
the work of the Council, the 
working groups and the agen-
cies; 
(iv) action taken on the proposal to 
set up a European defence insti-
tute; 
(v) keeping the public informed of 
the Council's work3; 
(vi) the progress of seven-power con-
sultations on disarmament; 
(vii) the SAC's study on Japanese 
armaments and action to be taken 
on this study. 
(c) For future meetings between the Coun-
cil and the Assembly: 
(i) Are the Council or its Chairman-
in-Office prepared to hold a meet-
ing with the Assembly committee 
responsible for relations with the 
Council before the ministerial 
meeting in Venice so that the 
Council may be informed of the 
Assembly's view in due time?4 
(ii) Is the Council prepared to receive, 
at the close of the ministerial 
meeting in Venice, the two com-
mittees (Committee on Defence 
1. Since the President of the Assembly wrote this letter to 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly has received a note from the Secretary-
General giving two organograms. 
2. A letter from the Secretary-General to the President of 
the Assembly dated 17th March 1986, circulated to members 
of the Assembly, answers this question. 
3. On 20th May 1985, the Council sent the Assembly a 
document on "WEU and public awareness", appended to 
the reply to Recommendation 411. This sets out the Coun-
cil's intentions in regard to informing public opinion but the 
Assembly has received no word of the possible implementa-
tion of its intentions. 
4. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council gave the Presi-
dent of the Assembly a favourable answer to this question on 
8th February 1986. A meeting was held between the Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, assisted by representatives of 
most member countries, and the Committee for Relations 
with the Council in Rome on 8th April. 
Questions and Armaments and 
General Affairs Committee) 
which have requested a joint 
meeting on that occasion, as well 
as the Presidential Committee of 
the Assembly? If the Council 
considers it desirable, these meet-
ings might be combined in a single 
meeting.4 
(iii) Is the Permanent Council pre-
pared to organise twice-yearly 
meetings with the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly in 
order to inform it of the state of 
matters dealt with in WEU? 
(d) The Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly has not been very satisfied 
with the way ministers have taken part 
in Assembly sessions. 
(i) It has expressed the wish that their 
interventions be grouped on the 
day set aside for consideration of 
the Council's work. At the next 
session, this would be in the after-
noon of Tuesday, 3rd June.5 
(ii) The Presidential Committee has 
also expressed the wish that the 
Council be represented throughout 
the Assembly's debates by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
or by a minister or secretary of 
state representing him aiJ.d 
empowered to speak during 
debates on matters on the agenda, 
either to answer questions or to 
give the Council's views on the 
matters being debated. 
2. SDI 
(a) The probable cuts to be made by the 
United States Congress in amounts ear-
marked by the United States for its 
defence are perhaps liable to alter the 
offers of co-operation made by the United 
States to its partners. It is to be feared 
that if Europe does not give an early 
answer to the offers made to it the United 
States may give priority in this field to the 
countries which were the first to give their 
answers, and particularly Japan. The 
Assembly has been informed of diver-
gent answers given by certain member 
countries to the United States offers. How-
4. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council gave the Presi-
dent of the Assembly a favourable answer to this question on 
8th February 1986. A meeting was held between the Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, assisted by representatives of 
most member countries, and the Committee for Relations 
with the Council in Rome on 8th April. 
5. An at least partial answer was given to this question on 
8th February 1986. 
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ever, it has not been · nformed of the text 
of the agreements co eluded between cer-
tain member count es and the United 
States in this connec ·on. 
In view of th importance of the 
reports considered d ring the debate on 
the SDI, which was th central point of the 
Assembly's last sessi n, does the Council 
intend to take accoun of them in pursuing 
its work on the ha onisation of Euro-
pean answers to the I? Does it intend 
to pursue a dialogue ith the Assembly on 
this matter?6 
(b) The developme t of Eureka requires 
that Europeans kno what benefits they 
will derive from the SDI so as to direct 
their own programm and to foresee the 
budgetary commit ents needed for 
Eureka. 
Does the Cou cil intend to tackle 
the question of the elationship between 
the SDI and Eureka nd is it prepared to 
inform the Assembly about the develop-
ment of Eureka since the programme was 
adopted in Hanover on 6th November 
1985? 
3. WEU agencies 
Information re ived by the Assem-
bly suggests that the new WEU agencies 
will have very small taffs which will not 
allow them to condu t research on their 
own. It will be pos ible to make them 
responsible only for work of synthesis 
whose value will dep d on the sources of 
information availabl to them and the 
means they have of rocessing this infor-
mation. 
This implies greement between 
WEU on the one ha d and NATO, the 
IEPG and national a inistrations on the 
other for the provisi n of the necessary 
information. Secon ly, it requires a 
computerised docum ntation centre being 
made available to th agencies. Can the 
Council specify wh t steps have been 
taken to provide th agencies with the 
information they nee ?7 
The question arises whether the 
Assembly will be abl to have access to 
this information and o the agencies' com-
puter and in what co ditions. 
6. The Council said the answe to this question will be 
given in the answer to Written Que tion 263, but this answer 
had not reached the Office of the Jerk of the Assembly on 
lOth April 1986. 
7. The answer to Written Questi n 262, dated 20th March 
1986, answers this question. 
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4. Problems outside the NATO area 
The Assembly has heard nothing 
about how the Council has followed up the 
intentions expressed in the Rome declara-
tion in this connection. 
(a) Does the Council intend to examine 
the consequences for Europe of the 
emergence of new arms producing and 
exporting powers such as Japan and 
Brazil? 
(b) Does the Council intend to tackle the 
question raised by certain countries' 
support for international terrorism and 
measures to be taken to prevent the 
growth of such terrorism? 
(c) Does the Council intend to seek to 
harmonise member countries' policies 
so as to help to restore peace where it is 
the most seriously threatened, particu-
larly in the Near and Middle East, 
Africa or possibly Latin America, as it 
is urged to do in the modified Brussels 
Treaty? 
I am quite aware that this represents a 
very considerable number of questions 
and wishes and that the Council will prob-
ably not be able to answer them all 
immediately. It seems to me, neverthe-
less, that serious consideration of these 
proposals and the adoption of a positive 
attitude towards them by the Council 
would be a major step towards improving 
relations between the Council and the 
Assembly, which is our common aim." 
50. Probably the annual report will provide 
answers to some of the questions put by the Presi-
dent and the Assembly's opinion on the report 
and the Council's action in 1985 will depend on 
the value of these answers. It must be borne in 
mind, on the one hand, that no answers have yet 
been given to questions not marked with a foot-
note and, on the other hand, that many of the 
answers mentioned are incomplete, provisional 
or vague and the Assembly cannot therefore con-
sider them satisfactory. 
51. It is nevertheless possible to make a num-
ber of remarks here and now. First, the fact that 
the Council's report is an annual one does not 
allow the Assembly to obtain a valid idea of the 
Council's initiatives and in good time. It is 
essential that, by appropriate procedure, the 
Council should keep the Assembly informed 
more frequently about what it undertakes and 
what it achieves if it wishes to establish or main-
tain a true dialogue with the parliamentarians 
for, if there is a lapse of time of more than a few 
months between something happening and it 
being reported to the Assembly, any reactions 
which may be expressed are no longer of interest, 
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nor can the Council adjust its approach to take 
account of the parliamentarians' views. In the 
long run, it is oflittle importance whether the la~­
ter approve or disapprove of what the Council 
does; all that counts is that they should be able to 
exert an influence on it. 
52. As shown by your Rapporteur's footnotes 
to a number of the questions put by the President 
of the Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, some answers, preliminary answers 
or incomplete answers have been given during 
the early months of 1986. It is gratifying that 
the Council, its Chairman-in-Office and the Sec-
retary-General did not feel they had to wait for 
the publication of the annual report in order to 
give the Assembly this information and thus pro-
vide material for a dialogue between the two 
WEU bodies. It is for the Assembly to pursue 
these exchanges and your Rapporteur therefore 
proposes to examine the Council's activities in 
1985 without waiting for the Council to send the 
thirty-first annual report. 
53. He nevertheless feels that the Council's 
scattered communications to the Assembly make 
it difficult for parliamentarians, in view of their 
activities and the voluminous documentation 
they receive, to absorb this information correctly 
and in the long run it is detrimental to valid 
exchanges between the Council and the 
Assembly. The nature of some of the docu-
ments the Council has sent means that they can-
not be circulated outside the Assembly. Your 
Rapporteur has tried to overcome this drawback 
by having an information document prepared for 
the General Affairs Committee containing the 
texts suitable for such a presentation, but others 
could not be included because of their personal 
nature. Your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise 
that the very principles ofparliamentarism mean 
that a communication to a parliamentary assem-
bly cannot be counted if it cannot be circulated 
to all the members of that assembly. A dialogue 
between the two sides of WEU cannot be con-
ducted by means of private letters and informal 
meetings at which no minutes are taken. Such 
letters and meetings may be useful for establish-
ing a dialogue but do not, in themselves, consti-
tute a dialogue. Practically speaking, your 
Rapporteur suggests that the Council make a 
clear distinction between communications to the 
Assembly and their accompanying letters and 
give a reference number to the former so that 
they may be grouped for working 
purposes. Failing this, misunderstandings 
would probably soon arise over the nature of the 
Council's communications about which the 
Council would be the first to protest. 
54. Your Rapporteur also asks the Council to 
ensure that the declassification of documents 
produced by the agencies or working groups 
prior to their communication to the Assembly be 
effected as quickly as possible so that the Assem-
bly may receive information which is not out of 
date before it arrives. This was already the case 
for the text on the SDI and documents prepared 
by the international secretariat of the SAC on 
Japanese armaments industries, for instance. 
Henceforth it may also be true for texts produced 
by the three agencies. 
55. Procedure for consultation has been intro-
duced since the Council started to reactivate 
WEU and this has allowed the Assembly to be 
not altogether alien to the activities of the Coun-
cil, particularly when it meets at ministerial 
level, but it is far from producing adequate 
results since all the decisions relating to WED's 
own activities are prepared at the level of the 
Permanent Council and its working groups and, 
inevitably, it tends to take the place of earlier 
procedure which is becoming obsolescent. 
56. Thus, meetings between the Presidential 
Committee and the Council were held after each 
ofthe two ministerial meetings in 1985, but there 
was no joint meeting between the Council and 
Assembly committees in 1985. Similarly, the 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee was 
not received by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council at the close of these ministerial meet-
ings: it would have been pointless since the 
Chairman-in-Office gave the Presidential Com-
mittee as a whole the information which had 
hitherto been reserved for the Chairman of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
57. Conversely, the rarity of joint meetings 
with committees reduced considerably the num-
ber of parliamentarians able to take part in the 
dialogue with the Council. Even when the 
chairmen of political groups are convened to its 
meetings, the Presidential Committee is not a 
political body with political weighting and it 
does not have to prepare the replies to the annual 
report of the Council whose adoption is one of 
the Assembly's statutory duties. Having taken 
note of the fact that joint meetings with commit-
tees, from which the Council intentionally 
removed all that was compulsory for it when it 
gave up applying the official procedure which it 
had itself worked out, are to be held at the close 
of the ministerial meeting in Venice on 30th 
April, your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that 
it is essential to hold such meetings if the dia-
logue with the Council is really to involve the 
Assembly. 
58. The President of the Assembly met the 
two successive Chairmen-in-Office of the Coun-
cil several times in 1985. Your Rapporteur can 
but welcome such meetings, but he must stress 
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came to light during the Deaember 1985 session 
indicate that these meetings did not produce all 
the results one was entitled ~o expect. 
59. Moreover, the Assemb~y set up a Commit-
tee for Relations with the Qouncil whose main 
duty is to· inform the Council, before its deci-
sions are taken, of the As~embly's views. It 
could have played an important role at the time 
measures were taken to reactivate 
WEU. However, it was no~ possible to arrange 
a meeting with the Council Wior to the minister-
ial meeting in Rome in November 1985 when a 
number of important decisions had to be taken 
in this sense. Your Rapporteur is gratified that 
it was possible to hold such .a meeting in Rome 
on 8th April 1986. · 
60. Finally, at the meeting between the Presi-
dential Committee and the lpermanent Council 
on 21st January 1986, no anlswers were given to 
the many questions set out in the letter from the 
President of the Assembly. Clearly the mem-
bers of the Permanent Council are not empow-
ered to answer on behalf of their governments 
when questions relate to matters on which they 
have had no special instructions. It might have 
been hoped, however, that for matters relating 
directly to WEU, as for almost all the questions 
put, it would have been possible for them to give 
their views. This does not seem to have been 
the case. 
61. At such meetings, we. are therefore faced 
with the problem which h~s always paralysed 
relations between the Assemlbly and the Council 
and there is no reason for the Assembly to depart 
from the position it has always adopted, i.e. to 
insist either on formal meetings for which the 
parliamentarians' questions are transmitted in 
advance and the Council's ~mswers, adopted in 
accordance with the ru~es governing the 
organisation, express the un~nimous opinion of 
the seven governments, or on informal meetings 
allowing a real dialogue but implying that the 
government representatives speak freely. If the 
Permanent Council continues to insist on infor-
mal meetings without paying the price and allow-
ing its members to speak freely, there is every 
reason to fear that these tneetings have little 
future. This is so for instance when the Council 
acts as it did over the Assembly's budget for 
1986, i.e. holding its meeting with the parliamen-
tarians only after it had previously adopted its 
positions unanimously. A dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly is not and cannot be 
the mere presentation to the Assembly of deci-
sions already taken. 1 
that they are of interest only if the remarks of the 62. All these remarks gi1'e your Rapporteur 
Chairman-in-Office truly commit the the impression that the problems raised are not 
Council. As no record is taken of such meet- just procedural but concern the way the Council 
ings, it is difficult to ensure that participants believes its role should be played. There can be 
draw identical conclusions, and the differences no improvement in relations between the two 
between the Council and the Assembly which WEU bodies if the Council' continues - as was 
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the case for understandable reasons before the 
reactivation of WEU abolished most armaments 
controls - to shelter behind procedure to conceal 
its refusal of all initiatives implied by Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
Rome declaration. No procedure will allow a 
true dialogue to be initiated between the Council 
and the Assembly, nor will the Council's 
expressed desire to launch a policy of keeping the 
press informed have the slightest chance of suc-
cess as long as the Council has no real exis-
tence. 
63. Similarly, the Council cannot expect the 
Assembly to play effectively the role among pub-
lic opinion assigned to it by the Rome declara-
tion if it persists in using procedure which in fact 
deprives the Assembly of credibility. The 
Council's persistent refusal to grant the Assem-
bly the budget it needs to meet the growing 
requests for documentation, information, attend-
ance at various colloquies, and relations with 
other parliamentary assemblies, which it has 
been receiving since the Council itself raised the 
idea of reactivating WEU, the total absence of 
independence in the management of the budget 
which it forces upon the Assembly, the shortage 
of information it provides and the meagreness of 
the dialogue it allows significantly limit the 
Assembly's audience. It is not for your 
Rapporteur to tackle the budgetary aspects of the 
matter here, but he wishes to recall that they also 
have a political aspect which should not be 
neglected. 
64. Until such time as the thirty-first annual 
report of the Council reaches the Assembly, it 
will be difficult to review the Council's political 
activities in 1985. Possibly new practices, 
including the presence of senior ministry officials 
and experts at meetings of the Permanent Coun-
cil, may have changed the standard ofthe Coun-
cil's work considerably, but the Assembly has 
nothing on which to form an opinion. Your 
Rapporteur wishes to underline that during a 
first reading of the working paper which he sub-
mitted to the General Affairs Committee on 17th 
March, many of his colleagues voiced grave 
doubts about the Council's true intentions 
and its will to apply the Rome declaration 
effectively. The documents sent by the Council 
to the Assembly in the first months of 1986 are 
certainly not likely to make them change their 
minds, particularly where the activities of the 
new agencies are concerned. 
65. Until 31st December 1985, the ACA and 
the international secretariat of the SAC had their 
own activities, defined on a permanent basis, 
and their dependence on the Council was 
limited. This is no longer the case, at least for 
most of the activities of the three new 
agencies. One may wonder, however, why an 
intergovernmental body needs agencies to pro-
vide it with information which, inevitably, will 
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come mainly from the governments represented 
on the Council. As long as these agencies have 
no permanent, clearly-defined and compulsory 
tasks, and are responsible mainly for certain top-
ical studies, the need for which is not always 
obvious and they are not given the means to do 
their job thoroughly, it may be wondered to what 
extent the governments really wish to reactivate 
WEU. 
66. This is one of the reasons why the propo-
sal made by Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, in December 1984, taken 
up and developed by the successive rapporteurs 
of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Masciadri 
(Document 990), Mr. van der Sanden (Docu-
ment 1012) and Mr. Berrier (Document 1034), to 
set up an institute to study defence questions, 
apart from the interest of setting up such an insti-
tute, would, if the institute were set up in WEU, 
have the further advantage of providing a perma-
nent programme of work and responsibilities, at 
least for the agency for the study of security and 
defence problems (Agency II). Your 
Rapporteur believes this matter is on the agenda 
of the meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
Venice and he hopes the governments will take a 
decision on it. He has noted with very special 
interest the specific proposals in the article by 
Mr. Pierre Schwed and General Henri Bagnouls 
" Ebauche d'un institut europeen des hautes 
etudes de defense " published in the French mag-
azine Defense nationale ofMarch 1986, which he 
considers makes a particularly interesting propo-
sal for incorporating such an institute in 
WEU. He regrets that so far the Council has 
given only evasive and laconic answers to the 
proposals made by the General Affairs Commit-
tee in this connection. 
67. He also regrets that the Council has given 
no indication of what it expects of the work of 
Agency I on disarmament and the control of 
armaments, i.e. its own intentions in this respect. 
In May 1985, Mr. van der Sanden's report said 
that there had been American opposition to the 
pursuit of the Council's work on this matter and, 
while the Council has never given the Assembly 
any information about this, the General Affairs 
Committee received confirmation during its visit 
to the State Department in Washington in June 
1985. This was perhaps not the most appropri-
ate place for the Assembly to obtain important 
information about the Council's activities. 
68. Finally, the answer to Written Question 
262 is far from providing the assurances that 
might have been expected after the Rome decla-
ration about the permanent activities of Agency 
Ill and the areas of its responsibilities compared 
with those of the IEPG. 
69. Your Rapporteur has to conclude this 
chapter by stressing that many details are still 
lacking about the activities of the Council and its 
dependent organs both in the recent past and 
regarding the governments' intentions for the 
future. He is very much afraid that these gaps 
in the information given to the Assembly and the 
delay in adopting the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council may conceal considerable hesitancy 
in the intentions of the Seven about effectively 
applying the decisions, the principle of which 
was agreed upon in Rome eighteen months ago. 
IV. The Assembly's prospects 
70. A brief debate led to the adoption of the 
amendment to include a new paragraph in the 
preamble to the draft recommendation submit-
ted by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee, as follows: 
" Referring to the fact that the report on 
the possibilities, conditions and conse-
quences of a closer institutional connec-
tion of the Assembly with other organs of 
WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will 
be prepared separately." 
71. Although there was not time for speakers 
to express their views in full, this debate indi-
cated that members of the Assembly have two 
apparently very different concepts if not about 
the nature and vocation of WEU, at least about 
what it is possible and desirable to do in the 
immediate future. 
72. Mr. Berrier's report included a chapter 
answering Order 63 which had been referred 
back to the General Affairs Committee for 
consideration. This chapter was based on a 
very sound analysis of the right established by 
the modified Brussels Treaty and noted that the 
Assembly's main duty was to supervise the 
Council's activities on the basis of the annual 
report which the latter has to submit to the 
Assembly. It concluded that the priority given 
to its supervisory activities meant that the 
Assembly had to be completely independent of 
the Council and hence the Office of the Clerk 
had to be independent vis-a-vis the Secretariat-
General. This led the Rapporteur to reject most 
of the ideas which had visibly guided the authors 
of Order 63. 
73. As opposed to this right, speeches by sev-
eral of the signatories of the order during the 
debate on Mr. Berrier's report referred to the 
changing position of WEU due to its 
reactivation. They considered that this situa-
tion called for greater unity between the Council 
and the Assembly so as to form a bloc in order to 
promote the European union they wanted, con-
sidering the priority hitherto given to the 
Assembly's independence to be out of 
date. This at least is the way your Rapporteur 
interprets Mr. Spies von Bullesheim's speech in 
favour of the amendment. 
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74. An attempt should therefore be made to 
get to the heart of the problem and to examine 
the elements of this order Qnly in the light of 
more general views on the present and future of 
WEU. 
75. In point of fact, this i~ not a new debate 
since it emerged at the very start of WEU and 
has constantly brought those who considered 
that the organisation was a balanced whole, 
acceptable in itself because it brought together 
the necessary conditions fo~ the application of 
Article V of the treaty, into
1 
conflict with those 
who considered that the failure of the EDC had 
permanently compromised the future of a 
defence Europe. Of those who considered that 
the solution offered by th~ modified Brussels 
Treaty was the best one pbssible, particularly 
among the French and British, many were in 
favour of a confederal-type Europe, at least for 
defence matters which the~ considered should 
not escape state sovereignty< 
76. Others, without stopping at a global view 
of the future of Europe, noted that the failure of 
the EDC had shown that Europe could go no fur-
ther in this area in the near future. One needs 
only to recall the hesitation shown by several 
members in 1954 about allowing German mili-
tary units to be formed, the aversion of the Brit-
ish to commit themselves for several decades to 
maintaining a large force on the mainland of 
Europe, the Federal Republic's hesitation about 
mortgaging aspects of its economic, military and 
political future by renouncing the production of 
certain weapons and France's refusal to take part 
in a European defence organisation in which the 
United Kingdom would not occupy a place to 
realise the delicate, subtle balance of commit-
ments which the modified Brussels Treaty had to 
meet: it was probably the maximum that it was 
possible to achieve in 1954. But in their view 
this in no way precluded the subsequent develop-
ment of WEU, giving it a place in a European 
union whose boundaries and above all political 
orientations were to be warked out without a 
prior condition being the solution of structural 
matters. 
77. Finally, a few people considered that by 
setting up a seven-power confederal-type Europe 
the signatories of the Paris Agreements were 
delaying and making more difficult the progress 
of a community-type Europe which at the time 
could only have been a six-power Europe and 
hence they constantly endeavoured to promote, 
outside WEU, the extension of Community 
Europe to the field of defence. This tendency 
has often been evident in the European Parlia-
ment but has so far produded no results in the 
governments. 
78. It is now clear that, hpwever one looks at 
it, the choice made after the failure of the EDC 
was the only one possible. It did not hinder the 
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enlargement of Community Europe and if the 
latter has not advanced towards greater Euro-
pean unity it is certainly not due to the influence 
exerted by WEU. However this may be, the 
question raised indirectly by Order 63 is to what 
extent the situation in 1986 is sufficiently differ-
ent from that of 1954 to allow the structure of 
WEU to evolve away from the treaty which set 
up the institution and made the Assembly a 
supervisory body implying that the Assembly 
should be completely independent of the Coun-
cil, as recalled in Mr. Berrier's report. 
79. A first argument in favour of an evolution 
in the WEU structure stems from the abolition of 
most of the controls exercised by the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments. This has been done 
progressively following, on the one hand, reduc-
tions in the list of conventional weapons which 
the Federal Republic undertook not to manufac-
ture and, on the other hand, the French decision 
not to submit its nuclear weapons to 
control. The decision taken by the Council in 
1984 to delete the lists in Annex Ill to Protocol 
No. Ill and subsequently to abolish all controls 
of conventional weapons completed this 
evolution. The argument which was apparently 
at the back of the minds of the authors of Order 
63 was that once these controls were abolished 
the Assembly's principal task vis-a-vis the Coun-
cil would no longer be significant. 
80. However, this argument is based only on 
Council practice in the last ten years (i.e. since 
the United Kingdom joined the European Com-
munities) and not on the intentions of the signa-
tories of the treaty. The latter considered that 
Article V was the basis of WEU, not arms 
controls. All the rest became significant only in 
relation to the casus foederis, which meant that 
the Assembly's role covered all the Council's 
activities and application of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and not specifically arms 
controls. Once these have disappeared, or 
almost, the Assembly's obligations remain the 
same: to supervise the application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty. The Council clearly 
recognised this when it acknowledged that it was 
answerable to the Assembly for all matters relat-
ing to the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, even if the seven-power consultations 
provided for in Article VIII were held in frame-
works other than WEU. A reduction in arms 
controls therefore does not affect the application 
of Article IX of the treaty. 
81. A second argument in favour of a change 
in institutional relations between the Council 
and the Assembly might be based on the fact that 
in practice the Assembly has played a role which 
has been far more important in terms of propo-
sals than of control. In December 1984, Mr. 
Masciadri prepared a brief showing the 
Assembly's important contribution to the 
reactivation of WEU which the Council 
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recognised in the Rome declaration. It is evi-
dent that this role of making proposals and sug-
gestions can often be developed more effectively 
in informal exchanges of views than through the 
transmission of official documents although, as 
shown by the brief published in 1984, it is 
mainly through texts adopted and transmitted to 
the Council that the Assembly has acted, while 
informal exchanges of views have often been 
very disappointing. But one may wonder 
whether they would have been less disappointing 
if there had been closer institutional links 
between the Council and the Assembly or 
whether, on the contrary, such links would not 
have led to the Assembly's ability to make pro-
posals and suggestions being restricted by allow-
ing the governments to take steps to ensure that 
parliamentarians did not adopt any proposals 
which displeased them. 
82. In this connection, the example of the 
Council of Europe provides ambiguous pointers, 
on the one hand because most of the matters 
handled in that forum relate to areas which gov-
ernments find less sensitive than those covered 
by the modified Brussels Treaty and, on the 
other hand, because the more or less discreet 
nature of government statements prevents an 
analysis of their nature and effects and, finally, 
because the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has no supervisory duties but 
has a consultative role which does not require 
the same strict separation of powers. 
83. The idea that WEU should one day draw 
closer to the European Community and that it 
would therefore be in its interest to bring the 
statute of its Assembly more into line with that 
of the European Parliament is not likely to 
encourage a tightening of links between the 
Council and the Assembly since the European 
Parliament for its part is totally independent of 
both the Council and the Commission. On the 
other hand, all the attempts it has made so far to 
handle matters relating to Western European 
security have remained without response from 
the governments. 
84. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to recall 
that an assembly without legislative or budgetary 
powers can act only by arousing the interest of 
the press and public opinion and an essential 
condition for ensuring such interest is to be inde-
pendent of the executive. 
85. In these conditions, your Rapporteur feels 
that the reactivation ofWEU as it is taking shape 
allows the Council and the Assembly to draw 
closer together in certain useful areas but it is not 
such as to call in question either the modified 
Brussels Treaty or the independence of the 
Assembly stemming from it. 
86. (a) A useful step would obviously be to 
bring the Council and the Assembly geographi-
cally closer together as this would allow savings 
to be made in the budget and facilitate exchanges 
of information between the two WEU 
bodies. However, this should not be to the det-
riment of the Assembly which needs suitable 
premises in a city where the press, and particu-
larly those interested in defence questions, is 
adequately represented, where it is easy to obtain 
information about matters it handles and where 
there is adequate hotel accommodation. 
87. (b) The new direction to be taken by the 
three agencies set up on 1st January will lead 
them to combine and add considerably to their 
documentation on matters of direct interest to 
the Assembly. The latter should ensure that its 
members and secretariat are authorised to have 
access to this information insofar as its classifica-
tion allows. The fact that the agencies' docu-
mentation is to be combined in a common ser-
vice should facilitate the establishment of an 
agreement between the Assembly and the Coun-
cil allowing such access in accordance with the 
Rome declaration which provides for " the possi-
bility that the Assembly might make use of con-
tributions from the technical institutions of 
WEU ". The declaration even specifies that the 
work of the agencies on arms control, disarma-
ment and security and defence problems " could 
form a useful point of reference for the work " of 
the Assembly. 
88. A number of statements by the Secretary-
General have explained the Council's views 
about possible co-operation between the WEU 
technical organs and the Assembly in application 
of the general obligation laid down in the Rome 
declaration. Inter alia, he has stated that any 
request for the co-operation of an agency in pre-
paring an Assembly report requires a specific 
decision by the Council and, furthermore, any 
expenditure incurred by the agencies on behalf of 
the Assembly must be met from the Assembly 
budget. While the Assembly is therefore 
allowed privileged use of the agencies, the Coun-
cil has placed strict limits on this use and 
ensured that there will be no confusion of 
authority between it and the Assembly in regard 
to these bodies. 
89. (c) While it is true that the change in the 
Secretary-General's responsibilities towards the 
Assembly proposed in Order 63 must in no case 
call in question the Assembly's independence of 
the executive, conversely the initiative taken by 
the Secretary-General, obviously with the 
authorisation of the Council, in addressing the 
Assembly at the December session on behalf of 
the Council to which he is responsible is obvi-
ously a major new development: it is a matter of 
organising relations between the two WEU bod-
ies on a clear basis in accordance with the voca-
tion of both sides and making the Secretary-
General a privileged instrument of the Council's 
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participation in this dialogue is a very positive 
factor. 
90. (d) Greater independep.ce for the Assem-
bly in the management of its operating budget 
within limits necessarily laid 1down in agreement 
with the Council would greatly facilitate relations 
between the Council and the Assembly by cut-
ting out a number of minor details. In this con-
nection, the idea of" one single budget " referred 
to in Order 63 is particularly unclear since the 
Assembly is at the same tim~ requesting greater 
budgetary independence. The Council has to 
reply to Recommendation 429 before the next 
session. This recommendation set out the 
Assembly's request for budgetary independen-
ce. The answer should throw light on the possi-
bility ofthe Assembly negotiating new procedure 
with the Council for adoptin' Assembly budgets. 
Under present procedure,· which gives the 
Assembly the right only to express an opinion on 
the budget of the ministerial organs, the only 
possibility of drawing up a single budget would 
be for the Assembly to relinquish its right to 
adopt its own budget after a last reading, which 
would run counter to the claim for greater budge-
tary independence which has always been the 
Assembly's position. 
91. Such are the possibilities which your 
Rapporteur considers desirable for tightening 
links between the Assembly and the other WEU 
organs within the context of the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
reactivation of WEU. Any attempt to tighten 
them further would mean revising the treaty, 
which the governments wished to avoid when 
they adopted the Rome declaration (the proce-
dure used to abolish arms controls is proof of 
this). A revision may be necessary when there 
is a possibility of merging WEU and Community 
institutions. This is not so at present. Conver-
sely, it might still call in question most of what 
was gained in 1954, i.e. the basing of European 
defence on a defensive alliance with particularly 
binding provisions. 
V. Conclusitms 
92. At its meeting on 17th March 1986, the 
General Affairs Committee was divided between 
those who considered that in the immediate 
future WEU should not be enlarged as this might 
lead to a weakening of the political will of the 
governments to follow up the Rome declaration 
and those who thought any European countries 
so wishing should be admitteU if they were mem-
bers of the European Community and the Atlan-
tic Alliance, in certain cases, or of one of them, 
in others. There are indications that the seven 
governments are experiencing the same 
difficulties. Your Rapporteur is not at all con-
vinced that this is a true alternative. While 
Portugal's application for rqembership in 1984 
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seems to have been almost unconditional, Spain 
has indicated that its interest in WEU is linked 
with the development of the organisation's activ-
ities and the members of the General Affairs 
Committee who visited Norway in February 
1986 heard similar remarks, apart from the fact 
that the Norwegian Government, which might 
be interested in WEU later, is not considering 
joining in the near future. 
93. Furthermore, nothing in the information 
the Assembly has received from the Council 
implies that the Seven have a political will which 
might be jeopardised by the accession of the 
countries which are now candidates. It is diffi-
cult to see how the presence of Spain or Portugal 
might weaken cohesion of which there is very lit-
tle sign. Quite the contrary, it may be hoped 
that the arrival of new members would force the 
governments to be rather more specific than 
before about what they intend to do with WEU, 
and above all in WEU. 
94 It is certain that since October 1984 suc-
cessive Chairmen-in-Office and the Secretary-
General have done what they could to meet the 
Assembly's wishes by increasing contacts and 
providing it with any information 
possible. They have certainly done much to 
give the Assembly confidence in their good 
intentions. Yet a start should at least be made on 
these intentions and this does not seem to be the 
case at all judging by the Council's communica-
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tions to the Assembly. The Assembly merely 
wishes the Council to implement the Rome 
decisions. Eighteen months later, it cannot be 
claimed that any real start has been made and 
the improvement in relations between the Coun-
cil and the Assembly is therefore little more than 
a matter of appearances and an exchange of 
courtesies. Members of the General Affairs 
Committee who attended the meeting with the 
Council in Bonn in April 1985 felt there was a 
complete absence of dialogue because the Coun-
cil, having practically nothing to say about its 
activities, could not dialogue with the 
Assembly. The failure to adopt the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council within the normal 
time makes one wonder why it is so difficult for 
the seven governments to reach agreement on a 
text which, after all, has to reveal only the past 
activities of the WEU Council, unless it is 
because these activities are a long way from cor-
responding to the intentions agreed to unani-
mously in Rome. 
95. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it 
highly risky to rely sufficiently on the Council's 
intentions to do nothing that might jeopardise 
the Assembly's independence. As long as the 
Council fails to show stronger political determi-
nation, the role of the Assembly will continue to 
be mainly one of criticism and censure, which 
means that the Assembly itself and all its attend-
ant organs must steadfastly maintain their inde-
pendence. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Deeply regretting that the Council has so far submitted to the Assembly only part of the report on 
its activities provided for in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(ii) Considering that the absence of a joint position on certain matters should not prevent the Council 
from presenting its report; 
(iii) Welcoming the fact that the Council, both in the Rome declaration and in the tasks which it 
assigned to Agency I, maintains its decision to discuss and harmonise the views of the Seven on disarm-
ament and the control of armaments; 
(iv) Concerned at the lack of progress achieved in the various international conferences now dealing 
with these matters in spite of the promising results of the summit meeting in November 1985; 
(v) Considering that it is more than ever essential for the Seven to maintain their own bilateral rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and to seek a common position on the control of armaments and disarma-
ment; 
(vi) Noting with satisfaction on the one hand that, when inviting the Soviet Union to be represented 
by experts in the assessment of a new system for measuring and detecting underground nuclear tests, the 
United States declared itself prepared to promote ratification of the treaties limiting tests to 150 kt and 
on peaceful nuclear explosions if the new system proves satisfactory, and on the other hand that on 20th 
February 1986 the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of on-site inspections in the context of an agree-
ment banning all nuclear tests; 
(vii) Noting reports that most nuclear tests down to the very smallest can be adequately monitored; 
(viii) Considering the new proposals concerning a convention to ban chemical weapons submitted by 
the Soviet Union on 22nd April 1986 to be a constructive basis for further negotiations; 
(ix) Reiterating the proposals contained in its Recommendation 425 adopted on 2nd December 1985 
which are still fully valid, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end of February of the following year; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU; 
3. Urge the Seven, in their consultations on negotiations on strategic and space weapons, to insist on 
the treaties already signed being respected, in particular SALT I, SALT 11 and the ABM treaty; 
4. Urge those of the seven governments participating in the MBFR negotiations to insist: 
(a) on the right of automatic inspections; and 
(b) on the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reductions zone to pass at all times 
through recognised entry-exit points with permanent observers; 
5. Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' invitation to observe a nuclear test carried out 
by it in order to draw up reliable data on verification, and ask the Seven to instruct their representatives 
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to proceed without delay to the negotiation of a treaty 
banning all nuclear tests; 
6. (a) Agree instructions calling for negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to be accelerated, taking full account ofthe most recent propo-
sals of the United States and the Soviet Union; 
(b) Pending a review of the entire situation next year, not approve as a NATO force goal the 
deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. In accordance with the terms of reference 
given to the Rapporteur for his report the com-
mittee noted that " as the internal WEU conven-
tional arms control functions are terminated at 
the end of 1985, while three new agencies are cre-
ated, including the agency for the study of arms 
contr?l and disarmament questions, the report 
replymg to the annual report of the Council can 
conveniently be combined with a follow-up 
report on disarmament which, in view of the 
impulse given by the Reagan-Gorbachev sum-
mit, will follow negotiations on the most topical 
or urgent disarmament problems, without how-
ever covering all the topics dealt with in the 
information report of 4th November (Document 
1040) or the report of 22nd November (Docu-
ment 1043) ". But at the time of writing the 
Rapporteur has in his possession only Chapters 
Ill and IV of the annual report of the Council 
dealing with the last activities of the former 
international secretariat of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee and the Agency for the Con-
trol of Armaments up to 31st December 
1985. As far as its own activities are concerned 
the Council apparently has not been able to reach 
agreement on the text of a simple account of 
them in 1985. 
1.2. As for the Council's three new Agencies I 
II and Ill, which replace the Agency and th~ 
international secretariat in Paris, a letter from 
the Secretary-General dated 17th March never-
theless throws light on their future composition 
and initial activities with a view to preparing the 
ministerial meeting of the Council in Venice on 
29th and 30th April'. 
1.3. It is not surprising that the Council was 
unable to reach agreement on two specific points 
on which the positions of the seven governments 
stil~ seem to differ. . These are Portugal's appli-
catiOn for membership ofWEU made in October 
1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reac-
tions of WEU countries to the United States 
invitation to take part in research for strategic 
defence purposes. 
1.4. In regard to the accession of new states to 
the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty pro-
vides that " the high contracting parties may, by 
agreement, invite any other state to accede to the 
present treaty on conditions to be agreed 
between them and the state so invited". The 
Seven seem to have been unprepared for 
Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way 
I. See text of letter from Secretary-General at Appendix. 
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anticipated their invitation. ; In this connection, 
another letter from the WEU Secretary-General 
on 26th February 1986 informing the President 
of the Assembly of his visit tQ Spain on 28th and 
29th January reports in regard to Spain that: 
"On relations between Spain and Western 
European Union, those to whom I spoke 
confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to 
WEU. How do they view such 
accession? They are aware that accession 
to WEU is at the invitation of the WEU 
Council. They will therefore await this 
invitation in due course, i.e. after the 
major debate on the problem of security 
raised by the referend¥m on 12th March 
has come to a conclus~on. " 
The Secretary-General concl111ded: 
" Still in my personal capacity, I con-
cluded that it was politically desirable, if a 
state wished to join WEU, for it: 
- to be a member of the Communities 
and of political co-operation; 
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; 
and 
- to have a real desire to promote a Euro-
pean security dimension." 
While it is certain that the accession of Portugal 
and Spain would be very warmly welcomed from 
a purely political standpoint, certain WEU coun-
tries consider that at the same time it is essential 
not to isolate the European allied countries on 
the two flanks which are of vital strategic impor-
tance for European securiw. Should not a 
simultaneous invitation therefore also be made 
to all the allied European countries members of 
NATO to join WEU? 
1.5. In regard to the American invitation to 
take part in research for strategic defence pur-
poses, the bilateral negotiations held by the 
United States with each of the European allied 
countries are making slow progress. 
Memoranda of understanding have been signed 
by the United Kingdom and Germany but, 
exceptionally for this type of document, their 
content has not been published, which is arous-
ing concern about the extent of the American 
technical know-how to which European indus-
tries taking part in the research would have 
access. 
1.6. Apart from these two delicate matters, it is 
nevertheless surprising, and unacceptable for a 
parliamentary assembly, not to have at its spring 
session a simple account of the activities of 
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the Council for the previous year. Where the 
Council's activities are concerned, the present 
report by the committee will therefore deal only 
with Chapters Ill and IV of the annual report. As 
for the future activities of the three new Council 
agencies, the letter from the Secretary-General 
reports that: 
" Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-
vis the countries of Western Europe in 
regard to questions of the control of arma-
ments and disarmament. In the future it 
will also have to take an interest in the 
control of conventional armaments and 
the essential problem of verification. " 
1. 7. The second part of this report consists of 
an updating of the committee's previous report 
on disarmament and the control of arma-
ments. 
11. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Conventional weapons 
2.1. In its 1984 report2, the committee exam-
ined the history of the rather incomplete applica-
tion of controls of member countries' weapons 
provided for in the Brussels Treaty as modified 
in 1954. There is no need to return to controls 
of conventional weapons - and the gaps in their 
application - since the Council, in accordance 
with several Assembly recommendations, 
decided to abolish them completely as from 1st 
January 1986. In 1985, in accordance with the 
decision of principle taken by the Council in 
Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its res-
olution of 23rd January 1985, controls were 
applied to only about half the conventional 
weapons subject to control under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols Nos. Ill and 
IV. By pursuing documentary controls- which 
represented most of the Agency's work in the 
past - in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field 
control measures in the same year, the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments duly carried out 
its duties until the last day of its existence with a 
full staff. The table hereafter gives a breakdown 
of field control measures. 
2.2. The Council's decision to control only half 
the number of conventional weapons formerly 
controlled in 1985 pending the complete aboli-
tion of such controls as from 1st January 1986 
seems curious, not to say aberrant. 
(b) ABC weapons 
2.3. The situation is different in regard to 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The 
Rome declaration adopted by the Council on 
27th October 1984 asserted that " the commit-
2. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to 
the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 
973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker. 
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ments and controls concerning ABC weapons 
would be maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed up to the 
present time". But, as in previous years, the 
annual report of the Council for 1985 states that 
" since the situation has remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency did not exercise any 
control in the field of atomic weapons " and the 
list of biological weapons subject to control 
accepted by the Council in 1981 having been 
renewed by the latter for 1985 " as in previous 
years ... the Agency did not exercise any control 
in the field of biological weapons". 
2.4. There remain chemical weapons. As for 
atomic and biological weapons, there are two 
aspects to controls of chemical weapons pro-
vided for in the Brussels Treaty: 
(i) control of any production in countries 
not having renounced the right to pro-
duce chemical weapons; 
(ii) verification of undertakings made by 
the country which renounced the right 
to produce such weapons. 
2.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first 
renewed the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control which it had previously approved. 
Then, according to the annual report, the ques-
tionnaire which the Agency sends the six coun-
tries which have not renounced the right to pro-
duce such chemical weapons asked: 
" ... whether production of chemical weap-
ons on their mainland territory had passed 
the experimental stage and entered the 
effective production stage. As in the past, 
all these states replied in the negative. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the mem-
ber states to declare any chemical weapons 
that they might hold. Since all the mem-
ber states replied in the negative, the 
Agency carried out no quantitative con-
trols of chemical weapons in 1985. " 
2.6. In the case of the seventh country, which 
has renounced the right to produce chemical 
weapons on its territory, the annual report speci-
fies that: 
"The competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided the Agency with a 
detailed, precise and complete reply to the 
request for information - aimed at facili-
tating the control of non-production of 
chemical weapons - which was sent to 
them by the Agency in accordance with the 
resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 
and with the directive received from the 
Council in 1960. In addition, the proce-
dure applied with these authorities since 
1973 was again used." 
2. 7. In regard to field control measures, the 
Agency each year conducts agreed verification of 
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Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 1961-85 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures I Total 
(of~ich control at units measures (all 
at under at at non- categories) 
depots national production Sub-total production production 
command plants plants of che~ical 
weapons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 
!!l 
63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 7 * * * * * n.a. 70 8 * * * * * n.a. 79 9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 2 * * * * * n.a. - 66 3 * * * * * n.fi. - 66 4 * * * * * n.a. - 71 5 * * * * * n.a. - 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. - 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. - 70 8 * * * * * n.a. - 68 9 * * * * * n.a. - 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. - 70 1 * * * * * n.a. - 70 2 * * * * * n.a. - 69 3 * * * * * n:a. - 72 4 * * * * * n.a. - 66 5 * * * * * n.a. - 34 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparen~ reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures 
(old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a. : Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from publi$hed annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the pub-
lished annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 
1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish 
them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without signifi-
cance. 
* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report. 
non-production in plants. But reports of the 
Council prior to 1983 contained the following 
reservation: 
" As the convention for the due process of 
law3 has not yet entered into force, the 
-----
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control 
effectively and making provision for due process of law, in 
accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as 
modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 
1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so far rati-
fied by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
257 
control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
agreed control measures. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. ~ince this agreement 
has never been withheld, the 1982 
programme of control measures at 
privately-owned plants was therefore 
drawn up with full confidence that it could 
be implemented as in previous years. " 
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2.8. In future, therefore, WEU's act1v1t1es in 
regard to the internal control of armaments will 
be limited in fact to this procedure for control-
ling chemical weapons. The Agency for the 
Control of Armaments has not been disbanded 
altogether, but its staff has been reduced to one 
person, an expert in chemical weapons. 
Ill. International negotiations 
on the control of armaments 
(a) General 
3.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the 
Council decided in the Rome declaration of 
October 1984: 
" ... to hold comprehensive discussions 
and to seek to harmonise their views on 
the specific conditions of security in 
Europe, in particular: 
- arms control and disarmament. " 
While the committee can but regret that the 
Council was unable to transmit its annual report 
in time, since this would have thrown light on 
the way in which it fulfilled this undertaking in 
1985, the task assigned to the new Agency I in 
preparing the ministerial meeting in Venice in 
April 1986 shows that the question is still on the 
Council's agenda. 
3.2. The committee, for its part, studied in 
detail last year the progress of negotiations on 
the control of armaments in four international 
forums: the bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear 
and space weapons, the mutual and balanced 
force reduction negotiations in Vienna; the con-
ference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm 
and the Geneva disarmament conference 4• 
3.3. At the close of the summit meeting 
between President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st Novem-
ber 1985, the committee was able inter alia to 
welcome " the positive fresh start to bilateral 
relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union ... and the constructive references 
to most arms control issues in the agreed state-
ment including the principle of a 50% reduction 
in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohi-
bition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an 
interim INF agreement, while noting the absence 
of specific agreements". The very positive 
impetus given to the negotiations was enhanced 
shortly afterwards by the long statement on dis-
armament made by General Secretary 
4. Disarmament, information report, Document I 040, 4th 
November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, 
Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. 
B1aauw. 
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Gorbachev in Moscow on 15th January 1986 
which contained six proposals, including a five-
year programme leading in three stages to the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
throughout the world before the end of the cen-
tury and a three-month prolongation of the mor-
atorium on nuclear tests initially declared by the 
Soviet Union as from 6th August 1985 immedi-
ately after it had carried out a programme of 
nuclear test explosions. 
3.4. However, in spite of these two auspicious 
events, it appears that meaningful progress in the 
various negotiations has been slight or 
nil. While Mr. Gorbachev's public statements 
seem promising, the actual proposals made by 
his delegates in the privacy of negotiations have 
apparently not come up to expectations. At the 
same time, certain western reactions to the 
Soviet proposals seem to have taken a step back-
wards compared with some earlier posi-
tions. Developments since the adoption of the 
committee's last report on 22nd November 1985 
are analysed under the following headings: bilat-
eral negotiations (INF, START, space weapons); 
MBFR; Geneva disarmament conference (com-
plete suspension of nuclear tests, chemical weap-
ons, space weapons); Stockholm conference. 
(b) Bilateral negotiations 
(i) Intermediate nuclear forces 
3.5. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range 
nuclear forces and space weapons, particular 
attention was paid to intermediate-range weap-
ons because of the new proposals put forward by 
Mr. Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January 
and the terms of the West's answer. Details of 
the proposals made by each side's negotiators in 
Geneva are obviously not known. But since the 
Soviet Union in particular has developed the 
habit of negotiating more publicly than in the 
past, the public is most probably aware of the 
major elements of the proposals exchanged. 
3.6. The rather spectacular language used by 
Mr. Gorbachev in his address was certainly 
intended to impress world public opinion: 
" The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-
step and consistent process of ridding the 
earth of nuclear weapons, to be imple-
mented and completed within the next fif-
teen years, before the end of this cen-
tury. " 
Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, 
this address contains at least the outline of cer-
tain tangible proposals. The first stage would 
last from five to eight years: 
" The first stage will include the adoption 
and implementation of the decision on the 
complete elimination of intermediate-
range missiles ofthe USSR and the United 
States in the European zone, both ballistic 
and cruise missiles, as a first step towards 
ridding the European continent of nuclear 
weapons. 
At the same time the United States should 
undertake not to transfer its strategic and 
medium-range missiles to other countries, 
while Britain and France should pledge 
not to build up their respective nuclear 
arms." 
During the second stage, starting in 1990 and 
spread over a period of five to seven years: 
. .. the other nuclear powers will begin to 
engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin 
with, they would pledge to freeze all their 
nuclear arms and not to have them in the 
territories of other countries. 
In this period the USSR and the United 
States will go on with the reductions 
agreed upon during the first stage and also 
carry out further measures designed to 
eliminate their medium-range nuclear 
weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear 
systems." 
Further details were given on 12th February dur-
ing an interview granted to West German televi-
sion by General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet spokes-
man on disarmament. He defined the 
" European zone " as being the area extending as 
far as longitude 80° east, i.e. a line some 1,300 
km to the east of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 
missiles are out of range of Europe. SS-20 mis-
siles west of that line would be destroyed: 
"We do not propose to move these SS-20 
missiles somewhere else. They will be 
destroyed under painstaking and reliable 
national and international control, includ-
ing inspections on site and on the spot. " 
3. 7. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the 
Geneva negotiations on 16th January were com-
pleted by letters to the British and French Gov-
ernments, not represented at the negotiations. 
3.8. There are two new and positive elements 
in these Soviet proposals. British and French 
nuclear forces would no longer be taken into 
account in the negotiations but merely frozen at 
their present level. Secondly, the Soviet Union 
no longer seeks a link with space weapons, a ban 
on which was previously to have formed part of 
any agreement on other weapons systems. This 
point was confirmed publicly by Mr. Gorbachev 
in an interview which he granted to United 
States Senator Edward Kennedy in Moscow on 
6th February when Mr. Gorbachev said that his 
proposal to withdraw SS-20s from Europe if the 
Americans did the same with their Pershing lis 
depended solely on the United Kingdom and 
France refraining from increasing their corre-
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sponding nuclear weapons and the United States 
not supplying such weapons to other countries. 
3.9. While the United States was holding con-
sultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. 
Paul Nitze's visit to Europe in February, the 
press on 8th February reported an American 
counter-proposal approved by Mr. Reagan sub-
ject to consultations with the allies. It is 
believed this plan accepted t.lite elimination of all 
intermediate-range Americaq and Soviet missiles 
stationed in Europe but alsq insisted on a 50% 
reduction in Soviet SS-20' missiles in Asia. 
However, no ceiling was said to be placed on 
British or French forces, nor were there to be 
limitations on the supply of American missiles to 
the allies. 
3.1 0. This time it was the European allies that 
had reservations about the fi~st American propo-
sals, considering that the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would 
leave western forces at the mercy of the conven-
tional superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, par-
ticularly in Central Europe. The American 
answer finally communicated to the Soviet 
Union on 23rd February returned rather to the 
"global zero-zero" position: already defined in 
1981. The United States therefore proposed as 
a target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise mis-
siles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage 
the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launching 
ramps in Europe, with a proportional reduction 
in Asia; only in the second and third stages 
would the United States agree to a reduction of 
its own missiles parallel with Soviet reductions; 
short-range missiles were also to be taken into 
account. Proposals relating to British and 
French forces were rejected since the Geneva 
negotiations are purely bilateral. French and 
British answers to Mr. Gorbachev also rejected 
his proposal, France recalling its well-known 
position that it is in favour iof all reductions in 
nuclear weapons but the arsenals of the super-
powers must be reduced significantly before 
reductions in the relatively small French forces 
can be considered; in any event, priority was to 
be given to reducing conventional weapons. 
3.11. In previous reports, the committee 
recalled that the existence of British and French 
forces had in fact been taken into account 
already in the SALT I and SALT II bilateral 
agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilat-
eral declaration accompanying the agreement 
stated that the Soviet Union could increase the 
number of its strategic missile launching subma-
rines in the event of the United States allies 
doing likewise. In the case of SALT II, it has 
been known for a long time that the concession 
which allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 
heavy ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in 
compensation for British and French nuclear 
forces and the deployment of American nuclear 
systems in Europe. 
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3.12. While the committee has always rejected 
any proposal to reduce British and French 
nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers 
have thousands of nuclear warheads, it has 
nevertheless drawn attention to the problems 
which would arise for the negotiations on the 
control of armaments if European forces were 
equipped with multiple-warhead missiles. The 
Trident missile, intended to come into service 
with the British force in the nineties, is designed 
to carry up to eight warheads. The possibility of 
a British force eight times its present size obvi-
ously raises a problem for the Soviet Union in 
the current negotiations. 
(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons 
3.13. Referring to strategic weapons in his major 
statement on the elimination of nuclear weapons 
before the end of the century, Mr. Gorbachev 
said: 
" Stage one. Within the next five to eight 
years the USSR and the United States will 
reduce by one half the nuclear arms that 
can reach each other's territory. On the 
remaining delivery vehicles of this kind 
each side will retain no more than 6,000 
warheads. 
It stands to reason that such a reduction is 
possible only if the USSR and the United 
States mutually renounce the develop-
ment, testing and deployment of space 
strike weapons. " 
In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of 
five to seven years, the United States and the 
Soviet Union will have completed the 50% 
reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same 
stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons 
would have to become multilateral, with the par-
ticipation of major industrial powers. There 
would be a ban on the development of non-
nuclear weapons based on new physical prin-
ciples, with a destructive power close to that of 
nuclear arms for other weapons of mass des-
truction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 
the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons 
will be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then made 
a few comments about verification: 
"We have in mind that special procedures 
will be worked out for the destruction of 
nuclear weapons as well as the disman-
tling, re-equipment or destruction of deliv-
ery vehicles. In the process, agreement 
will be reached on the numbers of weap-
ons to be destroyed at each stage, the sites 
of their destruction and so on. 
Verification with regard to the weapons 
that are destroyed or limited would be car-
ried out both by national technical means 
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and through on-site inspections. The 
USSR is ready to reach agreement on any 
other additional verification measures. " 
3.14. In his answer communicated to the Soviet 
Union on 23rd February, President Reagan 
reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce 
strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address 
on 24th February on the eve of the opening of 
the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party, President Reagan expressed reser-
vations about the rather publicity-seeking 
aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals: 
" On the other hand, many of the specific 
details proposed in the subsequent phases 
of the Soviet 'plan' are clearly not appro-
priate for consideration at this time. In 
our view, the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons will require, at the same time, the 
correction of the conventional and other 
force imbalances, full compliance with 
existing and future treaty obligations, 
peaceful resolution of regional con-
flicts ... Unfortunately, the details of the 
Soviet 'plan' do not address these equally 
vital requirements. " 
3.15. As the United States has still not accepted 
the principle of a link with the ban on space 
weapons, it seems unlikely that it will be possible 
to make much progress with strategic weapons in 
the immediate future. 
3.16. Towards 20th May, the United States will 
have to face the problem of respecting the SALT 
11 treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada 
undergoes sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. 
To respect the treaty limits, the United States 
will then have to dismantle two old Poseidon 
submarines (with 16 launchers each) or reduce 
the number of is Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th 
April, 52 of the 100 senators wrote to President 
Reagan asking him to take the necessary steps to 
respect the treaty. The committee for its part 
stresses the importance of respecting all existing 
treaties relating to the control of armaments. 
3.17. In the week of 21st April Mr. Paul Nitze, 
the President's Special Adviser on Arms Control, 
was touring European capitals, reportedly with 
the message that President Reagan had tenta-
tively decided to dismantle the two Poseidon 
submarines in question, but was simultaneously 
considering " proportionate responses " to cer-
tain actions of the Soviet Union which the 
United States had claimed to be violations of the 
SALT and ABM treaties. As the committee has 
previously pointed out the only such violation 
specifically endorsed by the NATO countries was 
the introduction of SS-X24 and SS-25 missiles by 
the Soviet Union 5• These United States' 
5. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information report, 
4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw - paragraphs 
4.25. to 4.27. 
responses might include the conversion of more 
than the agreed limit of 120 B-52 bombers to 
carry cruise missiles; acceleration of the 
Midgetman research and development 
programme (the introduction of this missile in 
addition to the already planned MX would be a 
similar violation of SALT II which allows only 
one " new " missile to each side). Other mea-
sures would include a request to Congress for an 
additional 50 MX missiles beyond those already 
planned 6• 
(iii) Space weapons 
3.18. In his references to space weapons in his 
address on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev main-
tained his total opposition: " We are against 
weapons in space. " But for the first time he 
seemed to consider the possibility of space 
research not leading to the deployment of offen-
sive weapons in space: 
"Space must remain peaceful, strike weap-
ons should not be deployed there. 
Neither should they be developed. And 
let there also be a most rigorous control, 
including opening the relevant labora-
tories for inspection. " 
3.19. If there has been a specific answer from 
the United States to this request to open labora-
tories engaged in space research for inspection, it 
has not been made public. In his 24th February 
address, President Reagan merely welcomed the 
Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of 
verification: 
"We intend to pursue in specific terms at 
the negotiating table General Secretary 
Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any 
necessary verification issues. " 
(c) Mutual and balanced 
force reductions in Europe 
(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985 
3.20. On 5th December 1985, western partici-
pants in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna put 
forward new proposals which they said were 
intended to allow a first, albeit modest, agree-
ment to be reached quickly. To this end, they 
accepted the general framework and main provi-
sions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th Febru-
ary 1985, but proposed making only half the ini-
tial reductions set out in that proposal. On 30th 
January 1986, the western proposals were sup-
plemented by an outline text accompanied by a 
table of associated measures. 
3.21. The western initiative provided for an ini-
tial cutback of 5,000 American and 11,500 Soviet 
troops in the reduction zone. It provided for a 
no-increase commitment relating to NATO, the 
6. The Guardian, 23rd April 1986. 
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Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet troops 
stationed in that zone which was to come into 
force immediately after the reductions. The 
agreement and its various wrovisions were to be 
valid for a period of three years following the 
completion of the initial reductions. This per-
iod was to be used to pursue negotiations and 
prepare for further reductions. 
3.22. Since the new proposals no longer insisted 
on prior agreement on levels of troops now pres-
ent in the reduction zone, (the data problem), 
they were intended, in the mind of the West, to 
allow speedy progress to be made. It was also 
believed that acceptance, during the period of the 
agreement, of the first stage of transitional force 
ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each alli-
ance and, on the other hand, to the United States 
and the Soviet Union s~parately was also a 
favourable factor for adtancing the negotia-
tions. 
3.23. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a 
cenain extent strengthened the verification sys-
tem hitherto envisaged. 
3.24. The associated measures included: 
- setting up permanent entry and exit 
points with observers through which all 
personnel of land and air forces of par-
ticipating countries would leave or enter 
the reduction zone; 
- notification and <;>bservation of with-
drawals; 
- notification of out-of-garrison activi-
ties; 
- exchange of observers on the occasion 
of such activities; 
- notification ofgrol!Ind force movements 
in the reduction zone; 
- the right for each side to conduct thirty 
inspections each year to verify the 
no-increase undertaking; 
- exchange of information up to battalion 
level; 
- the free use of national technical 
means. 
3.25. The only position adopted in the western 
proposal on what was to happen to the weapons 
of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each 
side to decide on the destination of the equip-
ment concerned. However, the proposal 
increased from 18 to 30, as compared with previ-
ous proposals, the number of annual inspections 
required and had the provisions relating to activ-
ities outside garrisons apply even on the western 
part of Soviet territory outside the reduction 
zone. 
DOCUMENT 1059 
(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its 
written answer of 20th February 1986 
3.26. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were 
rather encouraging. At a press conference in 
Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. 
Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR 
talks, said that the western proposals were in line 
with the spirit of Geneva but were still very 
divergent. He criticised however the associated 
measures, which he considered to be deliberately 
excessive, and also the fact that the reduction fig-
ures proposed by NATO were not significant and 
the 5th December proposal did not include the 
equipment of troops withdrawn. 
3.27. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th 
January gave an encouraging impression; he said 
he was prepared for " reasonable verification " of 
troop reductions, including the establishment of 
permanent verification posts at the points of pas-
sage of troops withdrawn. 
3.28. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th 
February 1986 entitled " draft agreement on the 
initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the 
United States of ground forces and armaments 
and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and 
armaments of the sides and associated measures 
in Central Europe" could not therefore fail to be 
very disappointing to the western partners. 
3.29. Although it accepts the principle of per-
manent verification posts at points where troops 
enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is 
negative in several respects: 
- while the reductions proposed by 
NATO were not militarily significant, 
the Pact would nevertheless agree to 
similar figures, i.e. 6,500 American and 
11,500 Soviet troops, which, for the 
West, did not correspond to the dispar-
ity between American and Soviet troops 
stationed in the reduction zone; 
- the verification measures proposed were 
termed excessive and a kind oflegalised 
spying. It was unacceptable to extend 
the area of verification to cover part of 
Soviet territory as NATO had requested 
for out-of-garrison activities. 
3.30. Furthermore, the question of the destina-
tion of the weapons of troops withdrawn 
remained at the heart of the East-West contro-
versy. 
3.31. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in 
the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes 
as intended to guide the negotiations towards a 
favourable outcome, may be summarised as fol-
lows: 
- in the course of one year, the USSR and 
the United States will withdraw behind 
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their national boundaries 11,500 and 
6,500 men respectively from their 
ground forces stationed in Central 
Europe, together with their armaments 
and combat equipment; 
- information on the military units 
reduced will be exchanged prior to the 
beginning of the withdrawals; 
- the eleven direct participants in the 
negotiations will undertake not to 
increase the levels of their ground and 
air forces in the reduction zone for a 
period of three years after the comple-
tion of the Soviet-American reduc-
tions; 
- as from the same date, updated figures 
on forces remaining in the reduction 
zone will be exchanged each year; 
- when the agreement comes into force, 
three or four observation posts will be 
established on each side; 
- units and subunits of the ground forces 
of all signatories of the agreement must 
enter or leave the reduction zone via 
these posts; 
- observation posts will be manned by 
representatives of both sides; 
- military activities (movements, exer-
cises, call-up of reservists) involving 
more than 20,000 men must be notified 
beforehand; 
- in addition to the obligation not to 
interfere with implementation of 
national technical means, requests for 
on-site verification may be made if well-
founded. As a rule, such requests 
should be granted. A refusal must be 
accompanied by a sufficiently convinc-
ing explanation; 
- a consultative commission will be estab-
lished to settle disputes which may arise 
when the agreement is implemented. 
Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East 
offered to join in the drafting of a joint agree-
ment, in the course of which the utmost should 
be done to overcome remaining difficulties. 
(iii) Present situation 
3.32. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th 
February 1985 and the western answer of 5th 
December 1985, the negotiations seem to have 
made little progress in spite of the concessions 
made by both sides. 
3.33. The East has mainly kept to its earlier pro-
posals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat sup-
port units, establishment of permanent entry and 
exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels in 
the reduction zone on a collective basis and with-
out national sub-ceilings for a period of three 
years after the completion of initial withdrawals 
under the control of observers from both 
sides. The NATO countries for their part have 
agreed to abandon their data requirements and, 
as a whole, have linked their proposals with the 
plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are 
still major points of disagreement, however, and 
these explain the disappointment felt on both 
sides. 
3.34. Differences between East and West have 
crystallised around verification. While the Pact 
has now agreed to the permanent presence of 
observers at entry and exit posts, during and 
after the reductions, it has not accepted western 
requirements concerning larger-scale inspections 
in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can 
take place only after a well-founded and justified 
request and with the prior consent of the country 
concerned. The NATO partners are calling for 
thirty inspections each year for both sides, at 
short prior notice. 
3.35. The other point at issue is the destination 
of equipment of units withdrawn. The West 
wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such 
equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but 
the East on the contrary insists on it being 
destroyed or returned to the country of 
origin. The geographical dissymmetry between 
the parties to the negotiations prevents NATO 
from accepting this position. 
3.36. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of 
individuals relieving troops in the reduction 
zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have 
pass through the official entry and exit 
points. As for the strengths to be notified before 
their withdrawal, the West is calling for them to 
be reported down to battalion level whereas the 
East does not wish to go lower than divisional 
level. Finally, the delicate problem of notifica-
tion of exercises and possible inspections in the 
two western districts of the Soviet Union, mea-
sures which the West considers essential for the 
security of the countries on the alliance's flanks, 
has not been solved. 
(iv) The future 
3.37. The foregoing explains why the thirty-
eighth session of the MBFR talks came to an end 
without any progress having been made and in 
an atmosphere of disappointment which was 
particularly bitter since both sides had cherished 
hopes of success. 
3.38. The Warsaw Pact criticises the West for 
the intransigence of the "legalised spying" veri-
fication system. 
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3.39. NATO for its part considers that the east-
ern countries' proposal of 20th February 1986 
merely reiterates the Wars4w Pact's requests of 
February 1985, fails to tal<~ seriously the ques-
tion of verification and tri s to deny the reality 
and importance of geograp y. 
3.40. Nevertheless, by proposing far smaller 
reductions than before (half), at the same time 
increasing from eighteen to thirty the number of 
annual inspections called ~or, NATO has gone 
against the conventional Soyiet position that any 
verification must be comimensurate with the 
magnitude of the reductions involved. At the 
close ofthis very disappointing session, both par-
ties nevertheless plan to return to the negotiating 
table in May with new positions which might 
finally lead to an agreement. 
3.41. Some confusion , arises over Mr. 
Gorbachev's speech in Easti Berlin on 18th April 
where he said: 
" The USSR proposes substantial reduc-
tion of all components of land forces and 
tactical aircraft based in Europe, including 
the relevant parts of American and Cana-
dian forces deployed there. 
The military units should be dissolved and 
their armaments either destroyed or put 
into storage on their national 
territories. The scope of the reductions 
must obviously covet' the whole of Europe, 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. "7 
It is not clear whether the Soviet Union is about 
to make new compromise proposals in Vienna, 
or is proposing a completely new initiative relat-
ing to the much wider area " from the Atlantic to 
the Urals" which at present is the basis of the 
Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe. 
3.42. In its previous re~ort, the committee 
pointed out with regard to I the unresolved prob-
lem of equipment that: 
"NATO could however accept the with-
drawal, to a depot in some rear area in 
Europe to be designaled, of the equipment 
of American units t<!> be withdrawn from 
the zone. " 1 
(d) Total nuclear test ban 
3.43. At the fortieth session of the United 
Nations Assembly which ended in December 
1985, very particular attention was once again 
paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. Three sepa-
rate resolutions8 were devoted to the matter, the 
7. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986. 
8. 40/80A; 40/81; 40/88. 
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first of which urged the three depositary powers 
of the partial test ban treaty to promote, at the 
Geneva disarmament conference, the creation of 
a special committee to negotiate a treaty on a 
complete halt to nuclear test explosions. 
3.44. In his speech on 15th January, Mr. 
Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until 
31st March 1986, the unilateral moratorium 
declared by the Soviet Union in August 
1.985. The United States maintained the posi-
tiOn held by the Reagan administration for the 
past two years according to which nuclear tests 
had become necessary to guarantee the effective-
ness of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first 
time since the Soviet moratorium was declared 
the United States carried out a test on 22nd 
March. At Easter Mr. Gorbachev proposed an 
emergency meeting in a European city to discuss 
a moratorium on nuclear tests but the United 
States having conducted a second test on lOth 
April, Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-Staff of 
the Soviet armed forces, stated at a press confer-
ence in Moscow on 14th April that the Soviet 
moratorium had been terminated as from 11th 
April and that Soviet tests would be resumed. 
3.45. In the meantime, a United States spokes-
man had announced on 14th March that Mr. 
Reagan had proposed in a direct communication 
to Mr. Gorbachev that an assessment be made of 
a new seismic technique which he called Corrtex 
designed to measure the yield of nuclear 
tests. For this purpose, the Soviet Union was 
invited to send scientists to the American test 
sit.e in Nevada in the third week of April to test 
th1s new system when a nuclear explosion was 
planned. President Reagan thus renewed earlier 
American proposals and asked the Soviet Union 
to hold negotiations on improving verification 
measures provided for in the treaties on nuclear 
tests for peaceful purposes and on nuclear tests 
below a threshold of 150 kilotonnes signed by 
both countries but not ratified by the United 
States. 
3.46. At the Geneva disarmament conference it 
has still not been possible to set up a special com-
mittee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear 
tests as called for in United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions and proposed in Geneva 
by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact 
countries. As in previous years, the western 
powers have maintained their opposition to 
terms of reference which would allow a treaty to 
be negotiated, considering that the terms of refer-
ence of a special committee should be limited to 
examining problems. 
3.47. In a letter addressed to the conference on 
20th February, General Secretary Gorbachev 
said: 
"The Soviet Union, for its part, has been 
doing all it can to help achieve this 
goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the 
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strictest control over a ban on nuclear-
weapon tests, including on-site inspections 
and the use of all the latest developments 
in seismology." 
The Soviet Union had also announced that it 
would agree to the establishment of regional seis-
mological networks on its territory to verify that 
a treaty banning nuclear tests was respected. 
3.48. Finally, at the disarmament conference the 
ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring 
systems submitted a report on its technical tests 
in 1984 in the framework of international 
co-operation for recording and analysing seismic 
phenomena with a view to verifying an agree-
ment banning nuclear tests. 
3.49. The western countries' position, which is 
well known, has not changed. The United 
States has asserted several times that it intended 
to pursue a nuclear test programme intended 
above all to ensure the reliability of American 
nuclear weapons. It is known that the present 
test programme also covers research on a possi-
ble X-ray laser for strategic defence systems and 
o~ ~ew nuclear warheads for the Midgetman 
mtsslle. The press has now quoted scientists at 
the United States Los Alamos nuclear weapons 
laboratories as saying that new generations of 
nuclear weapons under development, under-
stoo~ to be part of the SDI programme, would 
reqmre at least 100 test explosions per weapon 
compared with six for earlier weapons9• The 
United Kingdom for its part continues to assert 
that i~ is prepa:ed t<;> accede to a treaty banning 
tests 1f the venficat10n problem is solved. On 
thi~ latter point, the United Kingdom and the 
Umted States seem to be the only countries to 
consi~er that existing seismic networks, particu-
lar!~ 1f supplemented by regional systems on the 
temtory of nuclear weapon countries are not ~nough to verify. such a treaty. Franc~'s policy 
m the matter 1s apparently not to become 
involved in the public debate. 
3.50. The Prime Minister of China Mr. Zhao i~ his address of 20th March marking interna~ 
t10nal peace year, announced that China was 
henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it 
had not conducted any since 1980. At the 
Geneva disarmament conference China has ~eclared.th~t it is prepared to play ~n active part 
m negotiatiOns to draft a total test ban treaty. 
3.51. The other European allied countries at the 
moment are supporting United States opposition 
to the creation of a special committee in Geneva 
to draft a test ban treaty. However in their 
public statements and in their affirmative votes 
on United Nations resolutions on the suspension 
of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in 
favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the 
9. The Times, 19th April 1986. 
communique issued by the Federal German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April at the 
close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Boon indi-
cated that there was a chance of starting negotia-
tions intended first to limit and then to stop 
nuclear tests. 
3.52. The committee referred in its previous 
report to scientific evidence that underground 
nuclear explosions could be adequately moni-
tored down to the smallest yields. As in its last 
report, the committee asks that priority be given 
to negotiating a complete nuclear test ban treaty 
and that the Soviet Union be urged most 
strongly to accept the United States' invitation to 
follow the testing of the new verification system 
at the United States test site. 
(e) Chemical weapons 
3.53. The emphasis on the need for an agree-
ment banning chemical weapons in the summit 
communique of 21st November 1985 led to the 
belief that progress was possible in the negotia-
tions being held on this subject at the Geneva 
disarmament conference. The communique also 
announced the start of a bilateral dialogue on 
measures to be taken to prevent the proliferation 
of chemical weapons as follows: 
"We are prepared for a timely declaration 
of the location of enterprises producing 
chemical weapons and for the cessation of 
their production, and are ready to start 
developing procedures for destroying the 
relevant industrial base and to proceed, 
soon after the convention enters into 
force, to eliminating the stockpiles of 
chemical weapons. All these measures 
would be carried out under strict control 
including international on-site inspec-
tions. " 
Referring to certain interim measures, it said: 
" For example, agreement could be 
achieved on a multilateral basis not to 
transfer chemical weapons to anyone and 
not to deploy them in the territories of 
other states. " 
3.54. At the Geneva disarmament conference 
on 11th February, the United States representa-
tive, Mr. Lowitz, while his country gave priority 
to a comprehensive treaty eliminating chemical 
weapons, said: 
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American draft treaty banning chemical weapons 
tabled in 1984 the inspections called for would 
apply to all establishments capable of manufac-
turing chemical products, and not solely to state 
enterprises, as the wording bf the draft had ini-
tially indicated. 
3.55. The special ad hoc committee, under 
United Kingdom chairmanship this year, and its 
three subgroups are continuing their work but lit-
tle progress had been made until 22nd April 
when the representative of the Soviet Union 
introduced some significant new proposals which 
in particular moved further towards the western 
position on some aspects of destruction of chem-
ical weapon facilities and verification: 
- destruction of cherp.ical weapon stocks 
would begin within six months and be 
completed within 110 years of entry into 
force of a conventiOn; 
- within 30 days of entry into force the 
number, capability and precise location 
of all plants capable of producing chem-
ical weapons would be declared; 
- destruction or dismantling of such pro-
duction facilities would begin within 
one year of entry into force; 
- all production activities would cease 
immediately on entry into force and 
measures to ensure their close-down, 
including disconnej::tion from any non-
military chemical tproduction facilities 
the operation of1 which would be 
authorised under a convention, would 
be completed within three months; 
- fairly detailed provisions were described 
for destruction of production equip-
ment, or the dismantling of equipment 
which could be 111sed for authorised 
civilian chemical ~roduction; 
- verification measures were provided 
for: " including systematic on-site 
inspections, such as the verification of 
the accuracy of declarations, the sealing 
by inspectors of the facility to be closed, 
the periodic checking of preservation of 
seals up to the moment the seals are 
removed and the destruction or the dis-
mantling of the facility is initiated ... the 
final international verification would be 
carried out upon the full termination of 
the process of the elimination or the dis-
mantling of the entire facility". 
"However, the United States is opposed 3.56. The detailed nature of the Soviet propo-
to a formal treaty - as some have sug-
gested _ such as one that would mirror the sals, which are obviously based on the design of 
existing chemical production plants where no 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty for doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are 
nuclear weapons. " 
also carried out, makes these proposals a con-
At the session of the conference this spring, the vincing attempt at progress. The proposals do 
United States also made it clear that in the not however go into detail about subsequent ver-
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ification measures after destruction of existing 
and declared chemical weapon production plants 
has been completed, merely asserting that "the 
convention should envisage measures ensuring 
its strict observance ... first of all the prevention 
of the use of the commercial chemical industry 
for the development and production of chemical 
weapons". Nevertheless they seem to offer a 
solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty lead-
ing to a complete and verified ban on chemical 
weapons. 
3.57. Once again there is reason to deplore the 
use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in 
February 1986. For the first time, the United 
Nations group of experts investigating the inci-
dent mentioned Iraq by name: " The agent used 
has mainly been mustard gas although on some 
occasions nerve gas was also employed. . .. On 
many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical 
weapons against Iranian forces. " 
3.58. In the meantime, on 18th February the 
NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, 
made an important statement to the French 
Institute for International Relations in Paris 
about stocks of chemical weapons. For the first 
time since 1969, he was expecting NATO to 
approve American plans concerning the produc-
tion of chemical weapons. He outlined a plan 
providing for the transfer of chemical weapons to 
Europe in the event of crisis and after consulta-
tion with the European allies. He considered 
the stockpiling of chemical weapons should be 
approved as a force goal by the Defence Planning 
Committee at ministerial level. When voting 
funds in 1985 for the production of chemical 
weapons for the first time since 1969, the United 
States Congress had made production subject to 
the prior acceptance by the European allies of 
plans providing for the stockpiling of chemical 
weapons in Europe. 
3.59. The committee repeats the conclusions it 
reached in its last report, considering that chemi-
cal weapons now stockpiled in Germany were 
sufficiently effective to deter an enemy from 
using such weapons. It consequently recom-
mends that the United States be urged not to 
resume the production of chemical weapons at 
the present time and to make all necessary efforts 
to ensure real progress in 1986 in the negotiation 
of a treaty banning such weapons. While under-
lining the importance of realistic verification 
measures, the committee asks that the situation 
be re-examined at the end of 1986. In the 
meantime, it considers there is no need to 
approve the deployment of further chemical 
weapons in Europe as a NATO force goal. 
(J) Space weapons 
3.60. At the Geneva disarmament conference, 
the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an 
arms race in outer space has only just been 
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reconstituted. The Soviet Union proposed to the 
conference that an international agreement be 
prepared guaranteeing the immunity of artificial 
earth satellites, banning the creation, testing and 
deployment of new anti-satellite systems and 
making it compulsory to destroy old ones. It 
proposed that partial measures be taken urgently 
to enhance confidence between states in space 
activities pending a solution to the problem of 
preventing an arms race in space with all that 
implies. 
(g) The conference on disarmament 
in Europe 
3.61. The spring session of the conference on 
disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm 
was adjourned on 14th March. The heads of the 
United States and Soviet Delegations stressed 
that it had been possible to start work on drafting 
the final document, but that the agreement so far 
concerned only matters of secondary impor-
tance. 
3.62. While there is no progress to note since the 
committee's last report, participants in the con-
ference remain relatively optimistic about the 
possibility of reaching an agreement on a realistic 
document within the seventeen negotiating 
weeks remaining to the conference before the 
opening of the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe in Vienna on 4th 
November 1986. 
IV. The Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the 
activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
in 1985, it is stated that the committee: 
"having noted the ministerial decisions 
taken in regard to it and in regard to the 
establishment of the 'agencies for security 
questions', addressed the problem of 
co-operation in the field of armaments and 
research, and that of its own future. " 
Delegates' opinions appear to have been divided 
as to the expediency of convening the committee 
in the future. The new Agency Ill which is 
replacing the former international secretariat of 
the SAC is now working directly for the Council 
and, according to the letter of the Secretary-
General of 17th March 1986: 
"will study certain aspects of 
competitivity in the armaments industry 
in Europe and the implications of the evo-
lution of the world arms market, together 
with the problems of technological trans-
fers between European allies. " 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth 
in the draft recommendation, the substantive 
paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory 
memorandum as follows: 
Recommendation 
Paragraphs 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 (a) and (b) 
Explanatory 
memorandum 
Paragraphs 1.1 to 1.6 
1.4 
3.13 to 3.19 
3.20 to 3.42 
3.43 to 3.52 
3.53 to 3.59 
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Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly 
17th March 1986 
(Extract) 
The Council has instructed me to give you 
the following information concerning the staff 
and activities of the new agencies responsible for 
security questions. 
Since 1st January, each of these agencies 
has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the 
agency for the study of arms control and disarm-
ament questions (Agency I) and the restructured 
ACA. The former head of the international sec-
retariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is 
responsible for the agency for the development 
of co-operation in armaments (Agency 
Ill). Appointed by the ministers at their meet-
ing in Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior 
United Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has 
taken charge of the agency for the study of secu-
rity and defence problems (Agency 11). 
A full table of establishment will be sent to 
you as soon as all the posts have been filled. 
As indicated in the Bonn communique, 
the role of these new agencies is to carry out the 
studies requested by the Council. 
Certain studies have already been planned, 
all or part of which will be the subject of interim 
reports which might be presented to the minis-
ters at their meeting in Venice. 
Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-vis 
the countries of Western Europe in regard to 
questions of the control of armaments and 
disarmament. In the future it will also have to 
take an interest in the control of conventional 
apnaments and the essential problem of verifica-
tion. 
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In connection and close co-ordination 
with the tasks of Agency I, Agency 11 will have to 
study the assessment of the threat, and the con-
tribution of the WEU countries to the response 
to this threat, and the question of management 
resources. 
Agency Ill will study certain aspects of 
competitivity in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evolution of 
the world arms market, together with the prob-
lems of technological transfers between Euro-
pean allies. 
All these studies constitute internal work-
ing papers for the Council intended to contribute 
to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt 
with. 
In order to guarantee the availability of the 
information necessary for them, the agencies 
shall establish links with the appropriate interna-
tional bodies and with national admi-
nistrations. In this respect it must be noted that 
the latter must be assured that the classified 
information they transmit to the ministerial 
organs of WEU is handled in accordance with 
their security regulations and limited to the 
exclusive use of these organs. 
The suggestion to place at the disposal of 
the ministerial organs a computerised documen-
tation centre will have to be assessed in the light 
of budgetary priorities and will have to be exam-
ined subsequently by the Council. 
(signed) A. CAHEN 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
2nd June 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Cou~cil 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Millan and others 
1. In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" Pending a review of the entire 
situation next year,". 
2. After paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new para$raph as follows: 
"Urge the United States not to resume the production of chemical weapons a~ the present time." 
3. After paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Support regional measures such as the creation ofzones free of chemical weapons and subject to 
effective verification procedures. " 
Signed: Millan, Gansel, Beregovoy 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 4, 5 and 6 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
2nd June 1986 
4. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Concerned at the negative effects of a further arms race stemming from the decision announced 
by President Reagan to denounce SALT I and not to respect the SALT 11 limits voluntarily 
accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union; " 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"3. Invite the Seven to insist in the appropriate bodies on the United States and the Soviet Union 
respecting the limits imposed by SALT I, SALT 11 and the ABM treaty; " 
6. In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "further". 
Signed: Antoni, Vecchietti, Gianotti, Rubbi, Francese 
l. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendment 7 
2nd June 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
7. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "more than ever". 
l. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
271 
Signed: Cavaliere 
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Amendments 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 1 
tabled by Mr. Mi/ani 
8. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Noting with satisfaction that the Soviet Union has so far respected the unilateral moratorium on 
nuclear tests and concerned that the United States and France have not yet welcomed the pro-
posal for a concerted moratorium pending an international treaty permanently banning nuclear 
tests for military purposes; 
Noting the readiness shown by the United States and the Soviet Union to allow independent 
monitoring of their respective territories and aware that modern monitoring technology allows 
this to be respected closely in the framework of international agreements; " 
9. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as fol-
lows: 
" Disapproving the decision of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on the introduction of 
binary chemical weapons among its force goals; " 
10. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Believing that the United States Government's decision to consider SALT 11 obsolete is most 
serious since this relaunches the arms race; " 
11. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"Invite the United States and the other nuclear weapons countries to welcome the proposal for a 
concerted moratorium on military nuClear tests and at the same time call upon the Soviet Union 
and the United States to agree to independent supervision on their own territory and considering 
in this connection the agreement signed between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the United 
States Natural Reserve Defence Council for the establishment of stations to monitor the effects of 
underground nuclear tests to be encouraging; " 
12. Leave out paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" Calling upon the governments ofWEU countries, members of NATO, to adopt a position with a 
view to cancelling the decision to include the production of binary chemical weapons among 
NATO's force goals. " 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendment 13 
3rd June 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 13 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
13. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" Ensure that in future the annual report on its activities, in two half-yearly parts, reaches the 
Assembly at least two months before the opening of its ordinary sessions; " 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
3rd March-6th March 1986- Cyprus 
3rd March 
British Sovereign Base, Episkopi 
Mr. David Reynolds, Chief Officer; 
Brigadier Andrew Myrtle, Deputy Commander, British Forces; 
Air Vice-Marshal K.W. Hayr, Commander, British Forces. 
UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia 
Major-General Giinther G. Greindl, Commander, United Nations Force in Cyprus; 
Major Roderick MacArthur, Military Public Information Officer. 
4th March 
H.E. Mr. W.J.A. Wilberforce, CMG, British High Commissioner; 
Mr. George Iacovou, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
President Rauf Denktash; 
Dr. V. Lyssarides, President of the House of Representatives. 
5th March 
Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus; 
Mr. Elias Eliades, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. George Anastadiades, Director-General of the Ministry of Defence; 
Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations; 
Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director of the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General; 
Mr. Glafcos Clerides, Member of the House of Representatives. 
6th March 
H.E. Mr. Richard Boem, United States Ambassador; 
Mr. Richard Hoover, United States Embassy; 
Mr. Thomas Carolan, United States Embassy; 
H.E. Dr. Thilo Rotger, German Ambassador. 
21st March 1986- Rome 
Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Carmelo Liotta, Head Middle East and North Africa Desk, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Fernando Lay, WEU Affairs; 
Mr. Vittorio Olcese, Secretary of State for Defence. 
20th March 1986- Naples 
Information was gathered on behalf of the Rapporteur in interviews at Headquarters Allied For-
ces Southern Europe with: 
Admiral S. Morean, United States Navy, CINCSOUTH; 
Lt. General Thomas F. Healy, United States Army, Chief-of-Staff; 
Mr. Donald A. Kruse, Special Assistant for International Affairs; 
Brigadier General Carlo Parodi Dandini, Italian Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Operations; 
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Brigadier General Dimitrios Avgouropoulos, Hellenic Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Personnel 
and Administration; 
, Commodore Keith Estlin, Royal Navy, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Communic(ltions and Informa-
tion Systems; 
Admiral Andre Deloinde, French Navy, Head of French Military Mission, 1and Staff Officers. 
The committee as a whole met in Paris on 19th February 1986 when it discussed Mr. Kittelmann's 
draft outline report. 
The committee met again in Venice on 29th April 1986 when it discussed and 1adopted the present 
report. 
The Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those persons who discussed the subject of the report 
with him or provided information for it. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East 
region and the Mediterranean area has not changed; 
(ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has 
not increased since the committee's last report; 
(iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of 
atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population; 
(iv) Concerned at the latest dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and 
southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and 
positions of allied countries; 
(v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region 
caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan involvement in world terrorism and, 
last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region; 
(vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO; 
(vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appro-
priate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, 
when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended: 
1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in 
the Mediterranean area: 
(i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating mari-
time surveillance under COMMARAIRMED; 
(ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered 
by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies; 
(iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the princi-
ple of the freedom of the seas; 
(iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus 
helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent; 
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by pro-
viding military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed 
forces; 
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval 
on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a 
mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting 
defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members; 
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic posi-
tion on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NA TO's south-eastern 
flank; 
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, 
inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to com-
pleting the NATO command structure in the area; 
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and 
causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region; 
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7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus; 
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which 
will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General; 
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world 
and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security pro-
blems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction; 
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situ11tion of the peoples 
of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The committee has regularly reported on 
the security situation in the Mediterranean, the 
three most recent reports to be devoted exclu-
sively to the region being those by Mr. Bozzi in 
May 1981 1, Mr. Grant in May 1978 2, and Mr. 
Buck in May and June 1976 3• Most recently, 
however, Sir Dudley Smith's report of May 
1984 4 paid particular attention to the western 
Mediterranean and the position of Spain within 
NATO, drawing in particular on information 
gathered during the committee's visit to that 
country in October 1983, and the Rapporteur's 
subsequent visit to Gibraltar. 
1.2. On this occasion, therefore, the committee 
in the terms of reference asked the Rapporteur to 
deal with " the defence situation throughout the 
Mediterranean, in particular the eastern part". 
In this connection, the committee visited Greece 
and Turkey in October 1985 and the Rapporteur 
visited Cyprus and Rome in March this year. 
1.3. Nevertheless, the successful outcome of 
the referendum in Spain on continued member-
ship of NATO held on 12th March makes it 
appropriate to review the situation in that coun-
try also in the present report. 
1.4. As the General Affairs Committee is pre-
paring a report on terrorism and on security out-
side the area of the alliance 5, this report does not 
deal in detail with security problems arising from 
conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
except to the extent that the levels of armaments 
and armed forces of the immediate neighbours of 
Turkey, or the risk of" ... armed attack ... on the 
forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, 
when in or over ... the Mediterranean Sea ... " 6, 
make the security problem an " in-area " one for 
NATO. 
l. European security and the Mediterranean, Document 
876. 
2. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean, Documents 708 and 712. 
4. State of European security, Document 971. 
5. Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe of 
crises in other parts of the world, Rapporteur: Mr. van der 
Werff. 
6. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty- full text of Arti-
cles 5 and 6 at Appendix I. 
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II. The Mediterranean 
and European security 
(a) General 
2.1. The welcome confirmation of continued 
Spanish membership of NATO consolidates, in 
theory at least, the stabilising influence of NATO 
in the Mediterranean basin, where all countries 
on the northern shore are members, with the sole 
exception of Yugoslavia and Albania. Despite 
the long-standing and still unresolved disputes 
between Greece and Turkey which seriously wea-
ken the eastern flank, the countries of the 
alliance, through the frequent ministerial mee-
tings and lower level working groups of NATO, 
as well as of the European Community to which 
all except Turkey now belong, are much better 
placed to co-ordinate their policies to their 
mutual benefit than the countries on the eastern 
and southern shores of the Mediterranean des-
pite the fact, that with the exception oflsrael, the 
latter are all members of the Arab League. 
2.2. Within both main groups there are wide 
variations in standards of living with GDP per 
capita in the NATO Mediterranean countries 
ranging from little more than $1,100 (Turkey) to 
over $8,500 (France). Even wider variations 
among the Arab League countries are accounted 
for mostly by petroleum or natural gas resources 
of Libya and Algeria with per capita incomes of 
$8,400 and $2,200 respectively compared with 
Morocco and Egypt with per capita incomes of 
$600 and $700 respectively. Israel, and to ales-
ser extent the islands of Cyprus and Malta, stand 
out as countries with essentially European stan-
dards of living. Another common feature of 
many countries in the southern and eastern 
Mediterrean areas is the extreme youth of the 
population - in Libya more than half the popula-
tion is under fifteen. 
2.3. The Mediterranean Sea itself is of vital 
economic importance to all countries in the 
Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. At any 
one time some 2,000 merchant vessels, including 
250 to 300 belonging to the Soviet Union, are 
under way in the Mediterranean. Between 300 
and 400 of these are tankers carrying up to 30 
million barrels of petroleum or petroleum pro-
ducts. All imports of petroleum into Italy and 
Greece pass through the Mediterranean as do 
50% of those of France, Spain and Germany. 
2.4. There is thus a strong mutual interest for 
countries of both alliances, and all other Medi-
terranean countries, to ensure that the freedom 
of the sea is maintained. 
2.5. There are considerable forces belonging to 
NATO countries permanently stationed in the 
Mediterranean area. In addition to those of 
Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the 
United States maintains powerful naval and air 
forces and some army units under bilateral 
basing agreements with Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey. Portugal has earmarked certain units 
as reinforcements for northern Italy in the event 
of hostilities. Forces from other NATO coun-
tries take part in NATO exercises in the Mediter-
ranean area on a sporadic basis. Belgian, Ger-
man and United Kingdom contingents form the 
land component of ACE mobile force when 
deployed in the Mediterranean, and Belgium, 
Germany and Italy contribute squadrons to the 
air component. In addition, the United King-
dom and the United States contribute a ship to 
the naval on-call force Mediterranean when acti-
vated. 
2.6. In contrast the permanent military pre-
sence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 
described in Chapter Ill, is modest, comprising 
the Mediterranean squadron of the Soviet fleet 
and an occasional reconnaissance aircraft. 
(b) Threats to security 
2.7. The largest potential threat to NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean region comes 
from the very large land and air forces of the 
Soviet Union and its allies in three main areas. 
Eastern Turkey has a common frontier with the 
Soviet Union, but access to the Mediterranean 
from this remote and mountaineous region with 
poor road communications would be difficult. 
Greece and Turkish Thrace have a common 
frontier with Bulgaria, but there are no Soviet 
forces stationed in Bulgaria. In addition, how-
ever, there is a significant, but not large, Soviet 
amphibious capability which could threaten the 
Turkish Straits. There are at present only four 
Soviet divisions in Hungary, the nearest Warsaw 
Pact territory to north-eastern Italy, but separa-
ted from it by non-aligned Yugoslavia which 
would provide some warning time of any 
approach to the Mediterranean in this area. This 
potential threat is described in the next chap-
ter. 
2.8. Access to the Mediterranean itself for the 
Soviet navy involves passage either through the 
Turkish Straits or Gibraltar, both of which are 
controlled by NATO countries. Access for mili-
tary aircraft to the Mediterranean, without over-
flying NATO territory, involves overflight of 
Yugoslavia- which appears to be granted- and 
a circuitous flight path down the Adriatic. 
Since Soviet military base rights in Egypt were 
revoked by that country in 1972, Soviet naval 
forces have had relatively little access to port 
facilities in the Mediterranean, and Soviet air 
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forces have not been based in the Mediterranean 
area at all. 
2.9. The more immediate, but smaller-scale, 
threat to the security of allied countries in the 
Mediterranean area arises from existing or 
potential local conflicts among certain non-
aligned countries, with an inherent risk of invol-
vement of the superpowers, or from the anarchic 
behaviour of a country such as Libya. The poli-
tical stability of certain countries in the eastern 
Mediterranean and along the North African 
coast is uncertain. Any abrupt change of regime 
may lead to a change in political alignment 
favouring the Soviet Union and posing the direct 
threat of Soviet naval and air bases once again 
on the shores of the Mediterranean - although 
since its unfortunate experience in Egypt in 1972 
the Soviet Union does not appear to have sought 
very actively to reinstall its forces on Mediterra-
nean shores. 
2.1 0. Security in the Mediterranean itself there-
fore depends very much on the maintenance of 
good relations with all the non-aligned countries 
of the area and the pursuit of a negotiated settle-
ment to all actual or potential conflicts. Success 
in these aims will depend very much more on 
diplomatic and economic relations than on tradi-
tional military power. Permanent and lasting 
solutions to some of the local disputes or 
conflicts in the area may not always be in 
reach. Deficiencies can be found in the military 
readiness of the NATO forces available for use in 
the Mediterranean area. Bl!lt the cohesion of the 
alliance and the pursuit of co-ordinated policies 
by the NATO and European Community coun-
tries are more important for the preservation of 
peaceful and stable conditions in an inherently 
unpredictable future than any purely military 
measures. 
Ill. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
(a) Possible strategic and political objectives 
of the Soviet Union 
3.1. Historically Russia for 300 years had 
fought a series of wars with Turkey but the aim 
of gaining direct access to the Mediterranean 
through the possession of Constantinople and 
control of the Turkish Straits was never ful-
filled. Relations between the two countries 
were normalised in 1925 with the signature of a 
treaty of friendship between Lenin and Kemal 
Ataturk, at least until the signature of the non-
aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and 
the Third Reich in August 1939. Relations 
were again strained during World War 11 when 
Turkey, a non-belligerent, as it was entitled to do 
under the terms of the 1936 Montreux Conven-
tion, closed the Turkish Black Sea Straits to the 
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passage of warships of any belligerent - which 
included the Soviet Union and the western allies. 
3.2. Although Turkey finally declared war on 
23rd February 1945, the Soviet Union on 20th 
March that year denounced the 1925 treaty of 
friendship with Turkey which was not due to 
expire until December, demanded a revision of 
the Montreux Convention, and renewed certain 
historical territorial claims concerning eastern 
Turkey. In a subsequent note the Soviet Union 
demanded revision of the Montreux Convention 
as far as the passage of warships was concerned 
so as to permit the free transit of warships of 
Black Sea powers; to prohibit the transit of war-
ships of non-Black Sea powers except in certain 
cases; the right for Black Sea powers to share 
jointly with Turkey responsibility for applying 
the transit regime; and the right for the Soviet 
Union to participate jointly with Turkey in the 
defence of the straits. Turkey at the time indi-
cated a willingness to consider the first three pro-
posals but refused to consider Soviet participa-
tion in defence of the straits. Turkey insisted 
that the Montreux Convention could be revised 
only by agreement among the signatories. 
3.3. Soviet territorial claims against eastern 
Turkey were renounced only on 30th May 1953, 
some eighteen months after Turkey had acceded 
to the North Atlantic Treaty. In a note recalling 
also its earlier demands for revision of the Mon-
treux Convention, the Soviet Union stated that it 
had reconsidered its position and considered that 
mutually agreeable conditions could be found to 
ensure its security. Turkey reasserted its posi-
tion that it stood by the 1936 Montreux Conven-
tion. 
3.4. After 1953 the Soviet Union, having failed 
to secure a modification of the Montreux 
Convention, sought naval and air bases else-
where in the Mediterranean. A squadron of 
submarines was based in Albania until the with-
drawal of that country from the Warsaw Pact in 
1962 when the Soviet submarines were removed 
with the exception of two which were reported to 
have been seized by Albania at the time. After 
the 1956 Suez fiasco the Soviet Union was able 
to develop close relations with President Nasser 
of Egypt which enabled the Soviet Union to 
develop an important naval base in Alexandria, 
and to establish military air bases in Egypt. In 
1972 however the new President Sadat expelled 
Soviet military personnel acting as advisers to 
the Egyptian armed forces, and following abroga-
tion of the bilateral treaty of friendship with the 
Soviet Union in March 1976, the naval and air 
bases were closed to the Soviet Union, a move 
which particularly hampered the operation of 
Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. 
3.5. Since 1976 the Soviet Union has not been 
successful in securing the use of additional major 
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naval or air facilities on the shores of the Medi-
terranean. It appears likely, in fact, that in the 
light of its experience with Egypt, it has not acti-
vely sought to invest major military resources in 
another Mediterranean country, fearing the pos-
sible loss of substantial investments in the long 
term through unpredictable changes in political 
leaderships and policies of alignment in the 
countries of the area. 
(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
3.6. In an earlier report7 the committee exam-
ined in some detail the trend of Soviet naval 
deployment in the Mediterranean from the end 
of the second world war onwards. Very small in 
the 1950s the Soviet Union began to maintain a 
permanent presence of naval vessels reaching an 
average daily strength of about 20 inclusive of 
auxiliary vessels by 1964 or 1965 rising to an 
average of about 40 by 1969 - a level which has 
remained roughly constant since then, except for 
the big build-up to a total of 100 ships, including 
73 combatants, for a brief period at the peak of 
the 1973 Y om Kippur war. Even in that year 
the average daily strength only reached 56. A 
typical presence on any day in the last 12 months 
might have been: 
Surface combatants 
Submarines 
Intelligence collectors 
Naval auxiliaries 
Miscellaneous 
(minesweepers/research, etc.) 
Total 
6 
6 
2 
25 
5 
44 
Of these not more than one or two are modern 
ships with long-range anti-ship surface-to-surface 
missile capability. The remainder of the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron tends to be older on 
average than ships of the other Soviet fleets. 
3.7. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is 
maintained for the most part by rotation of sur-
face ships from the Black Sea fleet, with submari-
nes transiting from the Northern and Baltic fleets 
because the Montreux Convention prohibits the 
transit of submarines from the Black Sea except 
for major repair (or on first delivery of a new 
submarine constructed outside the Black 
Sea). In the absence of major naval bases 
within the Mediterranean, the Soviet Mediterra-
nean squadron leads a relatively uncomfortable 
existence at anchorages in a few sheltered spots 
7. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st 
May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant. 
in the open sea off the coasts of various coun-
tries, but beyond the limits of the territorial 
sea. The main anchorages include the Gulf of 
Hammamet off the Tunisian coast; the Gulf of 
Sollum off Libya; an area to the east of Crete; 
and another off Lemnos Island in the North 
Aegean. Anchorages off Kithera, southern 
Greece and south of Cape Passero, off Sicily, are 
also used during exercises. Surface combatants 
spend three-quarters of their time in the open sea 
at these anchorages. A quarter of their time is 
spent under way on exercises or surveillance ope-
rations. On the other hand Soviet submarines 
when in the Mediterranean spend 90% of their 
time at sea. 
3.8. For repair and maintenance purposes the 
Soviet Union has obtained the permission of the 
Syrian Government to use the port of Latakia, 
and Tartus where both submarines and surface 
ships rotate for maintenance periods usually of 
about 30 days. There are usually 6 to 8 repair 
ships in that port. The Soviet navy uses repair 
facilities at a number of other points in the Medi-
terranean. One submarine is always undergoing 
overhaul in Tivat, Yugoslavia, for 6 months at a 
time with a Soviet repair ship always present. 
Commercial repair facilities are also used in 
Bizerta in Tunisia and minor auxiliaries are 
usually to be found in the Greek shipyard on the 
island of Syros. Soviet naval visits to the 
Libyan ports of Tripoli and Tobruk have increa-
sed somewhat over the last 3 years; earlier in 
1986 a command ship was to be found in Tri-
poli. Annaba in Algeria has been used for 
repair work. 
3.9. It is of course open to the Soviet Union to 
make normal commercial arrangements for sup-
plies in the Mediterranean. Soviet supply ships 
regularly visit the Italian ports of Palermo, 
Naples and Genoa to take on fresh foodstuffs, 
and also to purchase various items of tools and 
hardware that are available on the open mar-
ket. On 26th January 1981 an agreement was 
signed between the Soviet Union and the Mal-
tese Government allowing the Soviet Union to 
use half of the Has Saptain underground oil sto-
rage facilities in Malta which had been built as 
part of the NATO infrastructure programme in 
the 1950s. Its total capacity was then reported 
to be 50,000 tonnes of diesel oil, 90,000 tonnes of 
other fuel oil and 40,000 tonnes of jet fuel. 
Soviet surface auxiliary vessels spend 95% of 
their time in the anchorages and ports mentio-
ned above as being normally used by the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron. 
3.1 0. The historical level of Soviet naval forces 
in the Mediterranean is illustrated in the fol-
lowing table for the period 1964 to 1977, since 
when it can be regarded as substantially unchan-
ged: 
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Historical trend of 
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
1964-77 
Year Annual Average 
ship days daily strength 
1964 1,500 I 5 
1965 2,800 8 
1966 4,400 12 
1967 8,100 22 
1968 11,000 30 
1969 15,000 41 
1970 16,500 45 
1971 19,000 52 
1972 18,000 49 
1973 20,600 56 
1974 20,200 55 
1975 20,000 55 
1976 18,600 50 
1977 17,747 48 
The Soviet presence was negligible before 1964 
and had remained constant at 46-48 since 1977. 
3.11. Under the terms of the Montreux Conven-
tion Turkey reports each year to the parties to 
that convention on transits of all naval vessels 
through the Turkish Straits. The following 
table shows the pattern of Soviet naval transits 
through the Turkish Straits since 1964: 
Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits 
1964-85 
Surface Auxiliary Year combatant Total transits transits 
1964 56 39 95 
1965 80 49 129 
1966 71 82 153 
1967 149 93 242 
1968 113 117 230 
1969 142 121 263 
1970 149 122 271 
1971 154 123 277 
1972 140 114 254 
1973 159 126 285 
1974 145 93 238 
1975 146 79 225 
1976 63 69 132 
1977 103 82 185 
1978 121 107 228 
1979 129 94 223 
1980 124 111 235 
1982 134 94 228 
1983 132 113 245 
1984 137 86 223 
3.12. Thus, compared with the naval forces 
maintained by other NATO countries in the 
Mediterranean, the Soviet presence is modest. 
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Naval vessels in the Mediterranean 
Soviet United Other France Spain& NATO Union 
Carriers -
Cruisers 3 
Frigates and destroyers 8 
Sub-total - Major surface corn-
batants 11 
Submarines 8 
Amphibious vessels 2 
Auxiliaries 27 
Total 48 
The Soviet squadron can of course be substan-
tially increased by reinforcement from the Black 
Sea fleet described in the next section, but given 
the formalities of passage through the Turkish 
Straits this would take a certain time, and thus 
provide warning. Naval experts feel it unlikely 
that in the event of hostilities the Soviet Union 
would in fact expose major surface naval forces 
to the risks of operations in the Mediterranean 
which would inevitably be controlled by NATO 
countries. The Black Sea fleet would be more 
likely to be used in defence of the Warsaw Pact 
southern flank. There are also important Soviet 
naval shipbuilding yards in the Black Sea, and it 
forms the main base for Soviet naval units ope-
rating in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. 
3.13. Major Soviet naval vessels including the 
Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carriers and the heli-
copter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are repor-
ted to transit the Turkish Straits from time to 
time on their way to deployment in other ocean 
areas after transiting the Mediterranean. They 
do not appear to be deployed operationally 
within the Mediterranean. It is expected that 
the full-sized aircraft carrier now under construc-
tion in Sebastopol will not be operational until 
the early 1990s. It is however anticipated that it 
will then leave the Black Sea, declared to Turkey 
as a cruiser because the Montreux Convention 
prohibits the transit of aircraft carriers, and will 
then be deployed with the Northern or Pacific 
fleet for use in more distant oceans. 
(c) Warsaw Pact forces 
in proximity to NATO countries 
(i) The Black Sea fleet 
3.14. As least as important as the Black Sea fleet 
itself are the naval shipbuilding yards at Niko-
laiev where at the present time the first proper 
8. Spain also has I aircraft carrier (2 in 1986) and escorts 
at Rota, west of the Straits of Gibraltar. 
9. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey. 
10. When only 1 carrier present in Mediterranean the 
United States total of 39 falls to 33. 
States 
210 
1 
14 
17 
5 
6 
11 
3910 
284 
NAT09 
2 2 - 6 
6 1 - 8 
60 13 7 94 
68 16 7 108 
37 11 8 61 
24 - - 30 
70 19 17 117 
199 46 32 316 
Soviet aircraft carrier is under construction. 
Reported to be nuclear-propelled, between 
65,000 and 75,000 tonnes, some 300 m overall 
and to be equipped with steam catapults, this 
carrier when operational will for the first time 
permit the Soviet Union to operate fixed-wing 
aircraft at sea. First announced publicly by 
Admiral Gorshkov in 1979 the carrier has been 
under construction since 1983 but is not expec-
ted to undergo sea trials before 1988. Given the 
time it has taken other navies to acquire the 
necessary skills, the carrier is not expected to be 
fully operational in the oceans of the world until 
the early 1990s. It is not yet clear what aircraft 
will operate from it; there are reports that a new 
naval aircraft is being specially developed for the 
vessel. 
3.15. When operational it is expected that the 
aircraft carrier will operate with the Soviet Nor-
them or Pacific fleet, rather than in the Mediter-
ranean itself. 
3.16. The operational Black Sea fleet comprises 
first some 28 submarines (not nuclear-propelled 
- construction of nuclear-propelled submarines 
does not appear to be carried out at the Niko-
laiev Black Sea shipyards). One of the K.iev-
class aircraft carriers is normally based with the 
Black Sea fleet but operates usually beyond the 
Mediterranean. Of 37,000 tonnes displacement, 
270 m length overall, this class operates vertical 
take-off aircraft and helicopters. The smaller 
helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are 
also assigned to the Black Sea fleet. The total of 
48 main surface combatants is completed with 9 
cruisers, 21 destroyers and 15 frigates. There 
are in addition 25 lighter corvette-class vessels. 
3.17. The amphibious capabilities of the Black 
Sea fleet is represented by 21 amphibious ships, 
including 5 landing ship tanks, and 5 battalions 
of naval infantry totalling 3,000 men. 
3.18. Since the committee last reported five 
years ago, the Soviet Black Sea fleet naval avia-
tion has been strengthened and now includes 100 
bombers including the Tu-22M Backfire bomber 
as well as the older Tu-16 Badger. 
(ii) Land forces 
3.19. If NATO countries on the southern flank 
sometimes feel themselves the poor relations, 
with older equipment than that on the central 
front, the same is true of the Warsaw Pact's sou-
them tier, Bulgaria and Hungary and Romania, 
if the latter country can still be considered as par-
ticipating militarily in the pact. Both tanks and 
aircraft in these countries' forces tend to be older 
models than in the centre. 
3.20. There are three widely separated areas of 
NATO territory to which the threat of Warsaw 
Pact land forces has to be considered. North-
eastern Italy is possibly the most remote threat, 
being separated from the nearest Warsaw Pact 
forces in Hungary by the neutral territory of 
Yugoslavia and Austria. These Warsaw Pact 
forces comprise a total of 4 Soviet divisions and 
6 Hungarian divisions, the latter at a lower state 
of readiness than those of the Soviet Union. A 
further 7 Soviet divisions at a lower state of rea-
diness in the Kiev military district, the other side 
of the Carpathians, represent a reinforcement 
capability against north-eastern Italy. The War-
saw Pact forces stationed in Hungary are equip-
ped with 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces. 
Against this Italy has 8 divisional equivalents 
with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artillery and mortar 
pieces. Portugal provides a reinforcement bri-
gade for deployment in northern Italy. 
3.21. Against Greek and Turkish Thrace there is 
an immediate threat from the Bulgarian army 
comprising some 7 divisional equivalents at 
category 1 and 2 and a further 3 cadre divi-
sions. Romania further away provides 2 tank 
divisions and 4 motorised rifle divisions and one 
mountain division equivalent together with a 
further 4 cadre divisions. No Soviet forces are 
stationed in Bulgaria or Romania in peacetime, 
and Romania has not normally permitted the 
passage of Soviet ·forces for exercise pur-
poses. In the Odessa military district in the 
Soviet Union there are a further 8 motorised rifle 
divisions and 1 airborne division. Of a total of 
34 divisions the Italian 1985 white paper on 
defence estimates that just over 22 are at a high 
state of readiness with 3,680 tanks and 2,940 
artillery and mortar pieces. Against these there 
are a total of 22 Greek and Turkish divisions 
available in the area, but account has also to be 
taken of the amphibious forces of the Soviet 
Black Sea fleet listed above. 
3.22. In the area of eastern Turkey along its 
common border with the Soviet Union there are 
12 Soviet divisions deployed forward with 2,400 
tanks and 1, 700 artillery pieces. A further 8 
divisions with proportional numbers of tanks 
and artillery are available as reinforcements in 
the southern Soviet military districts. The Tur-
kish army has some 8 divisions in north-eastern 
Turkey and a further 4 in south-eastern Turkey 
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protecting its other borders which could be used 
as reinforcements in the event of an attack in the 
north. · 
(iii) Air forces 
3.23. The extreme mobility of air forces makes 
it misleading to count numblers of aircraft based 
in particular countries in peacetime. The Ita-
lian white paper on defence quoted above shows, 
in the whole of the southern region, some 695 
Warsaw Pact fighter bomber/ground attack air-
craft, 1, 5 60 interceptors and 19 5 reconnais-
sance. Corresponding numbers for NATO are 
615, 295, and 90. The situation on the NATO 
side has somewhat improved since the commit-
tee last reported with a modernisation pro-
gramme under way in the three NATO countries 
concerned with three squadrons of Tornado air-
craft being phased in in Italy and plans for 
Greece and Turkey to acquire F-16 aircraft. 
(iv) General 
3.24. Official NATO briefings speak in general 
terms of unfavourable force ratios in the sou-
them region of 3 to 1 in north-eastern Italy, 2 
to 1 in Thrace, and 3 to 1 in eastern Turkey. 
There are however considerable United States 
air forces available for rapid reinforcement from 
their normal bases in Spain and from the United 
States, and there are defensive advantages of 
both terrain and warning tilme in north-eastern 
Italy and of terrain in eastern Turkey. 
IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean 
(a) Defence policy and armed forces 
(i) Portugal 
4.1. Although Portugal is not strictly a Medi-
terranean country it is mentioned in this report 
in part because of its commitment to a reinforce-
ment role in north-eastern Italy. The commit-
tee reported in some detail on the Portuguese 
defence effort as a whole fbllowing its visit to 
that country in October 1982 11 • 
4.2. Portugal's main contribution to collective 
NATO defence is to the Atlantic command, Por-
tugal forming part of SACLANT's area of res-
ponsibility. The important IBERLANT subor-
dinate command is assig~d to a Portuguese 
admiral and is responsible for the sea area com-
prising the western Atlantic south of the Portu-
guese/Spanish frontier as fair east as the approa-
ches to the Straits of Gibraltar. 
4.3. The Portuguese army has undergone 
considerable reorganisation over the last ten 
years having been reduced in size from 190,000 
to 45,740 today, organised into the equivalent of 
some 7 or 8 brigades. 
11. State of European security, Document 936, 8th 
November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. B1aauw. 
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4.4. One mobile armoured brigade is ear-
marked for deployment in north-eastern Italy 
and has practised this deployment during NATO 
exercises. On one occasion Portugal has contri-
buted an artillery battery to ACE mobile force 
referred to below. 
4.5. With the second lowest per capita income 
among the NATO countries, Portugal's chief 
problem is with modernisation of equipment. 
As far as the army is concerned, this is reflected 
in its armour which still consists of some out-
dated M-48 tanks and light armoured cars. As 
in the case of Greece and Turkey, NATO com-
manders lay stress on the need for Portugal to 
receive defence assistance from other countries 
of the alliance. For the time being the United 
States, Germany and the Netherlands provide 
military aid to Portugal. The Assembly has 
noted and welcomed, in the context of a number 
of other committee reports, Portugal's applica-
tion to accede to the Brussels Treaty which has 
been under consideration by the WEU Council 
since October 1984. 
(ii) Spain 
4.6. The committee last visited Spain in Octo-
ber 1983 and reported on that visit in the frame-
work of its report the following year 12• 
4.7. Spain became a full party to the North 
Atlantic Treaty on 30th May 1982, but the socia-
list party then in opposition had pledged that it 
would hold a referendum on Spanish member-
ship of NATO if it came to power, as it did in 
November 1982. 
4.8. The promised referendum was held only 
on 12th March 1986, in political conditions 
rather different from those during the debate on 
Spanish accession to NATO. The socialist 
government, and the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Gonzalez, in person, campaigned vigorously for 
a " yes " vote on the carefully drafted question 
put to the electorate with three pre-conditions in 
the following terms: 
" The government regards it in the natio-
nal interest that Spain remain within the 
Atlantic Alliance and considers that per-
manency of membership should be estab-
lished according to the following terms: 
1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic 
Alliance does not include its incorporation 
in the integrated military structure. 
2. The prohibition concerning the ins-
talling, stocking or introducing of nuclear 
weapons on Spanish territory, will be 
upheld. 
3. Gradual steps will be taken towards 
a progressive reduction of the United Sta-
tes military presence in Spain. 
12. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 
1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith. 
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Are you in favour of Spain being part of 
the Atlantic Alliance within the framework 
set out by the government? " 
4.9. The centre and right-wing opposition led 
by Mr. Fraga, which has supported membership 
of NATO, opposed the holding of the referen-
dum on principle, and called on voters to abs-
tain. The communist party called for a " no " 
vote. 
4.10. The results of the referendum on 12th 
March were considered an outstanding victory 
for the government: 
Yes 8,987,525 52.54% 
No 6,815,173 39.83% 
Blank votes 1,119,202 6.54% 
Spoiled papers 187,219 1.09% 
Turn-out was put at: 17,109,118 (59.71%); 
abstentions: 11,542,410 (40.29%)13• 
4.11. The result was welcomed in particular by 
the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord earring-
ton, at a press conference on 13th March when 
he noted that it would be simpler if all NATO 
member countries enjoyed the same status in the 
organisation. He recognised however that 
NATO had lived for many years with the parti-
cular problems of the 16 sovereign independent 
countries who were members and " we accom-
modate with this". 
4.12. In a previous report14 the committee poin-
ted out the anomalies of present Spanish mem-
bership of NATO. Following ratification of 
Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 
May 1982 negotiations had begun on the integra-
tion of Spain into the NATO military struc-
ture. The progress of the talks has not been 
made public but they were known to have run 
into difficulties over the allocation of command 
responsibilities in the Iberian area, because of 
differences of opinion between Spain and Portu-
gal which has exercised an important command 
responsibility in the Atlantic for many years. 
These negotiations were frozen with the change 
in government in Spain in November 
1984. Spain from the outset of its membership 
of the organisation has however participated 
fully in all NATO committees including in parti-
cular the Defence Planning Committee, the Mili-
tary Committee, and, as an observer, the Nuclear 
Planning Group. At the last meeting of the 
NPG on 21st March 1986, the Spanish Ambassa-
dor announced that Spain henceforth would par-
ticipate as a full member; the communique of the 
meeting no longer carried the customary reserva-
tion, " Spain attended as an observer", of pre-
vious communiques. Spain also attends mee-
tings of Eurogroup. France, in contrast, since 
13. Atlantic News, 14th March 1986. 
14. Document 971, op. cit. 
withdrawing from the integrated military struc-
ture in 1966, has not been represented on any of 
those bodies. France, on the other hand, since 
withdrawing its officers from the integrated staffs 
of the various NATO military headquarters has 
maintained military missions at these headquar-
ters and also continues to report the various sta-
tistics concerning its defence effort which NATO 
publishes each year 15• Spanish statistics are 
not yet included in the NATO figures. In 
confirming its membership of NATO, Spain 
continues its policy of not allowing nuclear wea-
pons to be stationed on its territory - a policy it 
has maintained since the accident with the Uni-
ted States aircraft in the 1960s when a nuclear 
bomb, which did not explode, burst open on 
contact with the ground causing radioactive 
contamination. The same policy with respect to 
nuclear weapons has always been pursued by 
Denmark and Norway. The consequences for 
the stationing of United States forces in Spain 
and the bilateral defence treaty are discussed in 
section 4.68 et seq. below. 
4.13. It appears to be generally recognised in 
NATO circles that in view of the terms of the 
referendum question, and while the present 
government remains in power, there will be no 
further discussion on the integration of Spanish 
forces into NATO. In the view of the commit-
tee however it would be undesirable for there to 
be any reduction in the present level of Spanish 
participation in NATO committees - which is 
mutually beneficial - and Spain should be urged 
to appoint military missions to the various 
NATO headquarters concerned which must 
include SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN as 
well as subordinate headquarters including 
EASTLANT (eo-located at Channel Command), 
IBERLANT as well as AFSOUTH and its subor-
dinate headquarters AIRSOUTH and NA V-
SOUTH. 
4.14. Since acceding to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, elements of the Spanish Mediterranean 
fleet (shown in the table in paragraph 3.12 
above) have been participating on a bilateral 
basis in naval exercises in the Mediterranean 
with various other NATO countries. Spanish 
submarines in the past have acted as hypotheti-
cal " hostile " forces in anti-submarine exercises, 
and recently Spanish surface units have par-
ticipated in such exercises for the first time. 
Without prejudging the question of permanent 
integration into the NATO military structure, it 
is felt that Spanish forces could make a useful 
military contribution to NATO's various multi-
lateral collective defence arrangements described 
in a later chapter. These could include: 
- periodical exercises with naval on-call 
force Mediterranean; 
15. See Appendix 11, derived from NATO statistics. 
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- provlSlon of reinforcement units for 
deployment in the Mediterranean area, 
and practising such deployments on 
exercises; 
- participation of mal(itime patrol aircraft 
in co-ordinated sunfeillance activities in 
the Mediterranea111 through bilateral 
arrangement with COMMARAIRMED 
in Naples (as France already does). 
4.15. The committee notes with satisfaction that 
Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
visited Spain for talks with ministers at the invi-
tation of the Spanish Government in January 
1986, and that at that time the government 
spokesman announced that Spain would apply 
for membership of the Brussels Treaty. It was 
understood that an application would be made 
once the results of the referendum were 
known. 
(iii) Gibraltar 
4.16. The British colony of Gibraltar houses a 
small naval and air headquarters which when 
activated during exercises or emergencies 
become a NATO naval command subordinate to 
NA VSOUTH in Naples - Commander Gibraltar 
Mediterranean, subordinate to Commander 
Naval Forces Mediterranean in Naples, and 
Commander Maritime Air, Forces Gibraltar, 
subordinate to Commander Allied Air Forces 
Southern Europe in Naples. 
4.17. Rapporteurs of the committee have visited 
Gibraltar from time to time, most recently in 
March 1984, and the committee at that time 
reported in some detail on the situation on the 
rock 16• 
4.18. British forces permanently stationed in 
Gibraltar are small. They amount to one batta-
lion and some artillery the historical role of 
which is to defend the territory against any threat 
from Spain - a surely anomalous role now that 
Spain has become a democracy and is a member 
of NATO and of the European Community. 
There are normally 2 Jaguar fighter aircraft on 
rotation from the United Kingdom which can 
perform a useful reconnaissance function in 
obtaining close-up photographs of Soviet naval 
units transiting the straits. British Nimrod 
maritime reconnaissance air(:raft operate out of 
Gibraltar from time to time. Britain does not 
now station naval vessels in Gibraltar perma-
nently but a guard ship - usually a frigate -
based in the United Kingdom is available at 
short notice. 
4.19. Other NATO countries including Canada, 
the Netherlands and the United States operate 
ships and aircraft out of Gibraltar during NATO 
16. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 
1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith - explanatory memo-
randum, paragraph 3.98 et seq. 
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exercises. In the event of hostilities naval ves-
sels from the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Italy would operate under the Gibraltar 
NATO command. If Spain does not join the 
integrated military structure ofNATO, Gibraltar 
will obviously continue to provide a useful base 
for a NATO naval headquarters from where 
control of the Gibraltar Straits can be exerci-
sed. 
4.20. As far as the political situation in Gibraltar 
is concerned Spain recognises British sovereignty 
over " the town and castle of Gibraltar, together 
with the port, fortifications and forts " in accor-
dance with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; succes-
sive Spanish governments have campaigned to 
" re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain " 
through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sove-
reignty. After imposing a series of restrictions 
on Gibraltar the Spanish authorities closed the 
frontier in 1969. An Anglo-Spanish agreement 
was reached in Brussels on 27th November 1984 
as a result of which the frontier was reopened in 
February 1985 while reciprocity of rights for Spa-
niards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain 
was agreed, together with the establishment of 
" a negotiating process aimed at overcoming all 
the differences between them over Gibraltar ... 
both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty 
will be discussed in that process. The British 
Government will fully maintain its commitment 
to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar 
as set out in the preamble of the 1969 constitu-
tion". The British commitment remains to res-
pect the wishes of Gibraltarians who in a 1967 
referendum voted by 12,138 to 44 in favour of 
retaining the link with Britain. 
4.21. Following the passage of the Spanish air-
craft carrier, Dedalo, within 1 mile of the Gibral-
tar dockyard and the launching of 2 helicopters 
from its flight deck in the vicinity of Gibraltar 
airport on the night of 20th/21st September 
1985, Britain lodged an official protest which 
was rejected by the Spanish Government. A 
Spanish Foreign Ministry official was quoted as 
saying: "Spain only ceded the waters within the 
actual port of Gibraltar to Great Britain ... conse-
quently the remaining waters adjacent to the 
rock come under Spanish sovereignty "17• Bri-
tain claims territorial waters up to 3 miles or the 
median line around Gibraltar whereas Spain 
claims territorial waters up to 6 miles from its 
coast - or up to the median line with Morocco in 
the case of the Straits of Gibraltar. For some 
time Spain has maintained a prohibited area for 
aircraft stretching some 30 miles in the vicinity 
of the Straits of Gibraltar. Airspace up to 3 
nautical miles around Gibraltar is however 
excluded from this prohibited area, permitting 
aircraft to operate in and out of the Gibraltar air-
field. The question of the territorial sea is dis-
cussed in paragraph 4.74 below. 
17. The Guardian, 3rd April 1986. 
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(iv) France 
4.22. France has not been part of the integrated 
military structure of NATO since 1966 but main-
tains substantial naval and other forces in the 
Mediterranean; NATO commanders express 
confidence that these forces would be available 
to NATO in the event of hostilities. 
4.23. France maintains a permanent military 
mission at the headquarters of CINCSOUTH in 
Naples, which includes 2liaison officers from the 
French Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterra-
nean in Toulon who are attached to the subordi-
nate NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces 
Southern Europe, also in Naples, who in turn 
maintains two NATO liaison officers at the 
French naval headquarters in Toulon. Arrange-
ments for the co-operation of French naval for-
ces with NATO forces in the event of hostilities 
are covered in detailed agreements negotiated 
between the NATO and French commanders-in-
chief concerned in 1972 and 1976. 
4.24. French naval forces in the Mediterranean 
are listed in the table in paragraph 3. 12. They 
normally include 2 aircraft carriers carrying 
Super-Etendard nuclear capable strike aircraft 
equipped with the AN-52 nuclear bomb. Two 
of the 11 submarines are nuclear-propelled - the 
Rubis and Saphir. Part of the 27 Atlantique 
maritime patrol aircraft are based in the Mediter-
ranean. 
4.25. French naval vessels participate in NATO 
naval exercises occasionally, and more fre-
quently in joint exercises with allied navies on a 
bilateral basis. French maritime patrol aircraft 
on request from the NATO Commander Mari-
time Air Forces Mediterranean in Naples will 
participate in surveillance of Soviet naval vessels 
in the Mediterranean. The Atlantique, of 
somewhat shorter range than the Orlon recon-
naissance aircraft of some other navies, can on 
these occasions land at NATO airfields in Italy 
for refuelling before returning to its French base. 
4.26. In May and early June 1985 the French 
Mediterranean fleet with some 14 vessels inclu-
ding the 2 aircraft carriers carried out a major 
cruise in the eastern and central Mediterranean, 
with port calls in Egypt and Greece, participating 
on the way in a series of allied and national naval 
exercises. The French Commander-in-Chief 
Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Claude Gagliardi, 
was quoted at the time as saying of the French 
fleet: " It is the military tool of an autonomous 
French policy in the Mediterranean, which was 
for a long time an American 'lake'. France is 
trying to catch up in this area vital for it, by 
demonstrating its military capability in the event 
of a crisis "18• At the conclusion of that exercise, 
18. Le Monde, 6th May 1985. 
one of the aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau, went 
into refit for 18 months which will include the 
fitting ofCrotale missiles in an anti-missile role. 
4.27. It is suggested that, in line with the com-
mittee's proposals concerning Spain, it would be 
useful if a French vessel were to be made avail-
able in the future for service with the naval on-
call force Mediterranean during its periodic acti-
vations. 
(v) Italy 
4.28. Italy is the major NATO participant in the 
Mediterranean area, the whole of its armed for-
ces being based on its own territory bounded 
only by the Mediterranean and the Alps in the 
north. In recent years the Italian Parliament 
has led in a process of opening up discussion of 
defence policy in Italy to parliamentary and 
public debate. This led to the publication on 
16th November 1984 (in English as well as in Ita-
lian) of the Defence White Paper 1985 presented 
by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini. 
Later than most NATO countries, Italy is also in 
the process of establishing a central defence 
secretariat with the Chief of Defence Staff 
controlling overall defence policy and opera-
tions. The traditional three services in Italy had 
been too autonomous in the past. Mr. Spadolini's 
introduction to the white paper reflects both of 
these processes: 
" The time is ripe for an exchange of opi-
nions between the civilian and the military 
society in order to arrive at a common 
assessment of problems that cannot in any 
way be considered in an exclusive or sepa-
rate way or covered by an impenetrable 
technicism. This is proved by the heated 
debates which are going on in parliament 
and all over the country. Italy's defence 
policy cannot be defined in the abstract 
but it must be agreed upon by a large 
majority of the population. Therefore 
this white paper on defence is at midway 
in a complex process of analysis and reor-
ganisation started by parliament and based 
on a constant dialogue ... 
The choice made by this white paper ... con-
sists in a defence structure based on mis-
sion needs with interrelations between the 
armed forces ... 
The problem is to reach a greater integra-
tion of the forces as regards operations, 
weapons and budget without in any way 
damaging the historical heritage of expe-
riences and traditions of the individual 
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General for Defence, and a national arma-
ments director, in the administrative sec-
tor. " 
4.29. The Italian Ministry of Defence is seeking 
also to modernise the structure of the army by 
reducing the number of conscripts to provide a 
more efficient and more professional army and 
reducing the inefficient administrative burden of 
the territorial recruiting structure which has not 
been reorganised since the 19th century. 
4.30 The potential military threat to north--
eastern Italy from Warsaw Pact forces has been 
the basis of Italian defence planning for a long 
time, but in recent years more attention is paid 
to possible threats to the rest of the territory ari-
sing from the inherently unstable conditions in 
many Mediterranean countries. The white 
paper refers obliquely to these problems: 
" In particular some conceptual and opera-
tional certainties that had been a major 
factor in the functioning of the internatio-
nal system (deterrence/parity /superiority) 
for more than ten years, have been under-
mined and the proportion and weights of 
power among regional and subregional 
areas have changed (Mediterranean/ 
Persian Gulf/ Africa). The increased ten-
sion between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and the ,ever-changing com-
plexity of the southern area have entailed a 
parallel increase both in the threat, diversi-
fied as to forms and instruments, and in 
the tasks which Italy will have to fulfil for 
her security ... 
Any part of national territory can be expo-
sed to air and naval bombings and to 
attacks (small-scale seaborne and air lan-
dings) aimed at either damaging the lines 
of communication between the northern 
and southern areas of the peninsula or sei-
zing areas oflimited size but- particularly 
on the islands - of politico-strategical 
importance. Most of these actions would 
be characterised by short warning times 
and would rely on the element of sur-
prise." 
4.31. The Italian forces available to meet the 
threat in the north-east include 20 brigades organ-
ised in 3 army corps based in Milan, Bolzano, 
and Vittorio Veneto. The total tank inventory 
includes 500 obsolete M-47, 300 M-60 approa-
ching the end of their useful life and 970 Leopard 
1 tanks. Support weapons include 6 Lance tac-
tical missile launchers for which the United Sta-
services... tes retains the nuclear warheads. Air forces 
The administrative, industrial and mili- assigned to the north-eastern region comprise 4 
tary structures should be better co-ordina- fighter bomber squadrons, 2 reconnaissance 
ted with a consequent strengthening ofthe squadrons and 3 squadrons of light fighter born-
tasks of the Chief of Defence Staff in the bers. 3 of these squadrons are now beginning to 
military field and of those ofthe Secretary- be equipped with the new Tornado aircraft, the 
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remainder with older F-1 04s and G-91 s, but a 
new fighter is being developed to replace them. 
4.32. Air forces available for defence of the sou-
thern part of the country, based there in peace-
time, amount to a total of 7 squadrons of fighter 
bombers, interceptors, and light fighter bom-
bers. There are 2 squadrons of Atlantic mari-
time reconnaissance aircraft. 
4.33. The maritime reconnaissance squadrons 
are operated by the air force, but the defence 
white paper envisages the creation of a naval air 
arm. There is a political debate in Italy about 
equipping the through-deck cruiser, Garibaldi, 
which entered service in 1985, with vertical take-
off aircraft to provide an aircraft carrier of the 
type in service with the United Kingdom 
navy. The Garibaldi was designed and built 
with that possibility in mind. The Italian navy 
would be responsible for patrolling the central 
Mediterranean area in the event of overall hosti-
lities co-ordinated by NATO. In addition to the 
Garibaldi, the Italian fleet comprises the helicop-
ter carrier, Vittorio Veneto, 2 cruisers/helicopter 
carriers, 4 destroyers, 16 frigates, 8 corvettes and 
10 submarines. 
(vi) Greece 
4.34. In preparing the present report the com-
mittee visited Greece in October 1985 where it 
was briefed by ministers and senior staff in the 
Ministries for Foreign Affairs and of Defence. 
4.35. The Greek defence effort is substantial 
when compared with the size and wealth of the 
country. To NATO definition the defence 
expenditure is 7.1% of the gross domestic pro-
duct - the highest in NATO; it may be compared 
with 6.9% for the United States. The total 
armed forces of 206,000 represent 6.2% of the 
active population - again the highest for NATO, 
Turkey coming next at 4.6%. In the early 1970s 
defence expenditure was only 4.1% of GDP and 
the armed forces numbered only 160,000. Para-
doxically therefore the Greek defence effort 
today under a parliamentary democracy is signi-
ficantly higher than during the dictatorship of 
the colonels. 
4.36. What Greece claims to perceive as a threat 
from Turkey, in particular following Turkish 
occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974, rather 
than any recent increase in the threat from Bul-
garia or from Warsaw Pact forces in general, lies 
behind this increased emphasis on defence. 
4.37. Greece and Turkey have been members of 
NATO since 1952. Thereafter two subordinate 
NATO headquarters were established in Izmir -
LANDSOUTHEAST and Sixth Allied Tactical 
Air Force- which under United States comman-
ders with Greek and Turkish deputies were 
designed to co-ordinate the land and air battle in 
the Greek-Turkish area in the event of hostili-
ties. In the period from 1953 to 1974 Greek 
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officers were withdrawn from the Izmir head-
quarters on a number of occasions; their pre-
sence in Izmir could have served as a barometer 
to the state of Greek-Turkish relations. They 
departed finally following the events of 197 4 
when Greece claimed to have withdrawn from 
the integrated military structure of NATO. In 
practice, the withdrawal was less than complete 
- in particular Greek officers continued to serve 
both in the NATO international military staff in 
Brussels and in other NATO military headquar-
ters outside Turkey. The Greek forces were 
nominally returned to the NATO military struc-
ture on 20th October 1980 under the " Rogers 
plan " negotiated largely by the Supreme Allied 
Commander, which was an agreement in princi-
ple, leaving many details to be settled by subse-
quent negotiations with Turkey and the various 
NATO authorities. The committee under-
stands that resumed co-operation with NATO is 
effective in practice only in the case of the Greek 
navy. Although Greece has sought to" assign" 
to NATO more forces than hitherto, in more 
than one case NATO has not been able to accept 
because the proposed declaration included forces 
on Lemnos. Furthermore, the present deploy-
ment of the Greek army and air force units is not 
in accordance with NATO policy. On 8th 
January 1985 a Greek Government statement 
was issued according to which: 
" The Foreign Affairs and Defence Council 
of the cabinet met today with the partici-
pation of the leadership of the armed for-
ces and approved the policy of national 
defence. The basic objective of our natio-
nal defence policy is the safeguarding of 
national independence and territorial inte-
grity of the country." 
The announcement did not name Turkey, but in 
December 1984 the Greek Government had sta-
ted that its new defence policy would be the basis 
for deploying Greek armed forces towards Tur-
key rather than Bulgaria19• In January 1986, the 
Greek Deputy Defence Minister was reported as 
saying that Greece was to deploy a new defence 
system along its borders, in particular in the 
Aegean area, involving 600,000 men, as a 
" purely preventive " measure. The move was 
said to be supported by the opposition New 
Democracy Party2o. 
4.38. The Greek forces, if fully co-operating 
with the co-ordinated NATO plans, would make 
an important contribution to defence in the sou-
thern region, but as in the case of Portugal and 
Turkey, the financial resources of the country 
alone do not permit sufficient modernisation of 
equipment. The 1,600 tanks in service include 
320 obsolete M-47 and 380 elderly M-48, toge-
ther with 106 more modern Leopard; support 
19. International Herald Tribune, 9th January 1985. 
20. Atlantic News, 8th January 1985. 
weapons include 8 Honest John tactical missile 
launchers for which the United States retains the 
nuclear warheads. The air force is equipped 
with F-104 and A-7 fighter bombers as well as 
F-4 and F-5A interceptors. Greece has announ-
ced its intention of acquiring F-16s and Mirage 
2000s. Modernisation of Greek forces is sup-
ported through defence aid from the United Sta-
tes and Germany. 
4.39. The total Greek forces assigned to NATO 
amount to 13 divisions (including 1 armoured 
division, 1 mechanised division as well as 5 
armoured brigades and 2 mechanised brigades) 
with 1,050 tanks, 27 warships (the total fleet 
includes 10 submarines, 14 destroyers, 7 frigates, 
16 fast-attack craft, and an amphibious force of 
13 landing ships and a number of landing craft) 
and 310 combat aircraft. 
4.40. The problems of Greek-Turkish relations 
and United States assistance are discussed 
below. 
(vii) Turkey 
4.41. The committee visited Turkey in October 
1985 for the first time since 1981 -a time when 
parliamentary government had been suspen-
ded. Mr. Turgut Ozal took office as Prime 
Minister in December 1983 following elections 
the previous month in which his Motherland 
Party had won a clear majority over the Nationa-
list Democracy Party which had been favoured 
by the military authorities. Only parties appro-
ved by the military authorities were allowed to 
contest the elections; 243 former deputies had 
been banned from political activity for 10 
years. Martial law was ended in Ankara and 6 
other provinces in July 1985. At present mar-
tial law remains in force in 5 provinces along the 
eastern frontier. 
4.42. Mr. Ozal's government has pursued an 
active policy to strengthen its links with Euro-
pean countries and European institutions. Mr. 
Halefoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has 
recently referred to Turkey's" contractual right" 
under the terms of the 1963 agreement on asso-
ciate membership of the European Community, 
to "apply for full membership in due time". 
4.43. With a defence expenditure of 4.4% of the 
GDP, Turkey's is among the highest defence 
efforts in NATO, comparing favourably with the 
larger WEU countries; with 4.6% of the active 
population in the armed forces, Turkey is second 
only to Greece among the NATO countries. In 
a country where illiteracy is still 30%, affecting 
twice as many women as men, the 20 months' 
compulsory military service has an important 
educational as well as a defence function in Tur-
key. Great importance is attached to training; 
there is a deliberate policy of posting troops for 
service to areas of the country away from their 
home province. 
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4.44. While emphasising first and foremost its 
ties with NATO and the Western European insti-
tutions including the Council of Europe and the 
European Communities with a view to eventual 
full membership of the lattell', Turkey maintains 
neighbourly relations with tlre Soviet Union and 
the Balkan countries, and would seek to improve 
economic relations with them - some electricity 
in the frontier regions is already supplied by the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Relations with Bul-
garia are however strained at the present time 
because ofthe repression of the Turkish minority 
in that country. Amnesty International repor-
ted in the week of 31st Match that 100 ethnic 
Turks had been killed in clashes with the Bulga-
rian police during the 1985 campaign to oblige 
the minority to change their names to Bulgarian 
ones, stop the use of Turkish, and close the mos-
ques. Turkey seeks the support of its allies as 
well as Islamic countries and the Soviet Union to 
stop Bulgarian atrocities. Turkey sees itself 
enjoying a special relationship with Islamic 
countries, especially the Arab countries. Never-
theless, a Turkish view of security has to take 
account not only of the obvious Warsaw Pact 
threat in Thrace and eastern Turkey, but of the 
level of armaments, largely supplied by the 
Soviet Union, of neighbours in the south-east. 
4.45. Iran and Iraq, neighbours of Turkey but 
not Mediterranean countries, at war with each 
other since September 1980, present a problem 
to Turkey which seeks normal relations with 
both and co-operation in dealing with the Kur-
dish minority in the frontier area of all three 
countries. From the military equipment stand-
point they are rather different. Iran, with regu-
lar forces of 305,000, has relied on its young 
revolutionary guards, reportedly 250,000, to sup-
plement its 250,000 army in its offensive against 
Iraq. It has received limited supplies of modern 
equipment from the Soviet Union since the fall 
ofthe Shah in early 1979. It is reputed to have 
1,000 tanks of which only 150 are relatively 
modern Soviet T-62 and T•72, 300 obsolescent 
T-54, and 500 British and American Chieftain 
and M-60 left from the Shah's regime. The air 
force now of dubious quality and training under 
the Khomeini regime is reported to have possi-
bly 80 serviceable American aircraft F-4s and 
F-14s; it has not been re-equipped by the Soviet 
Union. 
4.46. Iraq on the other hand has an army of 
475,000 in 20 divisions equipped with some 
2,900 tanks which also include some modern 
T -62 and T -72 and a sizable air force equipped 
with modern Soviet aircraft such as the Tu-22, 
MiG-23 and Su-20. 
4.47. Syria has 9 divisions with much more 
modern armour including 1,300 T -62 and 1, 100 
T-72 tanks. Its air force with 9 attack squa-
drons again has much modern equipment inclu-
ding 40 Su-20 and 50 MiG-23. Much of this 
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equipment of Turkey's immediate neighbours 
appears superior to the bulk of that in service in 
the Turkish armed forces. Turkey is simulta-
neously in the uncomfortable position of sharing 
common frontiers with the two present bellige-
rents, Iran and Iraq. 
4.48. The Turkish army of 540,000 men is orga-
nised in 12 infantry divisions, 1 armoured divi-
sion and 2 mechanised divisions with a further 6 
armoured, 4 mechanised, and 10 infantry briga-
des plus a parachute brigade and a commando 
brigade. The bulk ofthe 2,900 tanks are still the 
obsolescent M-48, but 200 more modern M-48A 
and 77 Leopard I have recently been acquired. 
Support weapons include 18 Honest John tacti-
cal nuclear missile launchers for which the Uni-
ted States holds nuclear warheads. 
4.49. The Turkish land forces are organised first 
in 3 field armies. The Turkish first army with 
headquarters in Istanbul is responsible for the 
area of the Turkish Straits where NATO brief-
ings in the past concerning the overall area of 
Greek and Turkish Thrace have suggested that 
manpower is about evenly balanced at some 
350,000 men on each side, but with a 2 to 1 
adverse ratio for NATO in tanks. The Turkish 
third army with headquarters at Erzincan has 8 
divisions responsible for the defence of the eas-
tern frontier with the Soviet Union where NATO 
briefings have suggested a 2 to 1 adverse ratio in 
manpower with about 152,500 men on the Tur-
kish side, and an adverse ratio of up to 7 to 1 in 
tanks of which Turkey deploys some 900 in a 
region that is not particularly favourable for 
armour. Turkish second army with headquar-
ters in Malatya has 4 divisions responsible for 
the southern border with Syria and Iraq and is, 
according to Turkish estimates, not capable of 
coping with the threat in this particular area. 
4.50. A fourth army, the Aegean army, in south-
western Turkey with its headquarters in Izmir is 
described by Turkey as comprising training 
units. It has been described by Greek authori-
ties as a threat to Greece; they have claimed that 
it contains 140,000 men. No other authorities 
have supported that claim. Independent obser-
vers in Turkey believe that there might be some 
50,000 men, largely in training units, in the 
Aegean army. 
4.51. Since the 1974landings, Turkey has main-
tained troops in Cyprus which at present amount 
to 17,000 men organised in 2 infantry divisions 
with 150 M-47 and M-48 tanks. 
4.52. The Turkish navy makes an important 
contribution to NATO both in the Black Sea and 
in the eastern Mediterranean. Its 130 ships 
comprise 15 destroyers, 2 escorts and 16 subma-
rines as well as a number of fast patrol craft, but 
as in the case of much other Turkish equipment, 
many are obsolescent. 
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4.53. The Turkish air force of 19 fighter squa-
drons and 4 transport squadrons with 8 Nike 
Hercules air defence squadrons is organised into 
the 1st and 2nd tactical air forces with headquar-
ters at Eskisehir and Diyarbakir, responsible for 
the defence of north-western and eastern Turkey 
respectively. The fighter squadrons are equip-
ped with F-5s, F-100s and F-4s. 7 of the squa-
drons have been equipped with F-104Gs sup-
plied as part of German and some Netherlands 
assistance. 
4.54. The chronic problem facing the Turkish 
armed forces is always one of modernising their 
equipment which lags one generation behind that 
of most other NATO countries, and is now infe-
rior even to some modern equipment in the Bul-
garian army. United States and German 
defence aid is promised to Turkey to assist in 
modernisation. 
(viii) Greek-Turkish relations 
4.55. Since the events of 1974 the committee 
has reported on six occasions on the state of 
Greek-Turkish relations which continue to affect 
adversely collective defence arrangements in the 
area. It is not the purpose of the present report 
concerned with European security to examine 
these in any detail, far less to suggest a solu-
tion. The salient features are merely recalled 
for the record. 
4.56. Apart from Cyprus, described separately 
below, Greek-Turkish differences concern to 
some extent ethnic minorities in each country, 
but for the most part the problem of the Aegean 
Sea where history has bequeathed to the two 
countries an extremely complex situation. Fol-
lowing the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 
1947 peace treaty with Italy, virtually all islands 
in the sea, with the exception of 2 at the entrance 
to the Dardanelles and a few minor islands 
within 3 nautical miles of the Turkish coast, are 
Greek territory and inhabited largely by a Greek 
population. Several are within 5 nautical miles 
or less of the Turkish coast. 
4.57. With the 6 nautical mile territorial sea at 
present claimed by both countries about 49% of 
the Aegean remains high seas, with a few high 
seas passages between islands providing uninter-
rupted high seas passage in and out of the 
Aegean, used also, of course, by all shipping bet-
ween the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
Normal shipping lanes pass nevertheless through 
the Greek territorial sea in many places. With a 
general trend in the world towards a maximum 
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, enshrined in 
the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, Turkey has found it necessary to 
assert on many occasions that it could not accept 
such an extension of the territorial sea by Greece 
which would leave no high seas passages between 
the Greek islands, and reduce the high seas area 
within the Aegean to less than 20%. Greece has 
not claimed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea~ on 
occasion it appears to have reserved the right to 
do so however. An extension of Greek territo-
rial waters to 12 nautical miles would also leave 
the Soviet Union cut off from free passage into 
the Mediterranean which adds an East-West 
dimension to the problem. 
4.58. The problem of the high seas is reflected in 
the airspace. In the 1950s, ICAO drew the 
boundary between the Athens and Ankara flight 
information regions (FIRs) largely along the 
median line between the Greek islands and the 
Turkish coast, leaving the Aegean entirely within 
the Athens FIR. Until1964 the NATO air ope-
rations boundary between Greek and Turkish air 
forces was more nearly a median line down the 
centre of the Aegean Sea. The NATO air com-
mand boundary was moved by consensus in 
1964 to coincide with the FIR line. In 1974 the 
Aegean became closed to civilian air traffic with 
the issue of conflicting NOT AMs by Turkey and 
Greece concerning the reporting of aircraft loca-
tions to Turkish and Greek air traffic control; 
they were withdrawn only in 1980 to permit 
limited civil and military air traffic across the 
Aegean. Until 1981 Greece however had main-
tained an air corridor W 14 between northern 
Greece and the Dodecanese which Turkey clai-
med obstructed Turkish access to international 
Aegean airspace. 
4.59. Economic rights to the seabed of the 
Aegean remain one of the most difficult prob-
lems. Turkey has claimed an equitable share on 
the basis of the extension of the continental shelf 
of the Turkish land mass under the Aegean; 
Greece has claimed a division based in principle 
on a median line between the Greek islands and 
the Turkish mainland. In a resolution of 25th 
August 1976 the United Nations Security Council 
called on the two countries to negotiate a 
settlement. Negotiations between the two coun-
tries were duly held until the Greek elections in 
October 1981, but have not been resumed since 
Mr. Papandreou came to power in Greece. 
The Greek position has been to prefer to refer the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice, 
although the court in 1976 recognised the exis-
tence of a dispute over the area and does not 
appear to have accepted jurisdiction. 
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in Turkey contained the headquarters of Sixth 
AT AF and of land forces south-eastern Europe 
which, in the event of ho~ties, would have 
controlled operations by Greek and Turkish for-
ces and by external reinforcements, in particular 
United States air forces, that might be operating 
in the area. Under the Rogers plan Izmir 
became a purely Turkish-NATO headquarters 
from 1st July 1978 on the ijnderstanding that a 
separate Greek-NATO headquarters would be 
established at Larissa in Greece. The Larissa 
headquarters has not however been estab-
lished because Greece and Turkey have not sol-
ved the problem of the control of military air-
craft operating in the Aegean. Turkey reserves 
the right for its military aircraft to operate in 
international airspace over the Aegean without 
reporting to Greek air control. Greece demands 
that all aircraft operating within the Athens FIR 
report to Greek air control. 
4.61. A further problem arises over the militari-
sation of certain Greek islands, in particular 
Lemnos. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Lem-
nos was to be demilitarised, as were the Dodeca-
nese under the Italian peace treaty. For some 
years Greece has stationed troops on Lemnos, 
claiming in part that there is a military threat 
from the Turkish mainland, and in part that the 
demilitarisation of the Lausanne Treaty was 
superseded by the Montreux Convention of 
1936. Because of the disputed nature of Lem-
nos it has never been included in joint exercises 
arranged by NATO but in recent years Greece 
has attempted to declare its troops on Lemnos to 
NATO as part of its contributed forces and has 
refused to participate in exercises that do not 
include the island. 
4.62. As a consequence of these disagreements 
the committee understands that reintegration of 
Greek forces can be said to be effective to some 
extent only in the case of the Greek navy, which 
participates in some NATO exercises. The full 
co-operation of Greek air and land forces in 
NATO defence plans, and the establishment of a 
new NATO headquarters in Larissa remain 
essential. 
(ix) United States 
4.63. As the only non-riparian NATO country 
4.60. The direct and indirect consequences of with a major military presence in the Mediterra-
these differences for collective NATO arrange- ·nean today, _the United States makes an impor-
ments in the area are considerable. After the tant contribution to NATO defence in the area 
partial withdrawal of Greek forces from the inte- not only by the size of its forces - important 
grated military structure of NATO in 1974, the though they are- but as a link between the local 
NATO military authorities had to negotiate new NATO countries in the area which are largely 
arrangements culminating in the Rogers plan separated by sea as well as by history. As well 
accepted by the NATO Defence Planning Corn- as participating in the NATO collective defence 
mittee on 20th October 1980. This provided for arrangements to which all the local NATO coun-
the return of Greek forces to the integrated mili- tries subscribe, the United States has bilateral 
tary structure of NATO but left details to be sett- mutual defence agreements With all the Mediter-
led by subsequent negotiations. Before 1974 the ranean NATO countries (except France) whereby 
integrated NATO military headquarters at Izmir the United States enjoys the use of various mili-
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tary base and other facilities, while it provides 
military assistance to Portugal, Spain, Greece 
and Turkey. In addition, United States officers 
in senior positions of command - in particular 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH) himself- have been bet-
ter placed to generate co-operation between the 
military forces of the different NATO countries 
in the area than might officers from those coun-
tries because of certain historical rivalries. 
4.64. At the same time, certain operations 
conducted by United States forces in the Medi-
terranean, which like forces of all NATO coun-
tries operate under national command in peace-
time, have been the subject of some criticism by 
European NATO countries from time to 
time. Increasingly the host countries have insis-
ted that the military installations they make 
available to United States forces shall be used for 
NATO purposes only - or for purposes approved 
by the host country. Periodical renewal of the 
bilateral agreements is the subject of negotia-
tions, sometimes lengthy negotiations. 
4.65. The United States sixth fleet in the Medi-
terranean will normally comprise up to 6 
nuclear-propelled attack submarines, 1 or 2 
(rarely 3) aircraft carriers, 12 other major surface 
combatants, 11 support ships and a marine unit 
of battalion size or larger embarked on 5 amphi-
bious landing ships. Normally based in the area 
of Naples and Catania in Sicily, the sixth fleet 
also uses the important large anchorage at Suda 
Bay in Crete. The United States air force in the 
Mediterranean area is largely based in Spain 
where there are 3 squadrons with 72 F-16 which 
rotate to United States air bases further east in 
the Mediterranean in Italy, Greece and Tur-
key. The United States naval aviation operates 
P-3 Orlon maritime patrol aircraft chiefly out of 
Sigonella in Sicily. 
4.66. United States army units in the Mediterra-
nean theatre are smaller but there are some 4,000 
army personnel in Italy mostly comprising the 
Southern European Task Force responsible for 
providing logistical and nuclear fire support to 
Italian forces. 
4.67. The United States basing agreement with 
Portugal originated in a bilateral executive agree-
ment of September 1951, modified, extended 
and amplified in various formal and informal 
arrangements since then. The agreement provi-
des for the use of 3 airfields and 5 naval facilities 
in the Azores as well as communication facilities, 
radio relays and navigational aids. Submarine 
surveillance facilities in the Azores are capable of 
tracking Soviet submarines as far away as the 
Straits of Gibraltar. In April 1975 the then Por-
tuguese Government declared that the Azores air 
base could not be used by the United States for 
supplying Israel in the course of any new war in 
the Middle East. 
294 
4.68. As in the case of Portugal, United States 
defence agreements with Spain were first conclu-
ded with a dictatorship and extended on a five-
yearly basis. Under a 1976 treaty which repla-
ced earlier agreements, most tanker aircraft (used 
for refuelling transport aircraft en route to Israel) 
were withdrawn from Spain, and strategic sub-
marines were removed from Rota from 
1979. A new agreement was signed in July 
1982, a month after Spain's accession to the 
North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time this 
agreement provided that the overflight and use 
of Spanish airspace was subject to Spanish 
control; it maintained Spanish policy, since the 
accident in the 1960s which caused radioactive 
contamination, of excluding nuclear weapons 
from Spanish territory. The major bases avail-
able to the United States are the naval base at 
Rota near Cadiz and air bases at Torrejon near 
Madrid, Saragossa north-east of Madrid and 
Moron near Seville in the south. There is also a 
naval air base at Rota used chiefly for maritime 
surveillance. A United States petroleum pipe-
line stretches nearly 800 km from Cadiz to Sara-
gossa providing aviation and other fuel to the 
United States air bases. There are 6 major com-
munications centres at various points in Spain 
and on the Balearic islands and 2 LORAN sta-
tions. The government of Mr. Gonzalez took 
office on 1st December 1982, not long after the 
conclusion of the July agreement with the United 
States which the socialist party in opposition had 
criticised. The agreement was ratified in April 
1983 with an additional protocol providing that 
Spain's membership of NATO did not imply 
participation in the integrated military struc-
ture. As already pointed out, one of the condi-
tions put to the Spanish population in the refe-
rendum on membership ofNATO held on 12th 
March 1986 was that " gradual steps will be 
taken towards the progressive reduction of Uni-
ted States military presence in Spain ". The 
United States agreed in December 1985 to nego-
tiate reductions in its forces when renewal of the 
1982 agreement was discussed. At the time of 
the referendum there were press reports that the 
United States forces in Spain had been quietly 
reduced from 12,600 to 9,500, partly by replace-
ment of United States by Spanish personnel. It 
was suggested that the lower figure would 
become the official ceiling when negotiations 
were completed. 
4.69. The United States military presence in 
Italy dates in practice from World War 11 but 
was first formalised by an exchange of notes in 
January 1952 followed by an agreement signed in 
October 1954 with subsequent additions. The 
Italian Defence White Paper 1985 makes vir-
tually no reference to the presence or role of Uni-
ted States forces in Italy. There is a total of 
some 58 various installations and bases available 
to the United States in Italy, some quite small 
such as radio relay stations, and some larger 
bases. The United States army presence of 
4,000 men in Italy is the largest in any of the 
Mediterranean countries, most of it concentrated 
in the Southern European Task Force with head-
quarters in Vicenza, with a logistic base in the 
port of Livorno which both provides logistical 
support as well as nuclear fire support for the Ita-
lian army. The United States air force has 
5,800 men in Italy; the main base is at A viano in 
north-eastern Italy from which tactical squa-
drons operate on rotation from the main bases in 
Spain. Naples airfield is also available to the 
United States air force and United States naval 
aviation operates maritime surveillance aircraft 
out of Sigonella airfield near the port of Catania 
in Sicily. The United States sixth fleet is based 
in part in Naples, with its headquarters-ship 
anchored off Gaeta to the north, and also uses 
the port of Catania in Sicily. The nuclear-
propelled attack submarines in the Mediterra-
nean are serviced at La Maddalena, an island off 
the north of Sardinia. There are 5,250 United 
States naval personnel in Italy. The United Sta-
tes operates some 15 radio communications sta-
tions located in various parts of Italy as well as 
the important intelligence-gathering centre at 
San Vito in the south-east near Brindisi. 
4.70. Agreements on United States military faci-
lities in Greece date from a first bilateral agree-
ment of October 1953 authorising the construc-
tion of military and supporting facilities in 
Greece such as the two governments should 
agree to be necessary " for the implementation 
of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO 
plans". Following the events of 1974 there 
were long-drawn-out negotiations over a new 
agreement in which Greece sought guarantees 
that military assistance to Greece and Turkey 
would henceforth be in the ratio of 7 to 10 res-
pectively, and in which Greece sought assurances 
concerning a military balance in the Aegean, and 
the use to which United States bases would be 
put. After Mr. Papandreou's government 
came to power in 1981, a new five-year base 
agreement was signed in 1983, providing specifi-
cally that the facilities provided could not be 
used against countries friendly to Greece, inclu-
ding Libya. Despite PASOK pre-election rheto-
ric calling for the removal of United States bases 
and nuclear weapons from Greek territory, the 
bases were reprieved. The most important 
from the United States point of view is probably 
the naval base in Suda Bay, Crete, an enclosed 
deepwater natural anchorage large enough to 
take the whole of the sixth fleet. The Suda Bay 
complex includes ammunitions storage sites and 
an airfield used by the United States air force for 
staging reconnaissance missions. There is a 
second air base at Hellenikon near Athens. 
There are in addition some eight major military 
communications facilities in various parts of 
Greece and a major intelligence-gathering centre 
at Iraklion in Crete. The present bilateral base 
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agreement expires in December 1988 and the 
United States has been anxious to secure assu-
rances tnat it will be extended beyond that 
date. Apparently during Mr. Shultz's visit to 
Athens at the end of Marcq the subject was not 
officially raised, but the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Papandreou, was reported as saying that Greece 
was satisfied with the agreement. The base 
agreement has always been closely linked to Uni-
ted States defence aid which in fiscal year 1986 is 
reported to be some $500 million in the form of 
credits- the breakdown of United States defence 
aid to 52 countries worldwide, including 10 in 
the Mediterranean area, is shown at Appendix 
Ill. United States forces in Greece number 3,500, 
mostly air force. 
4.71. United States basing arrangements in Tur-
key were first formalised in a number of secret 
agreements after Turkey's accession to the North 
Atlantic Treaty in 1952, the most important 
being the military facilities agreement of June 
1954. A defence co-operation agreement was 
signed in 1969 which apparently codified nume-
rous earlier agreements. Although classified, 
apparently for political reasons at Turkey's 
request, the contents were publicised by Mr. 
Demirel, then Prime Minister, in February 1970 
who pointed out that activities under joint 
defence co-operation were based on Article 3 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and would never 
exceed the limits of NATO commitments. In 
July 1975, when the United States Congress sus-
pended military assistance sales to Turkey, Tur-
key assumed full control ofUnited States instal-
lations, leading inter alia to the suspension of 
intelligence-gathering activities at 4 sites. A 
new four-year agreement was signed in March 
1976 which provided more specifically than the 
previous agreements that " the installations shall 
not be used for, nor shall the activities serve, 
purposes other than those authorised by the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey". Un-
der the agreement the Turkish Government has 
the right to appoint 50% of the personnel enga-
ged in technical operations and related mainte-
nance services and activities in the authorised 
installations which " shall be carried out 
jointly". Difficulties with Congress prevented 
the arms embargo being lifted before 1978 
and prevented the new agreement entering into• 
for~e. A similar agreeme~ was concluded in 
March 1980 which expired in December 1985, 
remaining tacitly in force while the Turkish 
Government of Mr. Ozal has notified the United 
States that it wishes to renegotiate its terms. 
The most important United States military faci-
lities in Turkey are the strategic airfield at Incir-
lik in south-central Turkey from which United 
States squadrons can operate on rotation from 
Spain and Italy, and 4 important intelligence-
gathering facilities located in eastern Turkey, 2 
on the Black Sea coast and 1 in the Sea of Mar-
mara. In addition, there are naval facilities at 
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Kargaburun in the Sea ofMarmara and at Izmir, 
further airfields at Izmir and Ankara and some 
16 major communications facilities in various 
parts of Turkey. During his visit to Turkey at 
the end of March the United States Secretary of 
State failed to renegotiate the base agreement, 
which is closely linked to the question of military 
assistance and, apparently, an attempt by Turkey 
to link agreement with its textile exports to the 
United States. General Rogers, the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, is reported as esti-
mating that $1.4 billion a year is needed to 
upgrade Turkish military equipment2'. Turkey 
is reported to have requested military assistance 
from the United States of $1.2 billion a year 
whereas United States proposals for fiscal year 
1986 amounted to $714 million military assist-
ance only - respecting the 7 to 10 ratio with 
Greece. As shown at Appendix Ill, assistance 
to Turkey would be about half in cheap loans 
and one-quarter in grants. United States forces 
in Turkey number 5,000 of which 3,800 are air 
force. 
4.72. Operations by United States forces in the 
Mediterranean serve both national and NATO 
purposes. The maritime surveillance operation 
conducted largely by aircraft but also by reports 
from surface ships is a continuous activity 
throughout the year. Information on the loca-
tions and movements of Soviet naval vessels is 
in part a co-ordinated NATO activity run by 
Commander Maritime Air Forces, a United Sta-
tes admiral based in Naples. The United States 
sixth fleet conducts NATO exercises in co-ordi-
nation with vessels of other NATO navies from 
time to time. The very large electronic intelli-
gence-gathering operation operated by the Uni-
ted States in the Mediterranean area, particularly 
in Turkey, is essentially a national defence func-
tion the fruits of which are certainly not circula-
ted on a NA TO-wide basis, although one or 
two allies have access to selected United States 
intelligence data through bilateral agreements. 
Nevertheless, the general picture of Soviet mili-
tary capability and activities which is built up 
from many different sources of raw intelligence 
data is undoubtedly of value to the alliance as a 
whole. 
4.73. However, certain military activities 
conducted by the United States in the Mediterra-
nean area, which have not in any way been co-
ordinated with NATO, have been the cause of 
concern to NATO allies. Two recent events are 
analysed separately here, because they raise diffe-
rent issues. 
United States warships in the Black Sea 
4. 74. In the week of lOth March 2 United States 
warships cruising in the Black Sea sailed to 
within 6 miles of the Soviet coast in the Crimean 
21. Time, 7th April 1986. 
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peninsula. The Soviet Union claims a 12 mile 
territorial sea and lodged an official protest with 
the United States over the incident. The Uni-
ted States claims that it was merely exercising the 
right of "innocent passage". Under the 1936 
Treaty of Montreux, naval vessels of non-Black 
Sea powers are entitled to pass through the Tur-
kish Straits and to cruise in the Black Sea under 
certain restrictions. Eight days' notice, prefera-
bly 15, of passage through the straits must be 
given to Turkey, there must not be more than an 
aggregate total of 45,000 tonnes of non-Black Sea 
power naval ships in the Black Sea at any one 
time, and not more than 30,000 tonnes belonging 
to any one non-Black Sea power. In practice, 
the United States navy exercises this right of 
non-Black Sea powers more than any other. An 
analysis of all passages by naval vessels through 
the Turkish Straits is given in the table here-
after. The United Nations Convention on the 
Law ofthe Sea ofDecember 1982, now signed by 
159 nations including all NATO countries except 
Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, provides for the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea "so long as it 
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security ofthe coastal state". Article 19 specifi-
cally precludes "any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal state". (The convention 
requires 60 ratifications to enter into force; so far 
only 25 mainly third world countries have rati-
fied; the United States is seeking amendments 
chiefly to the economic provisions of the 
convention. So entry into force is not an imme-
diate prospect.) The United Nations convention 
has largely codified previous usage in the matter 
of innocent passage. The spokesman for the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. Lomeiko, on 20th 
March asserted that: " what was involved here 
was not innocent passage, but a clearly provoca-
tive passage in clear violation of the state border 
of the Soviet Union and including an attempt to 
conduct espionage ... ". It had taken place "in 
the vicinity of the Soviet coast, where there are 
no traditional seaways "22• Press enquiries of 
the Department of Defence in Washington appa-
rently elicited the information that 'the Soviet 
Union had exercised a similar right to sail war-
ships near to American overseas territories, but 
not to the coast of the mainland23• 
United States warships in the Gulf of Sirte 
4.75. The United States navy had exercised its 
right to sail in the Gulf of Sirte off the Libyan 
coast on 7 occasions since 198124• This is a 
22. The Guardian, 21st March 1986. 
23. Dangerous games at sea, International Herald Tribune, 
25th March 1986. 
24. Statement by the United States Secretary of Defence, 
Mr. Weinberger. Television interview on 23rd March 1986 
quoted in Guardian, 24th March 1986. 
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Warships of non-Black Sea powers visiting the Black Sea 
1983 1984 
' 
Type of warship No. of days Total No. of No. of days Total No. of Country in Black ship-days Type of warship in Black ship-days 
Sea 1983 Sea 1984 
United States Destroyer 3 
J 
Cruiser 12 ! 40 Frigate 3 Frigate 12 Destroyer 8 Destroyer 8 
Frigate 8 46 Destroyer 8 
Destroyer 9 
Frigate 9 
Auxiliary 6 I 
Netherlands Destroyer 6 12 Frigate 6 - - -
Greece Training ship 13 13 Frigate 7 7 
Italy - - - Training ship 8 8 
Brazil Training ship 6 6 - - -
Egypt - - - Destroyer 5 5 
German DR - - - Training ship 9 } 18 Auxiliary 9 
Libya - - - Landing ship 6 ! Landing ship 6 18 Landing ship 6 
Poland - - - Training ship 10 10 
Source : Rapport annuel sur le mouvement des navires a travers les detroits turcs, drawn up each year by the Turkish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the 1936 Montreux Convention. 
different issue which does not involve the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
Libya claims a territorial sea of 12 miles but in 
1973 declared a base line across the Gulf of Sirte 
at 32°30' north latitude, claiming the waters to 
the landward as" internal waters". The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea per-
mits such base lines to be drawn across bays only 
if the length of the straight line needed to enclose 
the bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles. The 
length of the Libyan base line across the Gulf of 
Sirte is some 270 nautical miles long, in parts 
more than 100 nautical miles distant from the 
coast. The Libyan claim has not been recogni-
sed by any country except Burkina. In Decem-
ber 1985 Colonel Kadhafi began referring to the 
Libyan base line as "the line of death". 
4. 76. In March 1986, with a third aircraft carrier 
being brought into the Mediterranean for the 
purpose and early-warning Hawkeye aircraft 
both from the carriers and apparently from bases 
in Egypt providing radar cover, the United States 
task force of 30 ships began to fly a number of 
aircraft sorties over the disputed area of the gulf, 
correctly informing Libyan air traffic control on 
19th March that carrier flight operations were 
being carried out within its area of air control. 
Other press reports say that the Soviet Union 
was warned of United States intentions; Soviet 
297 
technicians were said to have been withdrawn 
from Libyan missile sites at the time, and a 
Soviet intelligence-gathering ship within the Gulf 
of Sirte took care to identify itself by keeping all 
its lights on. The United States claimed that on 
24th March Libya fired 6 surface-to-air SAM-5 
missiles from a base near to the town of Sirte, all 
of which missed their tal18ets. In retaliation, 
United States aircraft destroyed the missile 
radars with two Harm missiles designed to home 
in on hostile radar emission. In the course of 
24th and 25th March, United States aircraft 
launched a further attack on the missile site, sank 
3 Libyan patrol boats, and left a fourth dam-
aged. The United States had issued a warning 
that any Libyan forces more than 12 miles from 
the Libyan coast in the Gulf of Sirte would be 
considered hostile targets. The United States 
force then withdrew to Sicily. 
4.77. Later press reports from Washington25 said 
that planning for the operation began shortly 
after the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna 
airports on 27th December 1985, and was des-
igned in part to offer opportunity for reprisal 
against Libya which the United States blamed 
for the airport attacks. The SAM-5 missile tar-
gets in Libya were ideal from the United States 
25. International Herald Tribune, 26th Ma,rch 1986. 
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point of view as the installation of those Soviet 
missiles in late 1985 had been denounced by 
United States spokesmen as exceeding any legiti-
mate security requirement of Libya. 
4. 78. All NATO countries have of course joined 
in affirming the right of all countries to enjoy the 
freedom of the high seas, including the waters of 
the Gulf of Sirte, but the reactions of the Medi-
terranean NATO countries to the United States 
operations were reserved or critical. Typical 
was the comment by Mr. Craxi, the Italian Prime 
Minister, on 25th March, after an emergency 
cabinet meeting: 
" We do not want a war on our doorstep ... 
war games in an area of such high tension 
do not appear to be the most appropriate 
to resolve a question of principle and of 
international law. "26 
Italy told the United States that it hoped opera-
tions would not be conducted from bases in 
Italy. 
4.79. General Secretary Gorbachev in a speech 
on 26th March, distributed by Tass, predictably 
condemned V nited States actions against Libya, 
but added: 
"If the United States, which is situated 
thousands of miles from the Mediterra-
nean, pulled its fleet out of there, the 
Soviet Union would simultaneously do 
the same." 
4.80. Article 627 of the North At~antic Treaty 
provides that: 
" For the purpose of Article 5 an armed 
attack on one or more of the parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack ... on 
the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of 
these parties when in or over ... the Medi-
terranean Sea ... " 
It was therefore open to the United States when 
its aircraft were attacked by Libya on 24th March 
to invoke Article 5 and call on all other NATO 
countries to assist by taking action " including 
the use of armed force" 28• 
United States attack on targets in Libya 
4.81. The United States attack on targets in 
Libya on 15th April and subsequent events are 
not dealt with in the present report. The com-
mittee intends to refer to them in a report expres-
sing its opinion on the report of the General 
Affairs Committee on security and terrorism -
the implications for Europe of crises in other 
parts of the world. 
26. Daily Telegraph, 26th March 1986. 
27. As modified on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 
1952. 
28. Text of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty at 
Appendix I. 
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(b) Collective defence arrangements 
under NATO 
4.82. Collective defence arrangements under 
NATO in the Mediterranean can be described 
under three main headings: command structure; 
joint forces; infrastructure. 
(i) NATO command structure 
4.83. In peacetime forces which are assigned to 
NATO or earmarked for assignment in the event 
of hostilities remain under purely national com-
mand except for certain air defence forces kept 
on permanent alert. NATO maintains anum-
ber of jointly staffed military headquarters which 
in peacetime have a planning function, including 
the right to inspect the readiness of forces ass-
igned to NATO, and practise the control of for-
ces during periodical NATO exercises. 
4.84. The NATO Commander-in-Chief for the 
whole of the Mediterranean area, immediately 
subordinate to SACEUR, is Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, a United 
States admiral with headquarters in Naples 
where a number of immediately subordinate 
headquarters are also housed. Details of the 
chain of command and subordinate NATO 
headquarters are shown at Appendix IV. Refe-
rence has been made to the COMGIBMED 
headquarters in paragraph 4.16, and the prob-
lems of the Izmir headquarters and the planned 
headquarters at Larissa in Greece have been 
referred to in paragraph 4.60 above. 
4.85. Of particular importance in peacetime are 
the air defence headquarters which are perma-
nently manned and which receive information 
from the NADGE (NATO air defence ground 
environment) radar chain which, in the Mediter-
ranean area, comprises 9 radar stations in Italy, 4 
in Greece and 14 in Turkey. NATO airborne 
early warning aircraft are now operational in the 
Mediterranean, operating already out of nor-
them Italy and Turkey, and are scheduled to be 
operational out of airfields in Greece by 
1987. This considerably improves early war-
ning in the area, especially for low-flying air-
craft. 
4.86. Surveillance by maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft from all the NATO countries in the area, 
with good French co-operation, is co-ordinated 
by Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterra-
nean also located in Naples. 
(ii) Joint forces 
4.87. While NATO forces remain under natio-
nal command in peacetime, two joint internatio-
nal forces are activated periodically in the Medi-
terranean area which serve a politically valuable 
purpose in demonstrating the practical workings 
of NATO. The naval on-call force Mediterra-
nean (NA VOCFORMED) is normally assembled 
for a month twice a year for training when it 
makes a point of making port calls in various 
Mediterranean NATO countries. It is compo-
sed of one vessel contributed by each of Italy, 
Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States; Spain has been invited to contri-
bute a vessel. When in being the force is 
controlled by Commander Naval Forces Sou-
thern Europe from Naples. As with so many 
NATO arrangements in the Mediterranean the 
Greek-Turkey dispute has partly affected the 
operation of NA VOCFORMED. 
4.88. ACE mobile force, comprising both a land 
and an air element, is a multinational force of 
brigade group size supported by 3 or 4 squadrons 
of aircraft which can deploy on demand to the 
NATO flanks. In the Mediterranean area it is 
regularly exercised in northern Italy, in Thrace, 
and in eastern Turkey. In any period of tension 
on one of the NATO flanks, ACE mobile force, 
once the governmental decisions are taken, can 
be rapidly moved to the area concerned provi-
ding not only small but militarily useful reinfor-
cements but, politically more important, a 
demonstration of the solidarity of the alliance, 
demonstrating that any use of force by the War-
saw Pact would involve not only the flank coun-
try immediately threatened, but all other coun-
tries represented in the mobile force. 
(iii) Infrastructure 
4.89. NATO commonly-financed infrastructure 
has made an important contribution in impro-
ving the defence capabilities of the countries of 
the Mediterranean area. In the last 35 years it 
has funded the construction of airfields, now 
with hardened aircraft shelters, radar stations, 
fuel storage and communications systems. In 
the past priority has been given to the central 
region; the southern region lags badly behind as 
far as communications are concerned and the 
provision of aircraft shelters. NATO's latest 
six-year infrastructure programme was finally 
agreed by the Defence Planning Committee on 
5th December 1984 after nearly a year of difficult 
negotiations. It provides a total of 3 billion 
international accounting units ($7.85 billion) for 
the period 1985 to 1991 which will provide in 
particular for much of the outstanding facilities, 
including hardened aircraft shelters, necessary to 
receive United States air force reinforcements in 
Europe. As the United States provides 27% of 
infrastructure funds and the Federal Republic of 
Germany 26%, those two countries were prima-
rily concerned in the negotiations, but the Uni-
ted States exerted considerable pressure in an 
attempt to secure a higher expenditure ceiling. 
The programme will provide several hundred 
hardened aircraft shelters, improved communi-
cations and improvements to existing oil depots 
and pipelines. For the first time the southern 
region has been allocated more than 33% of 
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expenditure, but existing deficiencies will not be 
remedied until towards the end of the pro-
gramme in the early 1990s. 
V. The non-aligned countries 
of the Mediterranean 
(a) Yugoslavia 
5.1. The pessimistic scen .. rio occasionally put 
forward before the death of President Tito in 
1980, according to which the Soviet Union might 
on such an occasion attempt to assert the Brezh-
nev doctrine of the " socialist commonwealth " 
elaborated at the time of the invasion of Cze-
choslovakia in 1968, was not borne out. As the 
committee noted in its prevji.ous report there was 
an orderly transfer of power on President Tito's 
death to the rotating collective leadership repre-
sentative of the 6 republics and 2 autonomous 
regions provided for in the 1974 constitution 
that had been specially drawn up to prepare the 
way for the post-Tito period. There has been no 
evidence of external pressure from the Soviet 
Union to attempt to impose any particular new 
leadership or to establish closer relations. At 
the same time, the very provisions of the 197 4 
constitution, designed to prevent domination of 
national politics by any one of the constituent 
parts of the country, have not made for strong 
central government. The present Prime Minis-
ter, Mr. Branko Mikulic, on taking office in 
January 1986, complained that the most able lea-
ders were not being put forward by the provinces 
to serve in the Federal Government. Much real 
power remains in the hands of the separate repu-
blics. 
5.2. Yugoslavia has severe economic problems 
at the present time, made worse by the great dis-
parities in standards of living between the diffe-
rent constituent republics. There are severe 
public order problems in the province of Kosovo 
bordering Albania, where the majority Albanian-
speaking muslim population is slowly succeeding 
in expelling the minority Serbian population 
from the province. It is claimed that most of 
the 2,000 political prisonets held in Yugoslavia 
are held in connection with disturbances in 
Kosovo. 
5.3. President Tito broke away from Stalinist 
Russia as long ago as 1948 since when Yugosla-
via has pursued an independent foreign policy, 
having played in the past an important role in 
the world non-aligned movement. Neverthe-
less, the country maintains .correct relations with 
the Soviet Union and Soviet military aircraft on 
reconnaissance missions are able to overtly the 
country - the only access route to the Mediterra-
nean that is normally open to Soviet military air-
craft - and the provision of submarine repair 
facilities at Tivat has been noted above. 
DOCUMENT 1060 
5.4. Italy maintains good relations with Yugo-
slavia. From the standpoint of European secu-
rity it is certain that the neutral and non-aligned 
status of the country would provide very sub-
stantial warning time to NATO of any move-
ment by Warsaw Pact forces towards north-
eastern Italy. Italy believes that the European 
Community should play a leading role in helping 
Yugoslavia with its economic problems. 
5.5. Yugoslavia is regarded as having effective 
armed forces of 241,000 with nearly 1,000 tanks, 
mostly T-54/55, but including 100 T-74, and 
over 400 combat aircraft which include MiG-21 
and the Yugoslav ORAO produced jointly with 
Romania using British engines. Yugoslavia 
exported $2 billion of armaments in 1985. Fol-
lowing a visit to Yugoslavia by a Rapporteur in 
1978, the committee reported 29 on Yugoslav 
plans for " all-people's defence " which would 
involve most of the population in resistance if 
the country were invaded by any country. 
(b) Albania 
5.6. For decades a completely self-isolated 
country since its break with the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s Albania had received some economic 
and military assistance from China until the end 
of the Mao regime and had acted as an occasio-
nal spokesman for that country before it was 
admitted to the United Nations. After the 
admission of China, the isolation of Albania 
became complete. 
5.7. With the death of Enver Hoxha in April 
1985 there has naturally been speculation as to 
whether his successor, Mr. Ramiz Alia, would 
continue to follow Hoxha's rigid Stalinist and 
isolationist policy. There are a few tentative 
signs that this very backward underdeveloped 
country, where there are still no private cars, is 
taking a few tentative steps to establish some 
relations with European countries. It is under-
stood that the Soviet Union has attempted to 
improve its relations with the country, but with 
no sign of the Soviet approaches being reciproca-
ted. The Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister 
has recently paid a visit to the country, presuma-
bly at the invitation of Albania. Italy, which of 
the western countries naturally takes the lead in 
attempting to maintain friendly relations, has 
established a commercial airlink between Bari, 
Brindisi and Tirana. Italy, however, has a prob-
lem with a number of local families that have 
taken refuge in the Italian Embassy in Tirana 
against state repression and is endeavouring to 
secure safe passage for them. From the end of 
March 1986 there will be two weekly flights by 
Swissair from Zurich to Tirana - on the initia-
tive of Albania. Some limited tourism for 40 
visitors a week has been arranged with the Uni-
29. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st 
May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant. 
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ted Kingdom from October, and a larger com-
pany, Cooks Tours, is reported to be arranging 
weekend visits from 1987. 
5.8. Albanian armed forces total 40,000. The 
army of 30,000 has 100 mostly obsolete T-34, 
T-54 and T-59 tanks and an equally obsolete air 
force of 80 MiG-15, MiG-1 7 and MiG-19 com-
bat aircraft. 
(c) Cyprus 
(i) General 
5.9. Since 1974 the committee has frequently 
reported on the situation in Cyprus because it is 
an important factor in Greek-Turkish relations 
and consequently affects the cohesion of NATO 
and European security. For the first time the 
committee's Rapporteur was able to visit the 
island in March 1986, and to meet all the leading 
figures concerned. Previous reports of the com-
mittee have described the events from indepen-
dence in 1960 up to the 1974 coup d'etat by the 
Greek-officered national guard organised by the 
colonels' regime in Athens, which briefly repla-
ced President Makarios by the former terrorist 
Nikos Sampson, and the subsequent military 
intervention by Turkey, which led to the present 
de facto division of the island with the United 
Nations force in Cyprus maintaining a buffer 
zone between the two communities. The past 
events are not described again in the present 
report, nor is it its purpose, much less the role of 
WEU, to seek to propose any solutions to a prob-
lem that must be settled between the two com-
munities concerned, through the good offices of 
the United Nations Secretary-General, with as 
little interference from outside powers as possi-
ble. The purpose of the Rapporteur's visit was 
fact-finding; the committee's interest flows from 
its concern with European security. 
(ii) Present situation 
5.10. The ·events in 1974 transformed the situa-
tion in Cyprus in one significant way in that the 
two ethnic communities of Turkish-speaking 
Cypriots and Greek-speaking Cypriots are now 
physically separated by the cease-fire line. Pre-
viously, although a majority of the Turkish 
Cypriot population lived in the northern and 
eastern part of the island, the two communities 
had in practice been inextricably mixed with 
Turkish Cypriot agricultural communities in 
many villages throughout the island, and many 
Greek Cypriots in the north. 
5.11. The Turkish Cypriot northern part of the 
island today comprises about one-third of the 
land area. Population figures in Cyprus are in 
dispute; there has been immigration to both 
parts of the island since 1974, and the situation is 
obscured to some extent by the large number of 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots resident in the 
United Kingdom. Turkish Cypriots accounted 
for some 18% of the total population of 632,000 
in 1973. Independent observers believe that 
about 30,000 agricultural workers from Turkish 
Anatolia were then settled in the north in 1975, 
some of whom have since returned. Some Tur-
kish Cypriots have returned to Cyprus both from 
the United Kingdom and from Australia. Eco-
nomically northern Cyprus is almost entirely 
dependent on Turkey for its trade and external 
relations, and communications with Turkey are 
being improved through the enlargement of the 
port of Kyrenia and the construction of a new 
airport at Lefkoniko to the north-east of Nicosia 
which was opened on 7th March. Mr. Rauf 
Denktash, the undisputed leader of the Turkish 
community, announced the formation of a 
" Turkish Cypriot federated state " in 197 5 
which was designed to form one part of a federal 
republic of Cyprus; he did not claim internatio-
nal recognition as an independent state, but the 
title was recognised only by Turkey. In 1983, 
however, Mr. Denktash went further in proclai-
ming a" Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus", 
although reiterating his readiness to continue 
negotiations for the creation of a federal state in 
Cyprus. Only Turkey has accorded recognition 
to the proclaimed republic; so far neither Mr. 
Denktash nor Turkey has sought particularly 
actively to secure recognition for it. A draft 
constitution was approved by referendum on 5th 
May 1985; under it Mr. Denktash was elected 
President on 9th June that year by 70.5% of the 
votes against the Marxist CTP candidate, Mr. 
Ozgiir, who obtained 18.4% of the votes and Mr. 
Durduran of the left wing communal liberation 
party (TKP) who obtained 9.2%. Legislative 
elections on 23rd June 1985 led to the following 
results: 
23rd June 1985 - elections 
to the Northern Cyprus Assembly 
UBP (National Unity, 
Mr. Denktash) 37% 24 seats 
CTP (Marxist, Mr. Ozgiir) 
TKP (Left, Mr. Durduran) 
New Dawn (centre-right) 
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21% 12 seats 
16% 10 seats 
9% 4 seats 
5.12. The Greek Cypriot two-thirds ofthe island 
had an estimated 550,000 population but there is 
understood to have been some limited immigra-
tion from Greece and f~vourable economic 
conditions have attracted Cypriots from the Uni-
ted Kingdom and elsewhere. Unlike the north, 
the south has a strong economy with very little 
unemployment and has enjoyed an unpreceden-
ted building boom both ofhotels and offices in 
large part because of the move of various com-
mercial interests from the Lebanon and else-
where in the Middle East. There are signs how-
ever that this growth is coming to a halt. 
5.13. The present government of the Republic 
of Cyprus, internationally recognised as such, is 
still conducted under the independence constitu-
tion of 1960 although there has been no Turkish 
Cypriot participation in government since 
1963. The de facto jurisdiction of the govern-
ment is today limited to the Greek Cypriot part 
of the island. 
5.14. At the end of December 1984, President 
Kyprianou terminated a co-operation agreement 
between his Democratic Party (DIKO) and the 
pro-communist AKEL. In early 1985, the 
opposition Democratic Rally (DISY) led by Mr. 
Glafcos Clerides called for President Kypria-
nou's resignation because ofhis obstruction of an 
intercommunal agreement, 'and were joined by 
the AKEL Party in their opposition. The socia-
list EDEK party has continued to support Mr. 
Kyprianou. The AKEL and DISY Parties lack 
the two-thirds majority in the chamber necessary 
to unseat President Kyprianou, but on 1st 
November 1985 the chamber agreed unani-
mously to hold premature elections on 8th 
December which led to the following results: 
Republic of Cyprus elections - 8th December 1985 
% Seats 
1981 1985 1981 1985 
AKEL ~m-Communist) 32.8 27.4 12 15 
DISY ( emocratic Ra~, Clerides) 31.9 33.6 12 19 
DIKO ~Democratic Pa y, Kyprianou) 19.5 27.7 8 16 
EDEK Socialist) 8.2 11.1 3 6 
Total Greek Cfuriot 35 56 (Reserved for urkish Cypriots 15 24) 
Total seats 50 80 
5.15. Although the separation of the two corn- 300 Turkish Cypriots in the south - the two 
munities is virtually complete - the United zones are still interdependent for various servi-
Nations estimate only 1,100 Greek Cypriots and ces including water supplies, electricity and tele-
Maronites living in the north and approximately phone although with the construction of new 
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water catchment facilities in the south, the 
dependence on water supplies from the north 
will decrease. 
(iii) Greek, Turkish and Cypriot military forces 
in Cyprus 
5.16. Independent observers estimate that today 
Turkey maintains 17,000 men in northern 
Cyprus organised in 2 divisions with some 150 
battle tanks, artillery and armoured carriers. In 
addition, northern Cyprus has a militia of 4,500 
men based on a 2-year period of conscription at 
age 18, but the militia has little equipment of its 
own. 
5.17. In the south, Greece maintains one infan-
try battalion of 950 men and 1 commando of 
350. In addition, 450 Greek officers and NCOs 
are serving with the Greek Cypriot national 
guard. 
5.18. The national guard of 10,000 men is based 
on compulsory service of 26 months. It is organ-
ised in 1 armoured battali9n and 2 reconnais-
sance/mechanised infantry battalions, some 20 
ordinary infantry battalions and artillery support. 
It has a number of armoured carriers but lacks 
other armour. 
(iv) United Nations force in Cyprus 
5.19. The United Nations peace-keeping force 
in Cyprus was established by resolution of the 
Security Council on 4th March 1964 with a man-
date to prevent the recurrence of intercommunal 
fighting that had broken out in the island. The 
mandate has since been extended by the Security 
Council for successive periods of 6 months, most 
recently in December 1985. Because of the 
intercommunal nature of the fighting in 1964 the 
force was originally deployed in towns and villa-
ges throughout the island. Following the out-
break of hostilities in 1974 and the eventual estab-
lishment of a cease-fire called for by the 
Security Council on 16th August 1974 the force 
was substantially redeployed to man observation 
posts and patrols along the buffer zone which 
was then created between the cease-fire lines of 
the opposing forces. The zone crosses the 
island from north-west to south-east, is 21 7 km 
long and varies in width from 7 km at its widest 
to 10 m at points within the old city of Nicosia 
which it traverses. The force has established 
141 observation posts along the buffer zone, of 
which 60 are permanently manned 24 hours a 
day. In addition to patrolling the buffer zone 
and maintaining the military status quo as estab-
lished at the time of the 197 4 cease-fire, the force 
has humanitarian responsibilities to the small 
remaining minority populations living on the 
other side of the cease-fire line as well as sole 
administrative and police responsibility for the 
population living actually within the buffer zone 
where there are several villages, including Pyla, 
the only village with a mixed community remai-
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ning on the island. UNFICYP also maintains a 
presence in Varosha, the former Greek-Cypriot 
suburb of Famagusta on the Turkish side of the 
cease-fire line, but now abandoned. 
5.20. The force as constituted by the United 
Nations Security Council in 1964 is composed of 
military contingents from Austria, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom together with civilian police detach-
ments from Australia and Sweden. From a 
maximum size of 6,500 men, UNFICYP has 
now been reduced to 2,300 soldiers provided by 
the following contingents: 
Denmark 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Sweden 
Austria 
341 
741 
515 
376 
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These five contingents man the buffer zone in 
that order from west to east. The Finnish and 
Irish military contingents have now been redu-
ced to a token 10 and 8 respectively, but batta-
lions from these countries could be brought back 
at any time if necessary as the Security Council 
mandate remains valid. The force is supported 
by 35 international civilian staff of the United 
Nations of 21 different nationalities and 400 
local employees. Most of the logistical support 
for the force including transport, communica-
tions and rations is supplied by the British 
contingent. The force is commanded by Major-
General Giinther G. Greindl, seconded from 
the Austrian army, who is directly responsible to 
the Secretary-General. 
5.21. In 1984 the annual operating cost of the 
United Nations force was a little over US$100 
million a year. This is met first by the countries 
contributing contingents which, under United 
Nations regulations, are not reimbursed for 
troops' pay and allowances and normal material 
costs, and which have also agreed to meet certain 
of the extra costs involved in maintaining their 
troops in Cyprus. These contributions account 
for about two-thirds of the total cost. The 
remaining third is the direct cost to the United 
Nations which is financed through voluntary 
contributions from 71 countries including Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom from the WEU coun-
tries, but the voluntary Special Account had a 
cumulative deficit of $127.7 million by the end 
of 1984, provisionally made up by the troop-
contributing countries. None of the Warsaw 
Pact countries contributes. Details of financial 
contributions are shown at Appendix V. 
(v) British sovereign base area 
5.22. Cyprus was under the Ottoman Empire for 
300 years from 1570 until 1878 when the Sultan 
in an agreement with Britain consented " to 
assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and 
administered by England" 30• Britain used the 
island as a military base to provide assistance to 
the Ottoman Empire against Russia. With the 
outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey an enemy, 
Britain annexed the island which became a Bri-
tish crown colony under the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1924. After withdrawal of British forces from 
the Suez Canal zone in the early 1950s, Cyprus 
became the headquarters of British forces in the 
Middle East and Vulcan strategic bombers were 
based there in support of the CENTO commit-
ment to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. 
5.23. Under the Treaty of Establishment signed 
by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the 
Republic of Cyprus in July 1960, as part of the 
arrangements providing for the independence of 
Cyprus, the United Kingdom was provided with 
the present two sovereign base areas totalling 253 
sq. km which do not form part of the territory 
of the Republic of Cyprus. The United King-
dom also retained the use of various other sites, 
installations and training areas including port 
areas in Limasol and Famagusta and an area in 
Nicosia airport (disused since 1974) with the 
right to use the runway. 
5.24. British forces in Cyprus have never been 
assigned to NATO. Until 1976 it housed the 
headquarters British forces Near East, but since 
1960 the numbers of forces have been considera-
bly reduced and in 1976 the title of the headquar-
ters was changed to "British forces Cyprus". 
Today there are about 2,500 men organised in 
one and a half infantry battalions, one armoured 
reconnaissance battalion and some support units 
and a Wessex helicopter squadron. Phantom 
and Lightning tactical aircraft are based at the 
Akrotiri airfield. 
5.25. Britain maintains an important communi-
cations and electronic intelligence-gathering faci-
lity in Cyprus which, together with a similar ins-
tallation in Hong Kong, provides raw material to 
the communications intelligence centre in Chel-
tenham in the United Kingdom. Information 
derived from this source provides much of the 
basis for bilateral exchange of intelligence infor-
mation with the United States. The sovereign 
base areas provide the United Kingdom with a 
useful forward air base which can be used by air-
craft in transit to any points further east. It has 
been used in support of peace-keeping forces in 
the Lebanon and in the evacuation of residents 
from Yemen. With the knowledge of the 
Cyprus authorities, United States U-2 reconnais-
sance aircraft operate from the Akrotiri airfield 
carrying out observation duties over the demili-
tarised Sinai in a peace-keeping role. 
30. The Cyprus Convention between Britain and the Otto-
man Empire signed in Constantinople on 4th June 1878. 
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5.26. Cyprus also provides British army and air 
force units with ideal training areas, with the 
advantage of a Mediterranean climate. The 
sovereign base areas have J!>layed an important 
role in peace-keeping arrartgements in Cyprus, 
providing logistics support to the United Nations 
peace-keeping force referred to above. 
5.27. Politically the presence of the sovereign 
base area is not an issue with the main political 
parties of either communi~y in Cyprus. The 
Soviet Union on a number of occasions, most 
recently in 1985, in seeking to involve itself in 
the solution to the Cyprus problem has included 
proposals for the removal of all armed forces 
from the island. 
(vi) The Cyprus problem 
5.28. Since the events of 1974 there have been 
many years of abortive negotiations on a new 
constitution for Cyprus, in the course of which 
the Greek Cypriot side has come to concede the 
principle of a federal state while the Turkish 
Cypriot side as lately as November 1984 
announced territorial concessions which would 
reduce the proportion of the island to be inclu-
ded in a Turkish Cypriot federated state to 
29%. The most recent round of intercommu-
nity negotiations under the auspices of the Uni-
ted Nations Secretary-General in New York 
from 17th to 21st January 1985 broke down 
through the refusal of President Kyprianou to 
consider the Secretary-General's proposals as 
more than an agenda for negotiation whereas 
President Denktash considered them to be an 
outline agreement. 
5.29. In March 1986 the Secretary-General com-
pleted a " draft framework agreement " which, 
while not being made public, is understood to 
embody simply a listing of most agreed issues, 
and an identification of areas of disagreement. 
The main unresolved points between the two 
communities appeared to be first the timetable 
for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, with the 
Greek Cypriot · side insisting on withdrawal 
before any agreement enters into force, whereas 
the Turkish Cypriot side is unlikely to agree to 
complete withdrawal until' such time as the Tur-
kish Cypriot community ~as acquired confi-
dence in the working of any new federal sys-
tem. While the actual extent of territory to be 
included within each of the two future federated 
states is no longer a significant issue, the econo-
mic rights to be enjoyed by each community 
within the territory of the other remains to be 
settled. The Turkish Cypriot side is anxious to 
retain the homogeneity of its own community 
within the area of its own administration - a 
homogeneity that the 1974 events established for 
the first time. The Greek Cypriot side insists on 
the right of any Cypriots to engage in economic 
activities in any part of the island, which in prac-
tice, as the Greek Cypriots are the most entrepre-
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neurial-minded, amounts to the right for the 
Greek Cypriots to own property and conduct 
business in the area administered by the Turkish 
Cypriot community, although without any right 
to secure electoral representation outside their 
own area. The question of any guarantees by 
external powers also remains to be settled. 
5.30. By the 21st April, the date on which the 
Secretary-General had asked for replies to his 
draft, the press was reporting that the draft had 
been accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, but 
that a formal reply had not been sent by the 
Greek Cypriot side. Mr. George Iacovou, the 
Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, is reported to 
have visited Moscow on 28th April to discuss the 
convening of an international conference to 
consider the four issues they considered had not 
been adequately dealt with in the Secretary-
General's draft. This move was seen in allied 
circles as an attempt to force western allied coun-
tries to seek to persuade Turkey to persuade in 
turn Mr. Denktash to make more concessions to 
the Greek Cypriot position. The Soviet Union 
in January 1986 had renewed its proposals for an 
international conference on Cyprus which would 
seek to remove " all foreign forces " from the 
island - including by inference the British sove-
reign bases. 
5.31. It is not the purpose ofthis report to make 
any specific proposals about internal Cyprus pro-
posals. The committee nevertheless regrets -the 
absence of direct contacts between the two 
Cyprus communities in the last 12 years. It will 
be difficult to resolve outstanding problems 
while intercommunity relations are limited to 
the present slender and indirect political 
contacts. 
(d) Syria 
5.32. Syria, with an army of 270,000 men and 
4,200 tanks - 2,400 of them modem T-62 and 
T-72 - has the largest and most modem armou-
red force in the Middle East. Its air force of 500 
combat aircraft includes modem Soviet MiG-25 
and MiG-23 interceptors and 50 MiG-23 ground 
attack aircraft. It maintains some 3 armoured 
divisions with 800 battle tanks in Lebanon. Its 
navy is mainly based on 22 fast attack craft 
equipped with missiles. Israel claimed in 
February that the Soviet Union had supplied the 
first submarines. 
5.33. Massively supplied with modem military 
equipment by the Soviet Union, Syria neverthe-
less cannot be counted as a Soviet ally. Presi-
dent Assad, re-elected in February 1985 for a 
third 7-year term since he took office in March 
1971, and his Baath party have an overriding 
preoccupation with the restoration of the Palesti-
nian state and the removal of Israel from other 
occupied territories. Deeply involved in Leba-
non since it sent its forces in 1976, Syria supports 
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PLO factions opposed to Y asser Arafat, and 
some of the militia forces. While within the last 
18 months President Assad has visited Moscow 
where he received assurances of continued mili-
tary and economic support, western leaders have 
also visited Damascus including President 
M'itterrand and Prime Minister Papandreou, 
both in November 1984. Almost overlooked 
among the panoply of Soviet equipment in the 
Syrian armed forces are some Milan anti-tank 
missiles and 35 Gazelle helicopters supplied by 
France of which 15 destroyed in fighting have 
been replaced. 
5.34. Observers attribute the naval facilities and 
port rights granted to the Soviet Union in the 
Syrian port ofTartus and Latakia more to Syrian 
dependence on the Soviet Union for its equip-
ment, than on political alignment. The number 
of Soviet military technicians and advisers was 
reported in 1984 to have been reduced by about 
a third to some 3,000. While harbouring the 
Abu Nidal Palestinian faction, Syria has denied 
that it actively supports terrorism in third coun-
tries, and has assisted western countries in nego-
tiations to free hostages taken by various armed 
factions in the Lebanon. 
5.35. While Turkey is naturally preoccupied by 
the large and modem Syrian armoured divisions 
on its frontier, and has an outstanding dispute 
over territorial waters, relations between the two 
countries remain correct. 
(e) Lebanon 
5.36. The state of armed anarchy in Lebanon is 
not examined in the present report. Far from 
presenting any military threat of its own, Leba-
non is a victim of Middle East conflicts not of its 
making. Its air force is virtually non-
existent. Its army has some 50 tanks and a fur-
ther 60 AMX-13 light tanks. Control of the 
country is largely exercised at present by the rival 
militias supported by Syria and Israel, and 
Syrian-backed PLO factions. Unidentified 
groups have seized hostages from several western 
countries, but there is no identifiable authority to 
which to turn to secure their release. 
(f) Israe/31 
5.37. Relying heavily on the United States for 
military equipment (which in financial year 1986 
is providing more military assistance to Israel 
than to any other country32) and surrounded by 
potential adversaries, Israel has no alternative 
31. The General Affairs Committee has regularly reported 
on the situation in Israel, most recently in the situation in the 
Middle East and European security, Document 978, 25th 
May 1984, Rapporteur: Lord Reay. 
32. Appendix Ill. 
foreign policies open to it. The primary interest 
of all western countries is to seek a solution to 
the particular Middle East conflict that involves 
Israel and the Palestinians, but the prospect of a 
solution is no nearer. 
5.38. The highly efficient Israeli regular force of 
142,000 men are backed by well-trained rapidly 
mobilisable reserves of 370,000. Well supplied 
by equipment, chiefly from the United States, 
Israel has its own important arms industry and is 
an exporter of equipment to countries which 
include South Africa. Israel's 3,600 tanks 
include 1,200 modem M-60 and its over 600 
combat aircraft include F-15 and F-16. 
(g) Egypt 
5.39. Following the United States-sponsored 
Camp David agreement that sought to solve the 
Israeli-Egypt conflict in 1978, Egypt has become 
the largest single recipient after Israel of Ameri-
can military aid, entirely in the form of " for-
given credits "33• The settlement has given 
Egypt and Israel a firm sense of security on their 
common frontier; the demilitarisation of Sinai is 
guaranteed by the United States which, with the 
other countries in the multilateral observer force, 
assists in peace-keeping surveillance of the 
area. The Egyptian leadership and any fore-
seeable altem~tive leadership from the middle 
classes accept the peace treaty with Israel as the 
only realistic policy for Egypt. The establish-
ment in 1985 of close links beween Libya and the 
new regime in the Sudan is particularly distur-
bing for Egypt. 
5.40. Economically, disparity ofthe distribution 
of wealth among Egypt's large and growing popu-
lation has become progressively worse. A large 
proportion of Egypt's relatively skilled labour 
force has been employed in the oil-producing 
Arab countries and remittances have provided 
an important addition to resources of the poorer 
section of the community. But that source is 
drying up with the falling price of oil, reduced 
production and the return home of Egyptian 
workers, in particular from Libya. 
5.41. The riot in March by the central security 
forces is seen as a spontaneous demonstration by 
the lowest paid sector of the population against 
extremes of wealth flaunted in the luxury hotels 
in proximity to the barracks. Also muslim fun-
damentalism, building on deep-rooted opposi-
tion to the Israel peace treaty among the masses, 
which led to the assassination of President Sadat, 
remains a threat to the present regime. 
5.42. In Egypt, as in much of the Middle East, a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute would do 
much to ensure the stability of the present Egyp-
33. See Appendix Ill. 
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tian Government and its present western-
oriented policy. 
5.43. In military terms, Egypt now provides the 
United States with a sm~ll but strategically 
important forward base, tblrough which rapid 
deployment forces assigned :to the new United 
States central command e~tablished in 1983 
could be deployed for possitile operations in the 
Persian Gulf. About 1,200 United States army 
personnel are stationed in Egypt. 
5.44. One consequence of the change in allian-
ces for Egypt is the impact on equipment. 
Some 1,500 Egyptian tanks are Soviet models 
which it will be increasingly difficult to maintain; 
660 M-60s have so far been supplied by the Uni-
ted States. The air force of some 430 combat 
aircraft in service has been largely re-equipped 
with French and United States aircraft since its 
losses in the Yom Kippur conflict, but still 
retains 100 MiG interceptors. 
(h) Libya 
5.45. In its previous report the committee dealt 
at some length with Libya, and the problems 
which its behaviour on the international scene 
poses not only to the western world but to its 
neighbours and nominal allies. Despite its 
conflict with Chad, the northern part of which is 
at present occupied by part of the Libyan army, 
Libya itself does not represent a serious military 
threat to the western world. Its armed forces 
are relatively small with an army of 58,000 pro-
viding perhaps the equivalent of two-and-a-half 
divisions. With its oil wealth, Libya has how-
ever purchased massive amounts of military 
equipment, mostly from the Soviet Union, but 
also from France, Italy and the United King-
dom. But of its 2,500 battle tanks and over 500 
combat aircraft, much is reported to be in sto-
rage; the limited extent of skills among the 
Libyan population has obliged Colonel Kadhafi 
to rely on foreigners for technical support of 
sophisticated equipment while the air force 
reportedly relies on Soviet, Syrian, Pakistani, 
North Korean and Palestinian pilots. 
5.46. Libya could of course provide the Soviet 
Union with important strategic bases in the 
Mediterranean as it has done in the past for wes-
tern countries. Libya is reported to have con-
structed new airfields and to be constructing a 
new naval base beyond any possible national 
requirement, and vessels of the Soviet Mediter-
ranean squadron have spent more time in Tri-
poli in the past year than hitherto. But there are 
no signs of the Soviet Union establishing any 
significant military base of its own in the coun-
try. Indeed, during Colonel Kadhafi's visit to 
Moscow in October 1985 relations with the 
Soviet Union were reported to have become 
strained. He failed to attend the Kremlin recep-
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tion in his honour and the forecast treaty of 
friendship with the Soviet Union did not mate-
rialise although an economic agreement was 
extended. General Secretary Gorbachev was 
reported to have strongly criticised Libyan sup-
port for international terrorism including the sei-
zing of the Achille Lauro liner by Palestinian 
guerrillas. Nevertheless, in December 1985 the 
Soviet Union supplied Libya with long-range 
SA-5 surface-to-air missiles which were descri-
bed by a United States State Department spokes-
man as "clearly exceeding any legitimate secu-
rity interests which the Libyans may have". 
5.47. Libyan relationships with the rest of the 
Arab and muslim world vary from time to 
time. Colonel Kadhafi has been consistently 
hostile to his immediate neighbours, Tunisia and 
Egypt, as well as to Jordan. He has attempted 
to maintain good relations especially with Syria, 
and, surprisingly, in September 1984 signed a 
treaty of union with Morocco, but which does 
not appear to have had concrete results beyond 
indicating an end of Libyan support for the Poli-
sario forces opposing Morocco in the western 
Sahara. 
5.48. The problem of Libyan-sponsored terro-
rism abroad, the different interests and reactions 
of the European allies and the United States has 
been described in paragraphs 4.75 et seq. 
above. 
5.49. Libya's unprecedented wealth giving it one 
of the highest per capita incomes on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean has arisen for more 
than 90% from its petroleum exports. With the 
slump in the price of oil to one-third of the price 
of only a few years ago, Libya is facing an inevi-
table and severe economic crisis. It is interested 
in closer economic links with the European 
Community and the majority view among Euro-
pean countries is undoubtedly in favour of lea-
ving the country through its excesses to isolate 
itself from the more moderate Arab world, while 
maintaining a dialogue through countries best 
placed to communicate with Libya and seeking 
to influence its policy by economic means. The 
consequence of military action against Libya 
may for some time increase support for the coun-
try in much of the Arab world. 
(i) Malta 
5.50. Malta had been an important British naval 
base from the beginning of the 19th century and 
a NATO naval headquarters for the Mediterra-
nean was maintained there from 1952 until 
1971. Malta became independent in Septem-
ber 1964 and in 1971 when the Malta Labour 
Party under Mr. Mintoffwon the elections, it fol-
lowed a policy of non-alignment which led to the 
removal of the NATO naval headquarters to 
Naples. The United Kingdom continued to 
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maintain naval and air forces on the island from 
1972 to 1979 under a bilateral defence agreement 
which was not subsequently renewed, the last 
British forces being withdrawn in 1979. In 1980 
Italy concluded a bilateral agreement with Malta 
providing for economic assistance and military 
guarantees for the neutrality and non-alignment 
of Malta. In return, Malta agreed to forbid the 
use of military bases in Malta to any country 
except Italy which would have the right to use 
them for defending Maltese neutrality. 
5.51. In December 1984 Mr. Mintoff, seeking 
renewal of economic assistance, announced that 
the treaty with Italy had not been renewed, but 
Italy pointed out that the Maltese neutrality clau-
ses of the agreement had not expired. 
5.52. Mr. Mintoffs government had seen Malta 
as a link between Europe and the North African 
countries, in particular Libya. Colonel Kadhafi 
signed a five-year " economic and security co-
operation agreement " during a visit to Malta in 
November 1984 which also provided for the 
non-establishment of military bases on Malta, 
but contained offers of Libyan assistance with 
military training and of Libyan military assis-
tance if Malta were attacked. Malta had earlier 
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in 
October 1981 whereby the latter recognised Mal-
tese neutrality. Because of the conduct of inter-
nal policy under Mr. Mintoff which denied 
democratic rights to the opposition, relations 
with the Council of Europe and the European 
Community were strained, and the European 
Community in 1983 suspended aid because of 
human rights abuses. 
5.53. With the resignation of Mr. Mintoff, his 
former deputy Dr. Mifsud Bonnici became 
Prime Minister on 22nd December 1984. Since 
then relations with European countries and the 
Community have improved. The opposition 
Nationalist Party is again represented in the Mal-
tese Delegation to the Council of Europe. 
5.54. While Malta can provide an important 
naval and air base strategically located in the 
centre of the Mediterranean, there are plenty of 
other naval bases available to NATO forces. 
The interests of European security are therefore 
not opposed to Malta's own declared policy of 
neutrality and non-alignment. 
(j) Rest of the Maghreb 
5.55. Despite anxiety at times in the past about 
possible Soviet access to important naval bases 
in the western part of the North African coast, 
especially Bizerta in Tunisia and Mers-el-Kebir 
in Algeria, there has been no increased presence 
since the comrnittee last reported. The Soviet 
Union continues to use commercial repair facili-
ties for naval vessels in Bizerta and Annaba in 
Algeria. 
5.56. The political future of Tunisia is perhaps 
the most unpredictable at the present time with 
the danger of a pro-Libyan government assuming 
power when President Bourguiba, perhaps the 
last French-educated ruler, eventually leaves the 
scene. 
5.57. Algeria is seen as a more stable regime 
with a not unhelpful attitude to western interests, 
but its economy unfavourably affected by the fall 
in the price of natural gas. 
5.58. Morocco surprised western countries with 
the August 1984 declaration ofunion with Libya, 
but that appears in retrospect to have amounted 
to little more than an ending of Libyan support 
for the Polisaria guerrillas in the western Sahara 
in exchange for Moroccan non-intervention in 
Chad. Morocco appears to have stabilised the 
situation in the western Sahara by constructing a 
defensive ditch with electronic sensors. Moroc-
co's long-standing claim to the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla were renewed in 1985 when 
Spain announced the opening of negotiations 
with the United Kingdom about the future of 
Gibraltar. 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
6.1. The security of the Atlantic Alliance is 
based on the principle of political and strategic 
unity ofthe NATO area and the functional inter-
dependence of the whole military apparatus. 
Therefore, the NATO southern flank should not 
be considered" peripheral". In practice, in the 
event of the flanks being lost, the central region 
itself could no longer be defended. The need to 
pay greater attention to this part of the NATO 
area is justified by: 
- the danger for the alliance of possible 
encirclement, and local sources of 
conflict; 
- defence requirements; military equip-
ment of some of the countries in the 
area is still unsufficient in some cases; 
- the economic weakness of NATO part-
ners in the area; 
- the important contribution which the 
southern flank countries make to 
defence and detente. 
The key position of NATO's southern flank is 
determined by the strategic importance of the 
Mediterranean which is crossed by heavily used 
merchant shipping lanes, which in particular 
provide the main routes for supplying Europe 
with petroleum from North Africa and the Near 
East. The central power which exercised hege-
mony in the Mediterranean area in the past has 
now disappeared and has not been replaced by a 
politico-strategic balance of force on which 
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future security could be based. The distribution 
of power and the ratio c;>f forces in general 
remains unstable and changing. 
6.2. The Soviet Union also considers itself a 
Mediterranean power and conducts a policy 
aimed at neutralising western influences, espe-
cially that of the United States, and at increasing 
its own influence. It endeavours in this way to 
exploit for its own benefit the political heteroge-
neity, the lack of geo-strategic unity and the 
regional instabilities characteristic of this 
region. 
6.3. The stationing in the Mediterranean of the 
third squadron of the Sovit1t Black Sea fleet has 
weakened the domination of the United States 
Sixth fleet in the region. 'The mission of the 
Soviet squadron is both political and mili-
tary. In political terms it seeks: 
- to demonstrate the maritime presence 
of the Soviet Union as a power factor in 
this region and to provide a military 
guarantee for Sovit;~t policy; 
- to increase Soviet influence in the Arab 
states; 
- to present the Soviet Union as a poten-
tial protecting power; 
- to demonstrate that the Mediterranean 
should no longer be considered the 
exclusive domain of the West and that 
the Soviet Union should itself be regar-
ded as a legitimate Mediterranean 
power. 
In military terms it is designed: 
- to conduct peacetime surveillance of the 
activities of the United States Sixth 
fleet, to reduce its freedom of manoeu-
vre to prevent it from intervening in 
time of crisis and to increase the risk of 
actions against countries friendly to the 
Soviet Union; 
- in the event of a conflict to undertake a 
rapid offensive against units of the Sixth 
fleet. 
Admittedly the Mediterranean has not become a 
" red sea " - Moscow has achieved only a few of 
its aims in the Mediterranean area, especially as 
concerns access to support points and base 
rights. Nevertheless it has imposed itself in the 
region as an important influence. However, it 
must be remembered that the Soviet Union fleet 
in the Mediterranean encounters some difficul-
ties which limits its scope and the speed with 
which it could be reinforced (for example the res-
trictions concerning passage through the Turkish 
Straits resulting from the provisions of the Mon-
treux Convention, and the absence of proper 
bases on the Mediterranean shore). 
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6.4. On the whole the politico-military situa-
tion in the Mediterranean area is characterised 
by contradictory tendencies in the western and 
eastern parts where international European 
influences are at play, as well as in the Near East 
and North African area which create an unstable 
and disturbing situation. 
6.5. Apart from the area of interest to Europe 
in order to assess the regional situation in the 
Mediterranean area, account must also be taken 
of events in the Near and Middle East as well as 
in North Africa: 
- the still unforeseeable consequences of 
Egyptian policy which is tending to rap-
prochement with the Arab world; 
- the uncertain outcome of the war bet-
ween Iran and Iraq and the relations 
maintained by Iran with the big 
powers; 
- the Near East problem which remains 
unsolved and the tense situation still 
prevailing in the area; 
- the problem still pending of the western 
Sahara; 
- the radical policy conducted by Libya, 
based on revolutionary principles which 
constitute an unpredictable factor of 
unstability; 
- the economically oriented policy of neu-
trality conducted by Malta which in 
1981 permitted Soviet merchant vessels 
access to its protected petroleum stores 
and which in 1984 signed an agreement 
with Libya, the consequences of which 
are still not entirely foreseeable. 
6.6. The whole of the foregoing shows clearly 
that the Soviet Union poses more than a purely 
"conventional" threat to western security in the 
Mediterranean area and to the stability of the 
southern flank ofNATO. Thus, the very mixed 
southern region ofNATO, from a security stand-
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point, is subject at any moment to changes which 
are difficult to foresee. The political unity of 
the alliance, especially on the southern flank, is 
not assured from the standpoint of security. 
The gravity of this situation is not reduced by 
attempts to co-ordinate military plans for the 
southern flank. To this, on the periphery of the 
southern flank, is to be added the risk of conflicts 
with different possible causes and consequen-
ces. 
6.7. As far as East-West antagonisms are 
concerned, the southern flank offers the Warsaw 
Pact many more possibilities to test the political 
cohesion of the alliance and the danger always 
remains of a conflict in this important area for 
NATO. 
6.8. It is therefore in the western interest to 
strengthen, through carefully judged political, 
economic and military aid, the cohesion of the 
southern NATO countries, and to provide politi-
cal, economic and development aid with a view 
to stabilising the periphery of NATO's southern 
flank. 
6.9. The committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation, the sub-
stantive paragraphs of which relate to the present 
explanatory memorandum as follows: 
Draft 
Recommendation 
1(i) 
l(ii) 
1 (iii), (iv) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Explanatory 
Memorandum 
4.82-4.89. 
4.80. 
4.74-4.89. 
Chapters Ill and IV: 
paragraphs 4.5, 4.38, 
4.54. 
4.6-4.14. 
4.41-4.54. 
4.55-4.62. 
5.37-5.44. 
5.19-5.21. 
5. 9-5.21 ,5.28-5.31. 
5.39. 
2.1-2.10. 
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APPENDIX I 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
Wuhi11gt011 DC, 4th April 1949 
(Extracts) 
Article 5 
The parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self· 
defence recognised by Article 51 ofthe Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the party or par-
ties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
and in concert with the other parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such mea-
sures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and 
security. 
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Article 6 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed 
attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack: 
(i) on the territory of any of the parties in 
Europe i)t' North America, on the 
Algerian departments of France, on 
the territory of Turkey or on the 
islands under the jurisdiction of any of 
the parties in the North Atlantic area 
north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any 
of the parties, when in or over these 
territories or any other area in Europe 
in which occupation forces of any of 
the parties were stationed on the date 
when the treaty entered into force or 
the Mediterranean Sea or the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
Cancer. 
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Country National currency unit 
1981 
(0) (1) (- 5) 
Belgium ................... Million B. Frs. 125,689 
France (c) .................. Million F. Frs. 129,708 
Germany .................. Million DM 52,193 
Italy ...................... Milliard Lire 9,868 
Luxembourg ............... Million L. Frs. 1,715 
Netherlands ................ Million Guilders 11,296 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 12,144 
TOTAL WEU ........ 
Canada .................... Million C. $ 6,289 
Denmark .................. Million D. Kr. 10,301 
Greece .................... Million Drachmas 142,865 
Norway ................... Million N. Kr. 9,468 
Portugal ..... , ............. Million Escudos 51,917 
Turkey .................... Millions L. 313,067 
United States .............. Million US$ 169,888 
TOTAL NON-WEU .... 
TOTAL NATO (d),,,, 
Defence expenditure Defence expenditure 
(national currency, current prices) d (current prices -US$ million) a 
1982 1983 1984 l985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(-4) (- 3) (- 2) (- 1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
132,127 136,853 141,676 155,668 3,385 2,892 2,676 2,452 
148,021 165,029 176,638 186,242 23,867 22,523 21,654 20,212 
54,234 56,496 57,274 59,737 23,094 22,350 22,127 20,125 
12,294 14,400 16,433 18,059 8,681 9,090 9,481 9,353 
1,893 2,104 2,234 2,317 46 41 41 39 
11,921 12,149 12,765 12,885 4,527 4,464 4,257 3,978 
13,849 15,952 16,923 18,572 24,627 24,242 24,198 22,614 
88,228 85,602 84,434 78,773 
7,655 8,086 9,320 10,263 5,245 6,205 6,561 7,196 
11,669 12,574 13,045 13,750 1,446 1,400 1,375 1,260 
176,270 193,340 271,922 321,722 2,578 2,639 2,195 2,412 
10,956 12,395 12,688 15,431 1,650 1,698 1,699 1,555 
63,817 76,765 92,009 1ll,522 844 803 693 629 
447,790 556,738 803,044 1,198,125 2,815 2,755 2,469 2,190 
196,390 217,198 277,052 266,642 169,888 196,390 217,198 237,052 
184,466 211,889 232,190 252,293 
272,694 297,491 316,625 331,066 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
GDP in purchasers' values Population (thousand) (current prices- US$ million) a 
l985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985! 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) ( 11) (12) (13) (14) 
2,241 95,730 84,251 80,087 76,046 73,586 9,852 9,856 9,856 9,852 
19,233 572,371 542,746 516,317 489,428 472,025 54,182 54,480 54,729 54,947 
18,835 683,239 659,849 653,883 613,159 576,699 59,790 59,761 59,562 59,336 
9,048 353,254 347,862 354,884 348,385 336,357 56,502 56,639 56,825 56,983 
36 3,818 3,437 3,374 3,235 3,123 366 366 366 366 
3,595 141,412 138,139 132,595 123,059 115,138 14,247 14,310 14,362 14,420 
22,034 513,978 483,864 455,443 424,679 409,567 56,379 56,335 56,377 56,488 
75,222 2,363,802 2,260,149 2,196,584 2,077,991 1,986,494 251,318 251,747 252,077 252,392 
7,539 291,539 299,061 324,003 332,492 338,035 24,366 24,657 24,904 25,150 
1,210 57,247 56,003 56,321 54,635 53,343 5,122 5,119 5,114 5,111 
2,379 36,941 38,140 34,813 33,466 33,509 9,730 9,790 9,848 9,910 
1,690 57,091 56,277 55,064 54,736 52,772 4,100 4,116 4,130 4,141 
635 23,928 23,365 20,668 19,310 19,624 9,970 10,030 10,099 10,170 
2,422 57,666 53,032 51,147 49,858 55,144 45,757 46,780 47,804 48,720 
266,642 2,934,911 3,045,279 3,275,728 3,634,522 3,870,830 230,043 232,345 234,538 236,681 
282,518 3,459,322 3,571,157 3,817, 743 4,179,079 4,423,257 329,088 332,837 336,437 339,883 
357,740 5,823,124 5,831,306 6,014,327 6,257,070 6,409,751 580,406 584,584 588,514 592,275 
Defence expendtture as % of 
GDP in purchasers' values 
1985! 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985f 
(15) (16) (17) ( 18) ( 19) (20) 
9,852 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 
55,222 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 
59,217 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 
57,154 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
366 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
14,492 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 
56,544 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.4 
252,847 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
25,427 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 
5,104 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 
9,989 7.0 6.9 6.3 7.2 7.1 
4,153 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.2 
10,231 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 
49,792 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.4 
239,048 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.9 
343,744 5.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.4 
596,591 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.6 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (I) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in 
exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as% ofGDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Units per US$ 
Country National currency unit 1981 1982 1983 
(0) (I) (I) (2) (3) 
Belgium Million B. Frs. 37.12900 45.69100 51.13200 
France Million F. Frs. 5.43460 6.57210 7.62130 
Germany Million DM 2.26000 2.42660 2.55330 
Italy Milliard Lire 1.13680 1.35250 1.51880 
Luxembourg Million L. Frs. 37.12900 45.69100 51.13200 
Netherlands Million Guilders 2.49520 2.67020 2.85410 
United Kingdom Million Pound Sterling 0.49312 0.57127 0.65920 
Canada Million C.$ 1.19890 1.23370 1.23240 
Denmark Million D. Kr. 7.12340 8.33240 9.14500 
Greece Million Drachmas 55.40800 66.80300 88.06400 
Norway Million N. Kr. 5.73950 6.45400 7.29640 
Portugal Million Escudos 61.54600 79.47300 110.78000 
Turkey Million Turkish Lira 111.22000 162.55000 225.46000 
United States Million US$ 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
Note b: 6 months' average. 
Note c : France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures 
are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e - Preliminary estimate. 
f - Forecast. 
• - WEU Office of the Clerk estimates. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25. 
1984 1985 b 
(4) (5) 
57.78400 63.76700 
8.73910 9.68360 
2.84590 3.17150 
1.75700 1.99590 
57.78400 63.76700 
3.20870 3.58440 
0.74833 0.84289 
1.29510 1.36130 
10.35660 11.36200 
112.72000 135.23000 
8.16150 9.13020 
146.39000 175.62000 
366.68000 494.64000 
1.00000 1.00000 
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Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as% of total WEU (current prices- US$) a 
1981 1982 1983 1984 l985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 l985f 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
344 293 272 249 248 3.84 3.38 3.17 3.11 3.25 
440 413 396 368 348 27.05 26.31 25.65 25.66 25.57 
386 374 371 339 318 26.18 26.11 26.21 25.55 25.04 
154 160 167 164 158 9.84 10.62 I 1.23 11.87 12.03 
126 113 112 106 99 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
318 312 296 276 248 5.13 5.22 5.04 5.05 4.78 
437 430 429 400 390 27.91 28.32 28.66 28.71 29.29 
351 340 335 312 298 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
215 252 263 286 297 5.95 7.25 7.77 9.14 10.02 
282 274 269 246 237 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.60 1.61 
265 270 223 243 238 2.92 3.08 2.60 3.06 3.16 
402 412 411 375 407 1.87 1.98 2.01 1.97 2.25 
85 80 69 62 62 0.96 0.94 0.82 0.80 0.84 
62 59 52 45 49 3.19 3.22 2.92 2.78 3.22 
739 845 926 1,002 1,115 192.56 229.42 257.24 300.93 354.47 
561 637 690 742 822 209.08 247.53 275.00 320.28 375.58 
470 509 538 559 600 309.08 347.53 375.00 420.28 475.58 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT- 1985 
Period of compulsory 1 Total in armed forces 2 ~tal armed forces 2 ( 'Jitary and civilian) 
military service military personnel I as percentage (months) (thousands) 
o active population 
Army Navy Air force (e) (e) 
Belgium 10 3 10 3 10 3 108 I 2.7 ! 
France 12 12 12 563 2.9 
Germany 15 4 15 ~ 15 4 495 2.4 
Italy 12 18 12 531 2.5 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 0.9 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 103 2.1 
United Kingdom voluntary 335 2.0 
TOTAL WEU 2,136 2.5 
Canada voluntary 83 1.0 
Denmark 95 95 95 29 1.4 
Greece 22 26 24 206 6.2 
Norway 12 15 15 41 2.5 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 101 2.6 
Turkey 18 18 18 825 4.6 
United States voluntary 2,289 2.9 
TOTALNON-WEU 3,574 
I 
3.1 
TOTAL NATO 5,710 j 2.8 
Sources: 
I. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. To be eighteen months from 1989. 
5. To be twelve months in combat arms. 
e - estimate. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
United States military assistance 
Department of Defence proposals FY 1986 
APPENDIX Ill 
·-"'-~ forgwen Cred1ts 
~~ eonc.u.on.J CreditS 
11 Tr ... ury Rate Credtta 
. ... 
Source: United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1986, 4th February 1985. 
312 
I I I I 
-
APPENDIX IV 
NATO military command structure- Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area 
North Atlantic Council (Bruuelo) and Defence Planning Committee 
I 
Mthtary Committee and International Military Stall (Bl'UIIela) 
I 
I I I I Supreme Allied Commaader Atlantic,~ 
SACLANT (Norfolk, Virgmia) 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
SACEUR (Caoteau, Belgium) I 
I I 
I 
I 
I rommander Iberian I Commande1· Allied Naval Atlantic Area, COMIBERLANT Forcea Southern Europe, (Oeirao, Port11j!3l) COMNAVSOUTH 
I 
(Napleo) 
I bland Commander I Madeira Co';=:r ,!.jval 
Supr.'rt Foroeo 
Sout(lem Europe 
Naplea) 
I 
I Gibraltar I Mediterranean Area, Weatem Mediterranean GIBMED (Gibraltar) Area, MEDOC (formerly Toulon, now 
exercioed by 
NAVSOUTH directly) 
Key: 
---
chain of command 
-------
new commands proposed in Rogers 
plan 
----- eo-located headquarters 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forcee I Southern Europe, CINC~OUTH (Napleo, Italy) 
I I I ------------~------------r-------~l ______ , 
Commander l..aud Commander .Ail' I•,orceiJ Comm&Dder Land 
I 
I Com mander Land I 
South-Central I 
Europe 1 
DSOUTHCENT: 
FoJ'CE'a Southern ~o~iRs~'U'm Forcee South-Eaotem I Forcea Europe (Verona) COMLA~D~~THEAST !coMLAN COMLANDSOUTH (Napleo) 
(bmir) I (I i ]-I ; I 
___ j -~~~-~~~-I l 1 Commander IIth ATAF Commander 6th A'PAF 
(\'ioenza) (Izmir) L----~~2 ____ J 
Ariua) 1 
________ ...J 
I I I 
North Eaotem Maritime Air Central Mediterranean Mediterranean Area, Mediterranean, Area, MEDCENT (Napleo) MEDNOREAST MARAIRMED (Ankara) (Napleo) 
l Eaotem Mediterranean I I Submarine& I .,rea, MEDEAST South Eaotem Mediterranean (A then&) Mediterranean Area, SUBMED (Naplea) MEDSOUEAST 
(formerly Jl&lta, noli· 
exercieed 
by NAVSOUTH dinctly) 
...... 
< 
-0 
0'\ 
0 
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APPENDIX V 
United Nations force in Cyprus 
Background information 
Finances 
UNFICYP is the only current United 
Nations peace-keeping operation financed solely 
by voluntary contributions. Funding comes 
from two sources: 
- about one-third of the costs are met by a 
special fund, the UNFICYP special 
account, to which 71 countries have 
contributed since 1964; 
- approximately two-thirds of the costs 
are absorbed voluntarily by troop-
contributing countries. 
In order to provide contingents for 
UNFICYP, the troop-contributing governments 
divert from national duty troops and other 
resources at an ongoing cost to them estimated 
by them at present at $36.2 million for each six-
month period. This figure includes (a) the 
troops' regular pay and allowances and normal 
materiel expenses for which, under existing 
arrangements, the United Nations is not 
required by the troop-contributors to reimburse 
them: these therefore constitute costs of main-
taining the force which are being financed direct-
ly by the troop-contributing governments; and 
(b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they 
incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under 
existing arrangements, the troop-contributors 
would be entitled to claim reimbursement from 
the United Nations, but which they have to 
finance at their own expense as a further contri-
bution to the United Nations operation in 
Cyprus. 
Including the above two elements of costs, 
the actual cost of financing the United Nations 
operation in Cyprus for the six-month period 
ending 15th December 1984 totals approximate-
ly $50.4 million, estimated as follows: 
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and 
allowances and normal 
materiel costs 
(b) Certain extra and extraordi-
nary costs of the troop-
contributing governments 
that are financed directly by 
US$ 
(in 
millions) 
them...................... 36.2 
314 
2. Direct costs to the United 
Nations which the 
organisation is required to 
meet (including the extra and 
extraordinary costs of govern-
ments providing contingents 
for which they seek to be 
reimbursed), financed 
through voluntary contribu-
tions ..................... . 
Total costs ............. . 
14.2 
50.4 
Voluntary contributions from govern-
ments are required to finance the second of these 
cost elements through the medium of the special 
account. 
The special account 
The special account was established to 
"finance direct costs to the United Nations 
which the organisation is required to meet 
(including the extra and extraordinary costs of 
governments providing contingents for which 
they seek reimbursement)". In the six-month 
mandate to 15th December 1984 these costs were 
$14.2 million. 
In the period since the inception of 
UNFICYP on 27th March 1964 to 15th Decem-
ber 1984, costs under this item have been 
US$470.5 million. However, to the latter date, 
voluntary contributions to the special account 
have only totalled US$342.8 million. In 
December 1984, therefore, the account was in a 
deficit by $127.7 million, a sum which has tem-
porarily been absorbed by troop-contributing 
countries until sufficient funding becomes avail-
able through the special account. The Secre-
tary-General regularly draws the attention of 
United Nations member nations to the deficit, 
which is currently growing by about $5 to 6 mil-
lion for each six-month mandate. The Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus is contributing 
the equivalent of more than US$1 million a year 
in finances and services. 
Costs absorbed by contingent-contributing 
countries 
Since 1964 troop-contributing countries 
have voluntarily absorbed about two-thirds of 
the costs of UNFICYP. These costs consist of 
"regular troops' pay, allowances, normal 
APPENDIX V 
materiel costs, plus certain extra and extraordi-
nary costs of the troop-contributing governments 
that are financed directly by them". In the six-
month mandate to December 1984, these costs 
were $36.2 million, made up as follows: 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Denmark 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
US$ 
(in 
millions) 
0.5 
1.9 
10.7 
0.6 
3.5 
19.0 
By extrapolation it is estimated that the 
sum absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing 
nations since 1964 is in the order of US$870 
million. In addition, as described earlier, these 
nations are also temporarily shouldering the spe-
cial account deficit which stood at US$127.7 mil-
lion in December 1984. Due to this deficit, the 
latest payment in respect of claims by troop-
contributing nations (which in some cases repre-
sent only a fraction of the actual costs incurred 
by them in maintaining their contingents) was 
made in January 1984 and met those claims only 
up to December 1977. 
Taking into consideration both the special 
account and the voluntarily absorbed amounts, 
UNFICYP has cost about US$1,400 million up 
to the end of 1984. At the present time, 
UNFICYP costs about US$100 million annu-
ally. 
Voluntary contributions 
To 15th December 1984, the voluntary 
contributors to the UNFICYP special account 
have been: 
Principal contributors 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Italy 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Japan 
Belgium 
Austria 
Cyprus 
Australia 
Netherlands 
%of total 
46.8 
21.4 
7.1 
6.1 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
1.9 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
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Turkey 
Finland 
Others (see below) 
Other contributors 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Botswana 
Democratic Cambodia 
Ghana 
Guyana 
Iceland 
India 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kuwait 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Luxembourg 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Korea 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
United Republic of Cameroon 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
0.6 
0.3 
0.7 
100.00 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
2nd June 1986 
1. In paragraph (v) ofthe preamble to the draft recommendation, after" Libyan" add" and Syrian". 
2. After paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Condemning Libya's attack on the island of Lampedusa, which constitutes a real act of war 
against a WEU country, and complaining that there was not recourse to the procedure provided 
for in Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty; " 
3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict" and insert "conflicts linked with the Palestinian problem". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
I. See 6th sitting, 4th June 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1985 
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PART ONE 
I. Activities of the Council 
1. During 1985, the Council met at minis-
terial level on 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Genscher, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and on 14th November in Rome under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
It held twenty-one meetings at permanent 
representative level in London. 
The Council was assisted in its work by 
the working group made up of assistants to the 
permanent representatives, which met thirty 
times, by special working groups (thirteen meet-
ings) composed of members of the embassies in 
London and experts from capitals - to prepare 
for the ministerial meetings of the Council - and 
by the Secretariat-General. 
2. A key feature of 1985 has been the efforts 
made to reactivate WEU, a process announced 
in the Rome declaration (26th and 27th October 
1984). On 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn, where 
the fourteen Foreign and Defence Ministers were 
meeting together for the first time in ordinary 
session, and on 14th November in Rome, where 
they met for the first time in informal session, 
the new structures of the organisation were put 
in place and decisions taken to enable WEU to 
fulfil the mission assigned to it by the Rome 
declaration. 
3. During its meetings, the Council examined 
a number of political and defence questions rela-
ting to European security and the European pos-
ture to be adopted towards the various initiatives 
and negotiations in the field of defence and secu-
rity. 
4. It also ensured that the commitments 
entered into by the member states ofWEU under 
the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and its 
protocols were observed. 
5. The Council has noted with interest the 
reports drawn up by the Assembly committees 
and has closely followed the Assembly's discus-
sions during both parts of its thirty-first ordinary 
session. 
Several members of the Council and the 
Secretary-General took part in the colloquy orga-
nised by the Assembly in Munich in September 
1985 on the theme the space challenge for 
Europe. 
contacts, in addition to the regular communica-
tion between the two bodies, were made during 
the sessions and informal meetings. 
* 
* * 
Mr. Edouard Longerstaey, Secretary-
General of WEU since 1977, retired on 31st 
May. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of 
Ministers appointed Mr. Alfred Cahen as his suc-
cessor. 
A. Political and defence questions 
concerning European security 
The following exposition relates to the 
deliberations of the Council, meeting at both per-
manent representative and mil)isteriallevel, and 
to the positions adopted by the Council in its 
replies to Assembly recommendations. 
I. East-West relatwns 
On the questions of East-West relations, 
the Ministers, meeting in Bonn, welcomed the 
resumption of the United Stat~s-Soviet negotia-
tions in Geneva - an important event for the 
security of the Atlantic Alliance in general and 
for that of Europe in particular. They reaffir-
med their firm support for, ancf their confidence 
in, their American ally in its efforts to achieve a 
more stable strategic relationship at the lowest 
possible balanced level of forces and called on 
the Soviet Union to display a positive attitude. 
The Ministers expressed the hope that the 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union would make possible radical 
reductions in their strategic and medium-range 
nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at 
ending the arms race on earth and preventing an 
arms race in space. They underlined in this 
regard the importance they attached to respect 
for existing treaty obligations. 
The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' 
determination to continue to work for better 
East-West relations on a realistic and long-term 
basis and for the full realisat~on of the CSCE 
commitments established at Helsinki and 
Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral 
negotiations in the field of confidence-building 
measures and conventional disarmament and 
The Council has, on several occasions, underscored the significance <i>f these negotia-
turned its attention to the question of its rela- tions for Europe. The Ministers reaffirmed 
tions with the Assembly, stressing both their their determination to continue contributing 
importance and their value. A number of towards progress in the negotiations for a com-
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prehensive and verifiable ban on chemical wea-
pons being conducted at the Geneva Conference 
on Disarmament. 
(a) Multilateral negotiations 
Negotiations on arms control and disar-
mament were discussed by the Ministers and the 
members of the Permanent Council. 
On this subject, the Council, replying to 
Recommendations 411 and 417, fully endorsed 
the emphasis placed by the Assembly on the 
need for the proper verification of arms control 
agreements in order to ensure compliance, the 
Council taking the view that verification was the 
most sensitive aspect of a global ban on chemical 
weapons. 
With regard to the MBFR negotiations, 
the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 
415, said that those WEU member governments 
and their Atlantic Alliance allies participating in 
the MBFR negotiations agreed that the basic pro-
visions of an adequate verification regime for an 
MBFR agreement should include on-site inspec-
tion, permanent exit/entry points, detailed 
exchanges of information on force levels and 
non-interference with national technical means. 
With reference to the Geneva Conference 
on Disarmament, the Council, in its reply to 
Recommendation 415, said that it favoured the 
achievement of either multilateral or bilateral 
constraints on the military use of outer space and 
believed that, in any agreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union aimed at 
preventing an arms race in space, the existence of 
and adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty constitu-
ted an important element. 
In its reply to Recommendation 417, the 
Council, having recalled the importance which 
the member states attached to the full implemen-
tation by all the participating states in the confe-
rence on security and co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) of all the principles and provisions laid 
down in the final act, deplored the delays and 
breaches on the part of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries in fulfilling the solemn intentions and com-
mitments expressed in Helsinki in 1975. 
As to the conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarmament in 
Europe (CDE), the Council pointed out in its 
reply to Recommendation 417 that the measures 
drawn up by the member countries of WEU in 
co-operation with their allies in the Atlantic 
Alliance contained specific commitments rela-
ting in particular to the exchange of military 
information, the prior notification of military 
manoeuvres, the invitation to send observers 
and verification measures. The aim of western 
participants was to achieve greater mutual trans-
parency as a means of building confidence bet-
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ween the countries of East and West. The 
Council was very much in favour of this aim as 
stated in its reply to Recommendation 421. 
(b) Bilateral negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union 
With regard to START and INF, the 
Council hoped that all the constructive and 
mutually acceptable proposals would be taken 
into account in the negotiations; it therefore 
shared the view expressed by the Assembly in 
Recommendation 415. The Council thought, 
however, that a moratorium on the deployment 
of long- and short-range INF weapons would 
alter the context of the negotiations and would 
perpetuate the Soviet Union's superiority. 
In his address to the Assembly on 22nd 
May, Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-i~-0ffice of 
the Council, welcomed the resumpt10n of the 
United States/Soviet talks in Geneva and recal-
led the WEU member countries' support for the 
American efforts to achieve a more stable strate-
gic relationship at the lowest possible balanced 
level of forces. The Council of Ministers 
expressed the hope that the Geneva negotiations 
would lead to radical reductions of United States 
and Soviet intercontinental strategic and inter-
mediate-range nuclear armaments and that 
agreements would be reached, aimed at ending 
the arms race on earth and preventing another in 
space. 
On several occasions, the Council discus-
sed the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev on 
nuclear disarmament prior to his meeting with 
Mr. Reagan in Geneva. Mr. Andreotti, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, briefed the Assem-
bly on 4th December about these discussions and 
welcomed the fact that the two leaders had 
agreed during their meeting to give a positive 
and constructive orientation to all the various 
disarmament negotiations. 
On this specific matter, it had already been 
pointed out in the reply to Recommendation 411 
that the negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union aimed at achieving a 
balance at the lowest possible level of forces had 
been advocated by the alliance and had stressed 
that western deployment could be reversed, hal-
ted or modified if the talks succeeded. This was 
why the allies had regretted the breaking-off of 
talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and 
why the WEU Council welcomed the opening of 
a new round of talks between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 
1985. 
The question of the Geneva negotiations 
was also raised in the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 417 which underscored the special 
attention paid by the Seven to an examination of 
this question. 
(c) Relations between Western Europe and the 
countries of Eastern Europe 
In his address to the Assembly on 22nd 
May, Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office ~f 
the Council, said that the Ministers had, at their 
meeting in Bonn, agreed that the East-West rela-
tionship must not be confined to matters of 
defence and arms control. Only a broad-based 
policy could bring about impr~ved. East~\Yest 
relations. It included co-operatiOn m political, 
economic cultural and humanitarian issues. 
He said that the final communique made parti-
cular mention of the undertakings entered into in 
Helsinki and Madrid in the framework of the 
CSCE. 
The replies to Recommendations 411 and 
417 also allude to this willingness to seek a 
genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern 
Europe, the member countries of WEU acting 
bilaterally and in the appropriate fora to prom~te 
the development of trade between the countnes 
of the East and of the West and also to promote 
co-operation in the field of environmental. pro-
tection. Furthermore, the member countnes of 
WEU had always demonstrated their concern 
to develop trade with the countries of the East in 
a way which did not jeopardise their own secu-
rity. 
2. WEU, the Atlantic Alliance 
and the European security dimension 
In the communique published at the end . 
of their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers ~eaffi~­
med their determination to strengthen theu soli-
darity and that which linked them with their 
allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which remained 
the only body for implementing common 
defence and the expression of the fundamental 
bond between the security of Europe and that of 
North America. 
During its meetings and in its replies to 
recommendations, the Council has ~requently 
affirmed its commitment to the cohesiOn of the 
alliance and its desire to see WEU provide politi-
cal impetus to bodies such as the IEPG and the 
CNAD. 
(a) Cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance 
During their discussions on matters rela-
ting to NATO, the Ministers of the WEU. mem-
ber countries frequently referred to the Impor-
tance and necessity of real cohesion and 
complete mutual trust between members of the 
alliance. 
Addressing the Assembly at its December 
session Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Co~ncil welcomed the contribution made to 
the success 'or the Geneva talks by the input of 
ideas and the common attitude of the NATO 
countries, in particular the WEU member coun-
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tries adding that it was perhaps the first time sine~ the fifties that a President of the United 
States had met his Soviet opposite number 
backed by such a high measure of . cohesi~n 
within the Atlantic Alliance. The Chairman-m-
Office also remarked that the need to preserve 
the alliance's political and strategic cohesion had 
constantly to be borne in mind~ European sec~­
rity must not be separated from that of the Um-
ted States and research on defensive systems 
must take account of all aspects of the threat at 
all levels both nuclear and conventional, so as to 
prevent 'the creation of zones with different 
levels of security within the NATO area. In 
other words, the security of the alliance must 
remain indivisible. 
At the same session, the Secretary-
General, Mr. Cahen, stressed the need for close 
contacts and most effective co-ordinated rela-
tions between the two organisations. 
(b) WEU and the European security dimen-
sion 
The role of WEU and the European 
dimension of security have been on the agenda 
of several meetings ofthe Permanent Council; in 
a note addressed to the latter, the Secretary-
General, Mr. Cahen, observed that ~he member 
countries of the European Commumty had suc-
ceeded in developing an economic dimension 
and, in the framework of politidal co-operation, a 
foreign policy dimension, but had not so far l?ro-
vided a true security dimension. It was agamst 
this background that the reactivated WEU 
appeared as one of th~ eleme~lts in the work of 
constructing Europe, m particular to promo~e 
closer co-operation in the security field. In this 
context, too, the Council has taken. account of 
the proceedings of the Luxembourg Intergovern-
mental conference on the reform of the Treaty of 
Rome. 
(c) The political impetus to be given by WEU 
Replying to Recommendations 416. ~nd 
423, the Council drew attentiob to the pohti~al 
impetus which WEU was call~d upon to pr~vi~e 
by supporting all co-operative efforts Withm 
Europe including those of the CNAD and IEPG 
and h~ped that the WEU contri~ution. to ~he 
work of the latter body would be mtensified . 
(d) European co-operation in the field of tech-
nology and armaments 
As stated in the Bonn communique, the 
Ministers held a detailed exchange of views on 
questions relating to armaments co-operat~on 
and research and agreed that closer co-operation 
and the harmonisation of their. efforts were fun-
I. See 2( d) (ii). 
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damental in maintaining in the longer term a 
competitive and advanced defence industrial 
base in Europe and in achieving a more cost-
effective defence. The Ministers instructed the 
Permanent Council to present proposals to help 
provide the necessary political impetus for, and 
practical contributions to, the various efforts 
undertaken in this field, including those carried 
out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD. 
Noting the increasing importance of tech-
nology, the Ministers also affirmed the member 
states' determination to take the necessary mea-
sures within the European Communities to 
strengthen Europe's own technological capacity 
and thus achieve the creation of a technological 
community. 
(i) On 22nd May, Mr. Genscher, then Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, briefed the Assem-
bly on the Ministers' discussions concerning the 
French proposal for close co-operation in the 
field of high technology, pointing out that the 
seven governments recognised the need for 
Europe to strengthen its own technological capa-
bilities with a view to creating a technological 
community. 
In its reply to Recommendation 419, the 
Council welcomed the European efforts which 
had already been made at various levels in the 
field of information technology, specifically 
mentioning Eureka and the Esprit programme. 
(ii) Whereas European co-operation in the 
field of civilian technology could be dealt with by 
the European Community, it was the task of the 
IEPG and WEU, whose role it was to provide 
political impetus to the IEPG, to address arma-
ments co-operation. 
At their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers 
took the view that the harmonisation of national 
and sectoral interests within a common political 
framework could facilitate co-operation in the 
various armaments fields. They set up an 
agency for the development of co-operation in 
the field of armaments (Agency Ill) to contribute 
actively to the development of European arma-
ments co-operation. 
The replies to Recommendations 416 and 
423 reflect the importance which the Council 
attached, within the framework of WEU's com-
petence, to promoting European armaments 
co-operation. 
(iii) The Council, in its replies to Recommen-
dations 414 and 416, recognised the importance 
of co-operation between the United States and 
Europe in the field of advanced technologies, 
emphasising in particular that one of the main 
purposes of the discussions within the IEPG was 
to work towards the establishment of a balanced 
two-way street in arms procurement between the 
United States and Europe. 
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3. Space and related activities 
(a) WEU and the strategic defence initia-
tive 
At their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers 
agreed to continue their collective consideration 
concerning the specific question of the United 
States invitation to participate in the research 
programme on the strategic defence initiative, in 
order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated 
reaction of their governments, and instructed the 
Permanent Council accordingly. 
The latter then charged a special working 
group consisting of assistants to the permanent 
representatives and experts from the capitals to 
consider the strategic and technological aspects 
involved in the United States invitation. 
In execution of its mandate, the group 
drew up an interim report which was approved 
by the Ministers at their Council meeting on 
14th November in Rome. The main points of 
this report were the following: 
1. Need to contribute to the cohesion of the 
Atlantic Alliance, whose role was fundamental in 
the discussion of this subject, as recalled by the 
Ministers of the member states in their Bonn 
communique. 
2. Consequently, any conclusions concerning 
participation in research that may be reached, or 
decisions made on a national basis, should not 
prejudge the positions of the member states on 
the political and strategic implications arising 
from the SDI programme and its future evolu-
tion. 
3. In this regard, a conclusive analysis of the 
political and strategic implications of the pro-
gramme would be premature at this stage. 
4. However, the need was recognised to bear 
in mind and take account of a number of wider 
considerations such as: 
(i) deterrence and stability must not be 
undermined but enhanced; 
(ii) nuclear deterrence remains the only 
way for effectively preventing war; 
(iii) the strategic unity ofthe alliance must 
be preserved by avoiding any decoup-
ling between the defence of the Uni-
ted States and that of their European 
allies; 
(iv) in the light of the implications that 
SOl-related developments may have 
for the strategy of deterrence, Euro-
pean security and EastjWest relations, 
the consultative process within the 
alliance must be effectively used to 
preserve the cohesion of the allies; 
(v) the priority goal of the Geneva nego-
tiations remains, for the countries of 
WEU, the achievement of significant 
and balanced reductions of the offen-
sive forces of the two parties; 
(vi) research into defensive systems must 
be carried out by both parties in strict 
compliance with the ABM treaty. 
5. Need for Europe to mobilise its resources 
in the field of advanced technology. Hence the 
member countries are aware that the decisions 
taken in an attempt to work out ways of co-ordi-
nating a response to the United States invitation 
would not be incompatible with the decisions 
concerning the Eureka project taken by the Euro-
pean Council in Milan on 28th and 29th June 
1985. 
6. Possible participation in SDI research 
should be seen against the background of the 
broader issue of transatlantic technological co-
operation, and perhaps could provide the oppor-
tunity for expanding that co-operation. It 
should also be seen within the context of the 
technological challenge facing Europe which calls 
for a response at national, European and transat-
lantic levels. 
7. This being said, the objectives relevant to 
participation should include: 
(i) to ensure European companies wish-
ing to participate in SDI projects 
have comparable rights and condi-
tions of involvement as United Sta-
tes companies, taking into account 
the limits of existing international 
agreements; 
(ii) to determine the arrangements 
necessary to safeguard the rights of 
European industries regarding the 
results obtained from SDI research 
·projects in which they have partici-
pated; 
(iii) to ensure adequate protection of 
research data; 
(iv) to ensure participant countries have 
sufficient access to the SDI pro-
gramme so as to be able to judge the 
whole range of projects; 
(v) to consider whether SDI research 
projects can be undertaken in the 
framework of existing alliance co-
operation procedures; 
(vi) to assess whether there exist within 
the SDI programme identifiable sec-
tors of special interest to European 
countries; 
(vii) to ensure European participation in 
research projects opens up a genuine 
exchange of technology; 
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(viii) to avoid the risk of a European 
brain-drain to the United States. 
* 
* * 
The activities of the special working group 
have already been described in the Council 
replies to Recommendations 417, 419, 420 and 
421. 
As regards the observation by both the 
Americans and the Soviets of their obligations 
under existing treaties, WEU governments noted 
with satisfaction the United States Govern-
ment's commitment to keep any further defence 
research within the limits of al restrictive inter-
pretation of the ABM treaty. 
The Council also drew attention to this 
aspect in its reply to Recmrtmendation 413, 
noting that the strategic defence initiative was no 
more than a scientific research programme and 
did not therefore contravene the provisions of 
the ABM treaty; on the other hand, relevant tests 
or deployments would, under the terms of the 
ABM treaty, have to be a matter for negotia-
tion. 
In his address to the ~ssembly on 4th 
December, Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, having stressed the importance of 
co-ordination within WEU, made a point of 
summarising the many areas of convergence bet-
ween the positions of the variou~ governments as 
expressed in the interim report of the special 
working group and also, in his view, between 
these positions and the American position. 
* 
* * 
At its meeting in Rome on 14th November 
the Council of Ministers instructed the Perma-
nent Council to continue its consideration of 
SDI in the light notably of the results of the 
Geneva summit, and by making use of the work 
of its special working group. 
(b) European space programme 
The Council, like the Assembly, has shown 
a keen interest in this question, as shown by its 
replies to Recommendations 413 and 414. The 
countries of WEU have in fact played an impor-
tant role in the ESA decision to respond positi-
vely to the United States offer to participate in 
the space station project. 
It is noteworthy in this connection that the 
colloquy organised in Munich from 18th to 20th 
September 1985 by the Assembly's Committee 
on Scientific, Technological • and Aerospace 
Questions on the theme the space challenge for 
Europe was attended by the German State Secre-
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tary for Defence, Mr. Timmermann, and by the 
United Kingdom, French and Italian Ministers 
for Industry or Research. 
4. WEU and public awareness 
In their Bonn communique, the Ministers 
recalled the contribution that WEU can make in 
particular to achieve a wider consensus among 
public opinion on the efforts made by the Euro-
pean countries in the field of defence. 
On several occasions, and notably in its 
reply to Recommendation 411, the Council also 
stressed the need to ensure that European opi-
nion was informed as completely as possible 
about the threats to our continent and about the 
security and defence policy adopted by the mem-
ber countries and the Atlantic Alliance to coun-
ter these threats. 
Following its meeting in Bonn, the Coun-
cil remitted to the members of the Committee 
for Relations with the Council, the report entit-
led "WEU and public awareness "2, which had 
been drawn up in pursuance of the mandate 
given to the permanent representatives by the 
Ministers at their meeting in Rome on 26th and 
27th October 1984. 
5. Regional problems 
(a) Regional conflicts 
These questions were considered primarily 
in the Council replies to Assembly recommenda-
tions relating to a specific region, notably 
Recommendations 412, 418 and 422 on the Gulf 
war, Cyprus and European security and Lebanon 
respectively. 
In each case, the Council shared the 
Assembly's concerns and drew attention to the 
initiatives taken within the appropriate interna-
tional fora. 
(b) Disaster in Mexico 
Sharing the feelings expressed by the 
Assembly in Recommendation 424, the Council 
recalled the WEU member countries' participa-
tion in international solidarity through the 
sending-out of equipment, medical and first-aid 
teams and financial help. 
* 
* * 
B. Dialogue between the Council 
and the Assembly in 1985 
The WEU Council frequently gave consi-
deration to the problem of its relations with the 
Assembly. 
2. See Annex. 
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It emerged from these reflections that the 
interaction between governments and parliamen-
tary institutions within WEU was important for 
the organisation to focus on a European dimen-
sion of security. 
The importance that the member states 
attach to strengthening their dialogue with the 
Assembly was displayed notably by the presence 
of many members of the governments at the two 
parts of the Assembly's session. 
* 
* * 
The main feature of 1985 was an experi-
mental new procedure for replying to recommen-
dations which proved very satisfactory and 
meant that the Assembly received replies much 
sooner than in the past. 
1. The following documents were transmit-
ted to the Assembly: 
(i) the thirtieth annual report of the 
Council on its activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1984, 
communicated in implementation of 
Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty; 
(ii) the Council's replies to Recommen-
dations 411 to 424 which the Assem-
bly adopted during the second part of 
its thirtieth ordinary session and the 
first part of its thirty-first ordinary 
session; 
(iii) the Council replies to Written Ques-
tions 249 to 261, put by members of 
the Assembly; 
(iv) the document on WEU and public 
awareness2; 
(v) the document on the reorganisation of 
the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments, the international secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee2. 
These last two documents above were 
adopted by the Council of Ministers on 23rd 
April in Bonn and remitted to the Committee for 
Relations with the Council that day. 
2. There were several contacts between the 
Council and the Assembly organs: 
(i) on 23rd April in Bonn when Mr. Gen-
scher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
presented the conclusions of the 
ministerial meeting to the Committee 
for Relations with the Council; 
2. See Annex. 
(ii) on 5th November in London when 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General, gave a 
speech on the new public relations 
activities of the Council to the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations; 
(iii) on 14th November in Rome when 
Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, presented the 
conclusions of the ministerial meeting 
to the Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly; 
(iv) on 4th December in Paris at a meeting 
(followed by a luncheon) between the 
Permanent Council, under the chair-
manship of Mr. Andreotti, Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the 
Presidential Committee of the Assem-
bly. 
3. On 11th September, Mr. Andreotti, Italian 
.Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, had talks in Rome with 
Mr. Caro and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, President and 
Vice-President respectively of the Assembly. 
4. Finally, the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council and other Ministers addressed the 
Assembly during its sessions. 
(i) During the first part of the thirty-first ordi-
nary session of the Assembly in Paris (20th-23rd 
May 1985): 
- on 22nd May, Mr. Genscher presented 
the thirtieth annual report of the Coun-
cil to the Assembly in his capacity as 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council and 
also spoke as the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; 
- on 21st May, Baroness Young addres-
sed the Assembly as the United King-
dom Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs. 
(ii) During the second part of the thirty-first 
ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris (2nd-
5th December 1985) the following Ministers took 
the floor: 
- on 4th December, Mr. Andreotti, Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council; 
- on 3rd December, Baroness Young, 
United Kingdom Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; 
- on 4th December, Mr. Dumas, the 
French Minister for External Rela-
tions; 
- on 5th December, Mr. Spadolini, Italian 
Minister of Defence. 
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5. Mr. Cahen also addressed the Assembly 
on the occasion of the second part of the thirty-
first ordinary session in Paris on 2nd Decem-
ber. 
II. Implementation of Protocol No. 11 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 
on forces of Western European Union 
A. Level of forces of member states 
During the year under review, the Council 
has carried out its customary tasks in implemen-
tation of Protocol No. 11 on forces and arma-
ments control. 
1. Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Article Ill of the Protocol provides for a 
special procedure, if necessary, to enable these 
levels to be increased above the limits specified 
in Articles I and 11. 
So that it may satisfy itself that the limits 
laid down in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 
are not exceeded, the Council receives informa-
tion every year concerning the levels in question, 
in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. 
This information is obtained in the course of 
inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the 
Council by a high-ranking officer designated by 
him to that end. The information, as at the end 
of 1984, was conveyed at the ~ppropriate time. 
The same procedure is under way for 
1985. 
Furthermore, the Council takes the neces-
sary steps to implement the procedure laid down 
in its resolution of 15th September 1956, where-
by the levels of forces under NATO command 
are examined in the light of the annual review. 
For the year 1984, the permanent repre-
sentatives to the North Atlantic Council of Bel-
gium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom examined the level of forces of WEU 
member states and reported to the Council. 
The Council noted that the level of forces 
of the member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified 
in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as at pre-
sent in force. It also took note of a declaration 
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on French forces made by the representative of 
France. 
The same procedure is under way for the 
year 1985. 
1. Forces under natiolllll command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national command 
- internal defence and police forces, forces for 
the defence of overseas territories, and common 
defence forces - are fixed each year in accor-
dance with the procedure specified in the Agree-
ment signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in 
implementation of Article V of Protocol No. 11. 
* 
* * 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs 1 and 2 above, the Council has been able, 
in 1985, to carry out its obligations under Proto-
col No. 11 to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
B. United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe 
The Government of the United Kingdom 
has informed the Council that the average num-
ber of British land forces stationed on the main-
land of Europe in 1985, in accordance with the 
commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 to 
the modified Brussels Treaty, was 56,005. The 
continued need for the presence of troops in Nor-
them Ireland made it necessary for units of the 
British Army of the Rhine to be deployed for 
short tours of duty there, and in 1985 there was 
an average of 814 men from the British Army of 
the Rhine in N orthem Ireland. As has been 
previously stated, these units would be quickly 
returned to their normal duty station in an emer-
gency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, the Government of the Uni-
ted Kingdom has informed the Council that the 
strength of the United Kingdom's contribution 
to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1985 
was: 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Jaguar I 
Tornado 4 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar I 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles 4 
Air transport Puma I 
Chinook I 
Ground defence RAF regiment I 
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Ill. Activities of the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments 
In 1985, the Agency continued to carry out 
the tasks assigned to it under the terms of Article 
VII of Protocol No. IV. However, the extent 
and volume of the control activities was affected 
by the following Council decisions: 
At their meeting in Rome on 26th and 
27th October 1984, the Ministers decided, in 
accordance with Article V of Protocol No. Ill 
which allows the Council to vary the ACA's 
control activity, to abolish gradually the remain-
ing quantitative controls on conventional wea-
pons. The Ministers agreed that these controls 
should be substantially reduced by 1st January 
1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 
1986. (Document on the institutional reform of 
WEU3, point Ill, 3(a).) 
Pursuant to this decision, the Council 
adopted a resolution3 on 23rd January 1985 -
effective from 1st January 1985- indicating the 
types of armaments in respect of which controls 
had been lifted. 
It was also stipulated that the factory 
inspections of conventional weapons subject to 
control in 1985 had been abolished. 
A. Situation concerning 
the control of atomic, 
chemical and biological weapons 
1. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same 
as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise 
any control in the field of atomic weapons 
1. Biological weapons 
All the member countries again gave their 
agreement, for 1985, on the renewal of the list of 
biological weapons subject to control as accepted 
by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the 
fact. 
As in previous years, however, the Agency 
did not exercise any control in the field of biolo-
gical weapons 
3. Chemical weapons 
The Agency asked member countries for 
their agreement to renew in 1985 the list of che-
mical weapons subject to control. This agree-
3. These texts were communicated to the Assembly at the 
time. 
ment was given and the Council noted the 
fact. The Agency therefore continued to use 
this list for its control activities in 1985. 
In implementation of Article Ill of Proto-
col No. Ill, which lays down conditions to enable 
the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the right 
to produce them, and in accordance with the 
Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the 
countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whe-
ther production of chemical weapons on their 
mainland territory had passed the experimental 
stage and entered the effective production 
stage. As in the past, all these states replied in 
the negative. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the mem-
ber states to declare any chemical weapons that 
they might hold. Since all the member states 
replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 
1985. 
The competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, 
precise and complete reply to the request for 
information - aimed at facilitating the control of 
non-production of chemical weapons - which 
was sent to them by the Agency in accordance 
with the resolution adopted by the Council in 
1959 and with the directive received from the 
Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure 
applied with these authorities since 1973 was 
again used. 
B. Controls from documentary sources 
The main aim of the Agency's work in this 
field of its activity has been to compare, by study-
ing the relevant documents, the quantities of 
armaments held by the member states with the 
levels fixed by the Council, in order to establish 
whether these constituted appropriate levels 
within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
Under the usual procedure, the Agency 
studied the member states' replies to its annual 
questionnaire, and the information given by the 
state concerned in reply to its annual request for 
information concerning the non-production of 
certain types of armaments. It compared this 
information with: the data supplied by NATO; 
the information communicated to the Council by 
the Governments of the United States and 
Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV); the 
conclusions of its budgetary studies; the informa-
tion culled from open sources (specialised press) 
and the detailed statistics arising from its 
controls in previous years. 
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2. Verification of apprfJpriate 
levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports supplied by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, 
in particular, by the NATO international secreta-
riat, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities provided for by Article XIV of Proto-
col No. IV. 
The consultations included a joint study 
session at Casteau on 21st October 1985 with an 
Agency expert and the appropriate officers from 
SHAPE headquarters; they cpncluded with a 
meeting in Paris on 26th November 1985 which 
was attended by representatives of the Agency, 
SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN, and the 
international military staff of NATO. The meet-
ing concluded that the quantities of armaments 
declared by the member states for their forces 
placed under NATO command and stationed on 
the mainland of Europe cortesponded to the 
appropriate level for the control year 1985 within 
the terms of Articles XIV and XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, in respect of those armaments in respect 
of which the Agency is authorised to control 
stock levels. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on 
the mainland of Europe 
In accordance with the procedure in force 
for the implementation of the agreement of 14th 
December 1957, the Agency suJi>plied the Council 
with the information relating to the armaments 
of this category of forces which had been sup-
plied by the member states i!ll response to the 
Agency's annual questionnaire. The Agency, 
having received from the Council the statements 
by the member states of force levels, analysed on 
the Council's behalf the data for armaments and 
forces, having regard to the roles of their forces. 
The Council subsequently accepted or 
approved for 1985 the maximlilm level of arma-
ments of these forces and notified the Agency 
accordingly with the view to drawing up the final 
tables of the abovementioned forces. 
C. Field control me.asures 
The aim of this aspect of the Agency's acti-
vities was to verify the accuracy of the informa-
tion obtained from documental controls. 
For 1985, the preparation of the pro-
gramme of field control measures was considera-
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bly influenced by the decisions referred to in the 
introduction to this chapter 
1. Programme definition 
The formulation of the 1985 programme, 
even incorporating the substantial cutback on 
conventional weapons control measures which 
was tantamount to a 50% reduction compared 
with previous years, was a straightforward opera-
tion thanks to the well-defined criteria used in 
the past. 
As 1985 was the final year of quantitative 
conventional armaments control, every effort 
was made to produce a balanced programme bet-
ween the land, sea and air weapons of member 
states. 
The system of joint Agency/SHAPE 
inspections at depots under NATO authority, 
introduced in 1957 and used each year since, was 
again authorised in 1985. Some depots were 
programmed for inspection by an Agency I 
SHAPE team. 
On the basis of these considerations and of 
the information already available to it, the 
Agency was able to draw up a suitable pro-
gramme for 1985 at the beginning of the 
year. In keeping with the usual procedure, this 
provisional programme was later modified follow-
ing analyses and reviews of the member states' 
replies to the Agency's questionnaire, and some 
minor changes were made. 
2. Type and extent 
of freld control measures 
The total number of field control measures 
was thirty-four. 
These measures fall broadly into the follow-
ing categories: 
(i) quantitative control measures at 
depots; 
(ii) quantitative control measures at units 
of forces under national command; 
(iii) agreed non-production control mea-
sures in factories. 
Most of the quantitative control measures 
related to the land materiel, the others relating to 
air materiel and naval materiel; a significant 
number of these measures relating to missiles. 
The agreed non-production control mea-
sures were carried out at chemical plants. 
D. Other activities 
1. Technical information 11isits (TIVs) 
and studies 
The technical information visits (TIVs) 
and studies have in the past provided the means 
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of updating and improving armament control 
techniques in a changing technological world. 
They have also kept Agency experts up to date 
and interested. However, in view of the cessa-
tion of controls of conventional armaments at 
the end of 1985, it was considered inappropriate 
to incur expenditure on TIVs in this field during 
the year. 
Nevertheless, because of its relevance to 
possible new tasks, some members of the Agency 
attended the WEU Assembly colloquy on the 
space challenge for Europe. Furthermore, at the 
invitation of the French authorities, Agency 
experts attended the Salon du Bourget and the 
French army exhibition at Satory. 
2. In response to a request made in May by 
the Assembly's Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, the Council gave its agree-
ment for Agency experts to assist the committee 
in the preparation of two of its reports. 
3. The information gathered by the Agency 
in 1985 concerning the procurement and con-
struction of armaments for the forces of WEU 
member countries stationed on the mainland of 
Europe is set out in an annex to this report. 
E. General conclusions 
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX 
of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report 
to the Council that, as a result of the control 
exercised in 1985, the figures obtained in accor-
dance with Articles XIII of Protocol No. IV for 
the control year 1985: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV, and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the 
terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in 
implementation of Article V of Protocol 
No. II, 
represented the appropriate levels of armaments 
subject to control for each of the member states. 
As required by Article XX ofProtocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures carried out at force units 
and military depots and during agreed non-
production control measures, it did not detect 
for the categories of armaments which it 
controls: 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the governments of a 
member state concerned had under-
taken not to manufacture (Annex II to 
Protocol No. Ill); 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in 
excess of the appropriate levels (Article 
XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified 
by export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
As in previous years, the help and co-
operation given to the Agency by the national 
and NATO authorities, the directors and staff of 
the military establishments and private firms 
which the Agency visited played an important 
part in the accomplishment of its mission. 
IV. Activities of the Standing 
Armaments Committee 
In 1985, the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee met twice, on 3rd May and 25th Octo-
ber. The main items on the agenda of its meet-
ings were: the follow-up to the Rome decla-
ration and the Bonn communique regarding 
co-operation in the field of armaments and 
research and the future of the SAC in the reorga-
nised WEU; the study of the armaments sector of 
industry in the member countries ofWEU; infor-
mation regarding the study on the development 
of the Japanese armaments industry and its pos-
sible repercussions in Europe; the updating of 
WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for 
wheeled vehicles; the activities of Working 
Group No. 8 on operational research. 
A. Follow-up to the Rome declaration 
and the Bonn communique 
regarding co-operation in the field 
of armaments and research 
and the future of the SAC 
in the reorganised WEU 
The Standing Armaments Committee, 
having noted the ministerial decisions taken in 
regard to it and in regard to the establishment of 
the agencies for security questions, addressed the 
problem of co-operation in the field of arma-
ments and research, and that of its own future. 
B. Study of the armament sector of industry 
in the member countries of WEU 
The Standing Armaments Committee has, 
on the basis of data supplied by the member 
countries, drawn up the 1985 revision (covering 
the period 1976-83) ofthe first section ofthe eco-
nomic part of the study on the armament sector 
of industry in the member countries of WEU. 
The Council has approved the transmission to 
the Assembly of a declassified version of this 
updating. 
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C. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 011 trials methods 
for wheeled vehicles 
Work by the group of e~perts on the up-
dating ofWEU Agreement 4.Ff.6 has progressed 
steadily. The group met twice at the WEU offi-
ces in Paris to discuss the texts drafted by the 
various delegations and in turn circulated in the 
two working languages by the international secre-
tariat. 
A representative of the relevant NATO 
committee attended the meetings. 
The liaison between the group of experts 
and the NATO committee was provided by a 
committee secretary from the SAC. 
D. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 
on operational research 
The remit of this working group, set up in 
1968, is to exchange the findings of national ope-
rational research studies, to organise symposia 
on operational research methods and techniques 
and to arrange visits to national and internatio-
nal operational research centres. 
In 1985, the group held two meetings, the 
second of which was combined with a seminar 
on methodology. The Standing Armaments 
Committee has given the go-aqead for the group 
to visit the ESTEC laboratory (European Space 
Technology Centre) in the Netherlands during 
1986. 
(a) Exchange of information 
During the year, the deh:~gations presented 
a number of information sheets concerning new 
studies and updatings. 
(b) Seminar on methodology 
The theme of the seminar was .. forecast-
ing the life-cycle cost of weapon systems". 
Papers were presented by the German, Belgian, 
French, Italian and Netherlands Delegations and 
were followed by discussions. 
(c) Lexicographical activity 
The two meetings of the working group 
were devoted in part to the revisions of the five-
language glossary. 
2. Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances 
to enemy action 
This working group was not convened 
during the year under review. 
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E. Activities of 
the international secretariat 
1. The international secretariat has assisted 
the SAC, the group of experts on WEU Agree-
ment 4.Ff.6 and Working Group No. 8 in their 
work. 
2. It has produced the study on the develop-
ment of the Japanese armaments industry and its 
possible repercussions in Europe. This study 
has been completed following a study trip to 
Japan, in the course of which meetings were held 
with a number of high-ranking officials from the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the 
Japanese Defence Agency. Talks were also held 
at the Confederation of Japanese Industries (Kei-
danren), the Research Institute for Peace and 
Security and at the Technical Research and 
Development Institute. Finally, contacts were 
made with representatives of parliament, the 
press and the universities. Visits were also paid 
to the NASDA space centre in Tsukuba, to the 
launch site at Tanegashima, to the Mitsubishi 
H.I. shipyards at Nagasaki and the aeronautics 
and space factory at Komaki and, lastly, to the 
Fujitsu factory at Kamata. 
The study was transmitted to the Council 
on 22nd October. A declassified version will be 
communicated to the Assembly. 
3. The international secretariat has also 
contributed to the discussion on the follow-up to 
the Rome declaration regarding co-operation in 
the field of armaments and the new structures to 
be set up. 
4. On 20th March 1985, the Assistant Secre-
tary-General, head of the international secreta-
riat, presented his oral annual report to the Per-
manent Council on the activities of the 
SAC. The Council noted the report's proposals 
regarding the future activities of the SAC in the 
context of the follow-up to the Rome declaration 
regarding co-operation in the field of arma-
ments. 
5. Relations between the SAC international 
secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have 
continued in accordance with the provisions for 
co-operation laid down in 1973. A member of 
the international secretariat attended the annual 
meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Com-
mittee. 
6. As regards contacts with NATO, the inter-
national secretariat was represented at the April 
and September meetings of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors, which took 
place at NATO headquarters in Brussels. 
An observer from the international secre-
tariat was present at the June and December 
meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Arma-
ments Group. 
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7. In September, a member of the internatio-
nal secretariat took part in one-day meetings 
organised in Strasbourg by the French National 
Defence secretariat on the subject .. defence and 
university research". 
8. According to the ministerial instructions, 
the international secretariat has terminated its 
activities. Its tasks vis-a-vis the Standing 
Armaments Committee will be taken over by 
Agency Ill (agency for the development of co-o-
peration in the field of armaments), which was 
established on 1st January 1986. 
V. Activities of the Public 
Administration Committee 
A. Meetings of the committee 
The Public Administration Committee, 
which meets once every six months, held its two 
meetings of 1985 in Haarlem, from 17th to 19th 
April, and in Celle, from 25th to 27th Septem-
ber. 
As usual, these meetings were devoted to 
exchanges of information on significant adminis-
trative developments in the member countries 
during the preceding months and to the prepara-
tion of the multilateral seminar for government 
officials which takes place in the autumn of each 
year under the auspices of the committee, and 
which is organised by each of the member coun-
tries in turn. 
The exchanges of view on administrative 
developments in the member countries represent 
a major part of the meetings. They provide 
delegates with an opportunity of describing the 
most notable reforms and innovations in their 
administrations, the problems raised and the 
obstacles (if any) encountered. Since, more 
often than not, the issues concern all the member 
countries (spread of new technologies throughout 
government departments, repercussions on the 
administration of a difficult economic climate), 
these exchanges of view provide a useful oppor-
tunity to compare the experiments being conduc-
ted in particular countries, the common aim of 
all of them being to adapt administrations and 
their staff more effectively to social and techno-
logical change and to the constraints of the cur-
rent economic situation. 
During the year under review, the exchan-
ges of view focused on working conditions in the 
civil service, the characteristic features of which, 
in 1985, were austerity and modernisation. 
Almost everywhere, the climate of auste-
rity has led to a reduction in total wage and 
salary costs and a limit on recruitment, which is 
tending to become more and more selective. 
Concurrently, the search for greater efficiency in 
the administration has led to more intense acti-
vity in the field of basic and advanced vocational 
training including at the senior level where 
attempts are being made - sometimes in co-
operation with the private sector - to familiarise 
officials with modern management methods. 
The redeployment of manpower and increased 
staff mobility also contribute to the same end. 
The modernisation of office systems is 
also designed to achieve greater productivity and 
at the same time to improve the working condi-
tions of officials and the services provided to 
consumers. It is forecast that, by about 1995, 
data transmission systems may well replace 
documents in the public services. Here too, 
such objectives call for a major training effort: as 
modern systems continue to spread throughout 
the administration, a proper policy will be nee-
ded to educate the vast majority of officials at all 
levels about information technology. 
B. Seminars for government officials 
It was in the light of the above considera-
tions that the topic for the 1985 seminar for 
government officials was chosen; it was held in 
Maastricht from 6th to 12th October and 
brought together twenty senior civil servants 
from the administrations of the member coun-
tries. The actual title of the seminar was 
" The management of change in the public admi-
nistration " and focused specifically on the 
contribution which private sector management 
techniques could offer a public sector anxious to 
reform itself. 
Prior to the seminar, and before any gene-
ral discussion had been initiated on the main 
topic, each participant had been asked to prepare 
a case-study describing his/her experience of the 
management of change. 
The seminar itself opened and closed with 
plenary sessions, further discussions taking place 
in two working groups, each comprising half of 
the participants. Four external speakers had 
also been invited to describe their own experien-
ces. The principal guests at the closing dinner 
were the Netherlands Minister for Internal 
Affairs and the Governor of Limbourg. 
The various case-studies gave the partici-
pants an insight into the diversity of national 
experiences on this topic of common interest. 
Some of the case-studies dealt with the 
internal reorganisation of a public service aimed 
at modernising and simplifying management 
methods. 
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A second group of studies centred on 
schemes to achieve drastic cuts in public service 
facilities in order to obtain budgetary savings. 
A third group focused more specifically on 
the attempts made to open up ,the administration 
to the outside and to adapt its services to the 
public's needs. 
With few exceptions all the case-studies 
and, especially, the contributions made in the 
meetings were profoundly influenced by the 
general atmosphere of budget4ry austerity and 
reappraisal vis-a-vis the public service sector, a 
sector thought to be consuming excessive funds 
to provide services deemed unsatisfactory both 
in terms of quantity and quality. 
The comments received after the seminar 
clearly demonstrated that it had provided the 
opportunity for a valuable exchange of informa-
tion for both the participants and the govern-
ments they represented. 
C. Study visits 
These visits, which are organised bilate-
rally on the responsibility of the members of the 
committee, enable an official to spend one or 
two weeks in the administration of another 
member country studying in his own specialist 
field. 
Examples of visits organised during the 
year are: regulations to control major accident 
hazards, the response of industry and enforce-
ment arrangements; the administration of air 
pollution control (subjects studied in the Federal 
Republic of Germany); infonnation services, 
with particular reference to programmes for 
overseas visitors (subject studied in Belgium); 
immigration control: policy, legislation and 
implementation (subject studied in France); 
safety of dams and reservoirs: legislation and 
implementation; long-term imprisonment: the 
provisions made for adult prisoners serving long 
sentences (subject studied in the Netherlands). 
VI. Budgetary and 
administrative questions 
(a) With the economic situation still obliging 
member countries to exercise strict control over 
public expenditure, the 1985 WEU budget was 
again restricted to zero real growth, this objective 
being applied to total expenditure including pen-
sion costs. 
The process of reactivation, which started 
in October 1984, continued during 1985, bring-
ing with it a number of financial consequences 
for the ministerial organs. 
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The control activities of the ACA were gra-
dually reduced in conformity with the Council's 
decision, taken in 1984, to lift entirely the 
control of conventional weapons on 1st January 
1986. This resulted in savings on travel in the 
ACA, whilst, with a view to the pending reorga-
nisation, staff vacancies resulting from retire-
ment or other reasons were kept unfilled. 
The workload of the Secretariat-General, 
however, was substantially increased; there were 
more Council meetings and meetings of working 
groups, and consequent increases in document 
production. As a result, vacancies which had 
not been budgeted for, or in part only, needed to 
be filled, mainly with temporary staff at the out-
set, but as the year progressed with permanent 
staff on short contracts. 
On the political and public relations side, 
and to ensure rapid co-ordination between natio-
nal delegations and with other organisations, 
senior officials had to undertake a considerable 
amount of unforeseen extra travel. 
Furthermore, following terrorist threats, 
and at the instigation of the specialist authorities 
concerned, unexpected security work at the 
WEU premises in both London and Paris had to 
be undertaken. The Paris offices were able to 
finance this from their budget surplus, but the 
Secretariat-General required supplementary 
funds. 
The budget for 1985 was drafted during 
the early stages of reactivation and could not be 
expected to take account of all the changed 
demands that would be made on personnel and 
material. 
Due to the financial repercussions of these 
changed demands, a revised 1985 budget for the 
ministerial organs had to be drawn up. 
(b) When drafting the budgets for 1986, the 
format of the Paris budget was adapted to the 
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organisational change effective from 1st January 
1986, namely one single budget for the agencies 
for security questions. The budget of the minis-
terial organs for 1986 consists therefore of two 
sections: Section A for the Secretariat-General in 
London and Section B for the agencies for secu-
rity questions in Paris. The combined budget 
for Sections A and B was increased by 5.89% 
over the revised 1985 ministerial organs' budget 
(including pensions). 
(c) The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts held nine meetings. In 
addition, there were eleven meetings of the 
Heads of Administration, ten joint meetings of 
the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
with the Standing Committee of Staff Associa-
tions, as well as one meeting of the Secretaries-
General. 
The main subjects dealt with, some of 
which are still under review, were as follows: 
- the improvement of staff participation 
in the framework of co-ordination; 
- current problems associated with the 
temporary levy on the basic salaries of 
A and L grade staff; 
- the report by international experts on 
international indices, economic parities 
and family budget surveys; 
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and 
allowances; 
- the report of a comparative study on the 
budgetary effect of the new education 
allowance; 
- a study on the children's allowance; 
- problems associated with special wage 
measures in some reference countries 
and their impact on salary compari-
sons. 
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PART TWO 
The meetings of the WEU Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence in Rome on 26th 
and 27th October 1984, in Bonn on 22nd and 
23rd April 1985 and, informally, in Rome on 
14th November 1985 were decisive steps in the 
process of reactivating the organisation. 
By the end of 1985 the new structures of 
the ministerial organs were outlined, most of 
them being already set up, with the rest to be 
completed in 1986. 
I. Activation of the ministerial organs 
As decided in Rome on 26th and 27th 
October 19844, the Ministerial Council, compri-
sing Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers 
met twice in 1985: ' 
- on 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn; 
- in informal session on 14th November 
in Rome. 
Points 11 and 12 of the Bonn communi-
que (annexed hereto) fixed the guidelines for the 
reorganisation of the ministerial organs in Paris 
and for the strengthening of the Secretariat-
General in London, as accepted in principle at 
the previous ministerial meeting in Rome. 
A. WEU Council 
In deciding at their meeting in Rome " to 
make full use of the institutions of WEU and, 
accordingly, to bring the existing institutions into 
line with the changed tasks of the organisation", 
the Ministers meeting in Bonn stated their inten-
tion to intensify the work of the Permanent 
Council in line with the increased activities of 
the Council of Ministers. 
B. Reorganisation of the 
ministerial organs in Paris 
In the communique issued after the Bonn 
meeting, the Ministers decided to reorganise 
comprehensively the ACA, the SAC and its inter-
national secretariat. They agreed to establish 
the following new structures under the collective 
title, agencies for security questions: 
- an agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions; 
4. See thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assem-
bly, Annex V (Document 1006). 
333 
- an agency for the study of security and 
defence questions; 
- an agency for the development of co-
operation in the field of armaments. 
The ACA will, for the1 time being, be 
placed under eo-direction with the agency for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions. It will continue to undertake its commit-
ments remaining after the abolition of quantita-
tive controls on conventional weapons. 5 
The SAC was also to be maintained and 
would meet at the appropriate level. The inter-
national secretariat of the SAC would be abo-
lished. The agency for the development of co-
operation in the field of armaments would also 
serve as a secretariat for the SAC. 
The Permanent Counci[, asked by the 
Ministers to implement rapidly their decisions 
and to submit to the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on 14th November in Rome a report 
on the progress achieved by then and on the new 
tasks attributed to these agencies, agreed on the 
following measures. 
The larger part of the tasks of the agencies 
will consist of ad hoc studies requested by the 
Council. 
Monitoring studies and periodic reports 
could also be undertaken by the agencies but 
should not, however, prevent the agencies from 
completing the ad hoc studies within the time-
table set by the Council. After examining the 
first monitoring studies and periodic reports, the 
Council may, if necessary, reorient the agencies' 
work. 
The new agencies will operate under these 
arrangements for a transitional period ending 
31st December 1987 when the Council will 
re-examme the problems of organisation and 
staff. 
C. Strengthening of the Secretariat-General 
in London 
In order to adapt the Secretariat-General 
to the increased activities of the Council of 
Ministers and the Permanent Council, and to 
implement the governments' and Assembly's 
desire to see the political dimension of the work 
of WEU clearly reinforced, a strengthened politi-
cal affairs division has been set up. Alongside 
the Council secretariat section, it will include a 
5. Document on the institutional reform of WEU, point 
111.3(a). 
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new section entitled, " General policy and 
research ". 
In addition, as had been recommended in 
the document WEU and public awareness6, a 
small information and public relations unit will 
be set up within the secretariat during 1986. 
II. Relations between 
the Assembly and the Council 
As already stated, the improvement of 
relations between the Assembly and the Council 
has been one of the latter's constant concerns. 
A. Improvement of the procedure for replying 
to the Assembly 
On 13th December 1984 the Permanent 
Council had instructed its Working Group to 
look at the question of improving the procedure 
for replying to the Assembly. 
A number of proposals have been put for-
ward and are being evaluated. 
6. Document transmitted to the Assembly after the meet-
ing in Bonn on 23rd April. 
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B. Improvement in the exchange 
of information 
between the Council and the Assembly 
(i) The subject has often been discussed at 
meetings between the Assembly and the Council 
(cf. Chapter I, B, 2) and in particular at the meet-
ing after the Assembly session on 4th December 
in Paris between the Permanent Council, chaired 
by Mr. Andreotti, Italian Foreign Minister, and 
the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. 
Several ideas were put forward which will 
be examined later by each of the parties and 
should lead to valuable results as from 1986. 
(ii) It should also be noted that the Presiden-
tial Committee of the Assembly set up on 19th 
February 1985 a Committee for Relations with 
the Council. The committee met the Council 
for the first time on 23rd April in Bonn where 
the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher, Foreign 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
informed it of the conclusions of the ministerial 
meeting and where the Council's reports on 
WEU and public awareness and the reorganisa-
tion of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments, the international secretariat of the Stan-
ding Armaments Committee and the Standing 
Armaments Committee were handed over. 
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Communique issued at the close of the ministerial meeting 
ofthe Council of Western European Union 
Bonn, 22nd-23rd A.pri/1985 
1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of the 
Western European Union met in Bonn on 22nd 
and 23rd April 1985. 
2. The Ministers recalled the importance 
of the decisions taken at their extraordinary 
meeting in Rome in October 1984 to permit 
better use to be made of the framework and 
institutions of WEU and harmonise their views 
on the specific conditions of security in Europe. 
They reaffirmed their determination to streng-
then their solidarity and that which links them 
with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, 
which remains the only body for implementing 
common defence and the expression of the 
fundamental bond between the security of 
Europe and that ofNorth America. 
3. Reviewing questions relating to security in 
Europe, the Ministers noted that their countries 
are confronted with a continuing quantitative 
and qualitative development of Soviet military 
forces which cannot be justified solely by 
security interests. They emphasised the indis-
pensable nature of deterrence based on credible 
nuclear and conventional forces. The Ministers 
reaffirmed the determination of each of their 
countries to pursue the efforts necessary, 
whether nationally or within the integrated 
military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, to 
strengthen their joint security. 
4. In this context, the Ministers underlined 
the substantial defence effort of the European 
countries of the alliance. Their contribution in 
this respect, whatever form it may take, is funda-
mental to the strength of the alliance as a whole, 
and to the defence of European interests. They 
recalled the contribution that WEU can make in 
particular to achieve wider consensus among 
public opinion on these questions. 
5. On the question of East-West relations, 
the Ministers welcomed the resumption of the 
United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva- an 
important event for the security of the Atlantic 
Alliance in general and for that of Europe in 
particular. They reaffirmed their firm support 
for, and their confidence in, their American ally 
in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic 
relationship at the lowest possible balanced level 
of forces and called on the Soviet Union to 
display a positive attitude. 
6. The Ministers expressed the hope that the 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union will make possible radical reduc-
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tions in their strategic al!ld medium-range 
nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at 
ending the arms race on earth and preventing an 
arms race in space. They underlined in this 
regard the importance which they attach to 
respect for existing treaty obligations. 
7. The Ministers also exiamined questions 
associated with research efforts concerning stra-
tegic defence. They agreed to continue their 
collective consideration in otder to achieve as 
far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their 
governments to the invitation of the United 
States to participate in the research programme 
and instructed the permanent Council accor-
dingly. In this context they underlined the 
importance of the continuing bilateral consulta-
tions with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance 
as an essential element of allied cohesion. 
8. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' 
determination to continue to work for better 
East-West relations on a realistic and long-term 
basis, and for the full realisation of the CSCE 
commitments established at Helsinki and 
Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral 
negotiations in the field of confidence-building 
measures and conventional disarmament and 
underscored the significance of these negotia-
tions for Europe. The Ministers reaffirmed 
their determination to continue contributing 
towards progress in the negotiations on a 
comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical 
weapons being conducted at the Geneva Confe-
rence on Disarmament. 
9. The Ministers also held a detailed 
exchange of views on questions relating to 
armaments co-operation and research and 
agreed that closer co-operation and the harmoni-
sation of their efforts are fundamental in 
maintaining in the longer term a competitive 
and advanced defence industrial base in Europe 
and in achieving a more cost-effective defence. 
The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council 
to present proposals in time for the next meeting 
to help provide the necessary political impetus 
for, and practical contributions to, the various 
efforts undertaken in this field, including those 
carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the 
CNAD. 
10. Noting the increasing importance of tech-
nology, the Ministers also affirmed the member 
states' determination to take the necessary 
measures within the European Communities to 
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strengthen Europe's own technological capacity 
and thus achieve the creation of a technological 
community. 
11. As regards the reorganisation of WEU 
institutions, the principle of which was agreed at 
the Ministerial Council in Rome, the Ministers 
decided that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, the international secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee, and the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee would be compre-
hensively reorganised. They agreed to establish 
the following new structures under the collective 
title " Agencies for Security Questions " : 
- an agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions ; 
- an agency for the study of security and 
defence questions ; and 
- an agency for the development of 
co-operation in the field of armaments. 
The Ministers endorsed the recommendations of 
the Permanent Council on this subject. They 
requested the Permanent Council to implement 
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rapidly their decisions and to submit to the next 
meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on 
the progress achieved by then and on the new 
tasks attributed to these agencies. 
12. The Ministers also considered suggestions 
made by the Secretary-General on the streng-
thening of the WEU Secretariat-General in 
London. They also discussed ways and means 
of improving WEU's public relations activities. 
The Ministers underlined the important role of 
the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active 
contribution to the revitalisation ofWEU. 
13. The Ministers recalled the importance 
which they attach to their non-member allies 
being informed as fully as possible of their work. 
In this context, they considered that the special 
interest expressed by certain states is an appre-
ciable encouragement to the efforts which they 
have undertaken within WEU. 
14. The Ministers decided to appoint Mr. 
Alfred Cahen as the new Secretary-General of 
WEU. They expressed their warm appreciation 
for the services rendered by the retiring Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Edouard Longerstaey. 
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WEU and public awareness 
Introduction 
I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU 
public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for tlile next ministerial 
meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 
29th October : 
"The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be 
deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent qouncil will submit 
proposals ... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. " 
I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to 
the themes WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the means by which this presenta-
tion is to be made. This paper aims to address these points. · 
Themes 
II. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment 
to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive 
integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European 
organisations. They emphasised : 
- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ; 
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ; 
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of 
Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members. 
II. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their 
views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, 
as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration. 
II. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its p111blic relations, with 
the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following 
could fulfil the expectations set at Rome : 
(a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it 
should never be taken for granted ; 
(b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of 
force imbalances and the present threat ; 
(c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity 
whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive 
dialogue and co-operation ; 
(d) to demonstrate the importance ofthe North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, 
while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the 
European contribution to the alliance and to western security; 
(e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek 
balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level 
of forces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ; 
(f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of 
armaments; 
(g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ; 
(h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy. 
II. (iv)In view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military 
forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central 
importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to 
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develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, 
and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American 
nuclear guarantee. 
11. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the 
alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive 
dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control 
negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be 
achieved. 
Means 
Ill. (i}There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled: 
- WEU Assembly ; 
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/ Agencies ; 
- WEU member governments. 
Assembly 
Ill. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance 
Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the role it might play in 
striving " to consolidate the consensus among public opinion " on the security and defence 
needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the 
Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and 
security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual 
governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls 
inter alia for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and 
representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of 
the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more comple-
mentary fashion. 
Ill. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to 
discuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable public attention during its bien-
nial sessions. 
Ill. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states 
on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across to a wider audience 
the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of 
defence and security issues (see paragraph Ill. (x) below) might also incorporate these ideas. 
Ill. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. This will to a large 
extent be a national task ; but WEU institutions can also play a role by helping to spread 
information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by 
Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press 
briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribu-
tion of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if in future 
Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in 
their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater 
contact between members of parliament of member states and the media. 
Council/Secretary-General/Agencies 
Ill. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive 
relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national 
governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should 
aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU. 
Ill. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote 
WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and 
to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General 
to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appro-
priate, speeches. 
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Ill. (viii) There is probably a role for a public relations and information unit within the Secre-
tariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and 
disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before 
the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would 
be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distri-
buted by the unit. 
Agencies 
Ill. (ix) The Council may commtsston the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to informa-
tion activity in the following ways : 
(i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be 
distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in 
London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation 
of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for 
distribution ; 
(ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list 
of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in 
London. 
National governments 
Ill. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is 
through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member 
states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use sho111ld be made of the 
major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put 
across the agreed themes. 
Ill. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence 
and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organi-
sations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the 
agreed themes and the role ofWEU in the context of European security. 
Ill. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater 
public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The fermanent Council 
will be instructed to look at this problem periodicially during its regular sessions. When the 
Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated 
in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to 
improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions. 
Conclusion 
IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a 
major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater 
public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile 
of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and 
transatlantic unity. 
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Reorganisation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
the Standing Armaments Committee, including 
the international secretariat 
of the Standing Armaments Committee 
With the aim of better adapting the insti-
tutions of WEU to present and future require-
ments, without amending the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of 
WEU, at the ministerial meeting in Rome on 
26th-27th October 1984, instructed the Perma-
nent Council to define the modalities of an over-
all reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the 
international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC. 
1. The mandate 
The mandate given to the Permanent 
Council reads as follows (document on the insti-
tutional reform of WEU, 111.3): 
"With the aim of better adapting the insti-
tutions of WEU to present and future require-
ments, the ministers reached the following deci-
sions: 
(a) Noting that the control functions origi-
nally assigned to the ACA have now become, for 
the most part, superfluous, the ministers deci-
ded, in accordance with Article V of Protocol 
No. Ill which allows the Council to make chan-
ges to the ACA's control activity, to abolish gra-
dually the remaining quantitative controls on 
conventional weapons. The ministers agreed 
that these controls should be substantially redu-
ced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st 
January 1986. The commitments and controls 
concerning ABC weapons would be maintained 
at the existing level and in accordance with the 
procedures agreed up to the present time. 
(b) The ministers have instructed the Perma-
nent Council to define, in consultation with the 
directors of the ACA and the SAC, the precise 
modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting 
both the ACA, the international secretariat of the 
SAC and the SAC which would be structured in 
such a way as to fulfil a threefold task: 
- to study questions relating to arms 
control and disarmament whilst car-
rying out the remaining control func-
tions;. 
- undertake the function of studying secu-
rity and defence problems; 
- to contribute actively to the develop-
ment of European armaments co-opera-
tion. 
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(c) As regards the first two functions indicated 
above, the intention would be to have available a 
common basis of analysis which could form a 
useful point of reference for the work of both the 
Council and the Assembly and also for informing 
public opinion. 
This reorganisation will have to be carried 
out taking into account, on the one hand, chan-
ges in duties resulting first from the reduction 
and then from the abolition of the control tasks 
and, on the other hand, the need to have the 
appropriate experts available. 
(d) As regards armaments co-operation, WEU 
should be in a position to play an active role in 
providing political impetus: 
- by supporting all co-operative efforts 
including those of the IEPG and the 
CNAD; 
- by encouraging in particular the activity 
of the IEPG as a forum whose main 
objective is to promote European co-
operation and also to contribute to the 
development of balanced co-operation 
within the Atlantic Alliance; 
- by developing continuing concertation 
with the various existing bodies. 
(e) In this general context, the Permanent 
Council will also take into account the existence 
of the FINABEL framework. 
{f) In carrying out this overall reorganisation, 
the Permanent Council will have to: 
- propose a precise organisation table 
which will make it possible to define 
and give a breakdown of the posts 
required for carrying out the three func-
tions referred to above; 
- ensure that the various arrangements 
proposed remain within the present 
limits in terms of staff and the organisa-
tion's budget, without weakening 
WEU's ability to play its role. 
The ministers asked the Permanent Coun-
cil to complete its work before their next ses-
sion. They expressed the wish, however, that in 
the meantime a start should be made on all or 
part of the new tasks as soon as possible. " 
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2. Present situation 
(a) Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(ACA) 
The ACA has a contractual foundation 
(see Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty 
in connection with Protocol No. I, Article IV as 
well as Protocol No. IV). 
The Council is not prevented by the treaty 
from adjusting the size of the ACA staff to the 
reduction in its responsibilities permitted by the 
treaty and currently being effected. This means 
that the ACA can be reduced to the absolutely 
essential number of posts. The vacated posts 
can be reallocated. 
In the ACA, there is one director hors 
grade and there are twenty-one administrative-
grade posts. The ACA consists entirely of inter-
national civil servants. 
By a resolution (C (85) 27), the Council in 
implementation of the decision contained' in 
paragraph 3(a) of Section Ill ofthe document on 
the institutional reform of WEU adopted in 
Rome on 27th October 1984, and having regard 
to the relevant provisions of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty of 23rd October 1954, 
Article 1 
HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st 
January 1985, the controls shall be lifted on the 
following types of armaments in the list con-
tai~ed in Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, signed in 
Pans on 23rd October 1954: the elevating mass 
referred to in paragraph 2 of the abovementioned 
list and the items mentioned in paragraphs 5, 
6(a), 6(b), 7, 8(c), 9, 10, ll(b) and ll(c). 
Article 2 
HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st 
January 1986, paragraphs 2 to 11 inclusive ofthe 
abovementioned list shall be cancelled. 
It is not possible to transfer new spheres of 
responsibility to the ACA, since this would not 
be consistent with the contractually established 
functions of the ACA (Article VII et seq. of Pro-
tocol No. IV). 
(b) Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) 
The SAC, including the international 
secre.tariat of the SAC, was not set up by the 
modtfie~ Brus~~ls Treaty or its protocols, but by 
a Council decisiOn taken in 1955. 
The SAC consists of the Committee itself 
(composed of national representatives) and an 
international secretariat; only the latter has a 
staff of international civil servants. 
The international secretariat has one direc-
tor hors grade and five administrative-grade 
posts. 
341 
DOCUMENT 1061 
3. The objectives 
Since the new agencies will have to play a 
special role within WEU, a definition of their 
tasks and their link to the Council and the Secre-
tary-General would be appropriate. 
(a) The Council 
The Council (Council 1of Ministers and 
Permanent Council) is central to the efforts to 
make better use of WEU. 
Pursuant to Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels. Treaty, the Council, assisted by the 
Secretanat-General, organises its activities as 
necessary and may consult or set up subsidiary 
bodies. 
(b) The Secretary-General atnd the Secretariat-
General 
The Secretary-General, who chairs the 
meetings of the Permanent Council, has a major 
role to play in co-ordinating and stimulating the 
work of the organisation. He heads the Secre-
tariat-General which is to be adapted in line with 
the increased activities of the Council of Minis-
ters and the Permanent Council. The Secreta-
riat-General is the executive body ofthe Council 
and directly serves it. It liaises between the 
Council and the Assembly, be:tween the Council 
and the agencies in Paris and between the Coun-
cil and other subsidiary bodies. It also prepares 
reports requested by the Council. 
(c) The new agencies 
The new agencies in Paris are to support 
the Council and work at its request. They will 
have a functional link with the Secretary-
General: they receive the Council's instructions 
through the Secretary-General and submit their 
studies via the Secretary-General to the Coun-
cil. The agencies' studies - whether on a regu-
lar or ad hoc basis - should provide a substantial 
analytical contribution to the work of the Coun-
cil. 
4. Draft operational decision 
for the Council of Ministers 
The following is the operational proposal 
by the Permanent Council for the Council of 
Ministers for: 
" The reorganisation 
of the WEU subsidiary bodies 
and establishment of the new agencies for 
security questions in Paris 
1. Under the collective title agencies for secu-
rity questions, three new structures will be estab-
lished in Paris, each of equal status: 
- an agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions; 
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- an agency for the study of security and 
defence questions; 
- an agency for the development of co-
operation in the field of armaments. 
Each agency will be headed by a director 
with a fixed term of office. 
The three directors will be individually 
and collectively under the authority ofthe Coun-
cil, having a functional link with the Secretary-
General, whose role will be to ensure proper 
co-ordination with the Council and the imple-
mentation of its decisions. 
The three directors will form a Committee 
of Directors having responsibility for co-ordina-
ting their work. The Secretary-General or his 
representative can be present on the commit-
tee. 
The total administrative-grade posts of the 
new agencies will in principle be shared in a 
balanced manner. 
The agencies for security questions will 
share joint services (administration, security, 
documentation, translation and interpreta-
tion). Each director will be responsible in turn, 
on an annual basis, for supervising the work of 
the joint services and for reporting to the Com-
mittee of Directors. 
2. Having regard to the present staffing situa-
tion, the following transitional measures will be 
adopted: 
(a) the present Director of the ACA, who 
holds an HG post, will remain head of 
the ACA and will set up and head the 
agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions; 
(b) an HG post will be transferred from 
the Secretariat-General in London to 
Paris. The incumbent will set up and 
head the agency for the study of secu-
rity and .defence questions. This 
transfer should be made without preju-
dice to the strengthening of the Secre-
tariat-General at another level; 
(c) the present head of the international 
secretariat of the SAC, who holds an 
HG post, will set up and head the 
agency for the development of co-ope-
ration in the field of armaments; 
(d) the setting-up of the agencies will be 
carried out under the supervision of 
the Council through the intermediary 
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of the Secretary-General represented at 
the Committee of Directors. 
3. At the end of 1987, the Council will again 
consider the problems of organisation and staf-
fing. 
In the meantime, the Council will take the 
measures necessary so that the terms of office of 
the three directors responsible for setting up the 
new agencies will end simultaneously, at the end 
of 1987. 
4. These measures will be taken without pre-
judice to those of a definitive character which 
will be adopted at the end of this transitional 
period. The latter will be taken in the light of 
the experience gained and should, in any event, 
meet the concern for a rational use of resour-
ces. 
5. The ACA is to be maintained. The Per-
manent Council re-emphasises that the commit-
ments and controls concerning ABC weapons 
(defined by Articles 11 and IV as well as Annex I 
to Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty) will be maintained at the existing level 
and in accordance with the procedures agreed up 
to the present time. After 1st January 1986 the 
remaining functions will have to be dealt with by 
a very reduced A-grade staff (a director and a 
deputy director). 
The ACA, as a separate agency, will 
remain, for the time being, under eo-direction 
with the agency for the study of arms control and 
disarmament questions. 
6. The SAC will be maintained and meet at 
the appropriate level, in particular to assist the 
Council of Ministers in giving the necessary poli-
tical impetus in the field of armaments co-opera-
tion. The international secretariat of the SAC 
will be abolished. The agency for the develop-
ment of co-operation in the field of armaments 
will also serve as a secretariat for the SAC. 
7. The Permanent Council emphasises that: 
- this reform will be carried out in strict 
adherence to the limits agreed in terms 
of budget and staff; 
- it will not give rise to the creation of any 
posts; 
- it will constitute an effort to rationalise 
the structures, notably by the setting-up 
of joint services for the technical 
bodies." 
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Production and procurement 
of armaments for the 
forces of WEU member countries stationed on 
the mainland of Europe 
1. Armaments for land forces 
(a) Belgium has increased its holdings of 
M-109 105 mm howitzers. Considerable quan-
tities of Milan anti-tank missiles were also deli-
vered. 
(b) France is in the process of scrapping some 
of its obsolete armoured fighting vehicles and 
battle tanks. A substantial number of modern 
light tanks and battle tanks have entered into ser-
vice; anti-tank missiles, most of them of the 
obsolescent Entac type, have been fired for prac-
tice purposes or have been scrapped. 
(c) The Federal Republic of Germany has 
withdrawn from service a number of Jagd Panzer 
Jaguar I tank destroyers fitted with 90 mm guns 
for conversion to armoured anti-tank missile-
launcher vehicles or observation vehicles. The 
delivery of Leopard II tanks, tracked armoured 
vehicles equipped with Hot launchers and Milan 
and Hot anti-tank missiles was expected. 
(d) Italy has continued to modernise its anti-
tank forces by procuring a substantial number of 
Tow missiles. Some obsolete battle tanks and 
anti-tank recoilless rifles were withdrawn from 
service. 
(e) Luxembourg has reported an increase in 
its holdings of Tow missiles. 
(f) The Netherlands have continued to 
modernise their tank and anti-tank potential by 
procuring Leopard II battle tanks and Dragon 
missile-launchers. 
(g) The United Kingdom has continued to 
replace obsolescent Chieftain battle tanks with 
tanks of the Challenger type. An increase in the 
anti-tank capability has been achieved through 
the delivery to BAOR of Milan anti-tank laun-
chers and Milan and Swingfire missiles. The 
anti-aircraft capability has been enhanced by the 
acquisition of Rapier anti-aircraft missiles. 
2. Naval armaments 
(a) Belgium has acquired Sea Sparrow (sea-to-
air) missiles. 
(b) In France, one nuclear missile-carrying 
submarine was commissioned. Two older des-
troyers, two conventional submarines and one 
tank-landing ship were withdrawn from ser-
vice. A number of Super Etendard carrier-
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borne aircraft joined the fleet (the delivery plan-
ned for 1984 having been postponed until 1985). 
A number of MM-40 (up-graded anti-ship 
Exocet) and Crotale Navale (sea-to-air) missiles 
were acquired whereas some medium-range 
Tartar/Standard sea-to-air missiles were scrap-
ped. The obsolescent SS-11 !and SS-12 air-to-
ground wire-guided missiles , were also scrap-
ped. 
(c) In the Federal Republic of Germany, there 
has been no change in the naval vessel situation. 
Some new Tornado attack aircraft were deliv-
ered, thus completing the fitting-out of one naval 
air wing. A number of older F-1 04 attack air-
craft were disposed of. In addition, the navy 
has acquired Sea Sparrow air-to-air missiles and 
Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles for its Tornado air-
craft. 
(d) In Italy, the through deck cruiser (light air-
craft-carrier) Garibaldi joined the fleet. Some 
older fast attack craft (torpedo-armed) were with-
drawn from service. A number of Otomat sea-
to-sea missiles were acquired, but some Terrier 
sea-to-air missiles were scrapped. 
(e) In the Netherlands, a new air defence fri-
gate, the Jacob van Heemskerck, joined the fleet. 
One older submarine was taken out of service. 
A number of Sea Sparrow missiles were bought 
whereas some older Sea Cat sea-to-air missiles 
were scrapped. 
3. Air force armaments 
(a) Belgium planned to expend a few Nike 
Hercules missiles during the year for training 
purposes. 
(b) France was due to reduce slightly its 
Jaguar A holdings and to take delivery of Mirage 
2000-C aircraft. A further delivery of Mirage 
F-1 C aircraft was also planned. Holdings of 
Crotale R-440 and Matra Super 530 missiles 
were also set to increase. 
(c) The Federal Republic of Germany was due 
to reduce its holdings of F-1 04G aircraft, this 
being offset by the planned delivery of Tornado 
MRCA aircraft. For training purposes, Nike 
Hercules, improved Hawk and Sidewinder AIM 
9B missiles were to be used. A significant quan-
tity of Sidewinder 9L missiles and Maverick 
AGM-65B missiles were also due for delivery. 
DOCUMENT 1061 
(d) Italy has reported no significant changes 
for 1985, apart from the fact that a small number 
of missiles will be expended for training purpo-
ses. 
(e) The Netherlands planned to take delivery 
of a number of F-16 aircraft and to expend some 
sea-to-air missiles in practice firings. 
344 
ANNEX IV 
(f) The United Kingdom has withdrawn from 
its air force a number of Jaguar aircraft assigned 
to the Second AT AF, but has made a correspon-
ding increase in its complement of Tornado air-
craft. The number of Rapier launcher and 
tracking installations has been increased as have 
the holdings of Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles. 
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ANNEX V 
Summary of revised WEU budget for 1985 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ F.frs F.frs F.frs 
Salaries and allowances ••••••••••••••• 0. 1,296,910 11,206,900 23,729,650 34,936,550 
Pensions ••••••• 0 •••••••• 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 0 ••••• 137,390 1,611,100 4,747,500 6,358,600 
Travel •••• 0 •••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 39,750 174,400 550,500 724,900 
Other operating costs 0 •••••• 0 0. 0 ••• 0 0 ••• 212,600 760,790 1,115,090 1,875,880 
Purchase of furniture • 0. 0 ••••• 0 0 •••••••• 2,720 22,500 73,9(])0 96,400 
Buildings 0 ••••••••••• 0. 0 0 ••••• 0. 0 ••• 0 •• - 25,000 45,000 70,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ••••••• 0 0 •••••• 0. 1,689,870 13,800,690 30,261,640 44,062,330 
WEU tax 0 0 0 ••••• 0 ••••• 0 ••••••• 0 0 ••••• 0 486,840 3,922,500 8,241,700 12,164,200 
Other receipts 0 0 ••••••••• 0. 0. 0 ••• 0. 0 0 ••• 43,620 234,500 528,900 763,400 
Pension receipts 0 ••••••• 0 •••••• 0 •••• 0 ••• 48,200 329,000 751,600 1,080,600 
TOTAL INCOME • 0 ••• 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 578,660 4,486,000 9,522,200 14,008,200 
NET TOTAL •• 0 0 •• 0 ••••••••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0. 0. 1,111,210 9,314,690 20,739,440 30,054,130 
National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1985 
600ths 
Belgium • 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 ••••••••• 59 
France ••• 0 0 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 •••• 0. 120 
Germany ••••• 0 •••••• 0 •••• 0 0 ••• 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 120 
Italy •••••• 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0 0. 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 0 ••••• 120 
Luxembourg 0 •• 0. 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 0. 0 •• 0 0 2 
Netherlands • 0 ••• 0 ••••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 59 
United Kingdom ....................... 120 
TOTAL .............................. 600 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
** Excludes Frs 750,000 frozen by Council. 
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£ F.frs 
109,268.98 2,881,572.78 
222,242.00 5,860,826.00 
222,242.00 5,860,826.00 
222,242.00 5,860,826.00 
3,704.04 97,680.44 
109,268.98 2,881,572.78 
222,242.00 5,860,826.00 
1,111,210.00 29,304, 130.00** 
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Summary of revised WEU budget for 1985 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ F.frs F.frs F.frs 
Salaries and allowances ••••••••••• 0. 0 •• 0 1,290,674 10,690,300 21,814,450 32,504,750 
Pensions 0 •• 0 •••• 0 •••••• 0. 0 0 0 0 0. 0 ••••••• 170,060 1,913,700 4,823,500 6,737,200 
Travel ••••• 0 0 •••••• 0 0 0 •••••••• 0. 0. 0 •••• 47,960 174,400 550,500 724,900 
Other operating costs • 0 •••••••••• 0 •• 0. 0. 268,330 777,490 1,115,090 1,892,580 
Purchase of furniture 0 ••••• 0. 0. 0 •• 0 0 ••• 0 9,720 22,500 73,900 94,400 
Buildings •• 0 0 0 ••••• 0 0 •••• 0 0 •••••• 0 0 0. 0. - 151,500 273,000 424,500 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE •• 0 0. 0. 0 ••••••••• 1,786,744 13,729,890 28,650,440 42,380,330 
WEU tax 0 ••••••••• 0 0 0 0. 0 ••• 0. 0 ••••• 0 •• 461,480 3,798,200 7,514,600 11,312,800 
Other receipts •• 0 0 0 ••• 0 0. 0 0 0 •• 0 ••••••••• 35,645 232,500 516,600 749,100 
Pension receipts •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 47,950 320,000 694,300 1,014,300 
TOTAL INCOME •• 0. 0. 0 0 ••••••••••• 0 ••• 545,075 4,350,700 8,725,500 13,076,200 
NET TOTAL 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0 •••••••• 0 0 ••••• 1,241,669 9,379,190 19,924,940 29,304,130 
National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1985 
600ths 
Belgium 0 ••• 0 0 •• 0 0 0. 0 •••• 0 0. 0 •• 0. 0 •••• 0 59 
France • 0 •• 0. 0 0 •••• 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0 0. 0 •••• 0 0 0. 120 
Germany ••• 0 0 ••• 0 •• 0 0 ••••• 0 •••••• 0 0 ••• 120 
Italy • 0 ••••• 0 0 ••••••• 0 ••• 0 •••••••• 0 •••• 120 
Luxembourg ••• 0. 0 •••••• 0. 0 ••••• 0 0 0. 0 •• 2 
Netherlands • 0 0. 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 ••••••••• 0 0 ••• 59 
United Kingdom ....................... 120 
TOTAL .............................. 600 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
346 
£ F.frs 
122,097.45 2,881,572.78 
248,333.80 5,860,826.00 
248,333.80 5,860,826.00 
248,333.80 5,860,826.00 
4,138.90 97,680.44 
122,097.45 2,881 ,572. 78 
248,333,80 5,860,826.00 
1,241,669.00 29,304,130.00 
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Communique issued after the ministerial meeting 
of the Council of Western European Union 
Venice, 29th-30th April 1986 
1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western 
European Union met in Venice on 29th and 30th 
April 1986. They recalled the important role of 
WEU in the process of European construc-
tion. They reaffirmed their attachment to WEU 
as a forum in which the governments concerned 
can address specific European concerns in the 
security field within the framework of their 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These 
concerns relate both to the need for effective and 
appropriate defence capabilities and to the speci-
fic implications for security and stability in 
Europe of developments in the various arms 
control negotiations. 
2. The Ministers stressed the importance of 
the contribution to common security made by 
the member states and expressed their apprecia-
tion of the contribution which the independent 
nuclear forces of France and the United King-
dom make to deterrence. They recalled the 
indivisible nature of western security and their 
firm determination to strengthen the ties and the 
solidarity which bind them together and to the 
other members of the alliance. 
3. The Ministers reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the improvement of East-West relations 
through the promotion of contact and dialo-
gue. In this respect they recalled the impor-
tance of the CSCE process. 
I 
They emphasised that a climate of confi-
dence is important for progress in the field of 
arms control and disarmament. They noted the 
need to find solutions in all negotiating fora that 
take full account of the security interests of their 
countries. 
The Ministers recalled that the fundamen-
tal objective of arms control, both conventional 
and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and 
stability at the lowest possible level of forces. 
4. The Ministers expressed their support for 
the efforts made by the United States in the talks 
with the Soviet Union about their nuclear wea-
pons and space. They welcomed the various 
ongoing and close consultations among the allies 
and the American resolve to take European 
concerns fully into consideration. 
The expressed the hope that the Soviet 
Union would give practical effect at the negotiat-
ing table to its stated intention to reach equitable 
and verifiable arms control agreements. 
5. The Ministers stressed that the ongoing 
negotiations on United States and Soviet longer-
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range intermediate nuclear foroes are of particu-
lar interest to Europe. They recalled the impor-
tance they attach to the objective of progressive 
reductions leading to the global elimination of 
this category of weapons within the framework 
of effectively verifiable agreements. In this 
context the emergence of new a~reas of instability 
should be prevented by adequate measures. 
6. The Ministers underlined that imbalances 
in the field of conventional threes throughout 
Europe equally constitute a factor of instabi-
lity. Progress towards balanced and verifiable 
reductions of conventional forces would thus 
represent a very significant contribution to the 
strengthening of security and peace in Europe. 
The Ministers hope that, in this field, the Soviet 
Union will translate into deeds at the negotiating 
table its recent statements. They underlined 
their countries' continued efforts in the context 
of negotiations in multilateral fora such as those 
·on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in 
Geneva (CD) and on mutual and balanced force 
reductions in Vienna (MBFR). The Ministers 
considered it necessary to intensify the negotia-
tions at the conference on confidence- and secu-
rity-building measures and disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in 
order that substantial results can be achieved 
before the third CSCE follow-up conference in 
the autumn of this year. 
7. The Ministers recalled the increasingly 
complex problems caused by the cost of research, 
development and production of weapons sys-
tems, particularly those involving emerging tech-
nology. They underlined the importance of 
co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen 
their defence capabilities. 
The Ministers welcomed the progress 
which had been made in the IEPG on harmonis-
ing military requirements and in launching co-
operative research projects. They particularly 
welcomed the decision taken in Madrid on 28th 
April concerning co-operation in the military 
aeronautics sector. 
The Ministers requested that studies be 
undertaken on the management of resources and 
the implications of rising defence costs. 
8. The Ministers also considered an up-to-
date report on issues relating to the SDI research 
programme provided by a working group of the 
Permanent Council. They decided that the 
work ofWEU should continue to deal with ques-
tions related to participation in the SDI research 
programme and the politico-strategic implica-
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tions for Europe of possible developments in the 
field of ballistic missile defence. 
9. The Ministers exchanged views on secu-
rity in the Mediterranean and the risks of desta-
bilisation in this region. They stressed the role 
which Western European countries can continue 
to play in order to reduce tension in the area. 
They agreed to examine this point in greater 
depth. 
10. They gave special attention to the threat to 
security posed by international terrorism and 
underlined the importance of early and effective 
action to implement the measures that the coun-
tries of Western Europe have agreed upon to 
combat this scourge. 
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11. The Ministers also reviewed the progress 
made since the October 1984 meeting in Rome 
in relaunching the organisation and exchanged 
views on its future prospects. In this spirit, they 
recognised the importance of good co-ordination 
among the various institutions capable of contri-
buting to a Western European dimension of 
common security. 
12. The Ministers mandated the Permanent 
Council to make proposals, at their next meeting, 
on ways of strengthening co-operation between 
existing European academic and research institu-
tions in the field of security and defence, thus 
improving the quality of their research relevant 
to WEU. 
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Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
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I. Introduction 
1. Since the last session, the Presidential 
Committee has pursued two tasks simulta-
neously: one is its traditional task of maintaining 
and improving relations between the Assembly 
and the Council and the other is the implementa-
tion of a mandate given to it by the Assembly in 
connection with the budget. In Order 64, the 
latter instructed the Presidential Committee" to 
negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to 
be granted adequate financial means to allow it 
to play its role in a reactivated WEU " and " in 
application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules 
of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to 
finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable 
conditions". 
2. As the Assembly will be able to see from 
the exchange of correspondence appended to the 
present report, relations between the Council and 
the Assembly have developed in terms of 
methods and procedure and the only obstacle 
has been the difficulty the members of the Coun-
cil have in agreeing to give the Assembly mean-
ingful information. This difficulty reflected 
the fundamental problems encountered by the 
Council in reactivating WEU. 
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3. In regard to the budget, the Presidential 
Committee was unable to obtain the credits 
hoped for. In particular, th~ Council refused 
the appropriations which would have allowed 
the Office of the Clerk to be strengthened by 
recruiting officials and purchasing modern 
equipment. 
4. Thus in both its relations with the Council 
and its budget, the Assembly is feeling the limits 
of reactivation. 
II. The Assembly's relations with the Council 
5. The Presidential Committee has shown 
the value it attaches to meetings with the Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council. It was therefore 
particularly grateful to Mr. Andreotti for having 
organised such a meeting during the session last 
December. This meeting allowed procedure to 
be worked out for the dialogue with the Council 
in future years. For instance, it was agreed to 
organise a further meeting between the Presiden-
tial Committee on the one hand and the Chair-
man-in-Office and the Permanent Council on the 
other and this was held at the seat of the Assem-
bly, Paris, on 21st January 1986. Mr. Andreotti 
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being unable to attend because of other commit-
ments, he asked Mr. Corti, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to represent him. 
6. At this meeting, the President of the 
Assembly stressed the Assembly's concern at the 
shortage of information transmitted to it on the 
activities of the Council outside ministerial meet-
ings. In particular, he noted that in spite of the 
undertakings given by the Chairman-in-Office 
during the December session the Assembly had 
received no information on the results obtained 
by the working group on the SDI. Mr. Caro 
also regretted the absence of information on the 
restructuring of WEU following the establish-
ment of the new agencies on 1st January 1986. 
7. The Council was also asked to confirm its 
agreement to a timetable of meetings providing 
for: 
- a meeting of the Committee for Rela-
tions with the Council before the spring 
ministerial meeting; 
- a meeting between the Council and the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and the General Affairs 
Committee at the close of the spring 
ministerial meeting; 
- a meeting between the Presidential 
Committee and the Ministers on the 
occasion of each ministerial meeting; 
- a twice-yearly meeting between the Per-
manent Council and the Presidential 
Committee. 
8. Finally, it was proposed that the participa-
tion of Ministers at sessions be organised, the 
main ministerial addresses being grouped on the 
same half-day, the Chairman-in-Office being 
represented as far as possible at the other sittings 
of the Assembly. 
9. Mr. Corti responded favourably to these 
requests, while reserving the Council's final posi-
tion, since the agreement of Italy's partners 
would have to be obtained to allow the sugges-
tions to be implemented. Mr. Andreotti subse-
quently confirmed that in principle his attitude 
was favourable. 
mittee for Relations with the Council before the 
autumn ministerial meeting and the meetings 
between the Presidential Committee and the 
Ministers and Permanent Council will allow the 
dialogue between the Council and the Assembly 
to be pursued further. 
11. Although from a formal point of view the 
contacts can be considered satisfactory, the subs-
tance of the information obtained is still open to 
criticism. 
12. The Presidential Committee could but 
note the delay in communicating important parts 
of the annual report. It also found a number of 
topics on which it considered the Assembly, at 
the opening of its spring session, was insuffi-
ciently informed. These are the enlargement of 
WEU, disarmament and the control of arma-
ments, international terrorism, the governments' 
will to use the potentialities of Article VIII ofthe 
modified Brussels Treaty to implement consulta-
tions between Europeans on the various threats 
to peace which affect their security, the political 
impetus given to European armaments co-opera-
tion and the establishment of a European insti-
tute for advanced defence studies. 
13. The meeting between the Presidential 
Committee, the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and the General Affairs 
Committee and the Council held in Venice at the 
close of the ministerial meeting did not allow the 
standard of the dialogue with the Council on 
these various matters to be improved suffi-
ciently, either because of the Council's concern 
not to divulge some of its work or because of the 
narrow area in which it had been possible to 
reach agreement. 
14. Starting its spring session in this difficult 
context, the Assembly is necessarily concerned to 
protect its ability to fulfil its tasks. For this pur-
pose, it must have adequate financial resour-
ces. But the amount of its budget was fixed 
without any dialogue with the Council. 
Ill. Budget of the Assembly 
for the financial y"ear 1986 
15. In Order 64, the Assembly gave the Presi-
10. In regard to procedure, the meetings called dential Committee the task of negotiating with 
for by the Presidential Committee were organi- the Council for the Assembly to be granted ade-
sed, with one exception. The Presidential Corn- quate financial means to allow it to play its role 
mittee's wish to be heard by the Council at the in a reactivated WEU. The President of the 
ministerial meeting before the Ministers conclu- Assembly therefore wrote to the Chairman-in-
ded their discussions was not accepted and a Office of the Council asking that a joint ad hoc 
joint meeting between the Presidential Commit- committee be set up at political level, as Mr. 
tee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Andreotti himself had suggested at the end of his 
Armaments and the General Affairs Committee address to the Assembly last December. The 
and the Council was held at the close of the purpose of this meeting was to find a means of 
Venice ministerial meeting. The Presidential solving a problem which was not so much finan-
Committee hopes that the meetings planned for cial, in view of the very small sums involved, as 
the second half-year, i.e. the meeting of the Corn- political since it was a matter of allowing the 
350 
Assembly, like the Secretariat-General, to be able 
to take part in the reactivation. In answer to 
this letter, the Council communicated its unilate-
ral decision to increase the Assembly's budget by 
8.6%. This decision was therefore taken 
without it being possible to hold the consulta-
tions planned by the presidency of the Coun-
cil. Mr. Andreotti stressed that this figure was 
the result of a compromise and the maximum it 
was possible to obtain at the present juncture. 
16. The Secretary-General for his part recalled 
the zero growth principle, which the Council had 
vigorously confirmed. Moreover, he under-
lined that the fact that the Council did not accept the 
principle of making up for losses incurred by the 
Assembly because the increases authorised in 
previous budgets were lower than the zero 
growth rate. The Assembly's budge~ for 198?, 
which represented a modest but real mcrease m 
relation to expected inflation in France, was tP.e-
refore to be an exception, thus implying that any 
increase in real terms in the 1987 and subsequent 
financial years would be refused. 
17. On behalf of the Presidential Committee, 
· Mr. Caro expressed regret that it had not been 
possible to hold the planned negotiation. The 
agreement between the Council and the Presi-
dential Committee on 4th December 1985 on the 
meeting of the joint ad hoc committee to study 
the Assembly's budget at political level not 
having been applied, he also emphasised that 
application of the zero growth criterion could be 
considered only when the Assembly's means had 
been adapted to its tasks, following the example 
of the ministerial organs, and in particular when 
the gaps in the table of establishment of the 
Office of the Clerk had been filled. Indeed, the 
dialogue between the Assembly and the Council 
could be fruitful only if the Assembly were gran-
ted the means offulfilling, in correlation with the 
Council's activities, its twofold role of stimula-
tion and supervision. 
18. Finally, expenditure for the payment. of 
pensions will rise very sharply bec.ause offici~ls 
recruited when the Assembly and Its secretanat 
were set up are reaching retiring age. The 
Council's refusal to examine the pensions budget 
separately will lead to a rapid and substantial 
reduction in the operating budget. The Assem-
bly's means of carrying out its tasks may there-
fore be jeopardised in the very near future and 
this cannot be considered acceptable. 
19. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration could but make reductions in the 
budget to take account of the overall compres-
sion of the Assembly's budget for 1986. The 
budget thus reduced is given in document 
A/WEU jBA (86) 2 revised, approved by the 
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Council after a favourable opinion by the Budget 
and Organisation Committee which groups the 
Council's financial experts. 
20. An answer should be given to a remark by 
the Budget and Organisation Committee quoted 
in the Secretary-General's note given in section 8 
of Appendix 11 to the present report. The 
detailed information the Council wants was 
given in the Assembly's initial budget, whi~h was 
the subject of the amendmen~s set out m the 
document submitted to the Council. 
21. The Presidential Comllllittee notes with 
regret that it has been impossible to strengthen 
the structure of the Office of the Clerk by the 
recruitment of officials in spite of the urgency of 
the matter and previous reductions in the 
Assembly secretariat. The problem of the struc-
ture of the Office of the Clerk should therefore be 
raised again and will be materialised in a draft 
supplementary budget for the financial y~ar 1986 
and in the draft budget for the financial year 
1987. 
IV. Conclusions 
22. While at political level the good will of the 
Council of Ministers and the Permanent Coun-
cil, as well as of the Secretary-General seems 
undeniable, the basis of the agreement between 
the governments is too narrow to allow WEU to 
benefit fully from the determination expressed in 
Rome to make better use of the potentialities of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. It would be tan-
tamount to despairing of the cause of Europe, 
however, to consider that the governments will 
be unable to overcome the remaining obsta-
cles. The Assembly itself will continue to urge 
the governments strongly, as it has always done, 
to overcome their differences in order to give 
more life to the only European body capable at 
the present time of promoting European thinking 
and European consultations on the conditions of 
European security. The Presidential Commit-
tee for its part, will continue, in the period bet-we~n sessions, to encourage the Council to give 
favourable consideration to the recommenda-
tions adopted by the Assembly. 
23. Finally, the problem of the balance bet-
ween the means available to the Assembly and 
its tasks will be the subject of a further study by 
the Presidential Committee. It will be for the 
Assembly to show that its moderation does not 
exclude determination. 
24. While this review of its action leaves the 
Presidential Committee some hope of improving 
the political and budgetary situation, it cannot b.e 
said that it is satisfied with the results obtai-
ned. 
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APPENDIX I 
Relations between the Assembly and the Council 
1. Letter from Mr. Caro, 
President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
(28th January 1986) 
(Remarks and suggestions made at the meeting 
between the Presidential Committee and 
Mr. Corti, Italian Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 
and the Permanent Council of WEU 
on 21st January 1986) 
1. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
The Assembly continues to be deprived of 
any serious information about the Council's acti-
vities, apart from ministerial meetings. 
(a) In spite of the undertaking given by 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
in December, the 1985 report of the 
working group on the SDI has not 
been communicated to the Assembly. 
(b) The new agencies were set up on 1st 
January 1986, but the Assembly has 
not been informed of: 
(i) their organogram and the staff 
available to them; 
(ii) the tasks assigned to them and the 
time-limits set for accomplishing 
these tasks; 
(iii) how the Ministers of Defence and 
their staff will take part in the 
work of the Council, the work-
ing groups and the agencies; 
(iv) action taken on the proposal to 
set up a European defence insti-
tute; 
(v) keeping the public informed of 
the Council's work; 
(vi) the progress of seven-power 
consultations on disarmament; 
(vil) the SAC's study on Japanese 
armaments and action to be taken 
on this study. 
(c) For future meetings between the Coun-
cil and the Assembly: 
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(i) Are the Council or its Chairman-
in-Office prepared to hold a meet-
ing with the Assembly committee 
responsible for relations with the 
Council before the ministerial 
meeting in Venice so that the 
Council may be informed of the 
Assembly's views in due time? 
(ii) Is the Council prepared to receive, 
at the close of the ministerial meet-
ing in Venice, the two committees 
(Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and Gene-
ral Affairs Committee) which 
have requested a joint meet-
ing on that occasion, as well as the 
Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly? If the Council consi-
ders it desirable, these meetings 
might be combined in a single 
meeting. 
(iii) Is the Permanent Council prepa-
red to organise twice-yearly meet-
ings with the Presidential Com-
mittee of the Assembly in order to 
inform it of the state of matters 
dealt with in WEU? 
(d) The Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly has not been very satisfied 
with the way ministers have taken part 
in Assembly sessions. 
2. SDI 
(i) It has expressed the wish that 
their interventions be grouped on 
the day set aside for consideration 
of the Council's work. At the 
next session, this would be in the 
afternoon of Tuesday, 3rd June. 
(ii) The Presidential Committee has 
also expressed the wish that the 
Council be represented through-
out the Assembly's debates by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil or by a minister or secretary of 
state representing him and empo-
wered to speak during debates on 
matters on the agenda, either to 
answer questions or to give the 
Council's views on the matters 
being debated. 
(a) The probable cuts to be made by the Uni-
ted States Congress in amounts earmarked by the 
United States for its defence are perhaps liable to 
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alter the offers of co-operation made by the Uni-
ted States to its partners. It is to be feared that 
if Europe does not give an early answer to the 
offers made to it the United States may give prio-
rity in this field to the countries which were the 
first to give their answers, and particularly 
Japan. The Assembly has been informed of 
divergent answers given by certain member 
countries to the United States offers. However, 
it has not been informed of the text of the agree-
ments concluded between certain member coun-
tries and the United States in this connection. 
In view of the importance of the reports 
considered during the debate on the SDI, which 
was the central point of the Assembly's last ses-
sion, does the Council intend to take account of 
them in pursuing its work on the harmonisation 
of European answers to the SDI? Does it intend 
to pursue a dialogue with the Assembly on this 
matter? 
(b) The development of Eureka requires that 
Europeans know what benefits they will derive 
from the SDI so as to direct their own pro-
gramme and to foresee the budgetary commit-
ments needed for Eureka. 
Does the Council intend to tackle the 
question of the relationship between the SDI and 
Eureka and is it prepared to inform the Assembly 
about the development of Eureka since the pro-
gramme was adopted in Hanover on 6th Novem-
ber 1985? 
3. WEU agencies 
Information received by the Assembly 
suggests that the new WEU agencies will have 
very small staffs which will not allow them to 
conduct research on their own. It will be possi-
ble to make them responsible only for work of 
synthesis whose value will depend on the sources 
of information available to them and the means 
they have of processing this information. 
This implies agreement between WEU on 
the one hand and NATO, the IEPG and national 
administrations on the other for the provision of 
the necessary information. Secondly, it requires 
a computerised documentation centre being 
made available to the agencies. Can the Coun-
cil specify what steps have been taken to provide 
the agencies with the information they need? 
The question arises whether the Assembly 
will be able to have access to this information 
and to the agencies' computer and in what condi-
tions. 
4. Problems outside the NATO area 
The Assembly has heard nothing about 
how the Council has followed up the intentions 
expressed in the Rome declaration in this 
connection. 
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(a) Does the Council intend to examine 
the consequences for Europe of the 
emergence of new arms producing and 
exporting powers such as Japan and 
Brazil? 
(b) Does the Council intend to tackle the 
questions raised by certain countries' 
support for international terrorism and 
measures to be tak(ln to prevent the 
growth of such terrorism? 
(c) Does the Council intend to seek to har-
monise member courtries' policies so 
as to help to restore peace where it is 
the most seriously threatened, particu-
larly in the Near ~nd Middle East, 
Africa or possibly Latin America, as it 
is urged to do in the modified Brussels 
Treaty? 
2. Letter from Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(8th February 1986) 
Aware as I am that the relations between 
the Council and the Assembly, and a more active 
contribution to the work of WEU on the part of 
the latter, constitute an essential aspect of the 
relaunching of the organisation, as agreed with 
the other member states, I had asked the Minis-
ter of State, Mr. Corti, to attend the joint mee-
ting of the Permanent Council and the Presiden-
tial Committee held in Paris on 21st January 
last. 
I have learnt from the Minister of State 
that the meeting - which is the first of a new pat-
tern of contacts I deem very useful - achieved 
satisfactory results and laid down the basis for 
the opening of a new chapter in the relations bet-
ween the two bodies, to the success of which, as 
reported to me by Ambassador Bottai, all the 
members are committed. 
In the mentioned Paris meeting the Italian 
Presidency suggested some concrete measures 
aimed at intensifying the flow of information 
from the Council to the Assembly. I refer in 
particular to the institutionalisation of the perio-
dical meetings between the Presidential Commit-
tee and the Permanent Council, to written 
briefings on the activities of the Council, to the 
presentation of the general report every six 
months and, lastly, to the circulation, in the 
appropriate form, of some of the working papers 
of the Council. 
I believe that, by implementing such mea-
sures, possibly together with others which may 
be identified later on, the Assembly should be 
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able to have a clear and updated picture of the 
trends prevailing within the Council with regard 
to the problems WEU is called to deal with. 
Among these, I have registered the expec-
tations of the Assembly on the strategic defence 
initiative. The matter, owing to its very nature, 
is in constant development and continues to be 
examined collectively in order to exchange infor-
mation and evaluations, in the framework of the 
choices that each country has made or is about to 
make in this field. The answer to Written Ques-
tion 263 will provide further elements on this 
point. 
I have also taken note of the other topics 
mentioned in your letter of 28th January and 
have asked Ambassador Bottai to gather the 
other partners' views on them. As for the Presi-
dency, I can assure you that the indications 
conveyed by you will be taken in due considera-
tion. 
I hope that a more intense dialogue bet-
ween the Council and the Assembly, to which 
Italy is firmly committed, will in any case foster 
a convergence of the ends of these two bodies, 
which is in the interest of WEU. 
I wish to reiterate my willingness to meet 
the Committee for Relations with the Council 
prior to the Venice meetings, the programme of 
which foresees also a working session with the 
Defence and General Affairs Committees. 
I know that the proposals put forward by 
yourself on the organisation of the next session 
of the Assembly are being examined by the 
Council. I hope that the engagements of the 
various ministers will enable them to meet with 
your wish; on my part, I shall not fail, as in the 
past, to participate in the proceedings, possibly 
in the afternoon of 3rd June. 
I shall ask the Secretary-General to inform 
you, in consultation with the Permanent Coun-
cil, of the reactions to some specific proposals 
advanced by you in your letter and which require 
the agreement of all the partners 
3. Letter from Mr. Caro, 
President of the Assembly, to Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
(28th February 1986) 
In answer to your kind letter of 8th 
February 1986 concerning the dialogue between 
the Council and the Assembly, I have pleasure in 
confirming that the Committee for Relations 
with the Council would be very grateful if you 
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would receive it, about one month before the 
Venice meetings, for a meeting similar to those 
organised in Gymnich under German presi-
dency. 
I also have to inform you of the wish of 
the Presidential Committee that it be heard by 
the Council during the next ministerial meet-
ing. In order to associate the Assembly more 
closely with the Council's deliberations, the Pre-
sidential Committee wishes its traditional meet-
ing with the Council to be held before the Minis-
ters complete their work. This meeting would 
be of a confidential nature so as to allow eve-
ryone to speak freely on both the Council and the 
parliamentary sides. It is clear that it would be 
even more fruitful if the Presidential Committee 
were better informed of the items on the Coun-
cil's agenda. 
Furthermore, as you know, the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and the 
General Affairs Committee have asked to hold a 
joint meeting with the Council at the close of the 
ministerial meeting in Venice. The procedure 
which I propose for the Presidential Committee 
would have the advantage of avoiding its meet-
ing with the Council being a duplicate of the 
meeting between the Council and these two com-
mittees. 
4. Letter from Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(17th March 1986) 
I have received your letter of 28th 
February in which you refer to the forthcoming 
meeting with the Committee for Relations with 
the Council. I am pleased to confirm that this 
will be held on 8th April. You also suggest that 
the traditional meeting between the Council and 
the Presidential Committee be held during the 
period of the Council meeting and not, as is cus-
tomary, at its close. 
At present, we are in agreement with the 
principle of organising a meeting with the Presi-
dential Committee on 30th April at 11 a.m., to 
be followed, before the traditional press confe-
rence, by the meeting with the General Affairs 
Committee and the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Although I found your proposal interest-
ing, I must nevertheless point out, after having 
duly ascertained the opinions of the other part-
ners, that the imminence of the Council meeting 
in Venice does not allow such an innovative 
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method to be studied in sufficient detail for it to 
be adopted. 
5. Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(29th April 1986) 
As he indicated in his answer of 8th 
February to your letter of 28th January, the 
Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Andreotti, has asked 
me to inform you of the Council's reactions to 
some of your proposals. 
The Council first wishes to emphasise 
once again its conviction that excellent commu-
nications between our two organs are essen-
tial. It has held many discussions on the mat-
ter, being intent on quickly achieving a real 
improvement in procedure for dialogue and esta-
blishing regular, reciprocal and efficient exchan-
ges of information. 
1. In regard to meetings between the Assem-
bly and the Permanent Council, the latter unani-
mously recognises the usefulness of informal 
meetings similar to the one held in Paris on 21st 
January and is prepared to hold further meetings 
of this kind, in particular on the eve of sessions 
of the Assembly. 
(i) Referring to the next meeting of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, the Presidency-in-Office of the 
Council consulted you and proposes to meet the 
Presidential Committee, the General Affairs 
Committee and the Committee on Defence 
questions and Armaments at the end of its meet-
mg. 
(ii) Regarding future Assembly sessions, the 
Council noted with interest the Presidential 
Committee's wish that ministerial speeches at 
Assembly sessions be grouped on the day devo-
ted to examination of the Council's work. The 
continuous presence of the Chairman-in-Office 
or his representative at political level during 
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Assembly debates may present a problem due to 
the ministers concerned having other commit-
ments. However, it is the will of member 
governments that this should be ensured in the 
manner the Assembly finds most useful. 
2. The annual report which the Council sub-
mits to the Assembly in the spring of each year is 
an important part of the Assembly's debates. 
The Council will endeavour to allow these deba-
tes to be based on up-to-date information. To 
this end, it will submit the report of the Council 
in two half-yearly parts and, as and when neces-
sary, will transmit written information on certain 
activities. This will of course have to be done 
with due respect for the confidential nature of its 
work. 
Reciprocally, the Council wishes to receive 
the Assembly's reports much earlier so that 
ministers' speeches in the relevant debates may 
be better prepared. 
3. You also refer to Mr. ~nscher's proposal 
for a European defence research institute for 
security matters. Having completed the reorga-
nisation of the new agencies, the Council propo-
ses to study means of improving co-operation 
between the national research institutes which 
study European security. 
4. The Council recognises the need for a 
significant improvement in public awareness of 
WEU. To this end, it has set up a public rela-
tions and information unit in the secretariat. 
With the same aim in mind, the Secretary-
General has agreed to give a number of lectu-
res. 
The purpose of this letter is not to answer 
in detail each of the matters you raise but to give 
you an idea of how the dialogue may be develo-
ped. 
It is clear that the Council's replies to 
Assembly recommendations and written ques-
tions remain the normal means of communica-
tion between the two organs. It is also possible 
to use one of the abovementioned procedures or 
any other procedure if necessary. 
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Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Exchange of letters between Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, 
Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU 
1. Letter from Mr. Caro, 
President of the Assembly, to Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
(20th December 1985) 
Before the close of the year, I wish to 
express my thanks to you for the efforts you have 
made for the cause of a Europe capable of 
making its voice heard in the debate on its own 
security. 
The achievement of this goal, which also 
inspires my action, requires the WEU Council, 
in the present European context, to exercise the 
duties our Assembly has been urging it to assume 
for a long time. But our Assembly too must be 
able to pursue its activities. I know this is our 
joint concern. At our December session, during 
which you delivered a most outstanding speech, 
we agreed to set up an ad hoc group with equal 
representation at the political level in order to 
break the present budgetary deadlock. I there-
fore propose a meeting in the early days of next 
year, which I would attend accompanied by Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
I hope this meeting at political level will 
allow the way to be cleared for a solution to a 
problem which seems minimal in view of the 
sums in question but important when it is reali-
sed that it is a question of providing the parlia-
mentary body of WEU with the means to fulfil 
its mission. 
2. Letter from Mr. Andreotti, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(11th January 1986) 
tatives from the Assembly and from the Council 
to find a satisfactory solution to the budgetary 
requirements which have been explained to me 
and suggest that we should meet. 
In this respect I have the pleasure to 
inform you that for the current year the Council 
has decided - thanks in particular to the stimula-
ting action pursued unremittingly by the Italian 
presidency - to increase the budget by about 
8.6%. 
I realise that this increase is less than the 
Assembly requested but, even if it is granted only 
as an exceptional measure, it nevertheless 
departs from the principle of zero growth to 
which as you know certain members of the orga-
nisation were initially most firmly attached. 
In these conditions, the solution we have 
reached corresponds to the compromise we wan-
ted and in my opinion constitutes, at this given 
time, the maximum it will be possible to obtain. 
I regret that I shall be unable to exchange 
views with you in Paris on 21st January next 
during the first of the meetings planned between 
representatives of the Assembly and of the Per-
manent Council but I have already other com-
mitments which prevent me from attending. 
However, since I attach symbolic value to the 
implementation of the new procedure for 
contacts which is not just for this occasion, I 
have the pleasure to inform you that the Minister 
of State, Mr. Corti, will represent me on that 
occasion. 
3. Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(17th January 1986) 
The Council has studied in the greatest 
detail the budget of the Assembly and the diffi-
culties experienced by governments in expressing 
an opinion on the Assembly's proposals for 
1986. It believes this question should be settled 
Thank you for your kind letter of 20th as quickly as possible ifthere are to be good rela-
December last in which you take up my proposal tions between the Council and the Assembly, as 
to form a group of an equal number of represen- required at the present juncture. 
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At its meeting on 15th January, the Coun-
cil instructed me to inform you of its present 
position with regard to the Assembly's future 
budgets and particularly its guidelines for 
1986. 
First and foremost, the Council wishes to 
call the Assembly's attention to the need, in view 
of the budgetary conditions prevailing in all the 
member states, to adhere to the zero growth prin-
ciple. 
Furthermore, the delegations emphasised 
the pressing importance of taking account of the 
insistence of WEU ministers themselves regar-
ding the need, in examining reforms relating to 
the reactivation of WEU, to respect the requisite 
budgetary limits. 
However, as an exceptional measure, the 
Council agrees that the budget of the Assembly 
for 1986 may be increased by a maximum of 
8.6% over the budget adopted for 1985. This is 
a concession granted to the Assembly alone, and 
not to the ministerial organs ofWEU whose bud-
get, as now adopted, shows an increase of5.9%. 
To explain this decision, the Council has 
instructed me to set out the following considera-
tions: 
The global increase proposed seems justi-
fied in this period of reform in which the Assem-
bly has an important additional role to play in 
regard to public opinion and external relations. 
This increase must in no way be conside-
red as compensation for the previous years 
during which authorised increases might have 
been below zero growth. This principle of com-
pensation linked to the previous budget is not 
acceptable to the governments. 
In the case of the budget of the ministerial 
organs, which has been agreed, the difference 
between the 1985 and 1986 budgets is the result 
of a deliberate policy of the Secretary-General 
and of the Council to reduce or to postpone 
expenditure during the past year pending specific 
decisions on future requirements. 
Except for the special case of the Assembly 
in 1986, henceforth all WEU budgets must res-
pect the principle of zero growth. 
Taking account of the above and in view 
of the fact that the Assembly withdrew its first 
budgetary proposals in December 1985, the 
governments are prepared to examine a draft 
budget of the Assembly for 1986 as early as pos-
sible so that the Assembly might proceed forth-
with to establish its programme for this year. A 
draft budget presented in February, for instance, 
might be adopted once and for all in March, but 
the Council would like to have the opinion of the 
Assembly on this point. 
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I also wish to inform you that the Council 
proposes to examine subsequently the question 
of the presentation of the budgets of the ministe-
rial organs with an eye to simplification which 
might also affect the Assembly. 
When the time- comes, the Council will be 
happy to communicate to the Assembly its 
conclusions on this point which might constitute 
a step to the advantage of the Assembly as well as 
of the Council. 
4. Letter from Mr. Caro, 
President of the As$embly, 
to Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU 
(27th January 1986) 
Following a statement by the Chairman of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration, the Assembly noted at the last session 
that it was not in a position to vote on the draft 
budget submitted to it since the Council had not 
made its opinion known. 
It therefore instructed the Presidential 
Committee to negotiate with the Council for the 
Assembly to be granted adequate financial 
means and to take the nece$sary measures to 
finalise, in acceptable conditions, the Assembly's 
draft budget. 
The Assembly regrets that it has not been 
possible to hold these negotiations since the 
agreement reached between the Council and the 
Presidential Committee on 4tlh December 1985 
to hold a meeting of the ad hoc joint committee 
to examine the Assembly's budget from a politi-
cal standpoint was not followed up. It was by 
unilateral decision that the Council fixed the rate 
of increase ofthe 1986 budget compared with the 
1985 budget at 8.6% and asked for a new budget 
conforming with this requirement. 
The Presidential Committee is compelled 
to take note of this decision but cannot approve 
it. The total amount of the budget having thus 
been decreed by the Council, the Assembly will 
take steps to reduce expenditure. I intend to 
inform you of these steps as soon as possible. 
The Assembly considers that it is for the 
Council to take this opportunity of giving a 
favourable answer to Recommendation 429 and 
" guarantee the Assembly full independence in 
all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its 
overall budget between the various heads while 
respecting the regulations governing the staff of 
the co-ordinated organisations ". 
Application of the zero growth criterion 
will be possible only when the Assembly's means 
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have been adapted to its tasks, as has been done 
for the ministerial organs, and, in particular, 
once a solution has been found to the recent 
reduction in the staff of the Assembly and to the 
shortcomings which henceforth jeopardise the 
smooth conduct of its work. 
While, in this spirit, credits should cer-
tainly be allocated to the Assembly, as you indi-
cate, to allow it to fulfil the additional role devol-
ving upon it in regard to public opinion and 
external relations, this cannot be the only justifi-
cation for increasing its budget. Implementa-
tion of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
requires a dialogue between the Council and the 
Assembly which can be fruitful only if the 
Assembly is allocated the means which will allow 
it to fulfil, in correlation with the development of 
the Council's activities, its twofold role of stimu-
lation and supervision. 
Expenditure on pensions will rise very 
considerably this year and will increase further in 
future because officials recruited when the 
Assembly formed its secretariat will be reaching 
retirement age. This compulsory expenditure is 
outside the control of the Assembly and must not 
lead to a reduction in its operating budget. The 
limitation of credits granted to the Assembly can 
therefore apply only to its operating budget. 
Finally, since the true rate of inflation so 
far has always been higher than authorised bud-
get increases, refusal of the principle of compen-
sating losses in resources calculated in real terms 
implies a steady reduction in the Assembly's 
financial resources. The Assembly notes with 
regret that the Council has thus departed from 
the spirit of its Rome declaration. 
5. Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(4th February 1986) 
Thank you for your letter of 27th January 
1986 concerning the Assembly budget. 
As you know, the Council's position is set 
out in my letter to you dated 17th January 1986. 
The questions raised in your letter in 
connection with the Assembly's autonomy and 
pension costs will be considered by the Council 
in the framework of its repiies to Recommenda-
tions 429 and 426. 
The final approval of the budget is clearly 
an urgent problem and I shall be glad to know 
the outcome of the meeting of the Assembly's 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
358 
APPENDIX 11 
tration to be held on 5th February, so that a pro-
gramme and dates for a meeting of the Council's 
Budget Committee may be arranged to discuss a 
draft Assembly budget, adapted accordingly. 
I am sure that you will understand the 
requirements incumbent on the Council in this 
situation and that this understanding will be sha-
red by the members of the Assembly whose 
essential role in the reactivation of WEU is fully 
appreciated by the Council and, as you know, by 
myself. 
6. Letter from Mr. Caro, 
President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU 
(24th February 1986) 
In answer to your letter of 4th February, I 
am pleased to send you the changes to the draft 
budget of the Assembly for 1986 as adopted by 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration on 5th February and by the Presiden-
tial Committee of the Assembly on 24th 
February. 
Like you, I think the final approval of the 
budget is an urgent matter and I shall be grateful 
for anything you can do to bring this affair to a 
speedy conclusion. 
7. Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(27th February 1986) 
Thank you for your letter of 24th February 
and for document A/WEU /BA (86) 2 revised 
containing the amendments to the Assembly's 
budget for 1986 adopted by the Presidential 
Committee. 
We are all aware of the serious budgetary 
difficulties facing our governments and I know 
the problems which this situation has created for 
you as President of the Assembly. I sincerely 
hope that following the next meeting of the Bud-
get and Organisation Committee to be held on 
1Oth and 11th April and the expression of a posi-
tive opinion by the Council we shall be able to 
settle this matter and pursue our common aim, 
the establishment of the best possible relation-
ship between us for the greatest good of WEU. 
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8. Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly 
(24th Apri/1986) 
I have the honour to inform you that at its 
meeting on 23rd April 1986 the Council expres-
sed a favourable opinion on the budget of the 
WEU Assembly for 1986 as presented in docu-
ment C-B (86) 5. 
I enclose one copy of this document in 
French and one in English. 
14th April 1986 C-B (86) 5 
Secretary-General's note 
WEU Assembly budget (amended) for 1986 
1. The Secretary-General refers to the amen-
ded budget of the Assembly for 1986, circulated 
under reference B (86) 8 (Assembly document 
A/WEU /BA (86) 2 revised), in which the estima-
tes originally presented in B (85) 16 have been 
reduced to bring the net total down to a level 
compatible with the Council's decision that the 
increase over 1985 should be limited to 8.6% 
(CR (86) 1, IV, 1). 
2. The amended budget was examined by the 
Budget and Organisation Committee at its meet-
ing in London on lOth April1986 (BR (86) 1, Ill) 
and the debate is summarised as follows: 
Presentation 
The committee acknowledged the efforts 
made by the Assembly to meet the wishes of the 
Council; one delegate regretted the lack of more 
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detailed information on how the substantial 
reductions had been achieved. Other delega-
tions agreed. The representative of the Office of 
the Clerk pointed out that the Assembly had had 
to present the document in haste because of the 
timetable for various meetings. Normally, the 
Assembly's budget contained fully detailed 
explanations and would in the future do so. In 
applying the reductions to the 1986 budget, 
account had been taken of the observations 
made by delegations at the committee's October 
1985 meeting. The committee accepted that the 
circumstances were exceptional in this ins-
tance. 
Pensions 
The Italian Delegate, with support from 
other members ofthe committee, urged that pen-
sions be excluded from the '8.6% target. The 
Netherlands and United Kingdom could not 
agree however. 
Estimates 
The committee noted that the original esti-
mates of F 20,021,300 had been reduced by 
F 3,211,400 to F 16,809,900 including pensions, 
which represented an increase of 8.65% over 
1985. Without pensions, the increase was 
7.39%. It was also noted that all staffing propo-
sals in the original budget had been with-
drawn. 
Detailed questions on a number of specific 
items of expenditure were answered by the 
Assembly's representative. 
3. Subject to the comments and observations 
reported above, the committee could unani-
mously recommend the Council to express a 
favourable opinion on the Assembly's budget for 
1986 as amended in document B (86) 8. 
4. The Council's formal approval of this bud-
get will be sought at the meeting to be held on 
23rd April 1986. 
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WEU Secretariat-General 
(a) Secretary-General's visit to Spain 
Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(26th February 1986) 
As you know, I made an official visit to 
Spain on 28th and 29th January. 
Through you I wish to inform the Assem-
bly of the main points of this visit. 
It was made at the invitation of the Spa-
nish Government. 
It allowed me to meet the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Fernandez-Ordonez, the Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Serra, and their colleagues. It also 
gave me an opportunity oflecturing to the Diplo-
matic School on Western European Union as 
such and also as an element of the building of 
Europe and the beginning of a pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. 
Finally, it gave me an opportunity of meet-
ing the Spanish press, usually with those whom I 
met, and in particular with Mr. Fernandez-
Ordonez. 
My activities during the two days I spent 
in the Spanish capital covered three topics: 
- co-operation between the Independent 
European Programme Group and W es-
tern European Union in regard to Euro-
pean armaments co-operation, since 
Spain has had the presidency of the 
IEPG since 1st January; 
- the Spanish Government's interest in 
Spain joining Western European 
Union; 
- Spain's relations with the Atlantic 
Alliance, in particular in the context of 
the referendum to be held on 12th 
March. 
On co-operation between the IEPG and 
WEU in regard to European armaments co-ope-
ration, my talks with Mr. Serra confirmed the 
conclusions I drew from my talks in The Hague 
in December with the outgoing Netherlands pre-
sidency in the person of the Minister of Defence, 
Mr. de Ruiter, and the Secretary of State for 
Armaments, Mr. van Houwelingen. Both the 
Spanish Minister of Defence and his Netherlands 
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colleague showed their interest in the driving role 
which Western European Union and its member 
countries can play in the Independent European 
Programme Group. The Spanish Minister 
agreed that it was important to maintain the 
necessary contacts in order to avoid duplication 
but on the other hand to promote worthwhile 
co-operation. In this spirit he said that, as the 
Netherlands presidency had already done, he 
would be happy for the Chairman of the IEPG 
and the Secretary-General of WEU to meet 
periodically and for the Director of WEU's 
Agency Ill for the development of co-operation 
in the field of armaments to hold regular meet-
ings with the Chairman of the IEPG National 
Armaments Directors and the Chairmen of the 
IEPG panels, particularly Panel Ill, whose res-
ponsibilities would make such contacts espe-
cially useful. He welcomes the co-operation 
now being established between the IEPG group 
of wise men responsible for studying the compe-
titivity of European armaments industries and 
WEU's Agency Ill, designed to enable the latter 
to make its contribution to the work of the wise 
men. 
On relations between Spain and Western 
European Union, those to whom I spoke confir-
med Spain's interest in acceding to WEU. 
How do they view such accession? 
They are aware that accession to WEU is 
at the invitation of the WEU Council. They 
will therefore await this invitation in due course, 
i.e. after the major debate on the problem of 
security raised by the referendum on 12th March 
has come to a conclusion. 
In this latter respect, the proximity of the 
referendum could not but give a certain amount 
of colour to my visit - which obviously did not 
take place in this specific context - not because 
the Spanish Government or I so wished but 
because of the force of circumstances. 
It goes without saying that the Spanish 
press and the international press represented in 
Madrid were very interested in putting questions 
to me in this connection. 
I did not wish to shirk this task but to ans-
wer as Secretary-General of a European organisa-
tion. In this connection, I recalled that where I 
personally was concerned I considered Western 
European Union destined to assert itself as: 
- the European dimension of security, i.e. 
as an element of the edifice which is 
taking its place, if not at the same level 
APPENDIX Ill 
because we are seven and not twelve, at 
least at the side of the other elements of 
this European edifice, the Communities 
and political co-operation; 
- the beginning of a European pillar of the 
alliance. 
Still in my personal capacity, I concluded 
that it was politically desirable, if a state wished 
to join WEU, for it: 
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- to be a member of the Communities 
and of political co-operation; 
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; 
and 
- to have a real desire to promote a Euro-
pean security dimension. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Agencies responsible for security questions 
(a) Duties of the agencies 
Letter from Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly 
(17th March 1986) 
The Council has instructed me to give you 
the following information concerning the staff 
and activities of the new agencies responsible for 
security questions. 
Since 1st January, each of these agencies 
has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the 
agency for the study of arms control and disar-
mament questions (Agency I) and the restruc-
tured ACA. The former head of the internatio-
nal secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is 
responsible for the agency for the development 
of co-operation in armaments (Agency Ill). Ap-
pointed by the ministers at their meeting in 
Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior United 
Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has taken 
charge ofthe agency for the study of security and 
defence problems (Agency II). 
A full table of establishment will be sent to 
you as soon as all the posts have been filled. 
As indicated in the Bonn communique, 
the role of these new agencies is to carry out the 
studies requested by the Council. 
Certain studies have already been planned, 
all or part of which will be the subject of interim 
reports which might be presented to the minis-
ters at their meeting in Venice. 
Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-vis 
the countries of Western Europe in regard to 
questions ofthe control of armaments and disar-
mament. In the future it will also have to take 
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an interest in the control of conventional arma-
ments and the essential problem of verifica-
tion. -
In connection and close co-ordination 
with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II will have to 
study the assessment of the threat, the contribu-
tion of the WEU countries to tqe response to this 
threat, and the question of manangement resour-
ces. 
Agency Ill will study certain aspects of 
competitivity in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evolution of 
the world arms market, together with the pro-
blems of technological transfers between Euro-
pean allies. 
Other tasks have been planned and will 
have to be undertaken during the transitional 
period up to the end of 1987. 
All these studies constitute internal work-
ing papers for the Council intended to contribute 
to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt 
with. 
In order to guarantee the availability of the 
information necessary for them, the agencies 
shall establish links with the appropriate interna-
tional bodies and with national administra-
tions. In this respect it must be noted that the 
latter must be assured that the classified informa-
tion they transmit to the ministerial organs of 
WEU is handled in accordance with their secu-
rity regulations and limited to the exclusive use 
of these organs. 
The suggestion to place at the disposal of 
the ministerial organs a computerised documen-
tation centre will have to be assessed in the light 
ofbudgetary priorities and will have to be exami-
ned subsequently by the Council. 
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Document 1064 29th May 1986 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 425 to 431 
RECOMMENDATION 425 1 
on disarmament 1 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union that has resulted from the summit meeting in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the 
agreement to hold further summit meetings as well as meetings of ministers and experts on various 
issues, and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the 
principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weap-
ons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements; 
(ii) Considering the present status of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in 
Vienna, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, in the Conference on Disarma-
ment in Geneva, and of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on 
nuclear and space weapons in Geneva; 
(iii) Considering the conclusions of the third review conference on the non-proliferation treaty held in 
Geneva; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of a concerted European position on all issues discussed in these forums 
in order to ensure that proper weight is attached to the requirements of European security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that the machinery and practice of consultation in NATO attaches full weight to the views 
of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues; 
2. Hold preliminary discussions itself on disarmament and arms control issues whenever a member 
government feels that proper weight is not being given to the European position in NATO or that Euro-
pean political co-operation has been unable to discuss an issue; 
3. Request the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals ofthe Soviet 
Union in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, and to seek an early interim agree-
ment on INF systems providing for the lowest levels compatible with the interests of allied security of 
United States systems based in Europe and comparable Soviet systems; 
4. Request countries participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations to press 
for an early first phase agreement in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for 
prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments; 
5.(a) Pending agreement in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on improved compulsory 
confidence-building measures, urge the Warsaw Pact to extend regular invitations to manreuvres to 
observers from NATO countries under the terms of the Helsinki final act; 
(b) Instruct the Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions to study the veri-
fication and observer regime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and 
to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact manreuvres; 
6.(a) Urge member countries in the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to the urgent negotia-
tion of treaties to ban chemical weapons and all nuclear tests; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 1043). 
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(b) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear test 
explosions with a view to establishing reliable seismic calibration data and urge the Soviet Union and 
the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties; 
7.(a) Request nuclear countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, to make arrangements as 
soon as possible to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as mentioned 
in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the non-
proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it; 
(b) Urge all members of IAEA to further improve its safeguards and to establish arrangements for 
international plutonium storage and spent fuel management; 
(c) Urge all parties to the London nuclear suppliers' group guidelines for nuclear transfers to continue 
co-operation and improve the application of the guidelines; 
(d) Urge member governments to insist on the full application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear 
material and installations in recipient countries before authorising the export of civilian nuclear mate-
rial or facilities. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 425 
The Council is fully aware of the need to ensure that European views are taken into due account 
within the Atlantic Alliance consultative process, particularly when the issues discussed relate to, or 
have implications for, the European dimension of common security. It believes that the co-ordination 
of views which has taken place within WEU and the continuous process of consultation within the 
Atlantic Alliance have so far given WEU governments ample opportunities to present their views and 
make an effective contribution to the formulation of positions adopted by the western countries within 
the framework of various negotiations in progress. This also applies to the proposals which have been 
publicly presented by the Soviet Union and tabled at the bilateral negotiations in Ge~eva on space and 
nuclear arms. WEU member states have actively contributed to the identification of positive elements 
in those proposals and of potential areas of convergence, while rejecting those negative aspects which 
have unacceptable implications for the security of Europe. 
The Council expressed its support for the efforts made by the United States in the talks with the 
Soviet Union about their nuclear weapons and space. In this connection, it recalls that the fundamen-
tal objective of arms control, both conventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and stability 
at the lowest possible level of forces. 
With regard to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Council draws the attention of the Assem-
bly to the fact that new proposals were put forward on 5th December 1985 by the western countries par-
ticipating in these negotiations, which seek to open a more fruitful dialogue in that negotiating forum 
and reflect the general views of the Assembly. WEU member countries regret, however, that the east-
ern response has so far been disappointing and hope that the Soviet Union will translate into deeds at 
the negotiating table its recent statements. The Council considers it necessary to intensify the negotia-
tions at the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe 
(CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in order that results can be achieved before the thir:d CSCE follow-up 
conference in the autumn of this year. These results must be concrete and substantial in the form of a 
set of CSBMs which are of military significance, politically binding, provided with adequate forms of 
verification and which cover the whole of Europe, as laid down in the mandate for this 
conference. They must represent a qualitative leap forward from those provisions agreed at Helsinki 
and this would justify a reaffirmation of the commitment to the principle of non-use of force. The con-
ference adjourns on 19th September. Ifthe conference is to produce a worthwhile agreement leading to 
greater openness about military activity of the sort that WEU member states require, the Soviet Union 
must show a greater willingness to negotiate on practical measures of information exchange, notifica-
tion, observation and verification. 
The Council is deeply aware of the urgent need to promote early progress in the negotiation of a 
global and verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. WEU govern-
ments have been actively involved in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva 
and will pursue their efforts with a view to agreement on this important subject. 
The Council is aware of the wish of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union ways of 
improving the verification provisions of the United States-Soviet treaties on nuclear 'testing. It regrets 
the Soviet Union's rejection of the United States proposal for exchanges of test-site observers. This 
would, in fact, have represented a step towards progress in achieving the aforesaid treaties' aim of for-
mally constraining nuclear testing. 
The Council reiterates the importance attached by member governments to the universal applica-
tion of the non-proliferation regime. WEU governments are satisfied that !AEA safeguards are effec-
tive in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They favour continued improvement in the 
implementation of the safeguards system and the wider acceptance of full-scope safeguards. They also 
favour the establishment of arrangements for international plutonium storage. They will continue to 
act accordingly. 
WEU member states have all adhered to the nuclear suppliers' group guidelines and are all com-
mitted to ensuring their effective implementation. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1986. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 426 1 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial years 1984 and 1985 2 
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Having taken note of the contents; 
(iii) Considering that: 
(a) the new structure of the ministerial organs ofWestern European Union depends essentially on 
the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional reform announced in the 
Rome declaration of 27th October 1984; 
(b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are 
merely a renewal of the budget for 1983; 
(c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis; 
(d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth was 
applied; 
(e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated 
organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this 
criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets; 
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expendi-
ture instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget; 
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the 
Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject; 
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for 
the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have 
offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision 
on this matter. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (I Oth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 1031 ). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 426 
1. The strict application of the zero growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their 
national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute. In principle, this objective 
applies to the overall total of the budget. As far as pension costs are concerned, it is recognised that 
these will continue to increase until the pension scheme has been in operation long enough for the 
levelling-off stage to be reached. It is also recognised that, by the very nature of the scheme and its 
impact on the relatively small budget of WEU, erratic variations in expenditure froQl year to year will 
result. The Council will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating 
expenditure. 
2. While the zero growth target is applied to a total budget, it is, of course, appreciated that some 
expenditure items may attract increases that exceed that target. In such circumstances, it is customary 
and necessary to exercise restraint in other areas of expenditure so that the overall objective may be 
attained. These principles have long been recognised and applied in the case of the budgets of Western 
European Union. 
3. Improvements in the status of staff remain the subject of a continuing study in the framework of 
co-ordination. Difficulties requiring reappraisal and causing delays can and do arise. This and other 
matters of concern to staff remain an important preoccupation of the Co-ordinating Committee. 
4. The Council has taken note of point 4 of the Assembly's recommendation. The question of 
establishing a single seat should in any case be examined in the light of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such an option. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th March 1986. 
369 
DOCUMENT 1064 
RECOMMENDATION 427 1 
on developments in China and European security 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering the major part played by China in the world balance and the maintenance of peace 
and the even more important role it will have to play in the near future; 
(ii) Considering that the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas and may 
develop independently of ideological and institutional differences; 
(iil) Considering that the major aim of the Chinese Government is the country's economic and social 
development; 
(iv) Considering that a condition of this development is the maintenance of peace in Asia and 
throughout the world and welcoming the fact that the Chinese Government clearly shares this convic-
tion; 
(v) Welcoming the development ofthe Chinese economy and oftrade of all kinds between China and 
Western Europe; 
(vi) Deploring developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence; 
(vii) Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being mas-
sacred, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Encourage all possible initiatives to ensure that current negotiations on the reduction of nuclear 
weapons also take the Far East into consideration so as to avoid weapons deployed in Europe being 
moved towards that region; 
2. Study and assess the extent to which Cocom restrictions hinder the continued development of the 
People's Republic of China; 
3. Urge member governments to develop their countries' political, technological and scientific rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China, in particular by: 
(i) increasing trade between China and Western European countries; 
(ii) developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe; 
(iii) facilitating cultural exchanges, particularly by establishing European cultural institutes in 
China. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (lOth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by MM. Michel and van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee (Document 1035). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 427 
1. The Council has examined with interest the Assembly's report on the evolution of China and 
European security and the recommendation adopted on this subject. 
The Council is fully aware of the importance of preventing disarmament measures in the Euro-
pean region from resulting in an increased threat to the Far East. This concern is reflected in positions 
adopted by WEU member countries with regard to the INF negotiations. The United States have 
always proposed the global reduction of LRINK missiles and have consistently maintained that Soviet 
reductions must include deployments in both Europe and Asia. 
2. The Council recalls that, on the basis of considerations similar to those in the recommendation, 
Cocom initiated, in the spring of 1985, a review of the provisions governing exports to China. 
3. All the member governments attach importance to the development of the political, technologi-
cal, scientific, commercial and cultural relations that their countries maintain with the People's 
Republic of China. In 1984 and 1985, trade between China and WEU member states in particular was 
characterised by a significant increase, analogous to the growth which occurred generally in trade 
between China and other industrialised countries. The Council notes that Chinese imports have grown 
faster than Chinese exports, and recognises the desire of the Chinese authorities to achieve a balance of 
trade. 
WEU countries account for approximately a third of total Chinese trade, whereas in proportion-
ate terms China is still a relatively minor trading partner for WEU countries. This indicates the long-
term potential for further growth in trade between China and WEU members. 
The member states are following with interest the smooth and successful implementation of Chi-
nese modernisation plans, based on outward-looking political and economic policies. 
4. Finally, as far as cultural relations are concerned, the Council points out that, in recent years, 
opportunities for the study of Chinese language and culture have multiplied in WEU countries, in 
response to growing popular interest in this large country and in its ancient civilisation. Among the 
WEU countries, France has set up a cultural institute in Peking; the United Kingdom has already estab-
lished a cultural representation there; Italy is preparing to open a cultural centre in Peking, destined to 
become a cultural institute; and the Federal Republic of Germany is about to start negotiations to set up 
an institute of culture there. The Netherlands has an extensive educational and scientific exchange 
programme based on a recently concluded treaty with the People's Republic of China. Belgium, for its 
part, concluded a cultural agreement in December 1980 covering, inter alia, the exchange of language 
assistants in higher educational institutes in the two countries. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th May 1986. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 428 1 
on WEU and the strategic defence initiative 
The strategic defence initiative 
(Defence aspects) 2 
(i) Considering the strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983 and 
the invitation from the United States Secretary ofDefence of March 1985 for allied countries to explore 
possible co-operative efforts " on data and technology short of ABM component level "; 
(ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of 
the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take 
their place in an effective defence system; 
(iii) Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology 
both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in 
verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures; 
(iv) Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States that will enhance secu-
rity and stability and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control 
agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements; 
(v) Expressing the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear deter-
rence which can only strengthen the defence of Europe; 
(vi) Welcoming the better prospect of progress in the bilateral negotiations on " space and nuclear 
arms both strategic and intermediate range", and welcoming the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in 
reply to Recommendation 413*, considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in 
sufficient detail the proposals for the United States' European allies to take part in the SDI programme, 
RECOMMENDS THAT. THE COUNCIL 
1. Agree a common response to the United States' strategic defence 1mUaUve or, if that seems 
impossible, specifY Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of 
the seven WEU member countries which should: 
(a) stress the importance of avoiding an arms race in space; 
(b) accept research compatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale 
which will enhance stability and security; 
(c) permit European industry to participate in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a 
genuine exchange of technology; 
(d) ensure that the answers of members ofWEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the 
development of Europe's technological capability and encourage the development of this 
capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (I I th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 1033). 
* " 3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing 
with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the 
lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes 
that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and 
hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does 
not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, 
under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view ofthe contribution ofthis treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of 
preventing its erosion. ~ 
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2. Give priority and special emphasis to a joint European programme for defence and arms control 
purposes, including observation and communications satellites, and to promoting civil technological 
research of Eureka type within ESA and the European Communities; 
3. Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced 
and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the 
pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in 
the three areas covered; 
4. Emphasise the need, when the results become available, for the United States and its European 
partners to discuss the political as well as the military and strategic implications of research on SDI; 
5. Instruct the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annu-
ally on the arms control impact of the SDI; 
6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe's 
security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy 
in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development ofthe 
strategic defence initiative. 
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to Recommendation 428 
The Council has taken note of the views expressed and the suggestions contained in Recommen-
dation 428. 
The Council reviewed, at its ministerial session in Rome on 14th November 1985, the results of 
the work conducted in the preceding months with the aim of co-ordinating, as far as possible, the 
national reactions of member governments to the United States invitation to participate in the SDI 
research programme. It noted with satisfaction that valuable work had been done in this regard and 
decided that the consultative process between member governments should continue. This decision 
was endorsed by the Ministers at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986 where they 
decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to possible participation 
in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implications for Europe of possible develop-
ments in the field of ballistic missile defence. The Seven consider that it falls within the scope of the 
WEU consultative process to pursue the joint reflection already undertaken in order to identify com-
mon elements of analysis and to facilitate co-ordination of their points of view. This reflection may 
also serve as a useful contribution to consultations on this subject within the Atlantic Alliance. The 
Council is firmly convinced that the security of the alliance as a whole must continue to be based on the 
strategy of nuclear deterrence as long as no valid alternative has been proven feasible and agreed by the 
alliance as a whole. 
The Council may ask the agencies for security questions to provide their specific technical contri-
butions to its work to enable it, as the competent political organ of WEU, to make analyses and draw 
conclusions. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1985. 
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(i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to 
make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the alliance, disarmament 
and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end; 
(iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this 
end; 
(iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Bonn communique 
and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness 
with which these intentions are transformed into decisions; 
(v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation; 
(vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the 
Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people; 
(vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but 
hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communique, the Council will 
increasingly inform the press of its activities; 
(viii) Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer 
institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs ofWEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will 
be prepared separately, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the 
Assembly; 
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the 
development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member 
countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative; 
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of disarmament questions, 
the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, 
by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their 
respective tasks; 
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disar-
mament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned; 
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security: 
(a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appro-
priate means; 
(b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of 
training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the 
seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public 
opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of 
security problems; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1034). 
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6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its 
overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations; 
7. Pursue its effort to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the 
continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees 
of the Assembly; 
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the 
European Community in a joint security policy. 
376 
DOCUMENT 1064 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 429 
1. Following the agreement reached at the extraordinary meeting held in Rome on 26th-27th Octo-
ber 1984 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council's members 
decided to convene normally twice a year at ministerial level, with full participation of Foreign and 
Defence Ministers. This was the case for the ministerial meetings in Bonn in April.1985, in Rome in 
November 1985 and in Venice in April 1986. 
2. The Council is fully aware of the importance of the development of new technologies in the field 
of armaments for the maintenance of security and peace in Europe. Experts of member countries dis-
cuss in the context ofWEU the consequences of new technological developments from the point of view 
of the European dimension of common security. 
The relevant WEU agency will be duly involved in this exercise. 
3. Within the framework of the reactivation ofWEU and in accordance with the tasks attributed to 
the three agencies, the Council has already agreed on the structure and distribution of personnel for 
these new agencies. 
4. The agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions has been assigned general 
tasks and specific studies which reflect the Council's interest in this area. 
5. Fully aware of the importance of informing European public opinion about matters relating to 
security, the Council's members are actively engaged in keeping their citizens informed. The Council 
takes note of the Assembly's suggestion to instruct the new agency concerned with defence questions to 
promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of the member countries; it could 
study how the idea of organising these training courses could be developed and encouraged, particularly 
once the agency is adequately staffed and provided that the present budgetary limits are not 
exceeded. It shares the view that it is important that nationals of the seven countries with responsibil-
ity in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion should acquire a better under-
standing of the European dimension of security problems. 
6. The Council notes the Assembly's wish regarding its budget. However, it would be difficult to 
meet this wish because of different budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the 
Council has approved some simplifications - along the lines desired by the Assembly - in the way the 
ministerial organs' budget is presented which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget. 
7. Following the joint meeting of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly and the Permanent 
Council, held on 21st January ·1986 in the presence of the Italian Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. 
Corti, and the assurances given by Foreign Minister Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office pf the Council, the 
Council confirms its willingness to keep the Assembly informed of its activities, as specifically stated in 
the Secretary-General's letter of 29th April 1986 to the President of the Assembly. 
8. The Council is aware of the Assembly's views on the interest of other states in joining WEU. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th May 1986. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 430 1 
on WEU and the strategic defence initiative -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the 
space challenge for Europe 
(Proposals) 2 
(i) Considering that it is now time to give new emphasis to a balanced, jointly-agreed European space 
policy and welcoming the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency in 
Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985; 
(ii) Aware of the need to develop markets, within Europe and worldwide, which will ensure economic 
returns from the large sums expended on space programmes; 
(iii) Noting that applications of space operations, for instance in telecommunications and meteo-
rology, are hampered by over-nationalistic-minded governmental administrations and institutional 
monopolies; 
(iv) Considering the recognised benefits for mankind of the utilisation of space; 
(v) Considering the need to promote the manufacture in space of new products in the sectors of phar-
macy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials; 
(vi) Considering that Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services; 
(vii) Considering also that European space industry is far more scattered and less rationalised than 
American industry, resulting in over-equipment and excess capacity, which will raise serious problems if 
the prospect of market stagnation is confirmed; 
(viii) Considering that Europe cannot remain in the van of space development if it fails to tackle the 
problems of a permanently-manned space station; 
(ix) Considering that the civil and military space budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union 
are almost seven times larger than the space budgets of the Western European countries; 
(x) Considering that Europe cannot therefore remain outside joint space defence programmes; 
(xi) Welcoming the establishment of the new space agency in Italy and the new space centre in the 
United Kingdom which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: par-
ticipation in the American space station and further development of the European launcher system -
Ariane-5 with the HM-60 engine -leading to an independent European manned transportation system; 
2. To help the European aerospace industry to start a necessary period of reorganisation to ensure its 
independence and competitivity in the international market; 
3. To define the co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activities 
can be discussed and determined; 
4. To accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications, sur-
veillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to strengthen 
strategic stability in relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as indicated in the NATO 
statement of 8th January 1985; 
5. To pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part ofthe thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1 036). 
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The Council shares the Assembly's view on the opportuneness of taking the necessary measures to 
ensure the adoption of a coherent and balanced European space programme. It should, on the one 
hand, give impetus to the pursuit of autonomous programmes and, on the other hand, expand the col-
laboration with American technological projects. 
With the aim of maintaining the political momentum of a European space policy, the member 
states approved at the Conference of Ministers ofthe European Space Agency in Rome in January 1985 
a long-term space programme. The main points of the programme are the development of a fifth-
generation European launcher, Ariane 5, and the setting-up of a European orbital structure (Colombus), 
which is an important factor in view of the participation in the international space station project pro-
posed by the United States President in March 1984. 
The Council is aware of the importance, underlined in the Assembly's recommendation, of the 
European space industry's ability to compete in international markets. Such competitiveness can only 
be achieved by the rationalisation of the European industry and by its vigorous development. 
The decisions adopted by ESA, including those of 30th and 31st January 1985, aim at ensuring the 
carrying out of common programmes and constitute the expression of its support for the independence 
and competitiveness of European industry. 
These decisions stem from the belief that Europe must develop its role and be in the forefront of a 
sector which is of the greatest importance for technological progress, and linked to advancements in 
fields such as biotechnology, electronics and new materials. 
The Council is fully aware of the importance of certain forms of utilisation of space which can 
contribute to strategic stability and to deterrence. The Council is therefore convinced that space tech-
nology in fields such as telecommunications and surveillance satellites can be usefully applied to the 
military sector for peaceful purposes. 
The Council closely monitors every development in technological and scientific research likely to 
affect the security of member countries. 
In this framework, it should be recalled that a process of in-depth reflection is being pursued 
within WEU on the questions related to possible participation in the SDI research programme and the 
politico-strategic implications for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile 
defence. 
It is the view of the seven member countries that it appears premature to reach definitive conclu-
sions, as these may well be affected by future developments, including developments in the research 
itself. These matters call for continuous review and the Seven believe that it is important to pursue the 
joint reflection already undertaken in order to identify common elements of analysis and to facilitate 
co-ordination of their points of view. 
In this framework, it is particularly relevant to analyse the possible impact on European security 
interests of the application of research in the field of ballistic missile defence. 
The enhancement ofNATO's integrated air defence system remains an important issue independ-
ent of SDI. 
As from now, it appears essential to the seven member governments that the research in the field 
of defensive systems be carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States in strict compliance with 
the ABM treaty; that the strategic unity of the Atlantic Alliance be maintained; that deterrence, stability 
and equilibrium be safeguarded and that the main aim of the Geneva negotiations remain substantive, 
balanced and verifiable reductions of the nuclear forces of the two parties. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1986. 
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RECOMMENDATION 431 1 
on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the decision of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom to initiate the project definition of a common Eurofighter aircraft to meet the 
operational requirements of their air forces from the mid-1990s; 
(ii) Understanding the reasons which led the Government of France to seek to procure an aircraft 
based on the Rafa1e experimental aircraft for the French air force and navy in the 1990s; 
(iii) Mindful of the necessity for the members of the western alliance to utilise their resources for 
defence as effectively as possible; 
(iv) Conscious ofthe calls for improved interoperability and standardisation of equipment on the part 
of Western European Union member nations repeatedly made by this Assembly; 
(v) Recalling the political impetus given to increased rationalisation and collaboration by the Euro-
pean aerospace industry at the WEU colloquy on international aeronautical consortia in London in 
1982; 
(vi) Aware that such aircraft currently in service as the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Atlantic, Transall, and Tor-
nado have already demonstrated the industrial, logistic and military benefits of collaborative production 
and joint procurement albeit with differing modes of collaboration and project management in each 
case; 
(vii) Eager to reform governmental, and industrial structures so as to harmonise operational require-
ments, co-ordinate re-equipment timescales and choices and utilise industrial capacity on a 
collaborative basis within the WEU member countries; 
(viii) Convinced that such reforms. are increasingly urgent in order to meet Western Europe's require-
ments for military aircraft at reasonable cost and to compete on more equal terms with United States 
manufacturers both within the NATO market and worldwide; 
(ix) Noting the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop 
the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal 
made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of 
co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes; 
(x) Believing that WEU and this Assembly in particular have a vital role in hel,ping to overcome 
national self-interests and the parochial political impediments which stand in the way of Western Euro-
pean integration of the procurement and production of high technology defence equipment, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the member states to: 
1. Ensure that the Independent European Programme Group issues regular reports of its proceedings 
to the Assembly ofWEU in order that members of the Assembly may monitor more closely the progress 
of Western European arms co-operation; 
2. Accede to requests to join WEU which have been or may be made by such non-member countries 
as Portugal or Spain respectively so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the 
defence field in Western Europe; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 1037). 
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3. Utilise to the full the experience gained in the management of previous international 
collaborative aerospace projects, and in particular of the Panavia Tornado, in deciding the governmen-
tal and industrial management structures to be adopted for the Eurofighter; 
4. Invite the governments of France on the one hand and of the four Eurofighter consortium nations 
on the other to request the participation of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in the pro-
duction and procurement of their respective fighter aircraft to replace the F-16 in the late 1990s; 
5. Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% partidpation in the con-
sortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for the four EF A partner nations to 
participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft; 
6. Work vigorously towards the adoption of a similar collaborative approach towards the definition, 
development, production and procurement of other military aircraft for the air forces of Western 
Europe and in particular of a multir6le aeroplane for such missions as transport, maritime reconnais-
sance and in-flight refuelling; 
7. Persuade the member nations of the Eurofighter consortium to standardise! to the maximum 
extent possible weapon systems and equipment to be incorporated into the Eurofighter so as to enhance 
the aircraft's interoperability and facilitate its logistic support; 
8. Initiate discussions both in the Independent European Programme Group and among the indus-
trial interests concerned on making the Eurofighter consortium a durable industrial arrangement on the 
lines of Airbus Industrie which could produce a family of military aircraft. 
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The Council shares the view that a regular exchange of information between WEU and the IEPG 
regarding their respective activities would contribute to an increased awareness of the complex prob-
lems related to the growth of European armaments co-operation. The improvement of relations 
between WEU and the IEPG, already under way, may also permit the Assembly to be better informed 
about IEPG activities. 
The Council has taken due notice of the Assembly's suggestion to make use of the experience 
acquired in the management of the Tornado aircraft to study the possibility of setting up other struc-
tures of management of a similar nature. In fact, such programmes entail the acquisition of technologi-
cal, industrial, commercial and operational experiences in the medium and long terms, which can be 
utilised in an organic way, whilst avoiding heavy bureaucratic structures. 
The Council agrees with the principle, underlying the Assembly's recommendation, of fostering 
the maximum possible rationalisation of the European market in the field of fighter aircraft. 
The Council has noted all the Assembly's recommendations and is able to state that contacts are 
being made between the various countries or groups of countries concerned for the purpose of studying 
the various forms of co-operation that might be set up to foster the development and unity of the air-
craft industry in Europe. However, the Council points out that the IEPG remains the relevant opera-
tional forum in this field. In this connection, the Defence Ministers of the member countries of the 
IEPG stated their position on this subject at their meeting in Madrid on 28th April last. They agreed 
that a systematic effort should now be made to promote the widest possible co-operation in key sectors 
of defence, looking ahead at the challenges facing Europe in the twenty-first century. Agreeing on the 
importance of co-operation in military aeronautics, and noting that important national and 
collaborative work was already under way, they decided to set in hand a study designed to highlight the 
possibilities for co-operation and co-ordination in the field of research, equipment and the manufacture 
of aeronautical hardware. 
Within technically possible limits, those countries belonging to the EFA consortium are consider-
ing the French proposal for cross-participation in the EF A programme and the ACE programme. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th May 1986. 
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Written Questions 262 to 269 and replies of the Council 
to Written Questions 262, 263, 264 and 266 
QUESTION 262 
put by Mr. Lem;er 
on 12th December 1985 
On 28th February 1978, the Council trans-
mitted to the Assembly a note on the " Division 
of work between the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group " which specified inter alia that it 
had authorised the SAC to prepare a study of the 
situation in the armaments sector of industry in 
the member countries, " with the reminder that 
governments were anxious to avoid any overlap-
ping with the work of other bodies, particularly 
the IEPG ". 
According to the twenty-ninth annual 
report of the Council, the SAC was instructed 
"to provide a simplified annual updating" of 
the economic section of this report. 
The Rome declaration of 27th October 
1984 specified that the Council intended to 
" give political impetus " to joint production of 
armaments. 
Finally, the communique issued at the 
close of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd 
and 23rd April 1985 gave WEU the task of pre-
senting " proposals in time for the next meeting 
to help provide the necessary political impetus 
for, and practical contributions to, the various 
efforts undertaken in this field, including those 
carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the 
CNAD". 
1. How can the Council reconcile these state-
ments with the creation, in November 1985, of a 
study group to prepare a study for the IEPG on 
improving the competitivity of the European 
defence industry, with a secretariat in Brussels? 
2. Why has a new secretariat been set up 
when the WEU agency responsible for arma-
ments co-operation is to continue to ensure the 
secretariat of the SAC? 
3. Why has the IEPG turned to a group of 
independent experts for a study, the elements of 
which obviously have to be supplied by the 
authorities represented in the SAC? 
4. In view of the fact that the decision of the 
WEU Council of 7th May 1955 left the work of 
the SAC open to NATO observers and specified 
that agreements or arrangements concluded in 
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the context of the SAC " would remain open to 
participation by other countries of NATO ", does 
the creation of this study grO"I!P and secretariat 
conform to the Council's will " to avoid any 
overlapping with the work of other bodies "? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the !A_ssembly 
on 20th March 1986 
1. WEU has an important contribution to 
make to the enhancement of European arma-
ments co-operation. The Standing Armaments 
Committee and Agency Ill are preparing con-
crete proposals in order to provide the necessary 
political impetus for, and practical contribution 
to, the various efforts undertaken in the field of 
armaments co-operation, including those carried 
out by the Independent Eur<l>pean Programme 
Group. Therefore, both WEU and IEPG, in 
their own distinct way, contribute to European 
armaments co-operation. In November 1984, 
the IEPG Ministerial Council commissioned a 
study on enhancing the comJI>etitiveness of the 
European armaments industry. In June 1985, 
the Ministers decided to entrust the study to a 
group of independent experts,from IEPG mem-
ber countries. The creation Of the study group 
by IEPG is in no way incompatible with the con-
tribution by WEU to Eur~pean armaments 
co-operation, it being understood that these 
activities must be concerted (see answer 4). 
2. For practical reasons, a small temporary 
secretariat has been made available to the IEPG 
group of experts, which will .be dissolved after 
the group's work has been completed. At the 
time the experts' group was created, WEU agen-
cies were still in a stage of (re)organisation and 
definition of tasks. Moreover, the differences in 
membership of WEU and IEPG should be borne 
in mind. 
3. Given the nature of the problem of indus-
trial competitiveness, IEPG ministers felt the 
need for advice from a group of independent 
experts, not formally representing the govern-
ments of its members. The group must be in a 
position to put forward proposals not necessarily 
reflecting current government policies. 
DOCUMENT 1065 
4. WEU, as well as IEPG, is aware of the 
risks of overlapping activities. The document 
of 1978 on division of work between the SAC 
and the IEPG specifically dealt with the 
exchange of information and co-ordination of 
activities between the SAC on the one hand and 
an IEPG working group on industrial co-opera-
tion and the rationalisation of the European 
defence industry on the other hand. Arran-
gements were made to ensure efficient liaison 
between WEU and IEPG. Exchange of infor-
mation and, as appropriate, concertation of 
activities continue to be of utmost 
importance. On 23rd December 1985, an 
exploratory discussion was held between the 
Chairman of the IEPG, at that time the Dutch 
State Secretary, Mr. J. van Houwelingen, and 
Secretary-General Cahen, accompanied by 
Agency Ill Director Hintermann. Then on 29th 
January in Madrid, Mr. Cahen met the new 
Chairman of the IEPG, Mr. Serra, the Spanish 
Defence Minister. It was agreed that activities 
with respect to the enhancement of the competi-
tiveness of European defence industry must be 
concerted to the greatest extent possible and 
should be complementary and mutually suppor-
tive. 
QUESTION 263 
put by Mr. Caro 
on 8th January 1986 
Will it be possible to pursue on a seven-
power basis the activities of the working group 
on the SDI in view ofthe very different nature of 
the response by certain member countries of 
WEU to the United States proposal to European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance to take part in 
the research programme relating to the strategic 
defence initiative? 
If so, will this working group examine only 
the political and strategic aspects of the SDI or 
will it seek to define a joint European position on 
national efforts to finance European participa-
tion in this programme and on the harmoni-
sation of regulations governing technology trans-
fer between the countries of the alliance? 
Finally, will it study the consequences for 
a separate development programme for Euro-
pean technology resulting from the measures 
adopted by each member country for its partici-
pation in the SDI? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 22nd May 1986 
At their Bonn meeting on 22nd-23rd April 
1985, the Ministers agreed to continue their col-
lective consideration in order to achieve as far as 
possible a co-ordinated reaction of their govern-
ments to the invitation of the United States to 
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participate in the research programme and 
instructed the Permanent Council accord-
ingly. To this end the Permanent Council 
established a working group with the mandate of 
examining the strategic and technological aspects 
involved in the United States invitation. 
The working group drew up an interim 
report covering these two aspects. The Minis-
ters examined this interim report on 14th 
November in Rome and agreed that the working 
group should continue to pursue its work. At 
their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 
1986, the Ministers decided that the work of 
WEU should continue to deal with questions 
related to possible participation in the SDI 
research programme and the politico-strategic 
implications for Europe of possible develop-
ments in the field of ballistic missile 
defence. The working group met again on 12th 
May. 
Whilst being fully aware of the variety of 
approaches chosen by member governments to 
their possible participation, the Council consi-
ders that the work carried out in WEU on these 
questions has been, and continues to be, useful 
for reflection by the governments. In addition, 
it has enabled the member states to have a better 
understanding of their respective positions on 
this very important question for their common 
interests. 
The Permanent Council has taken note of 
the subjects suggested by the honourable Presi-
dent of the Assembly for future consideration by 
the group in regard to participation in SDI 
research. Although these suggestions are related 
to situations and possible developments in par-
ticipation which cannot be anticipated at the pre-
sent stage and are beyond the scope of current 
plans for participation as well as ongoing con-
tacts with the United States Government, they 
nonetheless represent an interesting contribution 
to future reflections on the issue of participation 
and its implications. 
On the other hand, the political and mili-
tary aspects of the SDI programme are and 
should continue to be also a matter for review 
within the context of the inter-allied consultative 
process. The Permanent Council and the work-
ing group will obviously draw on the results of 
these consultations in the implementation of the 
mandate conferred upon them by Ministers. 
QUESTION 264 
put by Mr. Fischer 
on 26th February 1986 
According to the last part of paragraph 2 of 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV to the Brussels 
Treaty, member states undertake to furnish to 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments the 
statements listed in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of 
stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, including stocks 
held on the mainland of Europe for forces sta-
tioned overseas. 
I ask the Council to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Which of the three member countries 
(France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) still 
having overseas possessions hold arms on the 
mainland of Europe for their forces stationed 
overseas? 
2. What types of arms are involved among 
those mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill 
and what quantities are stockpiled? 
For the second question, I ask the Council 
to give details for each individual country. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 25th April1986 
All data relating to strengths and arma-
ments communicated in accordance with the 
terms in force in the modified Brussels Treaty by 
the member countries to the Council, either 
directly, or indirectly through the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments, are classified as 
" Secret " in the member countries, in NATO 
and in WEU alike. Thus any information 
obtained in the exercise of arms control cannot 
be divulged. 
For this reason the Council is unable to 
supply the information requested. 
QUESTION 265 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. De Decker, Ferrari Aggradi, 
Kittelmann, Stoffelen and Vecchietti 
on 8th April 1986 
To ask the Council ofMinisters what pro-
gress has been achieved in responding positively 
to paragraph 8 of Recommendation 429 in 
regard to enlargement ofWEU and when can the 
Assembly hope to expect a definitive reaction 
with most immediate regard to the application of 
Portugal which has already been submitted as 
long ago as 19th October 1984. 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
385 
DOCUMENT 1065 
QUESTION 266 
put by Sir Frederic /lennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant, 
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Mlirphy, Schulte, 
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff 
on 30th April 1986 
In Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, 
Ministers unanimously agreed that one of the 
priority tasks of the wn:u Council on 
reactivation was to agree on a dommon approach 
and reaction to the United States' SDI develop-
ment plans. 
Since then, individual ~ember states have 
pursued differing and different policies in this 
context. 
Yet in Rome on 8th April 1986 it was 
admitted by the Chairman-in-<Dffice of the Coun-
cil to the Committee for Relations with the 
Council that efforts were still being pursued by a 
specialist committee of experts, presumably to 
try to attain a so far failed joint attitude of the 
Seven towards SDI. 
When can the Assembly expect an indica-
tion either that the determination expressed in 
Bonn has been abandoned or1_ if not, when the Assembly will be informett of a positive 
answer? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 30th May 1,86 
I 
At their meeting in Bdnn on 22nd and 
23rd April 1985, the Ministers agreed to achieve 
as far as possible a co-ordinatefl reaction of their 
governments to the invitation of the United 
States to participate in' the research 
programme. The Seven did not commit them-
selves to the attainment of a joint attitude to SDI 
as there was a variety of appitoaches chosen by 
member governments to their possible participa-
tion. 
WEU member countries followed up the 
ministerial decision in Bonn by setting up a 
working group which exchanged information on 
the contacts member governments and European 
industry have had with the United States regard-
ing possible participation in the SDI research 
programme, and started a process of reflection 
on the strategic and technological aspects 
involved in the United States invitation. 
Moreover, they have discussed a number of ini-
tial points and aspects, as set out in the thirty-
first annual report of the Council to the Assem-
bly, in order to identify common elements of 
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analysis. In this field, consultation has already 
led to improved understanding of the issues 
involved on the part of each country. 
At their meeting in Venice on 29th and 
30th April, the Ministers decided that the work 
of WEU should continue to deal with questions 
related to possible participation in the SDI 
research programme and the political strategic 
implications for Europe of possible development 
in the field ofballistic missile defence. The SDI 
working group met again after this meeting and 
will continue to meet as appropriate. 
QUESTION 267 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant, 
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Murphy, Schulte, 
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffekn and van der Werff 
on 30th Apri/1986 
Has the Council under consideration on a 
continuing basis all aspects of present arms con-
trol and disarmament negotiations; and in par-
ticular has it agreed positions on: 
(a) the MBFR negotiations in Vienna; 
(b) the discussions in the conference on 
disarmament in Geneva on: 
(i) a comprehensive, verifiable 
nuclear test ban; 
(ii) a chemical weapons ban? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 268 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant, 
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Murphy, Schulte, 
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffekn and van der Werff 
on 30th Apri/1986 
Since the fundamental raison d'etre of 
WEU's existence as expressed in the modified 
Brussels Treaty is to maintain the defence and 
security of Western Europe, what collaborative 
action can the Council of Ministers and other rel-
evant organs of WEU institute and support to 
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take positive steps to establish joint machinery 
to combat government-sponsored and 
government-supported terrorism inside and out-
side Western Europe? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 269 
put by Mr. van der Werff 
on 30th Apri/1986 
Like everyone, the General Affairs Com-
mittee has dealt extensively with terrorism, won-
dering whether it might be preferable, when nec-
essary, to counter it in the framework of WEU 
rather than in that of the Twelve. Furthermore, 
such activity would improve WEU's position 
whose reactivation, since the Rome declaration, 
I feel has been marking time. 
The new form of terrorism, clearly aimed 
at our societies, seems to be coming from Libya 
and also from Syria and even Algeria and it is 
impossible for the terrorists themselves not to 
have the full support ofthe governments of some 
at least of these countries, particularly Colonel 
Kadhafi. 
Preventive and repressive measures must 
of course be taken without delay, but that is not 
all: we must above all see how to encourage 
forces against the practice of terrorism in the 
Arab countries. We should also ascertain how 
to deter the Soviet Union from affording large-
scale assistance to the governments of these 
countries and perhaps also examine how it might 
be possible to oppose such support. 
1. Does the Council intend to start such 
political activities? If WEU decides not to do 
so, will it really be done among the Twelve or in 
NATO? 
2. Who will take the initiative? 
3. Who will be responsible and how and 
when will the Assembly be informed of progress 
achieved, if any? 
4. Does the WEU Council intend to examine 
the decisions taken in Tokyo to fight terrorism 
and ensure that they are applied in Europe? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from _the 
Council. 
Document 1066 4th June 1986 
Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe 
of crises in other parts of the world 
OPINION' 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1 057) i 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur 
Amendments 
to the draft recommendation on security and terrorism - the implications 
for Europe of crises in other parts of the world 
contained in the report of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1057) 
Amendment 1 
lows: 
After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as fol-
" Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with 
developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief 'that in the case of such develop-
ments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests ofthe alliance the 
ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States 
deployments beyond the area';". 
Amendment 2 
At the end of paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add " and the firm dip-
lomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986; ". 
I. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 2 with 11 abstentions. 
2. Members oj the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli (Alternate for Amadei), Dr. Miller (Alternate for 
Brown) (Vice-Chairmen); Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Beregovoy, van den Bergh, Blaauw, Bourges (Alternate: Hunault), De Decker, 
Dejardin (Alternate: Michel), Edwards, Ertl (Alternate: Lenzer), Galley, Gerstl (Alternate: Soell), Giust, Konen (Alternate: 
Goerens), de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Masciadri, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Milam), Sarti, Scheer, Sir 
Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes, Wirth (Alternate: Jeambrun). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The report of the General Affairs Commit-
tee on security and terrorism - the implications 
for Europe of crises in other parts of the world 
(Document 1057) was referred to the committee 
for an opinion by decision of the Presidential 
Committee. 
1.2. The explanatory memorandum to that 
report deals, in three sections, with the case for 
consultation in the WEU Council with regard to 
threats to peace in whatever area they arise, the 
Gulf war and international terrorism. The 
report was adopted unanimously by the General 
Affairs Committee, so it will presumably com-
mand a wide measure of agreement in the 
Assembly. The Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments however would like to 
draw attention to two points, in part arising from 
more recent events. 
1.3. While both the Brussels and North Atlan-
tic treaties restrict their provisions for joint mili-
tary action in the event of an attack to a specific 
geographical area - Europe in the case of the for-
mer, and the broader area of the national territo-
ries, North Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean 
Sea in the case of the latter- neither imposes any 
geographical restriction on threats which may 
give rise to consultation. The Brussels Treaty 
in fact explicitly provides for such consultation 
"in whatever area this threat should arise". 
While the geographical fringes of the treaties are 
thus clearly defined in cases which may give rise 
to joint military action, there appears in practice 
to be a vaguer political fringe concerning the 
nature of other threats, particularly threats out-
side the geographical area for joint military 
action, concerning which it is proper to consult 
in the framework of a mutual defence treaty. 
II. Outside area 
2.1. In the opinion of the committee there is an 
important point to be made in the report of the 
General Affairs Committee where it discusses 
the case for consultation in WEU on threats aris-
ing outside Europe. The tentative but impor-
tant machinery for consultation in the North 
Atlantic Alliance should not be overlooked. 
The Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments has reported on a number of occa-
sions on the evolution of the process of consulta-
tion in NATO on events arising outside the geo-
graphical area of Article 6 of that treaty 1• The 
1. European security and burden sharing in the alliance, 
Document 959, 7th November 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Wilkinson. State of European security, Document 971, 15th 
May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith. 
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report by Mr. Harmel, then Foreign Minister of 
Belgium, commissioned by the North Atlantic 
Council in 1967 specifically recognised the need 
for consultation on out-of-area matters that 
might impair NATO security, and the usage con-
cerning such consultation was clarified in the 
communique issued following the NATO sum-
mit meeting in Bonn on lOth June 1982: 
"All of us have an interest in peace and 
security in other regions of the 
world. We will consult together as appro-
priate on events in these regions which 
may have implications for our security, 
taking into account our commonly-
identified objectives. Those of us who 
are in a position to do so will endeavour to 
respond to requests for assistance from 
sovereign states whose security and inde-
pendence is threatened. " 
A document on integrated defence was issued at 
the same summit meeting by representatives of 
governments participating in the integrated 
defence structure. It contained the following 
statement: 
"Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital inter-
ests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a 
view to sharing assessments and identify-
ing common objectives, taking full 
account of the effect on NATO security 
and defence capability, as well as of the 
national interests of member countries. 
Recognising that the policies which 
nations adopt in this field are a matter for 
national decision, we agree to examine col-
lectively in the appropriate NATO bodies 
the requirements which may arise for the 
defence of the NATO area as a result of 
deployments by individual member states 
outside that area. Steps which may be 
taken by individual allies in the light of 
such consultations to facilitate possible 
military deployments beyond the NATO 
area can represent an important contribu-
tion to western security." 
2.2. In Recommendation 396 adopted in 
November 1983 the Assembly expressed its 
belief that: 
" ... allied defence plans and commitments 
entered into in the Brussels Treaty must 
take account of the possible consequences 
of developments beyond the NATO area, 
and that in the case of such developments 
which the allies jointly recognise as directly 
threatening the vital interests of the alli-
ance the ready assistance of all allies must 
be forthcoming within the area to facilitate 
United States deployments beyond the 
area;" (emphasis added), 
and recommended that the Council urge the 
WEU governments: 
" 2. In the case of developments beyond 
the NATO area affecting their vital inte-
rests: 
(a) to facilitate by all necessary meas-
ures within the area the deploy-
ment of forces of any NATO 
country beyond the area; 
(b) in the case of those WEU member 
countries with appropriate mili-
tary capability to participate in 
such deployments;" 
The committee suggests that this recommenda-
tion might usefully be recalled in the draft 
recommendation submitted by the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Ill. United States attack on military targets 
in Libya 
3.1. Details of the United States air strike in 
Libya in the early morning of 15th April are too 
well known to need recalling. 
3.2. The earlier incident in the Gulf of Sirte 
described in the committee's report on European 
security and the Mediterranean was followed 
shortly by two acts of international terrorism 
involving American targets. On 2nd April a 
bomb exploded on board a TW A airliner while 
over Greece, and on 5th April a bomb in a Berlin 
discotheque killed two persons including one 
United States serviceman and one young 
Turkishwoman, and injured 204, including 35 
United States servicemen. The United States 
Government stated that it had direct evidence of 
Libyan involvement in the two incidents, but in 
urging military action against Libya it later con-
centrated on its evidence of Libyan involvement 
in the Berlin discotheque bombing based on 
intercepted communications. · 
3.3. The United States launched its air strike 
against Libya on 15th April from two carriers of 
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and by 
F-111 bombers flying from the United King-
dom. Inevitably, as in the case of any air strike 
in built-up areas, apart from the intended dam-
age to military objectives, there were unfortu-
nately some civilian casualties also. 
3.4. The United States attack raises signifi-
cantly different issues from the incident in the 
Gulf of Sirte on 24th March. The 15th April 
attack, carried out exclusively by the United 
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States, did not result from an attack on the forces 
of a NATO country within th~ area covered by 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and could 
not in itself have led to that tre~ty being invoked. 
3.5. The committee recalls that this incident 
revealed different reactions by most European 
allies about the unilateral us~ of force by the 
United States. 1 
3.6. Since the United States attack allied unity 
has been restored in several forums where 
increasingly realistic measures 1~ave been agreed 
to combat international terrorism. The report 
of the General Affairs Committee notes the 
measures agreed by the Twelve in the European 
Community on 21st April 1986 which were a 
great advance on the earlier decisions on 27th 
January and 14th April. Since then the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe at 
its meeting in Strasbourg on 23rd and 24th April 
included the following statement in its 
communique: 
" ... The Ministers expressed grave concern 
about the recent acts o£' terrorism which 
constitute a threat to peace and demo-
cracy. They reiterated ~heir stro·ng con-
demnation of terrorism 1wherever and by 
whomever committed ~nd whatever its 
purpose. They reaffirm~d the duty of all 
member states to take determined action 
against terrorism. They also reiterated 
their determination to put the like-minded 
approach of all members of the Council 
of Europe to greater advantage, amongst 
others by the co-ordination of the norma-
tive and juridical aspects of the combat 
against terrorism, taking account of the 
organisation's achievements and experi-
ence in this field. Recognising that the 
successful battle against terrorism will 
require the efforts of all states, they under-
took to co-operate as appropriate with all 
other states who share their common con-
cern about international terrorism. 
On the basis of a report by an ad hoc 
multidisciplinary working party of senior 
officials, the Ministers asreed that a Euro-
pean Conference of Minlisters responsible 
for combating terrorism should be held as 
soon as possible and in atJ,y case before the 
end of 1986. " 
Then the WEU Council at its ministerial meeting 
in Venice on 29th and 30th April made a passing 
reference to terrorism in its communique: 
" 10. The Ministers gave special attention 
to the threat to security posed by interna-
tional terrorism and underlined the impor-
tance of early and effective action to 
implement the measures that the countries 
of Western Europe have agreed upon to 
combat this scourge. " 
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and the summit meeting of the seven 
industrialised states meeting in Tokyo on 5th 
May 1986 issued the firmest condemnation yet 
of international terrorism and agreed on the 
strongest measures to combat it: 
"4. We specify the following as measures 
open to any government concerned to 
deny to international terrorists the oppor-
tunity and the means to carry out their 
aims, and to identify and deter those who 
perpetrate such terrorism. We have 
decided to apply these measures within the 
framework of international law and in our 
own jurisdictions in respect of any state 
which is clearly involved in sponsoring or 
supporting international terrorism, and in 
particular of Libya, until such time as the 
state concerned abandons its complicity 
in, or support for, such terrorism. These 
measures are: 
- refusal to export arms to states which 
sponsor or support terrorism; 
- strict limits on the size of the diplomatic 
and consular missions and other official 
bodies abroad of states which engage in 
such activities, control of travel of 
members of such missions and bodies, 
and, where appropriate, radical reduc-
tions in, or even the closure of, such 
missions and bodies; 
- denial of entry to all persons, including 
diplomatic personnel, who have been 
expelled or excluded from one of our 
states on suspicion of involvement in 
international terrorism or who have 
been convicted of such a terrorist 
offence; 
- improved extradition procedures within 
due process of domestic law for bringing 
to trial those who have perpetrated such 
acts of terrorism; 
- stricter immigration and visa require-
ments and procedures in respect of 
nationals of states which sponsor or 
support terrorism; 
- the closest possible bilateral and multi-
lateral co-operation between police and 
security organisations and other rele-
vant authorities in the fight against ter-
rorism. 
Each of us is committed to work in the 
appropriate international bodies to which 
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we belong to ensure that similar measures 
are accepted and acted upon by as many 
other governments as possible. " 
The Tokyo summit points the way in which 
essentially criminal offences of terrorism can be 
dealt with firstly by police and court action, and 
by concerted diplomatic action against states 
which condone or actively engage in interna-
tional terrorism. The committee suggests that 
an appropriate preambular reference to the 
Tokyo summit communique should be added to 
the draft recommendation in the report from the 
General Affairs Committee. 
3. 7. Other conclusions can be drawn from the 
Libyan affair: 
(a) An analysis of the events surrounding 
the American action against Libya 
leads to the conclusion that the United 
States felt obliged to resort to such 
measures because the Europeans, in 
the eyes of the United States, turned 
out not to be sufficiently reliable allies. 
(b) The basic attitudes of the western alli-
ances - refusal to use military means 
for achieving political aims - should 
in no way be changed, in principle. 
(c) However, state terrorists such as those 
of Kadhafi, whose basic attitude is: 
" Whoever opposes world revolution 
shall be eliminated! " must be taken as 
a serious threat and must be com-
bated. 
(d) The reality must be faced that state ter-
rorism as an instrument of policy of 
fanatical governments is a threat of a 
different kind, constituting in practice 
a new form of warfare as the Tokyo 
declaration recognises. This new 
form of warfare must be combated by 
mental, political and economic means, 
and - when these measures do not suf-
fice - by other adequate measures to 
restore order and security. 
IV. Conclusions 
4.1. The conclusions of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments are set forth 
in the two amendments which it proposes to the 
draft recommendation contained in the report 
from the General Affairs Committee. 
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